Veli Mitova
University of Johannesburg, South Africa, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- I am a Professor in Philosophy and the Director of the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, at ... moreI am a Professor in Philosophy and the Director of the African Centre for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, at the University of Johannesburg. I am also the South African team leader for The Geography of Philosophy Project, and a PI for the Epistemic Injustice, Reasons, and Agency project funded by a Newton Advanced Fellowship.
I work at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and , metaethics. At the moment, I am thinking about epistemic injustice and decolonising knowledge.
I am the author of Believable Evidence (CUP 2017), and the editor of Epistemic Decolonisation (2020) and of The Factive Turn in Epistemology (CUP 2018).
Before joining the University of Johannesburg in 2015, I taught and researched at Universität Wien, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México, Rhodes University (my alma mater), and Cambridge (where I obtained my PhD).edit
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The concept of wisdom has captivated scholars throughout history, yet disagreements remain over its cultural variability. Here, we investigated wisdom perception in self and others across 16 samples from eight cultural regions on five... more
The concept of wisdom has captivated scholars throughout history, yet disagreements remain over its cultural variability. Here, we investigated wisdom perception in self and others across 16 samples from eight cultural regions on five continents. Participants assessed wisdom exemplars, non-exemplar targets, and themselves on 19 socio-cognitive characteristics, rating each person's wisdom. Multilevel factor analyses unveiled two latent dimensions: Reflective Orientation and Socio-Emotional Awareness. These factors were invariant across cultures and correlated positively with each other and with explicit wisdom ratings, though ratings of some exemplars varied by culture within the socio-emotional dimension. We also found additive and interactive effects of these factors on wisdom ratings. Intriguingly, individuals perceived themselves as less reflective but more socio-emotionally aware than most wisdom exemplars. These results illuminate social perception across cultures and under...
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In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups—ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression—have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would... more
In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups—ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression—have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would potentially benefit at least three bodies of scholarship—on the epistemology of groups, on collective moral responsibility, and on epistemic injustice.
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In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups-ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression-have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would... more
In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups-ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression-have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would potentially benefit at least three bodies of scholarship-on the epistemology of groups, on collective moral responsibility, and on epistemic injustice.
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Epistemological disjunctivism is a view about the normative significance of our perceptual experiences. Although itself neutral on the nature of these experiences, it is commonly thought to smooth the way for metaphysical disjunctivism,... more
Epistemological disjunctivism is a view about the normative significance of our perceptual experiences. Although itself neutral on the nature of these experiences, it is commonly thought to smooth the way for metaphysical disjunctivism, the view that veridical and apparent perceptions are of radically different ontological kinds. John McDowell, for instance, is often taken to have argued from the former to the latter. The main aim of this chapter is to show that it isn’t a good idea to hold both forms of disjunctivism together, and a fortiori to move from the one to the other. The cornerstone of the argument is the claim that the conjunction of epistemological and metaphysical disjunctivism entails an implausible disjunctivism about motivating reasons for belief. The upshot is that friends of both forms of disjunctivism face a dilemma: if they think of the two views as logically independent, they shouldn’t hold both together; if they think of them as dependent, they shouldn’t hold either.
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Many influential philosophers have claimed that truth is valuable, indeed so valuable as to be the ultimate standard of correctness for intellectual activity. Yet most philosophers also think that truth is only instrumentally valuable.... more
Many influential philosophers have claimed that truth is valuable, indeed so valuable as to be the ultimate standard of correctness for intellectual activity. Yet most philosophers also think that truth is only instrumentally valuable. These commitments make for a strange pair. One would have thought that an ultimate standard would enjoy more than just instrumental value. This paper develops a new argument for the non-instrumental value of truth: (1) inquiry is non-instrumentally valuable; and (2) truth inherits some of its value from the value of inquiry. This makes truth finally but extrinsically valuable, a thesis that to my knowledge has not been directly defended in the literature. I support (1) by appeal to the notion of epistemic injustice, and (2) through the surprising claim that some goals get their value from the pursuit that aims at them.
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What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the... more
What sorts of things can be evidence for belief? Five answers have been defended in the recent literature on the ontology of evidence: propositions, facts, psychological states, factive psychological states, all of the above. Each of the first three views privileges a single role that the evidence plays in our doxastic lives, at the cost of occluding other important roles. The fifth view, pluralism, is a natural response to such dubious favouritism. If we want to be monists about evidence and accommodate all roles for the concept, we need to think of evidence as propositional, psychological and factive. Our only present option along these lines is the fourth view, which holds that evidence consists of all and only known propositions. But the view comes with some fairly radical commitments. This paper proposes a more modest view—‘truthy psychologism’. According to this view, evidence is also propositional, psychological and factive; but we don’t need the stronger claim that only knowledge can fill this role; true beliefs are enough. I first argue for truthy psychologism by appeal to some standard metaethical considerations. I then show that the view can accommodate all of the roles epistemologists have envisaged for the concept of evidence. Truthy psychologism thus gives us everything we want from the evidence, without forcing us to go either pluralist or radical.
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Abstract: Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their... more
Abstract: Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the ...
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It is argued that, contrary to popular pragmatist opinion, the source of epistemic normativity does not lie in the realm of practical rationality. Epistemic norms are indeed hypothetical, as the pragmatist anticipates, but he has... more
It is argued that, contrary to popular pragmatist opinion, the source of epistemic normativity does not lie in the realm of practical rationality. Epistemic norms are indeed hypothetical, as the pragmatist anticipates, but he has misjudged how much their antecedent can do for him. I first ...
