Rousseau

The argument of the first Discours is governed by the antithesis between the ‘original’ nature of man on the one hand and the corruption of modern civilisation on the other; this antithesis is developed in terms of a contrast between the freedom implied by true being and the enslavement and estrangement which is the human condition in the modern world. Rousseau is concerned not so much with historical details as with the moral theme which allows him to separate the original elements of man’s being from the artificial elements added by the process of civilisation. By ‘original’ Rousseau means ‘what belongs incontestably to man’. Rousseau is therefore concerned to distinguish the essential and authentic as given by true original being from the accidental and artificial elements added by civilisation.

Feminists have long criticized Rousseau for his patriarchal political theory. But when his lesser-known writings on women from the 1740s are taken into account, including a nearly 900 page manuscript critiquing Montesquieu from a feminist perspective, we see how the early Rousseau robustly converged in feminist ideas with his employer Madame Louise Dupin, before he gradually diverged from this egalitarian school of thought over the course of the 1750s. I add to the evidence of the early Rousseau's egalitarian response to 'the woman question' by showing his philosophical convergence with the feminist arguments of the anonymous 'Critique of the Spirit of the Laws' (c. 1749) as well as Madame Dupin's 'Ouvrage sur les femmes' (c. 1745-51)—manuscripts largely in his secretarial hand. Through this triangulation of understudied texts, we find that the early Rousseau was not a patriarchal apologist, but rather a feminist secretary and a secretary to a feminist.

History of European Ideas, forthcoming

Anglo-American readings of the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau from the late 19th century to the present have been mixed, to say the least.  If one looks at explorations of Rousseau’s political and educational texts, one notices that while scholars such as Roger D. Masters, Judith Shklar, and Patrick Riley have given valid and insightful readings of Rousseau’s works, many conservative Anglo-American critics and scholars project ideological perspectives onto Rousseau’s writings, seeing The Social Contract, Emile, and other texts as harbingers of totalitarianism or exemplifications of hypocritical manipulation.  In this paper these latter readings (or misreadings) are criticized for their misunderstanding or misappropriation of Rousseau’s philosophical achievement under the form of a detailed commentary revisiting some of the more complex concepts in Rousseau’s writings.  Rousseau can be seen as a constellating figure who has become an intellectual scapegoat for conservatives such as Irving Babbitt, J. L. Talmon, and Lester G. Crocker, and more recently for Jonathan Israel and Michael Coffman.  This lack of ability to understand the nuances underlying Rousseau’s philosophy raises concerns about ideological tendencies within educational systems in which such misunderstandings are fostered by overemphasis on specific and limited perspectives linked to empiricism, pragmatism, political and historical slants, and other philosophical trends.

One of the paradoxes of Robespierre’s Republic of Virtue is that the author from whom he so largely borrowed did not really consider himself virtuous. Virtue may mean purity of heart and motive in one’s daily actions, but as Jean-Jacques Rousseau very well knew, it also implied a constant rational struggle against intrinsic passions and appetites. It is for this reason that in several parts of the Dialogues, Rousseau portrays himself paradoxically as a virtuous man who lacks virtue: “But is there some virtue in that sweetness? None. There is only the inclination of a loving and tender nature […] This very reasonable choice isn’t made by either reason or will. It is the work of the pure instinct. It lacks the merit of virtue, doubtless, but neither does it have its instability. One who has surrendered only to the impulses of nature for sixty years is certainly never going to resist them” (RJJ 150). It is not difficult to see why Rousseau would characterize himself as such. If, as Saint-Preux warns Julie, “virtue is a state of war” (J 560), belief in this struggle would mean recognizing our inherent disposition to sin and refuting, as a result, one of Jean-Jacques’s principal tenets: man’s natural inclination for the good. As Rousseau notes in the first pages of the Dialogues, “virtue among us often requires fighting and conquering nature” (RJJ 10–11).

