Shahid Rahman
Born: 20/10/1956, New Delhi (India). German and Argentinean Citizen
Full-professor (classe exceptionnelle) of logic and epistemology at the Université de Lille-Nord-pas-de-Calais, Sciences Humaines et Sociales. He is also researcher at the UMR-CNRS 8163 : STL. Member (2016-2018) of the Conseil Scientifique du Réseau national des Maisons des Sciences de l’Homme. Member of the commission of the Institute Eric Weil, Director (for the French side) of the ANR-DFG Franco-German project 2012-2015 (Lille (MESHS)/Konstanz, Prof M. Armgardt): Théorie du Droit et Logique/Jurisprudenz und Logik.
Studies (in Europe): Masters in Philosophy, Mathematics, Philology (Erlangen-Nürnberg Universität) 1986-1989; PhD in Philosophy, Psychology, Philology , thesis on dialogical logic and constructive mathematics, 1990-1993; Habilitation in Philosophy (for the grade of professor), Universität des Saarlandes, 1994-1997.
Professional Experience (in Europe): Wissenschatlicher Mitarbeiter, Universität des Saarlandes, 1996-98. Researcher at the Max-Planck Institut für Informatik and at the Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz, 1997-2000. Acting Director of the Department of Philosophy, Universität des Saarlandes, 1999.
Research-Field: Prof. Rahman works span both philosophy of logic and its history, including a dialogical perspective on Constructive Type Theory. He is the leading researcher in the field of the dialogical conception of logic to which he contributed with publications in, among other fields, non-classical logics, legal reasoning, Aristotle, Arabic Logic and Epistemology.
Prof. Rahman is the main editing director of two collections of books in Springer, namely, Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science (more than 40 volumes edited so far) ; and Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, Perspectives from the Social Sciences and the Humanities. He is also main editor director of three other collections in College Publications, London, King’s College : Cahiers de Logique et Epistémologie, Dialogues, Cuadernos de Lógica, Epistemología y Lenguaje. His most recent books include N. Clerbout/S. Rahman: (1) Linking Game-Theoretical Approaches with Constructive Type Theory. Dialogical Strategies, CTT Demonstrations and the Axiom of Choice, Dordrecht, Springer, 2015; and S. Rahman/Z. McConaughey/A. Klev/N.Clerbout: Immanent Reasoning or Equality in Action, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018. (2) 2019: (En Arab) The dialogical approach to intuitionistic, classical and basic modal logic. Including a brief introduction to the dialogical take on Constructive Type Theory.. Avec Farid Zidani, Juan Redmond, Yasmina Kadoum, Beirut: Dar Al Farabi. (3) 2019:Inferences by Parallel Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence. Al-Shīrāzī’s Insights into the Dialectical Constitution of Meaning and Knowledge. With Muhammad Iqbal and Youcef Soufi. Cham: Springer.
Supervisors: Prof. Kuno Lorenz. Universität des Saarlandes. Germany
Phone: 003332041700
Full-professor (classe exceptionnelle) of logic and epistemology at the Université de Lille-Nord-pas-de-Calais, Sciences Humaines et Sociales. He is also researcher at the UMR-CNRS 8163 : STL. Member (2016-2018) of the Conseil Scientifique du Réseau national des Maisons des Sciences de l’Homme. Member of the commission of the Institute Eric Weil, Director (for the French side) of the ANR-DFG Franco-German project 2012-2015 (Lille (MESHS)/Konstanz, Prof M. Armgardt): Théorie du Droit et Logique/Jurisprudenz und Logik.
Studies (in Europe): Masters in Philosophy, Mathematics, Philology (Erlangen-Nürnberg Universität) 1986-1989; PhD in Philosophy, Psychology, Philology , thesis on dialogical logic and constructive mathematics, 1990-1993; Habilitation in Philosophy (for the grade of professor), Universität des Saarlandes, 1994-1997.
Professional Experience (in Europe): Wissenschatlicher Mitarbeiter, Universität des Saarlandes, 1996-98. Researcher at the Max-Planck Institut für Informatik and at the Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz, 1997-2000. Acting Director of the Department of Philosophy, Universität des Saarlandes, 1999.