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Abstract I defend the following three-part hypothesis: (1) the sense that one is running out of time diminishes one's capacity to reauthor oneself; (2) this capacity is constitutive of agency par excellence; so, (3) the sense of... more
Abstract I defend the following three-part hypothesis: (1) the sense that one is running out of time diminishes one's capacity to reauthor oneself; (2) this capacity is constitutive of agency par excellence; so, (3) the sense of running out of time attenuates agency. (2) is shown to enjoy both intuitive and abductive plausibility. (1) and (3) are confirmed by existing reflections on old age, as well as by empirical research.
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Why WK Clifford was a Closet Pragmatist.
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Many influential philosophers have claimed that truth is valuable, indeed so valuable as to be the ultimate standard of correctness for intellectual activity. Yet most philosophers also think that truth is only instrumentally valuable.... more
Many influential philosophers have claimed that truth is valuable, indeed so valuable as to be the ultimate standard of correctness for intellectual activity. Yet most philosophers also think that truth is only instrumentally valuable. These commitments make for a strange pair. One would have thought that an ultimate standard would enjoy more than just instrumental value. This paper develops a new argument for the non-instrumental value of truth: (1) inquiry is non-instrumentally valuable; and (2) truth inherits some of its value from the value of inquiry. This makes truth finally but extrinsically valuable, a thesis that to my knowledge has not been directly defended in the literature. I support (1) by appeal to the notion of epistemic injustice, and (2) through the surprising claim that some goals get their value from the pursuit that aims at them.
The topic of epistemic decolonisation is currently the locus of lively debate both in academia and in everyday life. The aim of this piece is to isolate a few main strands in the philosophical literature on the topic, and draw some new... more
The topic of epistemic decolonisation is currently the locus of lively debate both in academia and in everyday life. The aim of this piece is to isolate a few main strands in the philosophical literature on the topic, and draw some new connections amongst them through the lens of epistemic injustice.
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What is going on when we explain someone's belief by appeal to stereotypes associated with her gender, sexuality, race, or class? In this paper I try to motivate two claims. First, such explanations involve an overlooked form of epistemic... more
What is going on when we explain someone's belief by appeal to stereotypes associated with her gender, sexuality, race, or class? In this paper I try to motivate two claims. First, such explanations involve an overlooked form of epistemic injustice, which I call 'explanatory injustice'. Second, the language of reasons helps us shed light on the ways in which such injustice wrongs the victim qua epistemic agent.
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According to a popular line of thought, we should decolonise knowledge, science, and our university curricula for relativist reasons. Very crudely: the West has illegitimately claimed monopoly on what counts as knowledge, science, and... more
According to a popular line of thought, we should decolonise knowledge, science, and our university curricula for relativist reasons. Very crudely: the West has illegitimately claimed monopoly on what counts as knowledge, science, and rationality; this is a kind of epistemicide; so, epistemic decolonisation requires, at a minimum, that we accord different perspectives equal epistemic authority. In this paper, I do two things. I first argue that such relativist thinking far from supporting, in fact subverts, the call to epistemic decolonisation. The imperative to decolonise is an absolute one, and so cannot be supported by relativist arguments. I then try to crack the puzzle of how to stay absolutist while still acknowledging that a certain epistemic perspective has been unjustly imposed on many of us.
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Epistemological disjunctivism is a view about the normative significance of our perceptual experiences. Although itself neutral on the nature of these experiences, it is commonly thought to smooth the way for metaphysical disjunctivism,... more
Epistemological disjunctivism is a view about the normative significance of our perceptual experiences. Although itself neutral on the nature of these experiences, it is commonly thought to smooth the way for metaphysical disjunctivism, the view that veridical and apparent perceptions are of radically different ontological kinds. John McDowell, for instance, is often taken to have argued from the former to the latter. The main aim of this chapter is to show that it isn’t a good idea to hold both forms of disjunctivism together, and a fortiori to move from the one to the other. The cornerstone of the argument is the claim that the conjunction of epistemological and metaphysical disjunctivism entails an implausible disjunctivism about motivating reasons for belief. The upshot is that friends of both forms of disjunctivism face a dilemma: if they think of the two views as logically independent, they shouldn’t hold both together; if they think of them as dependent, they shouldn’t hold either.
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Are reasons for action facts or psychological states? There are two answers in the literature on the ontology of reasons. According to the Standard Story, normative reasons are facts, while motivating reasons are psychological states.... more
Are reasons for action facts or psychological states? There are two answers in the literature on the ontology of reasons. According to the Standard Story, normative reasons are facts, while motivating reasons are psychological states. According to the factualist, both normative and motivating reasons are facts. In this paper I argue that neither of these views is satisfactory. The Standard Story errs in thinking that the two kinds of reasons are different ontological entities. The factualist gets this right, but incurs some distasteful ontological commitments by thinking of motivating reasons as facts. We should, thus, give a proper hearing to the only serious logically possible alternative to the two existing views: both motivating and normative reasons are psychological states.
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I defend the following three-part hypothesis: (1) the sense that one is running out of time diminishes one’s capacity to reauthor oneself; (2) this capacity is constitutive of agency par excellence; So, (3) the sense of running out of... more
I defend the following three-part hypothesis: (1) the sense that one is running out of time diminishes one’s capacity to reauthor oneself; (2) this capacity is constitutive of agency par excellence; So, (3) the sense of running out of time attenuates agency. (2) is shown to enjoy both intuitive and abductive plausibility. (1) and (3) are confirmed by existing reflections on old age, as well as by empirical research.