This article intends to reexamine Rousseau's educational theory in the context of the nature/ culture opposition. In contemporary discussions on the nature/culture dualism, it has been often stated that his educational theory is based on the assumption that a child is a natural being. However, the author demonstrates that Rousseau was instead committed to a duality of human nature; this influences his educational theory. In his model, human nature consists of a natural and a social side; these two parts are in conflict which seems unsolvable due to the present state of society. A child is regarded as a figure which is open to the future reconciliation of nature and culture. Thus, Rousseau's model of education is presented not from the standpoint of the present state of society, but from the standpoint of an ideal state which might be built in the future. In addition, the examination of human duality allows one to show that Rousseau's ideas on civil and private education are closely interrelated.

Cet ouvrage se donne pour tâche d’examiner les discours les plus emblématiques produits par la philosophie moderne au sujet de la peine de mort. Assumant d’emblée le point de vue abolitionniste, notre intention n’est nullement de « peser le pour et le contre », mais de poser la question suivante : dans quelle mesure est-il possible de fonder rationnellement le refus catégorique de la peine capitale ? À cet égard, le détour par l’histoire de la philosophie nous montre à quel point la raison est avant tout divisée contre elle-même. En effet, au terme d'un travail visant à mettre à l’épreuve la cohérence interne des partisans de la peine de mort (Locke, Kant, Stuart Mill), ainsi que de ses adversaires (Beccaria, Bentham), il nous est apparu impossible de conclure à un simple défaut de rationalité de la part des uns ou des autres. Ce que l'on constate au contraire, c'est que chaque démonstration se déploie à partir d'un certain nombre de principes éthiques indémontrables. Bien plus, chaque grand courant de la philosophie pénale est susceptible de donner lieu à des prises de position radicalement opposées. Mais pour peu que l'on se refuse à concevoir un abîme insurmontable entre la raison d'une part, et la sensibilité d'autre part, la philosophie morale peut bénéficier d'une approche dans laquelle le raisonnement et « le cœur » se complètent, au lieu de constituer une alternative. À cet égard, c'est dans l'œuvre de Jean-Jacques Rousseau qu’il nous a semblé possible de repérer les éléments permettant de fonder au mieux l’abolition.

El presente escrito tiene como objetivo presentar el concepto de religión en Rousseau desde las obras el Emilio y El contrato social. Para ello, se comenzará con una introducción que da cuenta de la crítica de Rousseau a la religión del ciudadano, para luego pasar a la definición de Religión natural desde el Emilio, el concepto de religión civil en el contrato. Posteriormente se evidencia la articulación del Origen de las desigualdades en las definiciones de este concepto. Aunando a lo anterior, se mostrará cómo el concepto de religión de Rousseau se aleja de una definición metafísica y se centra en argumentos empíricos, producto de la observación de la naturaleza.

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

For the last 2,500 years literature has been attacked, booed, and condemned, often for the wrong reasons and occasionally for very good ones. ‘The Hatred of Literature’ examines the evolving idea of literature as seen through the eyes of its adversaries: philosophers, theologians, scientists, pedagogues, and even leaders of modern liberal democracies. From Plato to C. P. Snow to Nicolas Sarkozy, literature’s haters have questioned the value of literature―its truthfulness, virtue, and usefulness―and have attempted to demonstrate its harmfulness.

Literature does not start with Homer or Gilgamesh, William Marx says, but with Plato driving the poets out of the city, like God casting Adam and Eve out of Paradise. That is its genesis. From Plato the poets learned for the first time that they served not truth but merely the Muses. It is no mere coincidence that the love of wisdom (philosophia) coincided with the hatred of poetry. Literature was born of scandal, and scandal has defined it ever since.

