History Of Modern Philosophy

The theoreticians of peinture in early modern period, Lodovico Dolce, Roger Piles and Félibien, distinguish this art in three kind of clump: invenction (or composition), drawing and colouring. This sort of partition on its part is yet based on the preliminar basic division between theory (conception) and practice (composition) on the one hand, and realisation (drawing and colouring). If the distinction between drawing and colouring does not effects the theory, maybe we can suppose a petito principii deriving from materialistical thesis: it totally excludes indeed the initial conception to demonstrate its absence or uselessness. The aim of my article is to show...

Con i contributi di: Anthony Kenny · Andreas Speer · Jocelyn Benoist · Francesco Fronterotta · Enrico Berti · Riccardo Chiaradonna · Mauro Zonta · Francesco Marrone · Marco Lamanna · Paul Richard Blum · Siegrid Agostini · Igor Agostini · Alice Ragni · Francesco Campagnola · Jan Čížek · Pietro Montani · Pierluigi Valenza · Antonello D’Angelo · Jean-François Courtine · Marco Damonte · Emmanuel Cattin · Vincent Holzer · Andrea Grillo · Andrea Bellocci · Francesco Valerio Tommasi · Philippe Nouzille

Nossa proposta é investigar como ocorrem as metamorfoses da noção de substância simples no sistema leibniziano, entre Discurso de metafísica, Sistema novo da natureza e a comunicação das substâncias e Monadologia. Trata-se da mesma substância ou são noções diferentes?
Partimos de aporias de sua época e a polêmica entre os métodos modernos e escolásticos. Apontamos as críticas de Leibniz a ambos, partindo das insuficiências modernas aos excessos escolásticos, passando, assim, do campo da física ao campo lógico, em vista das questões metafísicas. Apoiando-se na exposição lógica, acabamos tentando reconstruir, involuntariamente, todo o sistema a partir do princípio de identidade, para conseguir apontar com mais clareza as inovações de Leibniz que reconciliam os dois partidos em sua síntese original.
Ao final, fazemos breves apontamentos particulares sobre cada um dos três textos e tiramos nossas conclusões, se as diferentes expressões da substância simples, nossa questão motriz.

Il saggio presenta una ricostruzione del dibattito storiografico sulla filosofia berkeleiana, a partire dai contemporanei di Berkeley, come Voltaire, Jonathan Swift, David Hume e Samuel Johnson, fino a Karl Raimund Popper e Richard Rorty, passando attraverso autori come Kant, Reid, Priestley, Moore e Russell. Viene infine analizzata la storiografia italiana, nonché le ultime "ricostruzioni" dei filosofi analitici e le interpretazioni "costruttiviste" di filosofi della scienza, percettologi e psicologi novecenteschi. Emerge con forza l'importanza del contributo dell'irlandese Arthur Aston Luce - curatore, con Thomas E. Jessop, dell'edizione di riferimento delle Opere di Berkeley, fino ad oggi.

Il volume si sofferma sulla critica popperiana di Hegel evidenziando come essa manchi di cogliere la lettera e lo spirito della filosofia hegeliana. Esso esamina sia la valutazione popperiana della Dialettica, sia le critiche alla teoria politica del filosofo di Stoccarda, evidenziando una totale incomprensione da parte di Popper dei caposaldi del pensiero di Hegel, incomprensione che si traduce nella creazione di un mero simulacro contro cui Popper scaglia i suoi strali a vuoto. Rimane aperto il discorso se ciò avvenga per difetto di comprensione o di deliberata "falsificazione".

Streszczenie: W poniższej pracy przestawiam koncepcje Thomasa More’a i Niccolo Machiavellego w odniesieniu do poglądów Leo Straussa. Najpierw przeprowadzam analizę poglądów zawartych w Księciu jako przykład rozwiązania nowożytnego, a następnie treści Utopii jako przykładu rozwiązania klasycznego. W kolejnej części pracy pokazuję elementy nowożytne w koncepcji More’a, a także rys historyczny myślenia utopijnego. Tak przeprowadzona analiza ma pokazać, że wbrew temu co pisał Leo Strauss, myślenie nowożytne nie rozwijało się wyłącznie na fundamencie Machiavellego, ale miało także źródło w poglądach More’a.

