Kant's Practical Philosophy

Contrary to Reinhold's theoretical discussion of Kant's philosophy, his practical critique and its underlying action theory and theory of freedom have been neglected in scholarship. In my paper, I shall reconstruct Reinhold’s practical philosophy after Kant. For that purpose, I will concentrate on the so-called “Reinhold’s Dilemma,” which concerns the problem of moral imputability in the case of evil actions in Kant. I show how Reinhold tried to escape this dilemma by introducing an elaborated action theory and theory of individual freedom. I shall argue that Reinhold’s account of freedom to act according and against the moral law is not best understood in terms of freedom of indifference, but rather in terms of a freedom to balance reasons on the basis of first and second-order volitions. I shall also discuss Kant’s attempt to escape Reinhold’s Dilemma in his late Metaphysics of Morals. Finally, I will evaluate Reinhold’s systematic siginificance by relating his theory of individual freedom with recent conceptions of volitional self-determination.

Kant on sex gives most philosophers the following associations: a lifelong celibate philosopher; a natural teleological view of sexuality; a strange incorporation of this natural teleological account within his freedom-based moral theory; and a stark ethical condemnation of most sexual activity. Although this paper provides an interpretation of Kant’s view on sexuality, it neither defends nor offers an apology for everything Kant says about sexuality. Rather, it aims to show that a reconsidered Kant-based account can utilize his many worthwhile insights and that by making Kant’s account of sexuality more consistent with his own basic philosophical commitments, the result is a compelling approach to the complex and complicated phenomena of sexual love, sexual identity, and sexual orientation.

Open access link here:
https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/fpq/article/view/3116

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar o modus operandi da produção audiovisual intitulada “Esclarecimento” com discussões importantes para o campo da Comunicação ao analisar por meio da Teoria Crítica da Sociedade elementos provindos da filosofia kantiana, sobretudo o uso da Razão Emancipatória, o processo de transformação da Razão em instrumento a serviço do capitalismo, a produção da Indústria Cultural e os impactos que essa instrumentalização provocaram no homem. O vídeo foi produzido em formato de revista eletrônica, possui uma linguagem acessível com fins de divulgação científica. É constituído por quatro matérias, à maneira de videotape, com imagens e vídeos alusivos aos conceitos-chave da Teoria Crítica. Há também uma entrevista exclusiva com um professor Doutor sobre as perspectivas de emancipação ou não do indivíduo, proposto pela teoria.

Abstract: Highlighting the debate with Rousseau, my objective in this paper is to stress,
through the analysis of some of these Notes and with the aid of some passages of other
texts, the new Kant`s conceptions on the religion and theodicy in the middle of 1760.
Specifically, I try to show that by critically appropriating Rousseau's thought, Kant is led to
the first formulations of an innovative answer to the questions of moral evil and God's
justice. This answer will result in the rupture with Leibniz and consequently in the contours
more essential of the ethics and philosophy of religion which will appear as definitive
philosophical doctrines in Kant`s maturity.
Keywords: evil, theodicy, justice, order, practical reason.

The Genesis of Kant`s Ethics: the moral precritical development in its relation to Theodicy

Abstract:


Kant‘s moral philosophy is one of the great cornerstones of the Western ethical reflection. The little that is known is that the basic conception on which Kantian ethics was built – videlicet, the concept of autonomy of the will – was developed from the attempt to solve a set of problems of metaphysical and theological character that could only have been overcome through the adoption of a new practical metaphysics. With this in mind, this research is an attempt at a reconstruction of the Kantian moral thought in its development, having as a higher aim the emphasis on the importance of the problem of theodicy in the genesis of Kant‘s original conceptions of freedom and the moral world, which emerged from the middle of the 1760s and only came to a bloom on the next decade. Such an attempt at a reconstruction will be guided by the chronological sequel of the pre-critical writings and Kant‘s reflections on the Manuscript Legacy, besides his Lectures on Ethics, sources that are temporally circumscribed from the late 1750s and the first half of the 1780 decade. In a first moment, the genesis of the moral problem will be analyzed from Kant‘s critical position – due to the objections that were raised precisely by the theodicy – in front of the intellectualistic comprehension of the concepts of perfection and will such as they were received by the German Scholastic. In a second moment, the beginning of a reformulation directly influenced by Crusius and the British moralists will be highlighted, and it will culminate in a repositioning of the ethical problem, having in mind the roles of reason and feeling. The third moment is marked by the Kantian assimilation of Rousseau‘s thought. Rousseau‘s influence will propel the emergency of a new understanding of the concept of perfection as an inner attribute of the will, enabling support for a new concept of practical philosophy. Indeed, a solution to the ethical problem regarding the conditions of possibility of free actions within the natural world will emerge and, besides that, a path to an adequate answer to the problem of theodicy will rise by means of the concept of a practical rational faith. Finally, the development of the Kantian doctrine of the categorical imperative will be highlighted – by means of the debate with Baumgarten‘s compendium – as the first attempts to lay down a systematic and unified view of morality that will try to establish a connection between the concepts of virtue and happiness – in this contexts, approach from the perspective of the highest Good.