In the long rhetorical war against literature, Marx identifies four indictments―in the name of authority, truth, morality, and society. This typology allows him to move in an associative way through the centuries. In describing the misplaced ambitions, corruptible powers, and abysmal failures of literature, anti-literary discourses make explicit what a given society came to expect from literature. In this way, anti-literature paradoxically asserts the validity of what it wishes to deny. The only threat to literature’s continued existence, Marx writes, is not hatred but indifference.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction
Words from Elsewhere
First Trial: Authority
Second Trial: Truth
Third Trial: Morality
Fourth Trial: Society
Conclusion
Notes
Acknowledgments
Index

Επιτέθηκαν στη λογοτεχνία, τη λοιδόρησαν, την καταδίκασαν, με κάθε πρόσχημα και ανεξαρτήτως καθεστώτος, με τις καλύτερες ή τις χειρότερες προθέσεις, για λόγους αστείους ή ενίοτε και σοβαρούς. Εξόρισαν τους ποιητές και έκαψαν τα βιβλία τους ή τουλάχιστον προσπάθησαν να το κάνουν. Εδώ και 2.500 χρόνια, η λογοτεχνία γίνεται στόχος ποικίλων επικρίσεων και κατηγοριών, που διατυπώνονται από φιλοσόφους και θεολόγους, ιερείς και παιδαγωγούς, επιστήμονες και κοινωνιολόγους, βασιλείς, αυτοκράτορες, ή ακόμα και προέδρους. Από τον Πλάτωνα ώς τον Νικολά Σαρκοζί, τούτο το βιβλίο παρουσιάζει όλα τα στοιχεία που προσκομίστηκαν σε αυτή την εξωφρενική δίκη, συνθέτει την τοιχογραφία ενός απίστευτου κόσμου με γκροτέσκες και γελοίες φιγούρες, και αφηγείται, με τον τρόπο του, μια άλλη ιστορία της δυτικής λογοτεχνίας, από τις απαρχές της: γεμάτη βουή και μανία, ανοησία, υποκρισία και άγνοια, με τις έριδες και τις μάχες της, τις ήττες και τους
θριάμβους της, τους στρατηγούς, τους προδότες και τους ήρωές της.
Μέσα από το μίσος για τη λογοτεχνία αποκαλύπτεται το κρυφό πρόσωπο της ιστορίας της λογοτεχνίας: εκείνο που της δίνει ίσως το αληθινό της νόημα.

publié dans: Rousseau et l'Allemagne à l'époque contemporaine (de Cassirer à Jünger et Hentig), (dir.) Reinhard Bach et Tanguy L'Aminot, Montmorency, Musée Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 2010, pp. 117-132. Cet article prend comme point de départ les observations de Victor Klemperer qui, dans ses journaux de l’époque nazie, écrit que la propagande nazie se lit fréquemment comme des extraits des écrits de Rousseau. Est-il possible de reconstruire la présence de la pensée de Rousseau chez les nazis ? L’influence de Rousseau sur l’essor d’un « romantisme politique » en Allemagne à partir du début du 19e siècle est incontestable. Même si Hitler ne cite jamais Rousseau dans Mein Kampf, il est par contre très souvent cité par Alfred Rosenberg dans Le mythe du vingtième siècle. Rousseau a influencé le grand juriste national-socialiste Carl Schmitt, parmi d’autres. En l’occurrence il faut reconstruire et réévaluer le contexte pour cette réception nazie de Rousseau. 
    I.  Victor Klemperer : Rousseau, un nazi avant la lettre?
    II.  Rousseau et la théorie nazie de l’Etat: les «avocats de la couronne» et leurs emprunts à Rousseau
    III.  Et audiatur altera pars : Lion Feuchtwanger et Ernst Cassirer.
    IV.  Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne ? Le mythe nazi et Rousseau

In questo capitolo discutiamo come la crescita elettorale e l’affermazione istituzionale del Movimento 5 Stelle, così come i cambiamenti nel sistema mediale italiano intervenuti fra il 2012 e il 2016, abbiano influenzato le strategie comunicative degli eletti del Movimento, le diete informative degli elettori cinquestelle e gli strumenti digitali sviluppati dal partito di Grillo per favorire la partecipazione degli iscritti. Concluderemo quindi delineando gli elementi di persistenza e quelli di cambiamento nei repertori comunicativi di élite, elettori e membri del partito di Grillo.