Research-Field: Prof. Rahman works span both philosophy of logic and its history, including a dialogical perspective on Constructive Type Theory. He is the leading researcher in the field of the dialogical conception of logic to which he contributed with publications in, among other fields, non-classical logics, legal reasoning, Aristotle, Arabic Logic and Epistemology.
Prof. Rahman is the main editing director of two collections of books in Springer, namely, Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science (more than 40 volumes edited so far) ; and Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, Perspectives from the Social Sciences and the Humanities. He is also main editor director of three other collections in College Publications, London, King’s College : Cahiers de Logique et Epistémologie, Dialogues, Cuadernos de Lógica, Epistemología y Lenguaje. His most recent books include N. Clerbout/S. Rahman: (1) Linking Game-Theoretical Approaches with Constructive Type Theory. Dialogical Strategies, CTT Demonstrations and the Axiom of Choice, Dordrecht, Springer, 2015; and S. Rahman/Z. McConaughey/A. Klev/N.Clerbout: Immanent Reasoning or Equality in Action, Dordrecht: Springer, 2018. (2) 2019: (En Arab) The dialogical approach to intuitionistic, classical and basic modal logic. Including a brief introduction to the dialogical take on Constructive Type Theory.. Avec Farid Zidani, Juan Redmond, Yasmina Kadoum, Beirut: Dar Al Farabi. (3) 2019:Inferences by Parallel Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence. Al-Shīrāzī’s Insights into the Dialectical Constitution of Meaning and Knowledge. With Muhammad Iqbal and Youcef Soufi. Cham: Springer.
Supervisors: Prof. Kuno Lorenz. Universität des Saarlandes. Germany
Phone: 003332041700
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Stressing the Dialogical origins of Philosophy and Conceptual Thinking
Papers by Shahid Rahman
Stressing the Dialogical origins of Philosophy and Conceptual Thinking
Suhrawardī’s notion of generic Plenitude provides a fine analysis: on the relation between sufficiern reason, Plenitude and free-will.
In a nutshell, whereas sufficient reason assures that every attribution of necessary contingency must be attributed potentially, Plenitude assures that it must actualize, but not necessarily by each individual.
In contrast, when Plenitude involves non-acquired capacities such as dispositions, causality does distribute individually, and determinism follows, but this of course does not contravene free-will in general.
• the book Inferences by Parallel Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence. Al-Shīrāzī’s Insights into the Dialectical Constitution of Meaning and Knowledge. With Muhammad Iqbal and Youcef Soufi. Springer, 2019 in print,
and the papers
• 2019. "Ibn Ḥazm on Heteronomous Imperatives. A Landmark in the History of the Logical Analysis of Legal Norms ". With W. Young and F. Zidani. In M. Armgardt et alii (ed). Legal Reasoning Contemporary and Ancient Perspectives, Springer. Forthcoming.
• 2019. "Legal Reasoning and Some Logic After All. The Lessons of the Elders". With S. Rahman, J. G. Granström and A. Farjami. In D. Gabbay, L. Magnani, W. Park and A-V. Pietarinen (eds.) Natural Arguments. A Tribute to John Woods. In print.
However, here and there, informed by recent discussions with Hassan Tahiri and Walter E. Young I added some new remarks and (initial) reflections on how to embed the subject of the papers (the parallelism between natural and deontic necessitation) in the dialectical framework of the theory of the occasioning factor (the Islamic counterpart to notion of ratio legis of Roman Law), the main subject of the book.
Sobre Contenido, Arquitectura Conceptual y Juegos al Alcance Humano.
Notas para una Lectura Contemporánea
Shahid Rahman
Université de Lille (Francia), UMR 8163: STL, ADA
Resumen:
En los albores del siglo XX, cuando la formalización de la matemática alcanza su cúspide, dos preguntas filosóficas de raíces venerables agitaron las discusiones en torno a sus fundamentos, una, de índole metafísica-ontológica y otra de índole epistemológica, a saber:
• qué es un objeto matemático y
• qué constituye conocimiento matemático.
Henri Poincaré, uno de los más destacados matemáticos del siglo y ciertamente de la historia; prefigura con su respuesta a la primera pregunta la teoría intuicionista de Leo Brouwer:
• el objeto matemático es una construcción.