Medical ethics is the study of ethics in the context of modern medical practices, medical personnel, technologies, and institutions. The study of medical ethics is indispensable for training ethically informed professionals in a variety of medical fields. • In this course we will utilize a case-study approach in order to explore the personal, historical, legal, economic, and political dimensions of medical ethical issues. • Lectures will be given on normative ethical theory and Rawlsian, Marxist, and Libertarian theories of justice in order to facilitate informed discussion. Collaborative learning and class participation will be of vital importance in this class.

En este trabajo proponemos examinar una doble exigencia formulada por Kant en El conflicto de las Facultades –a saber, la exigencia de libertad y la exigencia del orden–, a fin de señalar la premisa básica subyacente a dicha exigencia, esto es: la idea de que el orden público constituye la condición fundamental para la preservación del estado civil, entendido como el único estado en el que los hombres pueden ejercer plenamente su derecho innato a la libertad. Atendiendo a este objetivo, examinaremos el modo en que Kant caracteriza la contienda entre las Facultades, destacando el sentido eminentemente político del conflicto, y analizaremos la función específica que asigna a cada una de las Facultades, haciendo especial énfasis en la determinación de los límites establecidos para el libre ejercicio de la razón filosófica.



This paper addresses a double demand formulated by Kant in The conflict of the Faculties –to wit: the demand for freedom and the demand for order– with the aim of pointing out the basic premise implicit in such demand: the idea that the public order constitutes the fundamental condition for the preservation of the civil state, as the only state within which human beings can fully exercise their innate right to freedom. We will examine the way that Kant characterizes the contest between the Faculties, stressing its essentially political meaning, and will also consider the specific function that he assigns to each of them, paying special attention to the limits he sets on the free exercise of philosophical reason.

In the second Critique, Kant argues that for the highest good to be possible we need to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in a future world. In his other writings, however, he suggests that the highest good is attainable through mere human agency in this world. Based on the apparent incoherence between these texts, Andrews Reath, among others, argues that Kant’s texts reveal two competing conceptions of the highest good, namely a secular and a theological conception. In this paper, I argue that Kant has a coherent conception of the highest good which applies to two different domains, namely the domain of the individual humans and the domain of the human species.

Le présent article interroge la capacité des théoriques éthiques à justifier ou non la GPA en général, et plus spécifiquement, à se prononcer sur une possible légalisation en France dans les années à venir. Il montre que, contrairement à une idée reçue, l'argument kantien de la dignité humaine ne permet pas de conclure à son illégitimité. Les théories contractualistes et conséquentialistes permettent de la justifier sous certaines conditions mais un certain nombre d'arguments posent problème. Je suggère que l'utilitarisme des raisons développé par Derek Parfit offre certains éléments de réponse. Abstract : The present paper questions the capacity of ethical theories to justify or not surrogacy, generally speaking, and more specifically to find for or against the legalization of surrogacy in France in a foreseeing future. It shows that, contrary to a popular belief, the kantian idea of human dignity is of no use here. Contractualist and consequentialist theories can justify surrogacy under certain conditions but their arguments is no without raising issues. I suggest Derek Parfit's reason utilitarianism can offer some valuable answers to these difficulties.

Anthropogenic climate change poses a considerable threat to human life on planet Earth. Extreme weather, water stress, crop failure and the spread of diseases are among the eff ects of climate change that are already being felt around the globe. However, climate change does not pose a threat to all life: nature can certainly adapt to new conditions. The question is if we can adapt. Since global warming is already a reality and can no longer be averted, addressing climate change involves two types of measures: mitigation (attempts to curb and regulate greenhouse gas emissions and restrain individual consumer lifestyles) and adaptation to new living conditions (fi nancially supporting farmers aff ected by droughts, relocating residents threatened by rising sea levels, addressing new epidemics and climate migration). Sadly, experience shows that the more vulnerable the population aff ected by the adverse eff ects of climate change, and the greater the danger to their subsistence and physical integrity, the less the political will to support them. Kant's ethical theory provides normative guidance concerning our duties to others and to ourselves. It is no surprise that climate ethics has also turned to Kant and to Kantian inspired theories in search of normative principles for dealing with the challenges of climate change and spelling out what we owe to each other in this regard. While I do not dispute that there are important individual ethical duties in regard to climate change, the problem is that the focus on individual virtue and individual agency seems inadequate in the face of the urgency to mitigate the impact of climate change. Although I propose in this article a Kantian approach to climate change, I will start by explaining the limitations of applying Kant's ethical theory to the problem of climate change. Climate change is a global problem that calls for urgent collective action not only at the domestic level but 9781138700000_pi-257.indd 99 9781138700000_pi-257.indd 99