Anyone familiar with much of the social-contract literature will have noticed that the sense of “social contract” can differ a good deal from field to field, for example, from political theory
to business or medical ethics, and even from writer to writer in a single field, say, from Locke to Rawls. For some of these senses, we have well-established distinctions, for example, that
between hypothetical and actual contract. For other uses, we have no established distinction. But more significant than any lack of particular distinctions is, I think, the lack of a general
classification of social contracts that brings out fundamental differences between them. That is what this article offers. My classification has two dimensions. One concerns “contract”. “Contract” can be used literally or in some (more or less) extended sense ranging from close analogy to distant metaphor. The literal sense supports one sort of obligation (“formal moral obligation”); the analogical or metaphorical sense (generally) supports another (if it supports any moral
obligation at all). The other dimension concerns “social”. The “society” in “social contract” (whether the contract is literal, analogical, or metaphorical) may be either the result of the contract or a party to it and, whatever its relationship to the contract, the society may be one of several kinds of human association (moral, governmental, legislative, civil, or political). Arguments valid (or sound) for one sort of society may not be for another.

Resumo:
Este artigo pretende mostrar que, para desmontar as teses centrais da teoria política de Hobbes, Rousseau deverá recusar a antropologia do autor do Leviatã e lançar mão de outra antropologia que reivindica para o homem um aspecto moral condizente com a ideia de liberdade e de uma vontade que é causa de si mesma e inalienável. Trata-se de analisar a crítica de Rousseau à antropologia mecanicista de Hobbes para esclarecer, em primeiro lugar, porque, para o autor do Emílio, abdicar da vontade é abdicar da qualidade de homem. Em segundo lugar, pretende-se mostrar que esta mesma crítica permite a Rousseau repensar o exercício da cidadania em termos radicalmente distintos dos de Hobbes, pois ao cidadão rousseauísta estará resguardada a possibilidade de uma transformação moral que permite a construção de relações sociais de qualidade muito distinta daquelas que os súditos hobbesianos estabelecem entre si e com a coletividade.
Palavras-chave: Rousseau, Hobbes, antropologia, liberdade, cidadania.
This article aims to show that, in order to dismantle the central theses of Hobbes political theory, Rousseau must refuse the anthropology of Leviathan’s author, and resort to another anthropology, one that claims to man a moral aspect consistent with the idea of a will that is the cause of itself and that is inalienable. We intend to analyze Rousseau’s critique to the Hobbes´s mechanist anthropology to clarify, first, why, to the author of Emile, to renounce the will means to renounce the quality of Man. Secondly, we intend to show that this same critique allows Rousseau to rethink the exercise of citizenship in terms radically different from those of Hobbes, since the possibility of a moral transformation is safeguarded to Rousseau’s citizens, and this transformation allows the construction of social relations that are profoundly distinct of the kind of relations Hobbes’ subjects establish between themselves and the collectivity.
Key-words: Rousseau, Hobbes, anthropology, freedom, citizenship

This review discusses Rousseau's concepts of social contract and general will in his work "The Social Contract" and contrasts those views with the constitutional principles of representation and individual rights found in the United States and other democratic republics.

A division in scholarship on Rousseau’s Second Discourse turns on the issue
of division itself. Some see Rousseau’s natural man collapsing the division
between man and beast through suggesting that our origins might be in
orangutans, while others see Rousseau depicting a rupture of the human
being from the rest of the animal kingdom through the separation of the
physical and the metaphysical. I argue that in looking to the natural
scientific culture of Rousseau’s own time, one can see that he is
employing a uniquely informed vision of the human being that itself
straddles this divide of interpretation through presenting man as both a
naturally and mythically hybrid creature. To conclude, I claim that
illuminating this hybrid identity of the human being also sheds new
light on the kind of narrative Rousseau employs. His ‘hypothetical
history’ is itself a hybrid of two distinct origin stories, mirroring the very
argument Rousseau is making: that man is always a duplex of the animal
and the spiritual. This moves beyond presenting Rousseau as a thinker
of irresolvable paradoxes to seeing the Second Discourse as a resolved
presentation of what it means to be a natural duplex.

