Skepticism

This article aims to investigate the relationship between nostalgia, solitude, and skepticism in Emil Cioran’s thought. In the first place, we will examine how the concepts of Sehnsucht, saudade and dor are interpreted by Cioran as similar forms of radical nostalgia. In the second place, we will see how the skeptical attitude of doubting reality relates to the nostalgic impossibility of belonging to reality itself. Finally, we will suppose that the metaphysical feeling of being isolated and separated from the world implies a skeptical criticism of subjectivity itself and a humoristic interpretation of existence.

In current day South Korea pseudohistory pertaining to early Korea and northern East Asia has reached epidemic proportions. Its advocates argue the early state of Chosŏn to have been an expansive empire centered on mainland geographical Manchuria. Through rationalizing interpretations of the traditional Hwan’ung- Tan’gun myth, they project back the supposed antiquity and pristine nature of this charter empire to the archaeological Hongshan Culture of the Neolithic straddling Inner Mongolia and Liaoning provinces of China. Despite these blatant spatial and temporal exaggerations, all but specialists of early Korea typically remain hesitant to explicitly label this conceptualization as “pseudohistory.” This is because advocates of ancient empire cast themselves as rationalist scholars and claim to have evidential arguments drawn from multiple textual sources and archaeology. They further wield an emotive polemic defaming the domestic academic establishment as being composed of nationa...

Le statut de l'intuition et du donné a suscité une attention soutenue tant dans la théorie générale de la connaissance de Schlick que dans celle de Cassirer. Dans la première partie de l'exposé je m'attacherai à souligner leur proximité étroite dans la manière d'articuler ce statut avec la question du scepticisme, laquelle se voit attribuer une importance majeure dans leur épistémologie. Dans la seconde partie, je montrerai au contraire combien leurs réponses à cette question divergent considérablement, malgré ce souci commun de répliquer à un scepticisme se prévalant d'un statut privilégié du donné. Je tenterai enfin d'esquisser comment cette articulation entre les points de convergence et de divergence qu'entretiennent Schlick et Cassirer pourrait offrir un certain angle de compréhension de la rupture entre les traditions dites "analytique" et "continentale".

Many have thought that it is impossible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic that we have knowledge of the external world.  This paper aims to show how this could be done.  I argue, while appealing only to premises that a skeptic could accept, that it is not rational to believe external world skepticism, because doing so commits one to more extreme forms of skepticism in a way that is self-undermining.  In particular, the external world skeptic is ultimately committed to believing a proposition P while believing that she shouldn’t believe P, an irrational combination of beliefs.  Suspending judgment on skepticism is also problematic, for similar reasons; and, I argue, epistemic dilemmas are not possible; so, we should believe that skepticism is false.

RESUMO Desde a antiguidade, até a filosofia contemporânea, os filósofos têm enfrenta do questões relacionados ao conhecimento e ao ceticismo. Como obter a certeza diante de tantas dúvidas epistemológicas? Santo Agostinho enfrentou as questões céticas, tomando o caminho do autoconhecimento a partir de uma reflexão epistemológica sobre o cogito. Este artigo visa analisar a posição de Santo Agostinho diante do ceticismo. Ele enfrentou os céticos e, para isso, reconheceu a importância do autoconhecimento. A filosofia cristã de Santo Agostinho pode mostrar possibilidades para repensar o papel filosófico do autoconhecimento e a importância da superação do ceticismo.
Palavras-chave: Ceticismo. Agostinho. Autoconhecimento.

ABSCTRACT From ancient times to contemporary philosophy, philosophers have faced questions of knowledge and skepticism. How to get certainty in the face of so many epistemological doubts? St. Augustine faced the skeptical questions, taking the path of self-knowledge from an epistemological reflexion on the cogito. This paper aims to analyze the position of Saint Augustine in the face of skepticism. He confronted the skeptics and he recognized the importance of self-knowledge. The Christian philosophy of St. Augustine may show possibilities for rethinking the philosophical role of self-knowledge and the importance of overcoming skepticism.
Keywords: Skepticism. Augustine. Self-knowledge.