Respecto a la segunda pregunta su respuesta:
• el conocimiento matemático consiste en el desarrollo de una Arquitectura conceptual que le otorga su contenido propio
no parece ser haber sido comprendida o apreciada en su época. Ambas respuestas conducen a Poincaré a rechazar la analiticidad de las matemáticas, la reducción de ésta a la lógica y la concepción puramente sintáctica (no interpretada) del lenguaje matemático, proveniente del formalismo de David Hilbert que se impone rápidamente después de la creación de la metamatemática por Kurt Gödel; Paul Bernays y Alfred Tarski. Más aun, Poincaré propone que la noción de prueba rigurosa en matemáticas sea concebida, no como una pura derivación formal, sino en analogía con juegos al alcance humano, como la construcción de un lenguaje con contenidos al alcance humano. Construcción, Arquitectura y lenguaje con contenidos al alcance humano establecen; de acuerdo a Poincaré, un entramado por medio del cual se define el concepto de intuición matemática.
En la literatura reciente sobré Poincaré y su debate con Bertrand Russell y otros logicistas se encuentran trabajos que discuten la relación entre la respuesta ontológica y la epistemológica y proponen pensar la Arquitectura como la construcción de una estructura conceptual y proposicional. El nuevo estructuralismo en filosofía de las matemáticas parece encontrar sus raíces en Poincaré. Sin embargo, no hay detalles de cómo concebir el desarrollo de una tal Arquitectura. Más precisamente algunas de las teorías contemporáneas en filosofía de las matemáticas como el estructuralismo de Stewart Shapiro, no conciben la estructura como una construcción sino que parten de una idea realista de estructura: la estructura matemática es un objeto abstracto platónico, ante rem. .
Los objetivos principales de mi presentación, que en realidad busca sentar las bases de un nuevo proyecto de investigación, es defender la idea que la noción de Arquitectura conceptual de Poincaré puede ser elaborada en el contexto de una reconstrucción del programa Constructivista de Erlangen por medio de la teoría constructiva de tipos actual desarrollada por Per Martin-Löf. Es más, intentaré mostrar que la reconstrucción mencionada, si se implementa dentro de un cuadro dialógico, ofrece
(i) una nueva perspectiva sobre el argumento de Poincaré contra la analiticidad de las matemáticas – si el tiempo lo permite estudiaré el caso del axioma de elección que es un teorema en la teoría constructiva de tipos.
(ii) una solución al desafío que presenta para toda teoría lógico-matemática constructiva la introducción de operadores que trivializan la teoría (tonk).
(ii) una nuevo enfoque a la tesis filosófica de Poincaré de que la Arquitectura de las Matemáticas requiere el desarrollo de un lenguaje con contenidos al alcance de las capacidades humanas.
Ciertamente que el proyecto es de envergadura , sin embargo es fascinante. El punto de vista dinámico en la lógica y las matemáticas ya ha dado frutos en la intersección entre lógica; computación y lenguaje, es ahora el momento de explorar sus posibilidades en los fundamentos de las matemáticas tanto en su contenido matemático como filosófico: conocimiento es conocimiento de contenidos después de todo.
La idea general es de vincular el punto de vista dinámico con la convicción de Poincaré que las matemáticas son el resultado de la actividad creadora de la imaginación humana en el mismo sentido que la filosofía lo es.
(Closure talk (30 October 2011) at the
/International Conference: *Significance and Interpretation*/ in the context of the project*/ Knowledge based Society/)
Baia Mare (România) , 27-30 October 2011
In classical India, Jain philosophers developed a theory of viewpoints (naya-vãda) according to which any statement is asserted always within and dependent upon a given epistemic perspective or viewpoint that on one hand restricts its interpretation scope and on the other hand will render the conditions for the assertion of the statement at stake.