"Now written as a chapter in Rational Freedom vol 2 Philosophical Origins by Dr Peter Critchley

This paper considers Rousseau’s importance as a prophet of popular sovereignty and of the democratic state. In examining these claims, this paper makes an important distinction between the negative and positive conceptions of freedom. The paper proceeds to show how, in Rousseau’s construction, government becomes an agent of individual freedom so that individuals are perfectly free in a democracy worthy of the name - that is, which embodies and expresses sovereign power actively and directly."

Three decades ago, Francois Furet famously announced that the French Revolution was over. Napoleon's armies ceased to march around Europe long ago, and Louis XVIII even returned to occupy the throne of his guillotined brother. And yet the Revolution s memory continues to hold sway over imaginations and cultures around the world. This sway is felt particularly strongly by those who are interested in history: for the French Revolution not only altered the course of history radically, but became the fountainhead of historicism and the origin of the historical mentality. The sixteen essays collected in this volume investigate the Revolution s intellectual and material legacies. From popular culture to education and politics, from France and Ireland to Poland and Turkey, from 1789 to the present day, leading historians expose, alongside graduate students, the myriad ways in which the Revolution changed humanity s possible futures, its history, and the idea of history. They attest to how the Revolution has had a continuing global significance, and is still shaping the world today.

Para este trabajo seleccioné el eje sobre «El problema de la comunidad como producción histórica recurrente», con la intención de repasar el trasfondo histórico subyacente a las producciones teórico-sociales gestadas en torno al problema de la comunidad. En este sentido, me interesa especialmente entender cómo esta cuestión ha sido un problema recurrente a lo largo de la historia occidental, y cuáles han sido las generalidades, puntos comunes y diferencias en las respuestas a ese problema.

Resumo: Exponho neste artigo a leitura que Bento Prado Jr. (1937-2007) faz da obra de Rousseau mostrando que, no itinerário de pesquisa do filósofo brasileiro, não há incompatibilidade entre sua preferência por autores contemporâneos e a escolha desse pensador do século XVIII como objeto de estudo.

Abstract: In this paper I expose the reading of Rousseau's work by Bento Prado Jr. (1937-2007) showing that, in the Brazilian philosopher's research itinerary, there is not incompatibility between his preference for contemporary authors and the choice of this Eighteenth-century thinker as object of study.

In his final work, Rousseau claimed that his ideas formed ‘a body of doctrine so solid, so well connected and formed with so much meditation and care’ that it was more plausible than any other system. The unifying principle behind his thought was identified with the development of ‘a doctrine which ... was aimed only at the happiness of the human race’.

This work argues that the thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau forms a unity in all essentials; it exhibits a unity of purpose and is organised around a theme that remained consistent throughout Rousseau’s life. Rousseau the writer is characterised by a singular and naked honesty and a unity of purpose.

What makes Rousseau’s philosophy so vibrant and meaningful is its grounding in the most profound questions of being. Rousseau valued rational understanding as much as any philosopher. He also felt that this reason was thin and misleading if it is concerned with pure intellect detached from human being. Hence Rousseau’s view that true philosophy rests upon an inner determination which makes it clear that the philosopher loves the truth rather than merely wants to identify it. Philosophy needed to rest on something more profound in the human ontology. For Rousseau, the philosophical enterprise is inextricably connected with a consideration of being as a whole. Limited to intellectual activity alone, philosophy is not a genuine search for truth and is certain to leave the most important questions unanswered to the extent that it fails to engage with humanity’s whole existence. Philosophers need to penetrate beyond the intellect to identify the principles which were ‘engraved in the human heart in indelible characters’ and so find truth in the comprehension of the depths of being. This exploration of the inner landscape is genuine philosophy. In coming to understand essential being, the philosopher would come to comprehend the fundamental features of human society, thus reaching the level of universal principle. The moral ought-to-be of philosophy is thus grounded in something real, human nature and its potentialities, not something impossibly ideal, some abstract standard. Rousseau purported to give human beings a vision of the ideal human society that they would all, by nature, create and flourish in if they were to become truly human beings.