Dans l'expression Astrologie : « science des astres » il y a… 3 mots qui posent problème : « science », « des » et « astres » ! Ce sera le fil conducteur pour une analyse critique en profondeur de l'astrologie, qui plus est rénovée par l'EX-astrologue que je suis.
Ce tome 1 est donc une introduction à cette nouvelle analyse d'une discipline dont on sous-estime souvent la complexité. Signe "d'une grande richesse" pour l'astrologue, elle constitue pour moi le terreau idéal pour les biais cognitifs. La raison première, peut-être, pour laquelle l'astrologie a pu si aisément traverser les siècles.
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4e de couverture :
Il y a 12 ans, assistant aux désaccords profonds entre ses collègues, un jeune astrologue commence à s’interroger sur la question de l’erreur. Il débute une autocritique et se confronte aux sceptiques. Cet essai est le témoignage d’un homme sur son long parcours de déconversion. C’est aussi l’introduction à une analyse critique rénovée et sereine de l’astrologie qui ouvre à des problématiques plus fécondes.
Pourquoi les astrologues ne se réfèrent-ils pas aux positions des planètes réellement observées sur la voûte céleste ? Pourquoi conservent-ils certains astres qui n’existent plus ? Pourquoi les interprétations « marchent-elles » quand le praticien se trompe de date de naissance ?! L’outil astrologique (complexe et sacré) dupe-t-il ses utilisateurs de générations en générations ? Le zodiaque mésopotamien a-t-il, d’ailleurs, été créé par des astrologues ? Est-il vraiment né dans le ciel ?!
Et quel est l’énorme coup de chance qui permit aux horoscopes d’intégrer la presse, il y a juste 80 ans, avant d’inonder littéralement toute la planète ?
Le brainstorming, enfin, peut-il expliquer succès, échecs et longévité de l’astrologie sans prétexte scientifique ni métaphysique ?
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Membre du bureau de l’Observatoire Zététique et ex-astrologue de la Fédération Des Astrologues Francophones, Serge BRET-MOREL a développé une expertise unique. Dans ses conférences et publications, il met un point d’honneur à décrire avec pédagogie les questions déroutantes posées à, et par, l’astrologie.
Plus d’informations : www.astroscept.com

The aim of this paper is to explore some of the meanings of frequently underestimated and misunderstood topic of eclecticism. In doing so, we would like to ask how the phenomenon of eclecticism was perceived in the past and whether it is correct to regard it as something more than just an abstract notion, namely: as a philosophical mindset and particular way of approach to life in general. The text is divided into two parts. The first one contains an outline of the history of eclecticism, understood as a notion and a kind of attitude. It is shown that, among others, it was thanks to the eclectic approach that emerging Christian civilisation would open itself to the heritage of the classical era; late antiquity and the Renaissance, both having produced ideas of religious humanism, are also indicated as the most eclecticism-related epochs. The second part aims at describing the phenomenon of eclecticism as, unlike syncretism, depending on a selection of elements rather than combining them together. It is presented as a way of philosophising and thus as a way of being, potentially creative and open to different viewpoints, yet, unlike skepticism, committed to the truth. All in all, the paper shall be perceived as a praise of eclecticism, assuming that it deserves far more appreciation and scholarly attention than has been given to it thus far.

Harvey Irwin, in 2014, published the results of an online survey of members of the Parapsychological Association concerning the views of parapsychologists about paranormal phenomena and parapsychological research. The current study is a conceptual replication with a German version of the questionnaire that is partly adapted to the special demands of the two particular survey groups, members of the Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Parapsychologie (WGFP) [Scientific Society for the Advancement of Parapsychology] and the Gesellschaft für Anomalistik (GfA) [Society for Anomalistics]. 25 WGFP members and 57 GfA members took part in the survey. The results are compared between the groups as well as with the data of the survey conducted by Irwin. Despite many parallels, some remarkable differences were found. In general, it became apparent that parapsychologists and interested persons in anomalistics do not form a homogenous group with regard to the assessment of the evidence and the opinions on research-specific issues. Thus, they are not credulous ‘sheeps’ who adopt, without thinking, every paranormal claim or ‘evidence’, but rather a group of individuals whose assessments often demonstrate a high degree of variance.

Chapter 6 in Voltaire's science fiction satire, Micromegas, is an illustration of the French Enlightenment's movement toward empirical scientific methods and intellectual skepticism, away from speculative metaphysics, organic systems known as the Summae, and recognition of the absolute.

Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict-the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. In this paper, I argue that this conflict does arise, and that it creates problems for traditional skeptical views in epistemology. In particular, I will argue that on certain popular views about the nature of belief, it is impossible to adopt the near-global agnosticism recommended by the skeptical epistemologist. On other plausible views, it is only possible in special circumstances, and this limitation undermines skeptical epistemological claims. The only views about the nature of belief on which there are no metaphysical hurdles to adopting the agnosticism recommended by the skeptic are views that face powerful objections—objections that are completely independent of anti-skeptical epistemological considerations.