Abstract: In this paper I want to present the concepts of Thomas More and Niccolo Machiavelli in connection with the beliefs of Leo Strauss. Firstly, I analyze The Prince as an example of the modern solution and then Utopia as an example of the classic solution. In the next part of my work I present modern elements of Thomas More’s concept and the historical view on the utopian thinking. This analysis is to show that, in contrast to Leo Strauss’ beliefs, modern thinking was influenced not only by Machiavelli but also by More.
Słowa kluczowe:

Co-edited and translated with Jacob van Sluis.

Vol 1 of the Edinburgh Edition of the Philosophical Works of François Hemsterhuis

The first ever English translation of François Hemsterhuis’ early series of philosophical letters published during the 1760s and 1770s

This complete edition publishes Hemsterhuis’ 'Letter on an Antique Gemstone', 'Letter on Sculpture', 'Letter on Desires', 'Letter on Man and his Relations' and 'Philosophical Description of the Character of the Late Mr. F. Fagel' chronologically to gradually reveal Hemsterhuis’ complete systematic vision.

These letters are supplemented by three introductions. The first by Peter Sonderen pinpoints the significance of Hemsterhuis’ remarkably influential aesthetics. The second by Jacob van Sluis provides the context to 'Letter on Man and his Relations'. And the third by Gabriel Trop focuses on the importance of these writings in the history of ideas, especially Herder’s translation and ‘Postscript’ to the 'Letter on Desires', Diderot’s commentary on the 'Letter on Man and his Relations' and Goethe’s incorporation of Hemsterhuis’ definition of beauty into his aesthetic reflections.

The book is available here for purchase: https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-the-early-writings-of-francois-hemsterhuis-1762-1773.html

Trabajo para optar al título de Licenciado en Filosofía de la Universidad Pedagógica Nacional. En este se presenta un análisis sobre la estructura de uno de los pasajes más importantes en la Crítica de la Razón Pura, la Deducción Trascendental en la segunda edición, y se presentan algunas consideraciones del mismo.

The present paper intends to focus on the laic dimension of the trinitarian principle, analys-ing – in particular – some passages of Antonio Rosmini’s Theosophy. The main thesis is that in the Italian thinker there is a laic way to introduce Trinity into philosophical dis-course, where “laic” does not mean a rationalistic reduction of the Trinitarian mystery, but – as the etymological meaning suggests – its popular use, which does not make Trinity “embarrassing” for philosophical argumentation. On the contrary, far from being exclusive pre-rogative of theologians, the Trinitarian one is a laic principle that describes the grammar of being and that, therefore, has to be used in ontology as an authentic perspective of thinking, and also as form of thinking itself.

E. Pili, La Trinità è laica. Rosmini e il rapporto tra filosofia e rivelazione, «Quaderni di InSchibbolleth», 12 (2/2019), pp. 173-186

El presente artículo se enfoca en la idea de lo trágico en Marx. Efectúa una comparación entre El Capital y los Manuscritos de economía y filosofía para concluir que la comprensión de lo que sucede con el ser humano bajo el capitalismo pasa por entender su condición trágica. Se sostiene que la tragedia es el conflicto entre el ser humano y las condiciones materiales de vida que él produce; conflicto en cuyo desarrollo el ser humano sacrifica sus fuerzas esenciales con la intención de producir nuevos contenidos de vida para él.

Soren Kierkegaard Lucinda-kritikájának elemzéséből kiindulva azt vizsgálom meg, hogy miben különbözött Schlegel és Kierkegaard iróniával kapcsolatos trópus-használata, milyen metaforák mentén határolódott el a dán filozófus német elődjétől. A hegeli bírálati pontok számbavételével igyekszem árnyalni a Paul de Man-féle interpretációt is. Kierkegaard és Schlegel összehasonlítása során külön hangsúlyt fektetek az éghajlat, a meztelenség, és a restség alakzataira, illetve azok revelációval és szubverzióval kapcsolatos szerepére.