Digital technologies have been considered as generating new opportuni- ties to enhance democratic politics. However, political parties have generally been latecomers in appropriating digital media in their every day life. The case of the Ital- ian Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) represents an interesting example of innovative use of digital technologies in politics. Adopting a mixed-method research design, this article contrasts the democratic vision of the M5S with its online participatory plat- form. First, the discursive production of its leaders on democracy is analysed and complemented with an examination of a law proposal focusing on direct democracy. The core elements of the M5S’ democratic conception are identified in a criticism of representative democracy and the elaboration of a cyberutopian narrative. Sec- ond, the concrete realization of democratic ideals through online instruments of par- ticipation is taken into consideration. Sixty-five online ballots and 326 discussions of draft laws that took place on the Rousseau platform between 2012 and 2017 are critically inspected and discussed, singling out explanations of a continuing decline in participation over time.

A partire dalle idee sulla musica dei filosofi antichi, attraverso le concezioni medievali e rinascimentali, il volume considera l'impatto della rivoluzione scientifica, la stagione illuminista e gli sviluppi ottocenteschi, per giungere infine al ricco dibattito contemporaneo. Tra i principali autori trattati: i pitagorici, Platone, Aristotele, Aristosseno, Boezio, Agostino, Tomaso d'Aquino, Ficino, Galileo, Mersenne, Cartesio, Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Novalis, Schelling, Wackenroder, Hoffmann, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Hanslick, Helmholtz, Nietzsche, Bloch, Adorno, Jankélévitch, Wittgenstein, S. Langer, P. Kivy, J. Levinson, N. Goodman, R. Scruton.

Stella Ghervas, “Das Erbe des Wiener Kongresses und der Wert von Friedensstiften” [The Legacy of the Congress of Vienna and the Virtue of Peacemakers], Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ), Vol. 65, No. 22-24 (2015): 15-20.

Abstract (in German):
„Eine Betrachtung des Wiener Kongresses und des „Kongresssystems“ von 1815 bis 1823 entlang ihrer (Miss-)Erfolge bei der Bewahrung des Friedens zeigt fünf
„Lektionen“ auf, die heute noch angewandt werden könnten – vor allem mit Blick auf eine tragfähige Beziehung zwischen der Europäischen Union und Russland“.
See also on-line version: https://www.bpb.de/apuz/206927/das-erbe-des-wienerkongresses

Abstract (in English):
“This article examines the legacy of the Congress of Vienna and the ‘Congress System’ (1815-23) through their successes and failures in keeping peace. It outlines five “lessons” or principles that might still be applicable, especially in establishing a viable relationship between the European Union and Russia.”

[English abstract]

In this thesis I examine the mode of existence (or, rather, non-existence) of super-individual entities of power, i.e. those entities, like the State, supposed to transcend the individual and exercise power over it. I claim that the consequential and necessary inscription of these entities in a fictional context makes it impossible to derive deontologically compelling obligations from them, thus identifying a contradiction in Searle’s justification of “Y-independent terms” in his Making the Social World. I suggest a role of scientific authoritative speeches in this ontological and normative crisis.
In order to consistently explain the actual effects of power and domination of those inexistent entities, I subsequently combine Searle’s analytical account of social reality and his background notion with Foucault’s historical enquiries over disciplinary mechanisms, subjection devices and subjectivation practices. On the basis of their theories, I develop and try to define the concepts of linguistic entification of institutions, and of eidetic conditioning, i.e. the shaping of historical subjects in relation to an entified linguistic representation. As both notions are grounded in language, I apply them to a functional analysis of historical justification speeches about the State, focusing in particular on classical and contemporary contractarianism and its relation with theoretically defined ahistorical subjects and historically shaped individual ones.
Finally, I advance some theoretical, moral and practical considerations about the duty, for the individual, to oppose him/herself to the super-individual power as both ontologically deceptive and contrary to the autonomy imperative.