The pseudonymous author B.C. Johnson penned a short paper arguing against the existence of God that, while often cited by atheist debaters, is necessarily limited since it attempts to tackle over a dozen different pro-theist objections. In this short paper I try to bolster just one of Johnson's arguments to show that his version of God indeed cannot exist, but that it is an incorrect description of the Christian deity as accepted by most modern religious and theological scholars.

Some believe that our blood type – O, A, B, AB – can tell us a lot about ourselves, such as our compatibility with different romantic partners or even our satisfaction with different careers choices.  One of the most prominent claims of ‘blood type’ proponents is that blood type is intimately linked to personality – it determines our most core and pervasive characteristics.  This claim is widespread and largely accepted in certain parts of the globe, namely Japan.  This belief is also being (re)introduced in the U.S. more recently through popular books and claims such as those outlined in The Answer is in Your Bloodtype.  Unfortunately, proponents present little evidence for their claims and the ‘studies’ they do present often contain glaring methodological flaws.  Though the ‘blood type personality’ claim has been previously examined by scientists, research findings are unclear.  The results of our own investigation, presented here, suggest that blood type and personality are likely unrelated.  Though the ‘blood type personality’ claim may seem harmless, there are real consequences for those truly believing their personality and – by extension – behavior is determined by their blood type.  This type of thinking can reduce one’s motivation and self-perception, resulting in abandoned aspirations and scapegoating.

The intended title was “Universe Oriented Ontology” or “Multiverse Oriented Ontology”, or “Universe or Multiverse Metaphysics”.
I mention this as it gives an idea about the meaning and intention of the title and the work as well as the titles I considered and why I moved away from them to the present one.
The sub-title provides a further hint towards the intentions of the work, namely: ” Beyond Earth- and Human-centricity’. I opted for ‘transcending’ rather than beyond, as I am still in the process of describing the process of transcending and many of the ideas I am obliged to use from our conceptual system and practices are still earth- and anthropo-centered, And, they have not yet gone to a state beyond those two -isms.
I say something about universe-centeredness, then about planet earth as point and frame of reference and anthropo-centricity.
The socio-cultural practice of philosophy and the doing of philosophy is merely one of many human, social and cultural practices. I post different notions of philosophy by a number of writers, some of them philosophers. These notions are about their perceptions of what philosophy is. Few of them go into detail about the subject-matter of philosophy. No one really deal with the aims, purposes and objectives of the discipline and none deal with the nature of the doing of philosophy or philosophizing. Activities that I suggest resemble certain features of the processes of theorizing.
I end with explorations of possible characteristics of original- and creative thinkers. I do this by mentioning a number of themes of meta-philosophy listed and described by Peter Suber. I make a number of comments in them and highlight aspects relevant to these type of thinkers.
One find them of course in all disciplines and socio-cultural [racticesand disciplines be they the arts,humanities, sciences, etc. I am of course specifically concerned with original andcreative thinkers inthe Western tradition of philosophy.
As I am a radical and absolute sceptic, I end with an article on this theme.
It is said by everyone, for example Hume, Russell and Pascal, that such a radical position is psychologically impossible and that it cannot be lived 24/7. Pascal for example opted for believe or faith and he and a number of writers suggest that that  is the only way out and the final position of radical sceptics. I disagree with him.

Abstract

Some pages from the « Apology for Raymond Sebond » and the last chapter of the Essays suggest that Montaigne conceive the experience of scepticism (i.e. both the experience we have of scepticism and the experience that scepticism still allows us to have) through the concept of reformation. In this respect, in the pages on sickness and « body’s health » in the chapter « On experience », Montaigne describes also indirectly the « health » of a mind which has reformed itself.

Résumé

Deux pages capitales de l’« Apologie de Raimond Sebond » et du dernier des Essais suggèrent que Montaigne pense l’expérience du scepticisme (c’est-à-dire autant l’expérience qu’on fait du scepticisme que celle que le scepticisme permet, malgré tout, de faire) à partir du concept de reformation. À ce titre, dans le long développement sur la maladie et la « santé corporelle » de « De l’expérience », Montaigne décrit aussi indirectement la « santé » d’un esprit qui a réformé son entendement.