The Jainas furnished this theory of knowledge with an (epistemic) theory of disputation that takes into account the viewpoint in which the main thesis has been stated. In a recent joint paper with Nicolas Clerbout and Marie-Hélène Gorisse just published in the Journal of Philosophical Logic we developed a dialogical reconstruction of such a theory formulated in an argumentative frame: the idea is not to understand jain theory of knowledge as the mere addition logic+epistemology+argumentation, but rather as a logic based on a notion of meaning that is exclusively based on argumentative notions. In fact we centred our study in the work of tenth century jain philosopher Siddharsigani however in her PHD dissertation Marie-Hélène Gorisse showed that is also applies to the work of Prabachandra (of the same century) and it does seem that the general features I will talk about are shared if not by all at least by most of the jain philosophers.
In nowadays terms, it would be quite natural to understand the notion of viewpoint from a modal perspective. Certainly, the viewpoint indexes are not part of the object language. Indeed, viewpoints are implicit epistemic contexts that bound the assertion of statements, not operators that extend the set of logical constants. Moreover, each viewpoint represents a type of epistemic access to objects of the domain of discourse. This (epistemic) type defines a precise frame of the way assertions involving descriptions of those objects are to be interpreted and justified. Thus, each viewpoint is not to be seen just as a set of propositions (as in the standard notion of possible world) but rather as a whole epistemological, ontological and logical Weltanschauung. Accordingly
• each viewpoint should be thought as a set of secenarios with their own logic and epistemology. That is, as set of scenarios compatible with one particular type of knowledge
• there must be rules that regulate not only how to go from one scenario to the other but also from one scenario that constitutes the set of a given view point to the scenario of a different one.
Nevertheless, the most striking feature of the jain pluralistic theory of knowledege is to reach a complete knowledge, a knowledge encompassing somehow all the main diverging viewpoints. This is as the base of the famous story of 5 blind men unable to realize that each of the different parts they are touching constitute an elephant. Thus, the issue at stake is not only to be able to discriminate each each point of view but rather to attempt to see them as constituting positions in an overall a structure: complete or real knowledge amounts to realizing that one give point of view is only one of the positions of a whole structure. But this agrees with one of the most recent conceptions of modal logic or more generally intentionality: intentional reasoning is about reasoning in a structure. And here we are at the very core of my presentation that amounts:
- To the discussion of a structure that admits such a plurality of interpretative view points. We will see that the jain epistemological structure offers a new metalogical concept for epistemic (or more generally for modal) structures that does not reduce neither to validity nor to satisfyability and that we in Lille, following a suggestion of Tero Tulenheimo, call gobal satisfiability.
-
- To the study of a notion of individual dynamic enough to adapt to each of the viewpoints.
The point of the exercise is to see what we can learn nowadays from the Jain approach to multiple interpretation in the context of a theory of knowledge.
-convention for research and teaching between the universities of
Libreville and Lille3 and in the context of a common project supported by the "Agence universitaire de la Francophonie AUF) , section Afrique central"
about "Philosophie, logique et autres formes épistémologiques dans les
traditions orales africaines Vers une logique anthropologique" I was
invited by the university Omar Bongo at Libreville both as
speaker at the workshop on " Philosophie et Cadres Sémantiques des
Traditions Orales", with the particpation of the universities of
Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée, Université Congo Brazzaville and
Université Congo RDC; and
as "professeur invité" with the objective to teach 17 hours al the level
of L3 : "Philosophie" and at the level of Masters " Logique et
Epistémologie" (in fact the whole of the costs of the travelling and the
stay were overtaken byt the AUF-project and the University Omar Bongo)
The experience yielded a stimulating interchange at the research and
teaching level and motivated to attempt to extend our conventions
to other African universities such as the unviersity of Congo
Brazavillle, who has some researchers engaged in the topic of
argumentation, and to continue our project with the aim to work
towards the development and building of an international institute on
"Argumentation, Language and Knowldege in the African Traditions"
You find herewith a photo with some of the students of L3 ... a very
active and intelligent group of young students!
shahid rahman
Denials, Refutations, Negations and the Constitution of Arguments
(Argumenter avec le NON
Dénégation, réfutation, négation et la notion de Argument)
Shahid Rahman
(Université de Lille, UMR: 8163, STL)
(Draft 29 April 2011)
Abstract:
The main aim of the paper is to study acts of denials (the dual of acts of assertion) and negation-operators in argumentation contexts. In fact I would like to explore the systematic process by the means of which an act of denial (such as denying that a given sentence holds) launches an argumentation process and how it relates to a sentence building negation-operator (such as ~ ) – the latter can be subject of an act of denial and constitute the main claim of a subsequent argument. .
