The paper uses satisfaction conditions to explain the nature of reasons generally, and of second ... more The paper uses satisfaction conditions to explain the nature of reasons generally, and of second order reasons in particular. It explains the relations between a reason for an action, and a reason for that act to be guided by that reason for it, as well as the relation between a reason for an action and a reason for that act not to be guided by a reason for it (the second being an exclusionary reason). It illustrates the existence of second order reasons by providing examples for some situations in which they are likely to occur.
The paper examines some arguments for and against the view that practical reasons are subject to ... more The paper examines some arguments for and against the view that practical reasons are subject to a participatory condition of some kind. The distinctive constitutive element of participatory conditions is that conduct or attitudes, actual or hypothetical, of people other than those who have a reason, expressing approval or the absence of disapproval of the reason in question, are a condition for the existence of practical reasons, or of large classes of them.
My interest is in democracy and legitimacy. We can think about different
objects as being democra... more My interest is in democracy and legitimacy. We can think about different objects as being democratic or not being democratic: a decision, a policy, a law, a temperament, etc. can all be more or less democratic. I will consider the legitimacy of systems of government, especially of governments of states, and their democratic or undemocratic character. One way to describe the claim to be examined is that systems of government of states, their constitutional structures and practices, are legitimate only if and because they are democratic.
Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that m... more Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that makes the reasoning practical. I trace his argument, suggest improvements to its superficial deficiencies, and conclude that it fails because Dancy misunderstands the nature of reasoning.
Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that m... more Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that makes the reasoning practical. I trace his argument, suggest improvements to its superficial deficiencies, and conclude that it fails because Dancy misunderstands the nature of reasoning.
Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that m... more Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that makes the reasoning practical. I trace his argument, suggest improvements to its superficial deficiencies, and conclude that it fails because Dancy misunderstands the nature of reasoning.
he paper provides an analysis of normative powers as the ability to change a normative condition,... more he paper provides an analysis of normative powers as the ability to change a normative condition, and distinguishes and analyse sever types of such powers: creative (e.g. to legislate), adhering (e.g. naturalisation), directing (e.g. to pay one's tax on time). It further distinguishes basic from chained powers and offers an account of the relations between the different types and the values which explain and justify their existence. It ends by showing the connection between the thesis that values depend on human nature and culture and the dependence of normative powers on justifying reasons.
I first argue that there is no problem about how to justify partialities (though there is a diffi... more I first argue that there is no problem about how to justify partialities (though there is a difficulty in justifying impartialities). Then I consider the role of consent in justifying rights and duties, using voluntary associations as a case in which consent has an important but limited role in doing so, a role determined and circumscribed by evaluative considerations. The values explain why consent can bind and bind one to act as one does not wish to do and even as one judges to be ill advised. That opens the way to an explanation of how value considerations relate to non-voluntary membership in socially constituted groups, generating rights and duties that to a considerable extent are independent of the individual’s aims and preferences.
Keywords: identity, partiality, impartiality, voluntary-association, consent, non-consensual duties, social groups
The paper offers a new account of the rule of law, revising my previous view, and criticising som... more The paper offers a new account of the rule of law, revising my previous view, and criticising some alternatives. It focuses on the rule of law's aim to avoid arbitrary government, and on its relation to the essential functions of government. The rule of law requires that government action will manifest an intention to protect and advance the interests of the governed. As such it is almost a necessary condition for the law's ability to meet other moral demands, and it facilitate coordination and cooperation internally and internationally.