Iris Murdoch, Harry Frankfurt, and Michael Stocker all criticize modern (and especially liberal) moral theories for failing to accommodate love's apparent foundational importance. In this paper, I argue that these concerns highlight a real weakness of liberal morality, but that love as such does not offer a real alternative to liberal ethics. As such, we should seek a moral theory that accommodates love but does not leave it unrestrained. I then argue that Kantian ethics does precisely this, insofar as Kant's duty of charity or beneficence requires that we form and act on partiality toward those whom we benefit. I argue that the phenomenology of partial motivation on this view answers Murdoch, Frankfurt, and Stocker's objections and provides a useful gloss on Marcia Baron's analysis of primary and secondary motivations.

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

Die sog. Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik hat in den letzten Jahren überraschend wenig Aufmerksamkeit in der Kantforschung erfahren. Das beginnt sich erst langsam zu ändern, bedingt vor allem durch das Wiedereinsetzen eines allgemeinen Interesses an Metaphysik, aber auch durch die Wiederentdeckung der Einsicht, dass die kantische Philosophie nicht nur ihren Ursprung in der nach-wolffschen Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts hat, sondern dass Kant mit seinen Fragestellungen insgesamt dieser philosophischen Strömung sehr viel näher bleibt, als die bislang eher auf die empiristische Tradition hin ausgelegten Interpretationsansätze bemerkt haben. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes thematisieren den metaphysischen Ursprung und die metaphysische Stoßrichtung der kantischen Philosophie. Das geschieht vor allem im Ausgang von und mit Blick auf die kantische Preisschrift, die eine besondere Stellung in Kants Werk einnimmt. Ausgehend von dieser Schrift wird einerseits ein Blick zurück auf die Entwicklung der kritischen Philosophie sowie deren Architektonik in Abgrenzung zur rationalistischen Schulphilosophie geworfen und andererseits ein Blick nach vorn zur vermeintlich nachkritischen Revision der Systematik im Opus postumum.

The objective of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom (especially  the  problem  of  the  third  antinomy  and  its  resolution  in  the  critique  of  pure reason); its significance in the contemporary debate on free-will and determinism, and the possibility  of  autonomy  of  artificial  agency  in  the  Kantian  paradigm  of  autonomy.  Kant's resolution  of  the  third  antinomy  by  positing  the  ground  in  the  noumenal  self  resolves  the problem of antinomies; however, invites an explanatory gap between phenomenality and the noumenal self; even if he has successfully established the compatibility of natural causality and non-natural causality through his transcendental argument. This paper is also devoted to establish the plausibility of the knowledge claim that Kantian reduction of phenomenality has served half of the purpose of the AI scientists on the possibility of Artificial Autonomous Agency.

Jean-Luis Bruch remarked that Law has a very special place in Kant’s thinking. His language was to a great extent shaped by legal terminology, to the point that it displays a deep articulation between legal concepts and philosophical thinking, specially in the field of morals. We are thus led to ask to what extent Law in its theoretical and methodological dimensions underscores the construction of the Kantian system, more specifically on what concerns the domain of practical reason. The sources of Law (the modes of creation and expressing legal entities) included, in the XVIII century as today, the legislation, the court decisions, the customs and the jurisprudence. Yet, their relative importance deeply changed from then to today. In the present paper we will attempt to bring forward how these four alternative sources of Law shape the different formulations of the categorical imperative.

Anotou Jean-Luis Bruch que “o direito ocupa um lugar muito particular no pensamento do filósofo” Kant, por isso a sua linguagem é marcadamente jurídica: há em Kant uma articulação profunda entre conceitos jurídicos e pensamento filosófico, mas é na moral que este “pano de fundo jurídico mais se acentua. A questão que colocamos é a de saber em que medida o quadro teórico e metodológico do direito informa a construção do seu sistema, em particular no que respeita ao domínio da razão prática. No século XVIII os modos de formação e revelação do direito (as suas fontes) incluíam, tal como hoje, legislação, jurisprudência, costume e doutrina, porém com pesos relativos e formas de expressão marcadamente diferentes das presentes. No nosso estudo procuraremos explicitar a subjacência destes quatro momentos de juridicidade às várias formulações do imperativo categórico, pedra angular da conceção de moralidade de Kant.