Questo articolo parte dalla ricostruzione del modello aristotelico di amicizia fornita nel ‘Brief of the Art of Rhetorique’ e dai motivi della critica hobbesiana a questo modello per esaminare il modo in cui l’amicizia lavora nel discorso antropologico, etico e politico di Hobbes. In un primo momento mostra che l’amicizia rappresenta un potere e che la specificità dei rapporti amicali è costituita dalla loro natura egualitaria ed extra-contrattuale, nonché dalla corrispondenza di dono e gratitudine attraverso la quale si compie lo scambio di poteri e di onori. In un secondo momento si concentra sull’aspetto morale del problema, mettendo in evidenza il nesso tra l’amicizia e quella capacità di mettersi l’uno al posto dell’altro che costituisce il cuore di tutta la concezione hobbesiana della legge naturale. Infine, sottolinea il possibile pericolo politico dei vincoli particolaristici che l’amicizia è in grado di cementare e dalle forme di cooperazione che essa è in grado di promuovere nonostante e contro lo Stato.

Keywords: Hobbes, amicizia, potere, dono, legge naturale, politica

This study starts from the ‘reconstruction’ of the Aristotelian model of friendship, found in the ‘Brief of the Art of Rhetorique’, and the reasons behind Hobbes’s criticism of this model. It then moves on to examine the way friendship works in Hobbes’s anthropological, ethical and political discourse. First, Hobbes’s discourse shows that friendship represents power, and that the specificity of friendly relationships is their equalitarian and non-contractual nature, as well as, the correspondence of gifts and gratitude through which an exchange of power and honours is achieved. Second, it focuses on the moral aspect of the problem highlighting the link between friendship and the ability to put oneself in another’s shoes, which constitutes the heart of the whole of the Hobbesian conception of natural law. Finally, it emphasises the possible political danger of the bonds which friendship can cement and the forms of cooperation that it is able to promote in spite of and against the State.

Keywords: Hobbes, friendship, power, natural law, politics

Th e degree to which Hobbes's citizenry retains its right to resist sovereign power has been the source of a signifi cant debate. It has been argued by a number of scholars that there is a clear avenue for legitimate rebellion in Hobbes's state, as described in the Leviathan – in this work, Hobbes asserts that subjects can retain their natural right to self-preservation in civil society, and that this represents an inalienable right that cannot, under any circumstances, be transferred to the sovereign. Th e conclusion frequently drawn from this feature of Hobbes's account is that it places a considerable limit on sovereign authority. Th e right to self-preservation has been taken as proof that Hobbes sought to ensure that the sovereign's power relies upon the continual consent of the individuals that make up his or her constituency. I want to examine Hobbes's account of this civil right in Leviathan in order to show that this line of interpretation is ultimately unfounded. While self-preservation results from the individual's own judgment of threats to her personal safety, it is justifi ed in only the most strictly delineated contexts. Judgments regarding the overall peace and security of the state do not, and cannot, fall to individual experiences and judgments. Hobbes is quite adamant that individuals are not appropriate judges of right and wrong action in matters the sovereign legislates.

Le rapport entre Platon et Rousseau est significatif en ce que ces deux philosophes présentent chacun un projet de refonte radicale de la société. L’un fondé sur l’égalité géométrique, telle qu’elle est précisée d’une manière fondamentale à la fin du Gorgias, et développée successivement dans la République et dans les Lois, l’autre fondé sur l’égalité arithmétique, dans le cadre d’un paradigme moderne promouvant l’idée de liberté, en ayant néanmoins perdu de vue le principe d’égalité géométrique. Cette différenciation doit néanmoins être nuancée par le fait que Rousseau, lecteur assidu de Platon, a retenu de son lointain devancier l’idée que la cité doit être un holon vivant (le corps politique). Se pose alors la question des modalités selon lesquelles doit s’établir l’intégration totale de l’individu dans le corps social, et le fait est que l’on s’est souvent demandé si les deux projets ne portaient pas en eux, par la représentation holistique de l'État, les germes théoriques du totalitarisme. Cette question, sitôt posée, se voit assez rapidement résolue par le fait que l’holisme chez ces deux penseurs ne peut aucunement être assimilé au processus de déshumanisation mis en œuvre par les totalitarismes récents de nature industrielle, dans lesquels l’homme a perdu sa dimension d’homo laborans, selon l’expression d’Hannah Arendt. S’il y a un totalitarisme chez Platon, il reste « artisanal » et n’a jamais pu voir le jour, alors que le totalitarisme industriel, lui, a pu malheureusement se concrétiser, comme s’il avait fallu compter sur la puissance des machines pour cela. Le totalitarisme de type artisanal poursuivait la mission d’harmoniser les classes et les individus, le totalitarisme industriel sera systématiquement uniformisateur. Les réflexions de Karl Popper et d’Hannah Arendt ont été sollicitées et discutées pour résoudre cette question récurrente.


