Kant's Political Philosophy

This article examines some arguments in favor of taking peace as a political obligation that can be found in one of the most important founders of the pacifist movement, Jane Addams. The main focus is on her 1907 book Newer Ideals of Peace, which has often been read as idealistic and outdated, and above all, as more of an activit's manifesto than a serious contribution to either political philosophy or political theory. I point out that this owes much to an ambiguity of Addams' criticisms of the traditional and Kantian cosmopolitan defense of peace as a political ideal, the ambiguity between practical-political and conceptual problems. However, Addam's succeeds in identifying one profound problem for traditional, even enlightended institution-centered ideals of peace, the collapse of the very ideal in cases of breaches of explicit peace-agreements among nations, because breaches of agreements are tantamount to the loss of all commitment to the other nation's rights. It reveals that the conditions imposed by such ideals are at most necessary, but not sufficient for peace, and hence that the concept based on them not a complete concept of lasting peaceful conditions among humans. Once it is seen as dedicated to resolving the problems entailed by this fundamental problem, Addams' work, and in particular her focus on resources of solidarity and right-granting practices beyond and outside explicit agreements between governments can be understood as the development of a more adequate, coherent and comprehensive, while also a more actionable conception of peace. In the course of this development, Addams can also be observed to make use of crucial epistemological and more technical philosophical tools that are most closely associated with classical pragmatism, but which partly appear (albeit largely obliquely in the course of their application to a particular case) for the first time Addams' treatise. Addams' work is therefore of more than merely political activist interest for philosophers. Nonetheless, the article also explains her status as an important contributor to proper conceptions of world peace and the understanding of certain phenomena in the organization of public will formation precisely by pointing out that without some of her future-oriented proposals, like the inseparability of peace-policies and development, or the need to institutionally protect and foster spontaneous solidary action, the best contemporary work on peace would not have been possible.

The article examines whether realist theory should adopt a philosophical anarchist position concerning political obligation. The conclusions are mixed. Drawing on a distinction between strong and weak theories of political obligation (in the terminology of the paper, strong theories are committed to morality-based theorizing while weak theories depart from it), the article argues that philosophical anarchism and realist theory are natural allies against strong theories of political obligation but they must part company when it comes to weak theories because it is exactly their departure from morality-based theorizing that can make weak theories especially appealing to realists. In addition, two further objections can be raised against philosophical anarchism on realist grounds: first, philosophical anarchists are drawn to undesirably sweeping conclusions about the non-existence of legitimate political authority or the extreme scarcity of genuine political relations by their Kantian or Lockean background assumptions and, second, Simmons seems to have an implicit weak theory of political obligation which could be, ironically, much more appealing to realists than his overall Lockean anarchism or his sweeping criticism of weak theories. All in all, can a realist be an anarchist? Probably, but definitely not on philosophical anarchist grounds.

En este trabajo proponemos examinar una doble exigencia formulada por Kant en El conflicto de las Facultades –a saber, la exigencia de libertad y la exigencia del orden–, a fin de señalar la premisa básica subyacente a dicha exigencia, esto es: la idea de que el orden público constituye la condición fundamental para la preservación del estado civil, entendido como el único estado en el que los hombres pueden ejercer plenamente su derecho innato a la libertad. Atendiendo a este objetivo, examinaremos el modo en que Kant caracteriza la contienda entre las Facultades, destacando el sentido eminentemente político del conflicto, y analizaremos la función específica que asigna a cada una de las Facultades, haciendo especial énfasis en la determinación de los límites establecidos para el libre ejercicio de la razón filosófica.



This paper addresses a double demand formulated by Kant in The conflict of the Faculties –to wit: the demand for freedom and the demand for order– with the aim of pointing out the basic premise implicit in such demand: the idea that the public order constitutes the fundamental condition for the preservation of the civil state, as the only state within which human beings can fully exercise their innate right to freedom. We will examine the way that Kant characterizes the contest between the Faculties, stressing its essentially political meaning, and will also consider the specific function that he assigns to each of them, paying special attention to the limits he sets on the free exercise of philosophical reason.

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

Anyone familiar with much of the social-contract literature will have noticed that the sense of “social contract” can differ a good deal from field to field, for example, from political theory
to business or medical ethics, and even from writer to writer in a single field, say, from Locke to Rawls. For some of these senses, we have well-established distinctions, for example, that
between hypothetical and actual contract. For other uses, we have no established distinction. But more significant than any lack of particular distinctions is, I think, the lack of a general
classification of social contracts that brings out fundamental differences between them. That is what this article offers. My classification has two dimensions. One concerns “contract”. “Contract” can be used literally or in some (more or less) extended sense ranging from close analogy to distant metaphor. The literal sense supports one sort of obligation (“formal moral obligation”); the analogical or metaphorical sense (generally) supports another (if it supports any moral
obligation at all). The other dimension concerns “social”. The “society” in “social contract” (whether the contract is literal, analogical, or metaphorical) may be either the result of the contract or a party to it and, whatever its relationship to the contract, the society may be one of several kinds of human association (moral, governmental, legislative, civil, or political). Arguments valid (or sound) for one sort of society may not be for another.