For industrial and organizational psychologists who are unfamiliar with the mindfulness literature, Hyland, Lee, and Mills (2015) nicely introduce the concept by highlighting key findings from prior studies. Although their review focuses on the many benefits of mindfulness, we believe that mindfulness research should address certain questions that will help us understand whether mindfulness interventions result in a cost-effective positive return on investment. In alignment with the perspective of evidence-based practice (Briner & Rousseau, 2011; Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006), we call for a holistic evaluation of mindfulness, including a consideration of when or how unintended side effects emerge. Importantly, we discuss the potential mechanisms by which mindfulness generates valued outcomes (e.g., performance and collective psychological climate) and the need for more sophisticated research to isolate these causal effects. We also consider how the judicious use of utility analytics (e.g., cost effectiveness and return on investment) might help demonstrate the value of mindfulness interventions while also acknowledging questions of causality that must be addressed for such value to be experienced. We close by clarifying that we have the intention of promoting research to further evidence-based practices. There are organizations that have already begun providing mindfulness meditation interventions, and it is our hope that our commentary will help practitioners in these settings to consider the evidence suggesting that there may be unknown nuances regarding mindfulness practice. Ultimately, we believe that mindfulness is an important burgeoning area of research deserving of more scholarly attention.

Relevance and irrelevance, it is argued, is constitutive to our access to “information objects” on three interconnected levels: (1) access to the information object itself, (2) the information gained from it, (3) the use of that information. Relevance selectively shapes our experience and action, but the “irrelevance” of what is left out is not simply the opposite or absence of relevance. The complex relation between relevance and irrelevance expresses itself in different shades of knowledge and ignorance, and in a fuzzy border between information we do not want to access and information we cannot access. This implies both chances and risks for communication as a process of producing and exchanging information objects. In a second step, previous research on relevance and irrelevance is sketched with respect to different traditions and approaches: (1) Alfred Schutz and Aron Gurwitsch; (2) Paul Grice, Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson; (3) library and information science; (4) signs and language; and (5) epistemology and logic. Finally, the role of the word “relevance”, which is not found in all languages, is briefly considered after distinguishing the explicit reflection of relevance from the constitutive role of relevance, which often remains implicit.

In this paper, I present an interpretation of Descartes that deemphasizes his skepticism. I analyze a selection of remarks from Descartes' correspondence in which he makes judgments about the skeptics. I argue that such remarks display Descartes' attitude of contempt for skeptical philosophy. Since Descartes associates the skeptics with the activity of constant and total doubting and yet presents scenarios that seemingly arise from extreme doubt—like the malicious demon hypothesis—I look at what Descartes says in the correspondence about his own use of doubt in his published works. Descartes distances himself from the skeptics because he claims that whereas they doubt everything and, in so doing, act heretically, he uses doubt for a noble purpose. I suggest that although Descartes is influenced by skeptical ideas and considers skeptical argumentation to be useful, his strategic use of such argumentation should not lead us to believe that he condones skepticism. Quite the contrary, most of his remarks on the subject show that Descartes is highly critical or dismissive of skeptical ideas. Therefore, I argue that it is more accurate to characterize Descartes as a philosopher generally opposed to skepticism.

In the Cartesian tradition, hallucination reveals that what we take to be direct experiences of the world are in fact mere appearances: appearances which give only mediate and unreliable testimony to reality. If hallucination can pass itself off as perception – if we can be deceived by hallucinations – then it is always possible that our perceptions are false. Thus, if we wish to have knowledge of the world, we must transition to a different register: that of reason and judgment. In this classical analysis, abnormal perception functions to show the deficit of normal perception. As is well known, Merleau-Ponty's analysis of hallucination differs from this classical analysis in crucial respects. Not only does Merleau-Ponty argue that hallucination differs structurally from perception and that the hallucinating subject does in fact distinguish between her hallucinations and her perceptions, but he uses his analysis of hallucination to confirm his account of the bond between perception and the world. It is Merleau-Ponty's analysis of hallucination that leads him to his first sustained account of perceptual faith in Phenomenology of Perception. Here, abnormality is conceived not as demonstrating the deficits of normal perception, but as confirming its claims. In this paper, I will try to show how this analysis is possible.

In this paper, I present and criticize a number of inuential anti-skeptical strategies inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘hinges’. Furthermore, I argue that, following Wittgenstein’s analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’, we should be able to get rid of Cartesian skeptical scenarios as nonsensical, even if apparently intelligible, combinations of signs.