A review of Wedgwood's book, describing its outline, and main theses with a few evaluative observ... more A review of Wedgwood's book, describing its outline, and main theses with a few evaluative observations
Advances in the legalisation of international relations, and the growing number of international ... more Advances in the legalisation of international relations, and the growing number of international organisations raise the question whether state sovereignty had its day. The paper defines sovereignty in a way that allows for degrees of sovereignty. Its analysis assumes that while sovereignty has become more limited, a trend which may continue, there is no sign that it is likely to disappear. The paper offers thoughts towards a normative analysis of these developments and the prospects they offer. Advocates of progress towards world government, while wise to many of current defects, are blind to the evils that a world government will breed, and to the advantages of relatively sovereign political societies. The paper identifies the advantages of the legalisation of international relations, and the growth of international bodies. The dilemma of internationalisation is that its advantages can be obtained only if international organs acquire some of the characteristics of successful sovereign political societies, in attracting the loyalty and shaping the sense of identity of their members – a faraway prospect. The best we can hope for is a mix international regime of relatively sovereign states subject to extensive regulation by international organisations and laws. That requires a pluralistic jurisprudence of international organisations, allowing for great local diversity, of which we have so far seen only small beginnings. Key words: sovereignty, world-government, political-societies, international-relations, international-organisations, interpretive-pluralism, subsidiarity
The paper considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles ca... more The paper considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can change, and finds them wanting. The principal argument discussed derives from the claim that normative considerations are intelligible, and therefore that they can be explained, and their explanations presuppose the prior existence of basic normative principles. The intelligibility thesis is affirmed but the implication that basic change is impossible is denied. Subsumptive explanations are contrasted with explanations by analogy. Later in the paper, other objections are considered more briefly: that normative properties are queer, that they are unconnected to the rest of reality, and therefore cannot play an explanatory role, etc.
The paper offers a few reflections on moral implications of making sacrifices and of possible dut... more The paper offers a few reflections on moral implications of making sacrifices and of possible duties to make sacrifices. It does not provide an exhaustive or a systematic account of the subject. There are too many disparate questions, and too many distant perspectives from which to examine them to allow for a systematic let alone an exhaustive account, and too many factual issues that I am not aware of. Needless to say, the observations that follow are in part stimulated by the popularity of some views that are mistaken. I will not however examine any specific view or account of these matters. The aim is to provide some pointers that will be helpful when considering specific issues regarding the moral significance of sacrifice.
What is the role of intentions in the actions intended? What do they contribute, and how do they ... more What is the role of intentions in the actions intended? What do they contribute, and how do they contribute to the occurrence of the intended actions? The paper will offer an account of acting with an intention and of having an intention to act. It will not offer an account of intentional action, merely suggesting that when intentional actions are not actions done with an intention, their explanation as intentional relates to that of actions with intentions, showing how like them and unlike them they are. Motivation will be discussed mainly to distinguish its role in leading to action from the role played by intentions
The paper mixes comments on the ambitions that motivated writing The Morality of Freedom with obs... more The paper mixes comments on the ambitions that motivated writing The Morality of Freedom with observations on comments on the book, made at a conference in Jerusalem in 2016, by Japa Pallikkathayil, Avishai Margalit, Michael Otsuka, Jon Quong, Daniel Viehoff, Asaf Sharon and Arudra Burra. It acknowledges some of the critical points made while resisting others. Its strives to combine clarification of some of the themes in the book with recognition that its ideas require further development, and can be developed in various directions.
My topic is the possibility of acting in the belief that the action is bad and for the reason tha... more My topic is the possibility of acting in the belief that the action is bad and for the reason that it is, as the agent believes, bad. On route, I examine another question – namely whether agents can, without having any relevant false beliefs, perform actions motivated by the badness of those actions. The main worry is the compatibility of action for the sake of the bad with the thesis of the Guise of the Good (roughly that actions undertaken with an intention to perform them are undertaken because they are, as the agents see things, good in some respects). The examina-tion is helped by considering the way reason explanations and the more widely understood normative explanations can explain actions, in light of the conditions for the rationality of actions and the bearing of masking beliefs (broadly: self-deceived beliefs that mask the agents’ true motives or reasons from them) on the explanation of their actions. The discussion leads to consideration of the possibility of various conceptual mistakes. Given the variety of human motivations, I focus on the interpretation of one case: the Luciferian motive, understood, roughly, as the drive to defy the limits of thought or of rational thought.
The paper sketches the role of reasons and intentions in leading to action with an intention, exp... more The paper sketches the role of reasons and intentions in leading to action with an intention, explaining the way possession of rational powers transforms the formation of intentions. Part One explains how when humans act with an intention they act in the belief that there is value in the action. Part Two explains the relative role of value and intention in “producing” the action, and relates their role to that of motivation.