El entorno religioso de nuestra imputabilidad moral y la fe reflexionante del auténtico credo kantiano (Presentación al texto de Kant Sobre el mal radical) The Religious Environment of Our Moral Imputability and the Reflective Faith of Kantian Genuine Creed (Presentation to Kant's Text On Radical Evil) ROBERTO R. ARAMAYO • Instituto de Filosofía del CSIC, Madrid / España Resumen Aquí se presenta la primera traducción española del texto kantiano Sobre el mal radical tratado como el artículo que fue originalmente publicado en una revista y, por consiguiente, no tanto como el primer capítulo de La Religión dentro de los límites de la sola razón. Se intenta hacer ver que, tal como cuando trata el argumento moral sobre la existencia de Dios, Kant nos habla del ateo virtuoso como héroe moral de su formalismo ético, aquí la religión sólo sirve para dibujar mejor los contornos de las piezas claves del pensamiento ético kantiano: la libertad y la responsabilidad o imputabilidad moral, que constituyen el auténtico credo kantiano y sólo se dejan asociar con una fe "reflexiva". Palabras clave Kant; Mal radical; Imputabilidad moral; Fe reflexiva, Religión. • Profesor de Investigación en el IFS del CSIC. E-amil de contacto: aramayo@ifs.csic.es https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/279/341

Immanuel Kant es el filósofo más representativo del siglo XVIII, así como la expresión más depurada del pensamiento ilustrado. De Kant, hemos heredado con su antológico y exhortativo '¡Sapere aude!' la universal consideración de que los ilustrados favorecieron que la razón llegara a una deseable «mayoría de edad».Hace más de doscientos años, se teorizó ya sobre un modelo de paz en el mundo. Ésta es la vigencia moderna en su época, y postmoderna en nuestros días del siglo XXI, del filósofo metódico de Königsberg.

This paper examines the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, particularly as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the 2008 Heller decision, in light of Kant's distinction between a state of nature and a civil condition. We find that the individual right to bear arms confirmed by the Amendment and reaffirmed by the Court can only be understood on the presupposition that the U.S. lies in Kant's state of nature rather than a civil condition. This finding serves to challenge a dominant liberal account of U.S. history, according to which the movement from Emancipation to the Civil Rights Movement represents gradual if uneven progress from a flawed to a genuine liberal republic.

Husserl deemed that rational life is guided and surrounded by an “non-actualized” horizon of varied interests motivated by passive life. I wonder here, specifically, whether the properly theoretical rational activity (or praxis)—that claims to attain unquestionable and pure cognitive objectivity enshrined by modernity—is ever wholly dissociated from its emotional and somatic roots. An overview of some salient historical contributions to the nature of love, as a polymorphic phenomenon, and Husserl's reading of Fichte, serve as background for the hypothesis proposed in this paper.

Em 1795, a maneira sarcástica com a qual Kant inaugura um de seus textos mais influentes referindo-se ao letreiro de uma pousada holandesa sobre o qual está pintado um cemitério cujo lema é a “paz perpétua”, diz muito sobre a situação permanente de guerra em que se encontrava não só os países europeus daquele tempo, mas também, de um modo geral, os povos na história da humanidade.
Com o objetivo de colocar um fim definitivo em todas as guerras, Kant propõe os fundamentos de uma teoria integral do direito público tripartida nos âmbitos do 1) direito do Estado, 2) do direito das gentes e 3) do direito cosmopolita. Exige-se, na primeira esfera, a instituição da constituição republicana, o que deve tornar os Estados sistemas políticos representativos. Em relação à segunda esfera, os Estados republicanos devem se reunir em uma liga livre de povos contrária à guerra E, na última, os seres humanos devem ser reconhecidos como cidadãos do mundo, o que lhes garante um direito à hospitalidade.
Não é de se surpreender, levando em conta estas inovações, que o opúsculo kantiano “À paz Perpétua” tenha se tornado tão rapidamente popular e que a sua influência tenha se estendido para o contexto jurídico-político do século XX, materializando-se no aparecimento de organizações internacionais como a Liga das Nações (1919) e a Organização das Nações Unidas (1945).

These 22 essays examine student notes from all eleven areas of Kant’s university teaching – from metaphysics to geography. These notes (written by students such as Herder) can offer a new perspective on Kant’s intellectual development, clarify arguments from his works, consider topics unexamined in his publications, better depict the 18th-century philosophical background, and reveal the role of the textbooks he assigned. This book includes reproductions of pages from Kant’s personally annotated copies of Meier and Baumgarten and from the student notes, with original English translations.