----------------------------------------------

[Indice]

1. Introduzione: la problematica natura del potere sovraindividuale
1.1 Ciò che a tutti è comune
1.2 Nέμεζις (la Nemesi)
1.3 Scienza, tecnica e potere sovraindividuale: una curiosa dialettica
1.4 Per un'analisi critica del potere sovraindividuale
1.5 Struttura dell'analisi
  1.5.1 La natura linguistica delle istituzioni esplicite e l’esistenza finzionale degli enti istituzionali
  1.5.2 Il rapporto tra potere, linguaggio e realtà extra-linguistica
  1.5.3 Sfondo e storicità del soggetto
1.6 Un‟applicazione del dispositivo analitico: il caso del contrattualismo
1.7 Verso la dissoluzione dell'oggetto dell'analisi

2. L’esistenza finzionale degli enti istituzionali
2.1 Un'esperienza mancata
2.2 L'interpretazione istituzionale dei fenomeni
2.3 L'intenzionalità in forma collettiva
2.4 Agire con le parole: le dichiarazioni come atti linguistici
2.5 La teoria generale dei fatti istituzionali e delle istituzioni di Searle
2.6 Lo strano caso dell‟esistenza delle “entità fittizie”

3. Trame complesse. Tra potere, linguaggio, e realtà
3.1 Chiusure inutili e confronti necessari
3.2 Searle e Foucault a confronto sul tema della verità
  3.2.1 Searle
  3.2.2 Foucault
  3.2.3 Lo scontro degli opposti
3.3 Atti linguistici: dal silenziamento al contesto di potere
3.4 Orwell: la verità come funzione di potere
3.5 Un‟ipotesi sul rapporto tra linguaggio e realtà

4. La storicità del soggetto: come si è resi ciò che si è
4.1 La durevole inesistenza: dal potere al dominio sovraindividuale
4.2 La nozione di Sfondo in Searle
4.3 La storicità del soggetto in Foucault
4.4 Soggettività ed esperienza
4.5 Come si è resi ciò che si è
4.6 Il pregiudizio a favore del reale: esistenza, esperienza e consistenza

5. Legittimazione e assoggettamento: il contrattualismo comedispositivo linguistico
5.1 Conseguenze politologiche dell'analisi ontologica
5.2 Analisi generale del contrattualismo classico
5.3 Da Kant a Rawls
5.4 Una teoria (circolare) della giustizia
5.5 La teoria delle dominazioni
5.6 Bilancio dell‟analisi e prospettive di sviluppo

6. La libertà in gioco
6.1 Tre accezioni dell'imperativo di autonomia
6.2 Tre possibili atteggiamenti nei confronti del discorso filosofico-giuridico
6.3 Tre possibili dispositivi filosofico-giuridici per l‟azione politica
  6.3.1 Il rispetto come vincolo collaterale alle azioni individuali
  6.3.2 L’autorità legittima come tensione al proprio superamento
  6.3.3 La legittimazione dinamica dello Stato

7. Conclusioni: solo il nulla èconcluso
7.1 Intuizioni, obbiettivi e tattiche
7.2 Guadagni teorici
7.3 Oltre la fine
7.4 Augurio conclusivo

8. Bibliografia

Until the 1960s, governmental limits on speech and expression,
particularly around issues of pornography and obscenity, were
common. These restrictions were enacted to reinforce a set of
standards that had broad support among the American people.
Since the 1960s, we have seen a great expansion of the right to
free speech and expression. Today, however, the libertarian consensus has fractured. The new censorship that favors regulating
hate speech confronts the underlying premises of the old censorship. Rather than comparing and contrasting the libertarian position with the censorship of hate speech position, as is so often
done, in this article, I will compare and contrast two pro-censorship
positions, one group favoring the censorship of hate speech, the
other favoring the censorship of pornography and obscenity. My
purpose is not to advocate for censorship. Rather, my idea is to
examine and explain the different rationales that exist in the two
opposing approaches to censorship, to better judge the merits of
censorship and free speech.