It is more or less common ground that an important aspect of the explanation of normativity relat... more It is more or less common ground that an important aspect of the explanation of normativity relates it to the way Reason (our rational powers), reasons (for beliefs, emotions, actions, etc.) and reasoning, with all its varieties and domains, are inter-connected. The relation of reasoning to reasons is the topic of this this paper. It does not start from a tabula rasa. It presupposes that normativity has to do with the ability to respond rationally to reasons, and with responding to reasons with the use of our rational powers. The question is where does reasoning fit in?
I will compare two sketchy accounts of reasoning, judging their success in elucidating the concept and its role in the explanation of normativity. First I outline the view that reasoning is an activity of searching for a justified answer or for a justification of the answer to a question. Some critical reflection on that view leads to what I call the simple account, which takes reasoning to consist (broadly speaking) in responsiveness to perceived reasons. I will illustrate ways in which the simple account is at odds with the concept of reasoning. Its merits depend on the thought that intentions, attempts or actions can be conclusions of reasoning. Those who affirm that possibility often regard reasoning that has such conclusions as practical reasoning. Hence much of the paper will be about practical reasoning. That would lead to a tentative endorsement of reasoning as a search for a justified answer, suggesting a different view of the place of reasoning in explaining normativity.
The paper uses satisfaction conditions to explain the nature of reasons generally, and of second ... more The paper uses satisfaction conditions to explain the nature of reasons generally, and of second order reasons in particular. It explains the relations between a reason for an action, and a reason for that act to be guided by that reason for it, as well as the relation between a reason for an action and a reason for that act not to be guided by a reason for it (the second being an exclusionary reason). It illustrates the existence of second order reasons by providing examples for some situations in which they are likely to occur.
The paper examines some arguments for and against the view that practical reasons are subject to ... more The paper examines some arguments for and against the view that practical reasons are subject to a participatory condition of some kind. The distinctive constitutive element of participatory conditions is that conduct or attitudes, actual or hypothetical, of people other than those who have a reason, expressing approval or the absence of disapproval of the reason in question, are a condition for the existence of practical reasons, or of large classes of them.
My interest is in democracy and legitimacy. We can think about different
objects as being democra... more My interest is in democracy and legitimacy. We can think about different objects as being democratic or not being democratic: a decision, a policy, a law, a temperament, etc. can all be more or less democratic. I will consider the legitimacy of systems of government, especially of governments of states, and their democratic or undemocratic character. One way to describe the claim to be examined is that systems of government of states, their constitutional structures and practices, are legitimate only if and because they are democratic.
Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that m... more Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that makes the reasoning practical. I trace his argument, suggest improvements to its superficial deficiencies, and conclude that it fails because Dancy misunderstands the nature of reasoning.
Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that m... more Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that makes the reasoning practical. I trace his argument, suggest improvements to its superficial deficiencies, and conclude that it fails because Dancy misunderstands the nature of reasoning.
Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that m... more Dancy's main thesis is that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and indeed that makes the reasoning practical. I trace his argument, suggest improvements to its superficial deficiencies, and conclude that it fails because Dancy misunderstands the nature of reasoning.
he paper provides an analysis of normative powers as the ability to change a normative condition,... more he paper provides an analysis of normative powers as the ability to change a normative condition, and distinguishes and analyse sever types of such powers: creative (e.g. to legislate), adhering (e.g. naturalisation), directing (e.g. to pay one's tax on time). It further distinguishes basic from chained powers and offers an account of the relations between the different types and the values which explain and justify their existence. It ends by showing the connection between the thesis that values depend on human nature and culture and the dependence of normative powers on justifying reasons.
I first argue that there is no problem about how to justify partialities (though there is a diffi... more I first argue that there is no problem about how to justify partialities (though there is a difficulty in justifying impartialities). Then I consider the role of consent in justifying rights and duties, using voluntary associations as a case in which consent has an important but limited role in doing so, a role determined and circumscribed by evaluative considerations. The values explain why consent can bind and bind one to act as one does not wish to do and even as one judges to be ill advised. That opens the way to an explanation of how value considerations relate to non-voluntary membership in socially constituted groups, generating rights and duties that to a considerable extent are independent of the individual’s aims and preferences.