The paper aims to make a contribution to the debate about Kant’s take on revolution. It focuses on the principled, non-textual conflict within Kant’s writing and offers a possible analytical resolution. Along with Flikschuh and Ripstein, the papers finds coherence in Kant’s position, but locates this coherence at a different level than they do. Flikschuh seems to privilege public right over private right, and identifies the former as the a priori condition for private right. Her reading places Kant in too close of a proximity to Hobbes, thus sacrificing some of the complexity of Kant’s thought. Ripstein focuses on past entitlements as a point of departure and makes an analogy between private property and sovereignty. Despite the appeal of these approaches I find that they fall short of providing a convincing explanation for the categorical impossibility of trade-offs within the Kantian system and subsequently offer a different interpretation of Kant’s position on revolution—one that hinges on his privileging of certainty, security, and stability, his insistence on the autonomy of the different spheres, and his refusal to make trade-offs between these spheres. The autonomy of these different spheres takes different shapes and bears different meanings: the autonomy of law differs from the autonomy of morality; the autonomy and value of “order” differs from the autonomy and value of law. Still, the Kantian moves reveal a certain sensibility or tilt. Lastly, I contend that one can never give a full justification for such a sensibility.

Kant based his ethical theory on the belief that reason should be used to determine how people ought to act. He did not attempt to prescribe specific actions but instructed that reason should be used to determine how to behave.

The Categorical Imperative is supposed to provide a way for us to evaluate moral actions and to make ml judgments. It is not a command to perform specific actions -- it does not say, respect your elders". As commands or moral laws all persons must follow, regardless of their desires or extenuating circumstances. As morals, these imperatives are binding on everyone and imperatives are simply an ought. If the action is represented as goods in itself and therefore as necessary for a will which it accords with reason then that's a categorical imperative.

https://ctkebooks.net/translatio/hacia-la-paz-perpetua-un-diseno-filosofico/
Nueva traducción española de Hacia la paz perpetua, un texto donde Kant explicita su compromiso político con los ideales aportados por el republicanismo de la Revolución francesa, cuya célebre triada hace suya convirtiendo a la libertad, igualdad e independencia o autonomía jurídicas en sinónimos de unos derechos inalienables e inherentes a todo el género humano. Nada más firmarse la Paz de Basilea en 1795, Kant decide parodiar el alambicado formato de los tratados al uso, añadiendo en la segunda edición un protocolo "secreto" donde se reivindica que se deje hablar a los filósofos, toda vez que la publicidad se presenta como piedra de toque para compulsar las normas injustas. Además de reivindicarse una nobleza integrada por funcionarios, a la que se accede por méritos y no por abolengo, asistimos aquí a un duelo simbólico entre las deidades romanas representadas por Término y Júpiter, para ilustrar la significativa distinción kantiana entre moralista político y político moral.
(En breve se podrán solicitar ejemplares impresos en papel bajo demanda).

The article argues that civil disobedience must be perceived as an action with progressive and political significance, thus reflecting, from a Kantian perspective, the recognizable paradox between morality and law, as expressed in Kant's moral and political writings. Hence, this article firstly analyzes on which grounds Kant claims rebellion to be unjust. Secondly, it examines how and if people, from a Kantian point of view, can defend themselves against an unjust sovereignty. On this basis, it argues that 'civil disobedience' can be juxtaposed with the Kantian idea of 'freedom of the pen,' thus having the same function as a political corrective. However, two questions are still to be answered, namely if civil disobedience must be punished, and if civil disobedience as a political corrective can be justified? By considering civil disobedience primarily as political agency, both questions are answered in the affirmative.

Kant is famous for his universalist moral theory, which emphasizes human dignity, equality, and autonomy. Yet he also defended sexist and (until late in his life) racist views. In this essay, I address the question of how current readers of Kant should deal with Kant’s sexism and racism. I first provide a brief description of Kant’s views on sexual and racial hierarchies, and of the way they intersect. I then turn to the question of whether we should set aside Kant’s sexism and racism or ‘translate’ his egalitarian principles into inegalitarian ones. I argue for a third position, namely, that we should highlight the tensions that pervade Kant’s theory. In the final section, I argue that the use of inclusive language and female pronouns in recent discussions of Kant’s moral and political philosophy carries significant risks. I end by articulating several preconditions for fruitfully using Kant’s moral principles to criticize sexism and racism.

In the current era of political distrust and ideological extremism, perhaps the only element of modern politics we can all agree upon is its democratic structure – or can we? While democracy is now revered as the only political system which gives value to the opinions and rights of all individuals, in a society plagued by misinformation and manipulation, we are forced to question whether it is really the most just and robust system to let everyone over a certain age to vote, no matter their level of knowledge or exposure to potentially misleading political campaigns. This will be a study of the very essence of democracy; its flaws, its promise, and whether there exists a viable alternative.