The notion of denial I am aiming at does not include refusal of proposals, however it shares with such refusals the feature that the result is not the negation of a sentence. If I make the proposal “If you come to the cinema with me, I will give you a kiss” and you answer “No thank you very much!” you are in fact turning down a proposal and this act is not equivalent to the negation of the conditional sentence involved in the proposal: turning down my proposal is not equivalent at all with “You come to the cinema and I do not give you a kiss”.
More precisely, I will develop the idea that some basic acts of denial are constitutive of an important kind of argument – I will call those acts of denials antagonistic denials and the correspondent arguments antagonistic arguments: There is no antagonistic argument without a main claim, there is no main claim of an antagonistic argument without the corresponding act of denial of an assertion. In other words antagonistic arguments occur when there is an initial assertion that becomes a claim (the claim that the content of the initial assertion act can be grounded) by the very act of denying it and this interaction triggers the mutual interchange of defences and challenges. The process by which the initial assertion becomes a claim requires the willingness of the player, called the Proponent, to accept the commitment to ground the sentence involved in the act of denial of the contender (the Opponent).
It is important to point out that the result of an antagonistic denial is not a sentence but an interactive process called argument (the result of an argumentation process). When the result of an act of denial is a sentence then negation-operators come into scene. The various negation-operators are the result of casting an act of denial into a sentence (in the object language). These sentences however are not anymore the content of an act of denial but the content of a negative act of assertion that can be subject of claims and antagonistic denials. While antagonist denials trigger an argumentation process, negation-operators are components of an argument.
Shahid Rahman
(draft 29 April 2011)
Abstract: The standard logical approaches to model argumentation forms that involve defeasibility stress either the point on the non monotonic property of the turn-style or introduce a specific conditional (or a combination of the two). In a game-theoretic approach this means that either it is a property of winning strategies or it is about the rules that define a new logical constant (particle rules). In the present paper we will make use of an alternative to the approaches mentioned about available to the dialogical approach. The dialogical approach, as developed in the appendix, distinguishes between
• the rules defining the constants (local meaning),
• the rules that determine how to play (global meaning) and
• the rules that delineate the ways to win (strategic level) if winning is possible
• the notion of winning at play level from winning at the strategic level
In this context, defeasible reasoning is about introducing some restrictions on the rules on how to play (global meaning), it consists neither in introducing a new conditional (at the local level) nor in changing the winning-strategies. According to our view, defeasibility principle involves semantic features at the global level. More precisely, according to the dialogical approach, defeasibility amounts to the task of verifying that the proponent’s thesis is compatible with the last concession(s) introduced in the play. Notice that the theory of meaning underlying dialogical logic provides a uniform semantics that though it is neither model-theoretic non-proof-theoretic can capture the features of both of those approaches within one frame.
Moreover, this approach allows to distinguish John Pollock’s justification of a belief relative to the actual defeasible reasoning at a given stage from warrant which assumes the set of all possible inferences that can be drawn by an idealized player at a given stage. In the dialogical framework, while warrant corresponds to the strategic level (triggered by the extensive form of the play at a given stage) justification corresponds to the play level. Precisely the dialogical level where the semantics is generated and where Pollock’s notion of multiple assignments find its natural place.
It should be also pointed out that the dialogical framework provides to the development defeasible reasoning a level beyond the one of play and strategy: the level of cycles linked to the notion of dialogue-defineteness Dialogical defineteness is the dialogical way to deal with Church’s theorem on the non-decidability of first-order logic.
The analysis of defeasible reasoning within the dialogical framework should help to build a link between the approaches of default-logic and the argument-based approach initiated by John Pollock [1987], which defines notions like argument, counterargument, attack and defeat, and defines consequence notions in terms of the interaction of arguments for and against certain conclusions.
Shahid Rahman
(Université de Lille, UMR: 8163, STL)
Talk at the workshop on "Proofs and Dialogues" organized by the Wilhelm-Schickard Institut für Informatik. Tübigngen, 25-27 february 2011
Abstract
The dialogical framework is an approach to meaning that provides an alternative to both the model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical semantics.