Keywords: identity, partiality, impartiality, voluntary-association, consent, non-consensual duties, social groups
The paper offers a new account of the rule of law, revising my previous view, and criticising som... more The paper offers a new account of the rule of law, revising my previous view, and criticising some alternatives. It focuses on the rule of law's aim to avoid arbitrary government, and on its relation to the essential functions of government. The rule of law requires that government action will manifest an intention to protect and advance the interests of the governed. As such it is almost a necessary condition for the law's ability to meet other moral demands, and it facilitate coordination and cooperation internally and internationally.
A review of Wedgwood's book, describing its outline, and main theses with a few evaluative observ... more A review of Wedgwood's book, describing its outline, and main theses with a few evaluative observations
Advances in the legalisation of international relations, and the growing number of international ... more Advances in the legalisation of international relations, and the growing number of international organisations raise the question whether state sovereignty had its day. The paper defines sovereignty in a way that allows for degrees of sovereignty. Its analysis assumes that while sovereignty has become more limited, a trend which may continue, there is no sign that it is likely to disappear. The paper offers thoughts towards a normative analysis of these developments and the prospects they offer. Advocates of progress towards world government, while wise to many of current defects, are blind to the evils that a world government will breed, and to the advantages of relatively sovereign political societies. The paper identifies the advantages of the legalisation of international relations, and the growth of international bodies. The dilemma of internationalisation is that its advantages can be obtained only if international organs acquire some of the characteristics of successful sovereign political societies, in attracting the loyalty and shaping the sense of identity of their members – a faraway prospect. The best we can hope for is a mix international regime of relatively sovereign states subject to extensive regulation by international organisations and laws. That requires a pluralistic jurisprudence of international organisations, allowing for great local diversity, of which we have so far seen only small beginnings. Key words: sovereignty, world-government, political-societies, international-relations, international-organisations, interpretive-pluralism, subsidiarity
The paper considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles ca... more The paper considers the main arguments against the possibility that basic normative principles can change, and finds them wanting. The principal argument discussed derives from the claim that normative considerations are intelligible, and therefore that they can be explained, and their explanations presuppose the prior existence of basic normative principles. The intelligibility thesis is affirmed but the implication that basic change is impossible is denied. Subsumptive explanations are contrasted with explanations by analogy. Later in the paper, other objections are considered more briefly: that normative properties are queer, that they are unconnected to the rest of reality, and therefore cannot play an explanatory role, etc.
The paper offers a few reflections on moral implications of making sacrifices and of possible dut... more The paper offers a few reflections on moral implications of making sacrifices and of possible duties to make sacrifices. It does not provide an exhaustive or a systematic account of the subject. There are too many disparate questions, and too many distant perspectives from which to examine them to allow for a systematic let alone an exhaustive account, and too many factual issues that I am not aware of. Needless to say, the observations that follow are in part stimulated by the popularity of some views that are mistaken. I will not however examine any specific view or account of these matters. The aim is to provide some pointers that will be helpful when considering specific issues regarding the moral significance of sacrifice.
What is the role of intentions in the actions intended? What do they contribute, and how do they ... more What is the role of intentions in the actions intended? What do they contribute, and how do they contribute to the occurrence of the intended actions? The paper will offer an account of acting with an intention and of having an intention to act. It will not offer an account of intentional action, merely suggesting that when intentional actions are not actions done with an intention, their explanation as intentional relates to that of actions with intentions, showing how like them and unlike them they are. Motivation will be discussed mainly to distinguish its role in leading to action from the role played by intentions
The paper mixes comments on the ambitions that motivated writing The Morality of Freedom with obs... more The paper mixes comments on the ambitions that motivated writing The Morality of Freedom with observations on comments on the book, made at a conference in Jerusalem in 2016, by Japa Pallikkathayil, Avishai Margalit, Michael Otsuka, Jon Quong, Daniel Viehoff, Asaf Sharon and Arudra Burra. It acknowledges some of the critical points made while resisting others. Its strives to combine clarification of some of the themes in the book with recognition that its ideas require further development, and can be developed in various directions.