The relationship between Plato and Rousseau is meaningful in that these two philosophers each present a plan to radically change society. One based on geometric equality, as it is specified in a fundamental manner at the end of the Gorgias, and developed successively in Republic and in the Laws, the other based on arithmetic equality, in the setting of a modern paradigm promoting the idea of liberty, having nevertheless lost from view the geometric equality principle. This differentiation calls for some nuance in the fact that Rousseau, a regular reader of Plato, kept from his distant predecessor the idea that the city must be a living holon (the political body). One of the issues that was raised is that of the modes according to which the individual's total integration in the social body could be achieved, and the fact is that it has often been wondered if the two plans didn't carry in them, by the holistic representation of the state, the theoretical seeds of totalitarianism. This question, as soon as posed, sees itself answered quickly enough by the fact that the holism in these two thinkers cannot be assimilated by any means to the process of dehumanization put in place by recent totalitarianisms of industrial nature, in which man lost his dimension of homo laborans, according to Hannah Arendt. If there is totalitarianism in Plato, it remains "artisanal" and could never actually have existed, whereas industrial totalitarianism, itself, could unfortunately be established, as if it had been necessary to count on the power of machinery to do it. The artisanal type of totalitarianism wanted to harmonize the classes and individuals, whereas the industrial totalitarianism would be systematically homogenizing. The arguments of Karl Popper and Hannah Arendt have been solicited and have been discussed to solve this recurrent question.

Los "Prolegómenos " de la Aesthetica (1750-1758) de Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten se ofrecen aquí en latín y español.  Primera traducción parcial de esta obra capital de la filosofía moderna, que define y fundamenta el campo de esta disciplina, recogida luego en Estética breve (prólogo, selección, traducción y notas de Ricardo Ibarlucía, Buenos Aires, Excursus, 2014).

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

Translated by J. Colin McQuillan and Alexander G. Cooper.

This is a translation of Mendelssohn’s remarks on “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” They were presented to the Mittwochsgesellschaft shortly before Kant’s essay was published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1784. Mendelssohn begins by clarifying Kant’s distinction between the state of enlightenment (Aufgeklärtheit) and the process of becoming enlightened (Aufklärung), which another member of the Mittwochsgesellschaft—Oberconsistorialrath (O.C.R.) Johann Samuel Diterich—seems not to have understood. Mendelssohn then turns to Kant’s distinction between the public and private uses of reason, which he explains using the distinction between Berufsgeschäften and Außerberufsgeschäften. Berufsgeschäft is an archaic legal term referring to the work associated with one’s profession and the duties of one’s office. Außerberufsgeschäft appears to be a neologism. The terms capture Kant’s distinction between the public and private uses of reason very effectively, because they make it clear that the private use of reason is restricted by the duties associated with the office one holds, while the public use of reason is not bound by any such duties. Mendelssohn accepts the legitimacy of this distinction, but holds that there are cases in which it is right and even necessary to violate the duties associated with public office.

This dissertation concerns two controversial aspects of Descartes’ philosophy. The first is the meaning of the distinction between the material and objective senses of the word “idea.” The second is an alleged tension between the Fifth Meditation’s claim that the real natures are mind-independent and the claim of the Principles that universals are mind-dependent.

In the first chapter, I take up the material sense, and argue against those interpretations which see it as a category for the contentless ontology of ideas. I argue that the textual evidence points to the material sense being Descartes’ category for phenomenological description of how things seem to be to a given mind when it has a given idea. In particular, I argue that he deploys the material sense in his discussions of abstractions and that this points to the material sense being a category for content that lacks existential implication for the extramental world.

In the second chapter, I take up the ontology of the real natures, and suggest that there is no tension between the Fifth Meditation and the Principles because Descartes accepts two things under the term “nature,” namely, universals and individual essences. I suggest Descartes is committed to Platonism about individual essences in the Fifth Meditation, and that in the Principles he is concerned only with universals, about which he is a conceptualist. I further suggest that individual essences play key roles in both singular and universal thought.