"Rousseau: Ciudadano sin patria", aborda una de las principales inquietudes intelectuales de su autor, a saber, las implicaciones políticas del abandono del concepto teleológico de naturaleza. Al separarse las tendencias opuestas de libertad y autoconservación, que dicho concepto trataba de unificar, surgen dos posiciones políticas antagónicas que tratan de imponerse: la izquierda y la derecha, los "liberals & conservatives". Mientras los primeros representan la emancipación del individuo —el denominado por Freud principio del deseo— los segundos luchan por la seguridad, por el mantenimiento de las condiciones de conservación —el principio de realidad freudiano. La singularidad de Rousseau consiste en haber encarnado de un modo ejemplar ambas tendencias, convirtiéndose en precursor de todas las grandes posiciones políticas de la Modernidad.

Rousseau’s theology, like much of his philosophy, is paradoxical. It comprises both a rejection of traditional Christian dogma—notably original sin—as incommensurate with reason, and a defense of Christianity and political religion as institutions transcending the rationalism of the Enlightenment. His thoughts on religion thus unexpectedly comprise an anti-theological theology. This chapter discusses the private religion that Rousseau espoused in the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar, and the civil religion he described in the last chapter of the Social Contract. Counter-intuitively, it points out that his fame as an anti-theologian derives from his anti-intellectualism and personal mystical inclinations. And it recounts the influence that his religious thought exercised in Europe until the turn of the nineteenth century.

Uno de los propósitos fundamentales de la humanidad es que en el mundo impere la justicia. Representada como una mujer con una balanza y una espada en cada mano, la justicia se define como la concordancia con el derecho vigente. En su representación material la balanza significa el trato igual ante la ley, y la espada simboliza su doble tarea: proteger y sancionar. En términos generales puede decirse que existe una concepción cósmica de la justicia, en la cual ésta es comprendida como orden o medida. Esta idea genérica universal sobre la justicia existió históricamente en la mayoría de las civilizaciones, occidentales y orientales, no sólo en culturas primitivas y de existencia milenaria, sino también en el pueblo hebreo del Antiguo Testamento y en el origen de la cultura griega occidental. Algo es justo cuando su existencia no interfiere con el orden al que pertenece; es justo que cada cosa ocupe su lugar en el universo. La justicia es la concepción que cada época y civilización tiene acerca del sentido de sus normas jurídicas. Es un valor determinado como bien común por la sociedad. Nació de la necesidad de mantener la armonía entre sus integrantes. Es el conjunto de pautas y criterios que establecen un marco adecuado para las relaciones entre personas e instituciones.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Fundamental Political Writings includes the Social Contract, Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, and “Preface to Narcissus.” Each text has been newly translated, and includes a full complement of explanatory notes. The editors’ introduction offers students diverse points of entry into some of the distinctive possibilities and challenges of each of these fundamental texts, as well as an introduction to Rousseau’s life and historical situation, from his early years in Geneva to his final years in relative solitude. Each text is accompanied by images from the original editions. The volume also includes annotated appendices that help students to explore the origins and influences of Rousseau’s work, including excerpts from Hobbes, Pascal, Descartes, Mandeville, Diderot, Voltaire, Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, Joseph de Maistre, Kant, Hegel, and Engels.

Critics accuse Rousseau's works of promoting a passive and dangerous nostalgia in the face of the demands of moral judgment, critical thought, and political negotiation. In Émile and its source texts, however, Rousseau presents two modern heroes who follow their nostalgic pleasure to perceive their freedom of will and present duty to act – to achieve what Kant calls "enlightenment." In "Lettres morales," Rousseau advises Sophie d'Houdetot to act in response to her "voluptuous" remorse for lost, adolescent enjoyment of moral virtue. In Émile, the titular character realizes his autonomy in his nostalgic regret. He must pursue the pastoral dream of independent agrarian community despite understanding the inevitable failure of the political conditions necessary for community. In both cases, Rousseau raises, for non-ideal political theory, important "counter-nostalgic" passions that motivate moral action in compromised socio-political conditions.