My topic is the possibility of acting in the belief that the action is bad and for the reason tha... more My topic is the possibility of acting in the belief that the action is bad and for the reason that it is, as the agent believes, bad. On route, I examine another question – namely whether agents can, without having any relevant false beliefs, perform actions motivated by the badness of those actions. The main worry is the compatibility of action for the sake of the bad with the thesis of the Guise of the Good (roughly that actions undertaken with an intention to perform them are undertaken because they are, as the agents see things, good in some respects). The examina-tion is helped by considering the way reason explanations and the more widely understood normative explanations can explain actions, in light of the conditions for the rationality of actions and the bearing of masking beliefs (broadly: self-deceived beliefs that mask the agents’ true motives or reasons from them) on the explanation of their actions. The discussion leads to consideration of the possibility of various conceptual mistakes. Given the variety of human motivations, I focus on the interpretation of one case: the Luciferian motive, understood, roughly, as the drive to defy the limits of thought or of rational thought.
The paper sketches the role of reasons and intentions in leading to action with an intention, exp... more The paper sketches the role of reasons and intentions in leading to action with an intention, explaining the way possession of rational powers transforms the formation of intentions. Part One explains how when humans act with an intention they act in the belief that there is value in the action. Part Two explains the relative role of value and intention in “producing” the action, and relates their role to that of motivation.
It is more or less common ground that an important aspect of the explanation of normativity relat... more It is more or less common ground that an important aspect of the explanation of normativity relates it to the way Reason (our rational powers), reasons (for beliefs, emotions, actions, etc.) and reasoning, with all its varieties and domains, are inter-connected. The relation of reasoning to reasons is the topic of this this paper. It does not start from a tabula rasa. It presupposes that normativity has to do with the ability to respond rationally to reasons, and with responding to reasons with the use of our rational powers. The question is where does reasoning fit in?
I will compare two sketchy accounts of reasoning, judging their success in elucidating the concept and its role in the explanation of normativity. First I outline the view that reasoning is an activity of searching for a justified answer or for a justification of the answer to a question. Some critical reflection on that view leads to what I call the simple account, which takes reasoning to consist (broadly speaking) in responsiveness to perceived reasons. I will illustrate ways in which the simple account is at odds with the concept of reasoning. Its merits depend on the thought that intentions, attempts or actions can be conclusions of reasoning. Those who affirm that possibility often regard reasoning that has such conclusions as practical reasoning. Hence much of the paper will be about practical reasoning. That would lead to a tentative endorsement of reasoning as a search for a justified answer, suggesting a different view of the place of reasoning in explaining normativity.
Why democracy? Institutions of government and others must meet conditions of legitimacy. Why? and... more Why democracy? Institutions of government and others must meet conditions of legitimacy. Why? and what are they? what are principles of legitimacy, like the principle of subsidiarity? and how does democracy fit in a theory of legitimacy?
The paper surveys what it takes to be the seven most important advantages of democratic government: civil and political rights, more extensive opportunities for people to engage in public affairs, responsiveness to the expressed preferences of the people, stability, peaceful transfer of power, loyalty and solidarity. It then considers the role of legitimation in securing these advantages. These reflection lead to the question whether other regimes can secure the same advantages? And more importantly: given that all democratic regime rely also on non-democratic institutions, how are we to debate questions like how much democracy is needed? A question which arises within a single regime and in the interaction between several, say national and international, regimes.
connecting normativity to normative reasons, and their relations to intentions and motivations. O... more connecting normativity to normative reasons, and their relations to intentions and motivations. Offers an account of reasoning. Discusses the possibility of radical moral change, the guise of the bad. Offers an account of normative powers, and of promises. considers moral duties to others, the role of well-being, identity and social bonds
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Papers by Joseph Raz
objects as being democratic or not being democratic: a decision, a policy, a
law, a temperament, etc. can all be more or less democratic. I will consider the legitimacy of systems of government, especially of governments of states, and their democratic or undemocratic character. One way to describe the claim to be examined is that systems of government of states, their constitutional structures and practices, are legitimate only if and because they are democratic.