Massimo Cacciari ist  einer der bedeutendsten zeitgenössischen Philosophen Italiens. Dieses Buch ist die erste umfassende deutschsprachige Monographie zu seinem Denkweg. In Auseinandersetzung mit dem spekulativen Denken von Augustinus bis Schelling und dem christlichen Trinitäts- und Schöpfungsgedanken entwickelt er die kühne Idee eines Anfangs vor allem Ursprung - um der absoluten und gelösten Freiheit Gottes und der Menschen willen. Von da her kommt er zu überraschenden Einsichten in die theologisch-metaphysischen und politischen Gesetze der europäischen Kulturgeschichte, die einen kritischen Doppelblick auf das Woher und Wozu von Sein und Denken, eine theologische Relektüre klassicher Themen und eine Stellungnahme ermöglichen und erfordern.

A theory of evil should explain the difference between evils and wrongs. But once a theory of evil has been developed, how do we defend or refute it? The most commonly used method for doing this to provide pro-examples and counter-examples respectively. I argue that this method, by itself, is insufficient. To supplement it I argue that we should also focus on five key theoretical virtues that a theory of evil should have. These are: 1) meshing well with important theories of moral wrongdoing; 2) being based on a plausible moral psychology; 3) explaining the basis of our judgments about evil; 4) being able to alter, revise and expand our judgments about evil; and 5) being pitched at the right level of generality. In order to illustrate these virtues in depth I argue that my combination theory of evil has these five virtues to a high degree.

In this paper I examine Kant’s discussion of freedom in the Metaphysics of Morals, while devoting special attention to the question as to whether indeed, as many commentators have claimed, it contains a solution to an objection raised by Carl Leonhard Reinhold in the collected edition of his Letters on the Kantian Philosophy and again by Henry Sidgwick in a famous paper published in 1888. In the first section, I provide a concise formulation of what I believe to be the core of Reinhold’s and Sidgwick’s objection under the title “Objection R/S” and then describe the general structure of the predominant strategy by which commentators have tried to avoid it through recourse to a famous passage in the Metaphysics of Morals. In the second, I recount just enough of the history behind this passage to provide a proper context for its interpretation and, in particular, to show its historical link to Objection R/S. In the remaining sections, I argue that the passage pointed to by commentators does not and indeed cannot contain any solution along the lines so far suggested. By way of conclusion, I consider whether the results I have reached cohere with other passages from Kant’s works and briefly suggest but leave undeveloped an alternative strategy for meeting Objection R/S.

My theme is ‘life-writing’, understood as the shaping of one's life through the contemplation of values, although this activity is mostly unreflective. To become an art so that one's life can be shaped in greater accord with clearly held values, this process must become reflective. These values have an inescapably ethical dimension, because as we necessarily poetize our surrounding world, we contribute to our personal and communal ethos the character that arises from the culturally shaping power of guiding ideals. Even the immoralist cultivates life within an ethos where obscure feelings connect with some thing or other, whereby certain aims will then appear more valuable than others.

To understand how we cannot help but shape our lives according to dimly or clearly intuited values, I compare Coleridge’s primary imagination, the ‘shaping spirit’ ‘necessary for all human perception’ with Kant’s ‘blind though indispensible function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, yet of which we are scarcely ever conscious’. With Coleridge, we find in imagination an impulse to connect profound but obscure presentiments and ideas with our surroundings. This impulse propels great art and everyday aesthetics alike. Whether we pursue merely what attracts us, or seek value beyond this, all lives are freely shaped, without excuses, as the existentialists say, but not always in the most pellucid consciousness. Our choices inevitably engage us in the poetic art of life-writing. Cast in medias res, we necessarily improvise. But this is no argument against lives being moral-aesthetic works, spontaneous compositions in value.

Kant's most prominent formulation of the Categorical Imperative, known as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), is generally thought to demand that one act only on maxims that one can will as universal laws without this generating a contradiction. Kant's view is standardly summarized as requiring the 'universalizability' of one's maxims and described in terms of the distinction between 'contradictions in conception' and 'contradictions in the will'. Focusing on the underappreciated significance of the simultaneity condition included in the FUL, I argue, by contrast, that the principle is better read as requiring that one be able to will two things simultaneously without self-contradiction, namely, that a maxim be one's own and that it be a universal law. This amounts to a new interpretation of the FUL with significant interpretive and philosophical advantages.

Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical methodology. Begins by discussing how Kant conceives of the proper ends of rational inquiry, and how those ends inform his conception of the proper methodology for philosophy. Then discusses the foundational role that self-conscious capacities play within Kant's philosophical system. Concludes by discussing Kant's famous claim that the philosopher - unlike the mathematician - must be a legislator, and not an artist, of reason.