In the third chapter, I take up the objective sense, and the widespread interpretation of this sense of ideas as concerning current presentational or phenomenological content. I suggest that this account struggles with cases where there is stability in the object of thought paired with changes in the associated phenomenology. I propose that we ought to reject a straightforward equation of the objective sense with current presentational content, and instead adopt a scheme according to which what has objective being in an idea is the sum total of thinkable, essential features of the object, and that when an idea is clear and distinct, what we perceive has objective being in the idea.

Resumen: El “detestable misterio de la iniquidad” sólo encontrará su fin el día en el que “el último noble de la Tierra sea colgado con las tripas del último cura”. A partir de esta elocuente afirmación, podría concebirse a la Mémoire des pensées et des sentiments de Jean Meslier como un intento filosófico por desmitificar y derrumbar los fundamentos teológico-políticos sobre los que sostiene la dominación. Indicado esto, es posible señalar que la presente comunicación se ofrece como una primera reconstrucción de dicho intento, la que se realiza a su vez desde una perspectiva particular: la que pretende vincular los argumentos ateos y anticlericales de Meslier con las consideraciones escépticas realizadas por Michel de Montaigne.

Az értékkonzervatívok igenis fontosnak tartanak bizonyos a priori mércéket. Ám kérdés, honnét tudják ezeket "levezetni", ha nem engedik be az elméletet a politika világába. A józan észre hivatkozó konzervatív gondolkodásmód e kérdésre kínál választ. Nem hajlandó feladni az értékalapú politizálást, de tartózkodik attól is, hogy ideológiai konstrukciókat erőltessen a gyakorlati politika világára. Az érvelés lényege, hogy rendelkezünk olyan, mindnyájunkban fellelhető érzékenységgel (sense), amelyben elődeink tapasztalatai összegződnek, s amely másrészt biztosítja a politikai közösségünk nyilvános diskurzusának implicit logikáját. Ez a konzervatív elképzelés azt vallja, a józan ész fogalmával jelölt politikai tudás-forma nem mindenkor érvényes, fogalmilag meghatározható elvont elvek formájában ad gyakorlati eligazítást, hanem kicsit ahhoz hasonlít, ahogy a hagyományos elképzelés szerint az erények képesek befolyásolni döntéseinket és irányítani cselekvéseinket: mindenfajta életidegen teoretizálás nélkül. Az alábbi dolgozat arra tesz kísérletet, hogy néhány, bizonyos fokig esetlegesen kiválasztott szerző vonatkozó nézeteire utalva felidézze, milyen elgondolások szolgáltak a józan észt középpontba állító gondolkodásmód mögött. Kiindulópontul Oakeshottnak a tapasztalatról és gyakorlatról vallott elképzelése fog szolgálni. Ezután-ahogy eszmetörténeti előadásaiban Oakeshott maga is-visszakeresem a józan észre utaló politikai gondolkodásmód két antik előzményét (Oakeshott 2006). Arisztotelész vonatkozó elképzeléseiből fogok kiindulni, majd megmutatom, miként telítődik politikai tartalommal Cicerónál a sensus communis fogalma. Mindez azért fontos, mert az antik előzményekre való hivatkozás visszatérő elem a modern nyugati intellektuális konzervativizmusban. Ezt követően Vicóval, Shaftesburyvel és Burke-kel fogunk foglalkozni, a józan ész fogalmának egymástól eltérő, de közös, antik forrásokat használó, kora modern képviselőivel, akiknek vonatkozó elképzelései maguk fontos állomást jelentettek a józan ész modern, konzervatív újrahasznosításának folyamatában. míg azonban Burke szerepét senki nem vonná kétségbe a konzervativizmus születése kapcsán, Vico vagy akár Shaftesbury konzervatív pedigréje egyáltalán nem evidens. A jelen dolgozat mégis emellett érvel, továbbgondolva az Isaiah Berlin és Mark Lilla értelmezése által fémjelzett irányt, s összhangban Gadamer vonatkozó elképzeléseivel. A dolgozat egy olyan konzervatív hagyomány felmutatása, amely a józan észnek mérce-szerepet szán, nem ellentétesen a természetjog korábbi, klasszikus tanításával, ám el kívánja kerülni a klasszikus természetjog skolasztikus és doktriner jellegét. E tekintetben a józan észnek a prudencia erényéhez kapcsolódó, s így antik forrásokig visszanyúló, a kora modernitásban újra elővett, majd jó időre háttérbe szoruló értelmezése lesz irányadó.