Liberalism is a term employed in a dizzying variety of ways across the humanities and social sciences. This essay seeks to reframe how the liberal tradition is understood. I start by delineating different types of response – prescriptive, comprehensive, explanatory – that are frequently conflated in answering the question “what is liberalism?” I then discuss assorted methodological strategies employed in the existing literature: after rejecting “stipulative” and “canonical” approaches, I outline a contextualist alternative. On this (comprehensive) account, liberalism is best characterised as the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognised as such by other self-proclaimed liberals, over time. In the remainder of the article I present an historical analysis of shifts in the meaning of liberalism in Anglo-American political thought between 1850 and 1950, focusing in particular on how John Locke came to be seen as a liberal. I also explore the emergence of the category of "liberal democracy". I argue that the scope of the liberal tradition was massively expanded during the middle decades of the twentieth century, such that it came to be seen by many as the constitutive ideology of the West. This capacious (and deeply confusing) understanding of liberalism was produced by a conjunction of the ideological wars fought against “totalitarianism” and assorted developments in the social sciences. Today we both inherit and inhabit it.

'Universalist' moral principles have fallen into disfavour because too often they have been pretexts for unilateral impositions upon others, whether domestically or internationally. Too widely neglected has been Kant's specifically Critical re-analysis of the scope and character of rational justification in all non-formal domains, including the entirety of epistemology and moral philosophy, including both justice and ethics. Rational judgment is inherently normative because it is in part constituted by our self-assessment, of whether the considerations we now integrate into a candidate judgment have been integrated as they ought, so as to form a cogent, justifiable judgment. Constitutive of this self-assessment is that rational judgments must be based upon considerations which can be communicated to all others, such that they too can assess them as sufficiently cogent justification; also constitutive of this rational self-assessment is that we actually engage with others who do assess our judgments. Kant's Critical principles rule out in principle any unilateral imposition upon others, whether in cognition or morals. Using Kant's Critical principles and methods in connection with 'practical anthropology' and the enormously important domain of acquired rights and obligations shows how Kant had already justified fundamentally universal principles of justice which can be institutionalised in variously distinctive cultures, and which form the proper bases for our acquired, specifically social rights and obligations, including those of friendship and community. (7.04.16)

Final version: http://psc.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/03/13/0191453714566483.abstract
Today the idea of cosmopolitanism has become widely accepted as an appropriate answer to what we now call globalization. A key reference is Kant who argues for a Recht of the world citizen, and this is normally understood as a cosmopolitan law. Apparently Kant lets the law of the world citizen be limited to a right to visit, but somehow his peace project must imply something more than just this very modest claim. Following a hint from Kant himself I take a closer look at the material aspect of cosmopolitanism, i.e. the economy of travelling, and it appears that cosmopolitanism can function as an ideology for letting possible investors look for business cases, that is, for promising places for capitalist exploitation. As an answer to such strong material processes cosmopolitanism is insufficient, both as a moral imperative and as a stipulated right. What we need is a more comprehensive political and legal perspective and the solutions they indicate. To get inspiration to this, however, we can turn to Kant again, since it turns out that he does not argue for cosmopolitanism at all, neither as a program nor as an ideology. For Kant the overall goal is perpetual peace, and the law of the world citizen only represents one subordinate element. As an answer to globalization we should thus drop the limited ideal of cosmopolitanism and follow Kant in his ambition of a threefold political constitution comprising state law, law of the people and law of the world citizen.

The distinction between private and public use of reason  in Kant’s “What is Enlightenment” is best understood as one between different communicative spaces: The private use of reason belongs to hierarchical institutions, whereas the public is egalitarian. In the first section I examine similarities and differences between what Kant terms juridico-civil and ethical institutions from a rhetorical perspective. In the second, I outline a rhetorical understanding of the process of enlightenment, which has radical consequences for questions of the legitimacy of hierarchical institutions. I close with a reflection on how certain ambiguities in Kant’s political writings highlight an important problem in this context: Whether the principles of egalitarian communication are construed as inclusive or exclusive.

The Walking Dead is a popular TV series depicting a catastrophic and violent world. After a pandemic that turns humans into zombies, we witness the collapse of civilization with all its institutions, the depletion of the resources, and the struggle to build a new world in the middle of the wars between surviving groups. It illustrates a world of literal and metaphorical homo homini lupus. Some people choose sheer survival, and others try to build a moral, civil world. In this article, I propose a reading of this series from a Kantian perspective by employing his interrelated ideas on history, ethics, and politics. I claim that The Walking Dead represents the state of nature and the violence it contains, and illustrates the course of history toward a civil society as defined by Kant.