O primeiro objetivo deste ensaio é compreender a natureza específica das fake news e da pós-verdade enquanto fenômenos com características epistêmicas e sociais. Essa compreensão faz-se sob a hipótese de que um dos fatores que as tornam fenômenos particularmente inéditos e graves é a sua relação com formas corrompidas do ceticismo e relativismo. Descritas essas formas, o segundo objetivo consiste em contrastá-las a versões saudáveis de ceticismo e relativismo, procurando mostrar sua importância ao estabelecimento de acordos morais.
Após uma discussão sobre características definidoras das fake news (seção 1), vale-se de uma descrição do conjunto de crenças de conspiracionistas e negacionistas, em que se pode encontrar uma noção vulgar de ceticismo (seção 2). O relativismo vulgar é apresentado junto a uma descrição do que seria a pós-verdade (seção 3). Em seguida, apresenta-se uma defesa de um tipo específico de relativismo e ceticismo que serve a quem procura lidar adequadamente com o conhecimento em um ambiente não dogmático (seção 4). Ao fim, responde-se a uma possível objeção oferecida por relativistas de que haveria dogmatismo na crítica consensual às fake news e à pós-verdade (seção 5).

A variety of arguments for and against skepticism with respect to perception are presented and evaluated. The skeptical arguments are drawn from the Academics, the Pyrrhonists, and Descartes. Anti-skeptical responses considered include Moorean common sense, dogmatism, and externalism.

This paper explores a few of the ways that the Zhuang-Zi can inform contemporary analytic epistemology. I begin, in section 1, by briefly outlining and summarizing the case for my fictionalist interpretation of the text. In section 2, I discuss how the Zhuang-Zi can be brought into productive dialogue with the question of how we should respond to skeptical arguments. Specifically, I argue that the Zhuang-Zi can be reasonably interpreted as exemplifying an approach that is different from dominant contemporary responses to skeptical arguments in three ways: (i) it is fictionalist; (ii) it motivates a skeptical perspective rather than a claim; and (iii) it accomplishes its aims in an atypical, but nonetheless contextually appropriate, way. However, the Zhuang-Zi is relevant to contemporary debates about skeptical arguments because it can be used: (i) to respond to the same sorts of skeptical arguments that occupy contemporary commentators; (ii) to address a number of questions that arise in connection with such arguments; and (iii) to suggest important new questions for epistemologists to pursue.

Traditionally, economic analysis of agricultural technology adoption (or lack thereof) has focused on imperfect information, risk, uncertainty,
institutional constraints, human capital, input availability, and infrastructure as potential explanations for adoption decisions [1-3]. In studying
agricultural technology adoption, analysis of the adoption of high yielding varieties (HYV) in India has been particularly influential. Kohli and
Singh [3] found that inputs played a large role in the rapid adoption of HYVs in the Punjab on of the prosperous state in India. They claimed
that the effort made by the Punjab government to make the technological innovations and their complementary inputs more easily and cheaply
available allowed the technology to diffuse faster than in the rest of India. On similar lines study is conducted in Mauritius to learn feasible and
acceptable model of technology adoption. Mauritian economy is based on service industry. And farming is done only to satisfy local demand. At
points heavy imbalance is observed in demand and supply, hence the study becomes more important.

Habitar este mundo implica que nos llegue una lluvia constante de estímulos desde todas partes. Para algunas personas, tras ellos se esconden indicios de misterios complicados que debemos desentrañar
como sea. Por desgracia, lo de «como sea» suele ser literal. Y mientras mucha gente trata de usar la lógica en la resolución de los problemas, otra mucha parece que se afana solo en oscurecerlos. Sagán con su equipo de detección de camelos, trató de aportar algo de luz para que la gente no especializada pudiera diferenciar la ciencia de la pseudociencia

This paper explores two related issues concerning Locke's account of epistemic justification for empirical knowledge. One issue concerns the degree of justification needed for empirical knowledge. Commentators almost universally take Locke to hold a fallibilist account of justification, whereas I argue that Locke accepts infallibilism. A second issue concerns the nature of justification. Many (though not all) commentators take Locke to have a thoroughly internalist conception of justification for empirical knowledge, whereas I argue that he has an externalist conception of justification: it is the fact that sensation is caused by an external object that justifies our belief in the corresponding object. So, while most commentators take Locke to be a fallibilist with an internalist conception of justification for empirical knowledge, I argue he is actually an infallibilist with an externalist conception of justification.

Are near-death experiences (NDEs) just elaborate hallucinations produced by a dying brain? Or the exuberant fantasies of attention-seeking narcissists? As the accounts in this book abundantly demonstrate: Neither!

This book contains over 100 reliable, often firsthand accounts of perceptions during NDEs that were later verified as accurate by independent sources. These near-death experiencers were everyday people from all over the world—many of whom were clinically dead, unable to see or hear, and yet able to perceive new vistas of a world beyond the senses and even beyond death.

The Self Does Not Die is a trailblazing effort to present the most confirmed cases of consciousness beyond death ever compiled. - (There now is a paperback and a kindle version.)