The dialogical approach to logic is not a logic but a semantic rule-based framework where different logics could be developed, combined or compared. But are there any constraints? Can we introduce rules ad libitum to define whatever logical constant? In the present paper I will explore the first conceptual moves towards the notion of Dialogical Harmony.
Crucial for the dialogical approach are the following points
1. The distinction between local (rules for logical constants) and global meaning (included in the structural rules)
2. The player independence of local meaning
3. The distinction between the play level (local winning or winning of a play) and the strategic level (global winning; or existence of a winning strategy).
In order to highlight these specific features of the dialogical approach to meaning I will discuss the dialogical analysis of tonk, some tonk-like operators and the negation of the logic of first-degree entailment .
and the Dynamics of Public Announcement
Sebastian Magnier and Shahid Rahman
(Université de Lille, UMR: 8163 (STL)
In some recent papers [Thi08], [Thi10] and [Thi11] underlines the fact that the study of the notion of conditional right of the young Leibniz already shows the start of the interaction of logical and episte-mological perspectives characteristic of his mature work.
In this context, the originality of Leibniz’ proposal is to provide a logical analysis of the notion of conditional right. The idea behind is that conditional rights such be understood as a special kind of conditional sentences.
The main aim of our paper is to implement Thiercelin’s thorough insights on Leibniz’s analysis of the conditional right in the framework of a dialogical approach to the Logic of Public Announcement [vDvdHK08]
.
According to our view, on one hand:
• PAL furnishes a dynamic epistemic operator which models communication exchange between different agents that seems to be very close to Leibniz understanding of the dynamics between the truth of a proposition and the knowledge of the truth of that proposition (Leibniz calls the latter certification of its truth);
on the other hand, the dialogical approach provides:
• a semantics for the dynamic epistemic operator in the context of conditional right by means of which (i) the exchange between agents leading to a public announcement amounts to the (con-tractual) interaction of commitments of both the benefactor and the beneficiary of a condi-tional right (ii) the notion of certification is understood as an action, namely as a move where the beneficiary asks the benefactor to stand to his commitments, (iii) some restrictions specific to the logical nature of the head and the tail of the conditional right can be implemented by combining PAL with some features of linear logic within the same theory of meaning.
Coyoacan. In front of one of the oldest city halls of the Spanish colonial times in Latinoamerica
I am certianly involved in the teachings and propose systematic and historic studies in the intereface between knowledge and meaning, in my case, with a strong logical perspective
on philosophy of mathematics; philosophy of logic; cognition, philosophy of sicences, philosophy of language and epistemology, philosophy of law, argumentation theory. However, as apparent by the description, neither the teachings nor the research-subjects are confined to that fields. In fact the philosophical fields covered by the masters are very broad including contemporary perspectives on ancient philosophy, and French philosophy
It is totally based on existing literature. It constitutes chapter II of the book Immanent Reasoning by Rahman/McConaughey/Klev/Clerbout (2018), Springer
« Ce livre offre aux non spécialistes une introduction à la fois claire et précise de l’œuvre décisive de Gottlob Frege. La plume de Markus Stepanians nous guide au cœur du réseau fascinant qu’a élaboré cet esprit, l’un des plus lucides de la philosophie contemporaine, au carrefour de la philosophie des mathématiques, de la logique et du langage. La pensée de Frege, que beaucoup reconnaissent aujourd’hui comme étant le père de la philosophie analytique, est malheureusement toujours loin d’être apprécié à sa juste valeur dans la littérature francophone. »
En guise de préface:
Frege par lui-même
Par Shahid Rahman
L’œuvre de Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) compte parmi les œuvres capitales de la philosophie contemporaine et elle constitue le pilier de la philosophie analytique.