Keywords: identity, partiality, impartiality, voluntary-association, consent, non-consensual duties, social groups
Key words: sovereignty, world-government, political-societies, international-relations, international-organisations, interpretive-pluralism, subsidiarity
Keywords: Normative principle, normative explanation, intelligibility, explanations, analogical arguments
The paper will offer an account of acting with an intention and of having an intention to act. It will not offer an account of intentional action, merely suggesting that when intentional actions are not actions done with an intention, their explanation as intentional relates to that of actions with intentions, showing how like them and unlike them they are. Motivation will be discussed mainly to distinguish its role in leading to action from the role played by intentions
Keywords: Intention, purpose, motivation, action, normativitiy
Freedom, liberty, autonomy, equality, rights, authority
I will compare two sketchy accounts of reasoning, judging their success in elucidating the concept and its role in the explanation of normativity. First I outline the view that reasoning is an activity of searching for a justified answer or for a justification of the answer to a question. Some critical reflection on that view leads to what I call the simple account, which takes reasoning to consist (broadly speaking) in responsiveness to perceived reasons. I will illustrate ways in which the simple account is at odds with the concept of reasoning. Its merits depend on the thought that intentions, attempts or actions can be conclusions of reasoning. Those who affirm that possibility often regard reasoning that has such conclusions as practical reasoning. Hence much of the paper will be about practical reasoning. That would lead to a tentative endorsement of reasoning as a search for a justified answer, suggesting a different view of the place of reasoning in explaining normativity.
Keywords: Reasoning, Normativity, Practical reasoning, Reasons, Rationality, Dancy,
objects as being democratic or not being democratic: a decision, a policy, a
law, a temperament, etc. can all be more or less democratic. I will consider the legitimacy of systems of government, especially of governments of states, and their democratic or undemocratic character. One way to describe the claim to be examined is that systems of government of states, their constitutional structures and practices, are legitimate only if and because they are democratic.
Keywords: identity, partiality, impartiality, voluntary-association, consent, non-consensual duties, social groups
Key words: sovereignty, world-government, political-societies, international-relations, international-organisations, interpretive-pluralism, subsidiarity
Keywords: Normative principle, normative explanation, intelligibility, explanations, analogical arguments
The paper will offer an account of acting with an intention and of having an intention to act. It will not offer an account of intentional action, merely suggesting that when intentional actions are not actions done with an intention, their explanation as intentional relates to that of actions with intentions, showing how like them and unlike them they are. Motivation will be discussed mainly to distinguish its role in leading to action from the role played by intentions
Keywords: Intention, purpose, motivation, action, normativitiy
Freedom, liberty, autonomy, equality, rights, authority
I will compare two sketchy accounts of reasoning, judging their success in elucidating the concept and its role in the explanation of normativity. First I outline the view that reasoning is an activity of searching for a justified answer or for a justification of the answer to a question. Some critical reflection on that view leads to what I call the simple account, which takes reasoning to consist (broadly speaking) in responsiveness to perceived reasons. I will illustrate ways in which the simple account is at odds with the concept of reasoning. Its merits depend on the thought that intentions, attempts or actions can be conclusions of reasoning. Those who affirm that possibility often regard reasoning that has such conclusions as practical reasoning. Hence much of the paper will be about practical reasoning. That would lead to a tentative endorsement of reasoning as a search for a justified answer, suggesting a different view of the place of reasoning in explaining normativity.
Keywords: Reasoning, Normativity, Practical reasoning, Reasons, Rationality, Dancy,
The paper surveys what it takes to be the seven most important advantages of democratic government: civil and political rights, more extensive opportunities for people to engage in public affairs, responsiveness to the expressed preferences of the people, stability, peaceful transfer of power, loyalty and solidarity. It then considers the role of legitimation in securing these advantages. These reflection lead to the question whether other regimes can secure the same advantages? And more importantly: given that all democratic regime rely also on non-democratic institutions, how are we to debate questions like how much democracy is needed? A question which arises within a single regime and in the interaction between several, say national and international, regimes.