En effet, si à l’origine l’œuvre de Frege partage des intérêts et des fondements théoriques avec l’école de Franz Brentano et de Edmund Husserl, elle a fini par prendre un cours différent et original qui a jeté les fondements de la philosophie analytique. Une philosophie dans laquelle, comme l’a bien signalé Michael Dummett , l’analyse logique du langage est considérée comme l’unique accès possible à la pensée. Cette idée permet à Dummett de proposer la même méthode d’analyse comme pont entre la science et la philosophie. La science est dès lors conçue comme un ensemble de phrases (sous mode assertorique) qui expriment des propositions, et la philosophie de la science devient ainsi l’étude des relations logiques entre ces propositions. Science et philosophie retrouvent par là même les relations internes qui s’étaient évanouies entre les cimes et les abîmes du post-kantisme. En outre, à travers l’œuvre de Frege, la logique retrouve le rôle aristotélicien d’instrument (organon) pour la re-cherche des propositions qui fondent les théories scientifiques. Frege comprend une telle fondation comme le processus logique par lequel se trouve établi le lien avec l’objet ultime auquel réfèrent les propositions: l’objet vérité. En somme, la science, selon Frege, c’est le lieu où logique et vérité se rejoignent; sa philosophie est l’analyse qui met en évidence une telle jonction.
La singularité de l’œuvre de Frege que nous venons de souligner est telle qu’il est très facile de succomber à la tentation de l’aborder à partir de ses résultats et de ses conséquences, et ainsi d’expliquer son sens de l’extérieur. On part par exemple de la philosophie du langage ou de la philosophie de la science contemporaines, ou encore de la naissance d’une nouvelle philosophie de la mathématique, voire du débat actuel qui oppose réalistes platoniciens, réalistes modérés, conceptualistes, antiréalistes et pragmatistes, pour en venir à une qualification et à une classification censées situer l’œuvre de Frege dans la mosaïque de la pensée contemporaine. Markus Stepanians, l’auteur de la présente et excellente introduction à l’œuvre de Gottlob Frege, n’est pas tombé dans ce travers. Ce qui distingue le travail de Markus Stepanians de toutes les autres introductions, et qui justifie que le public de langue française y ait aujourd’hui accès, outre l’évidente nécessité d’une œuvre de cette qualité en français, est précisément de proposer au lecteur une interprétation interne .
Dans d’autres exposés célèbres de l’œuvre de Frege, un programme philosophique bien déterminé guide la lecture, parfois au détriment de la compréhension de la dynamique interne de la théorie de Frege . En effet, certains commentateurs entendent montrer que Frege était un philosophe du langage, d’autres, qu’il était un mathématicien, d’autres encore, qu’il était un kantien, d’autres enfin, qu’il était un platonicien. En s’en tenant à une interprétation interne qui s’oppose aux tentatives de ces commentateurs, Markus Ste-panians nous présente une introduction dans laquelle la genèse et le développement de la pensée de Frege sont considérés comme un entrecroisement de connexions systématiques. Par exemple, Markus Stepanians ne se contente pas d’exposer la théorie du concept de nombre de Frege, ainsi que sa philosophie générale du langage (sens et référence), il montre comment la dynamique interne de la théorie de Frege conduit celui-ci du premier aspect de ses recherches (théorie du nombre) au second (philosophie du langage), ainsi que la manière dont ces deux aspects se connectent avec le projet général de sa philosophie. Cette stratégie fait du présent livre une véritable introduction pour le lecteur non initié qui, sans elle, aurait certainement du mal à comprendre les liens profonds tissés par Frege entre les fondements de l’arithmétique, la logique, la sémantique et la philosophie du langage que Markus Stepanians présente avec précision et concision.
1.. Un aperçu général à partir de l’Organon, notamment des Premiers analytiques d’Aristote. S. Rahman et M. K. Akue Adotevi.
Cette premiére partie du document a pour seul but de donner un bref aperçu de la syllogistique traditionnelle à des fins d'enseignement dans les cours de première année de philosophie. Aucune prétention à l'originalité ici, une telle systématisation se retrouve dans les introductions classiques à la logique, comme Luce (1958), Cohen et Nagel (1968) et tant d'autres après les travaux marquants de ce dernier.
En fait, on est convaincu par le travail de Kurt Ebbinghaus (1964, French Trans. 2016), basé sur le travail d'approche preuve-théoretique de Paul Lorenzen que la Syllogistique d'Aristote n'est pas un système axiomatique mais plutôt un système de règles d'inférence - cette approche a été plus tard promu par John Corcoran (1972, 1974) et Timothy Smiley (1073) (dans la partie III du document, il y a un article comparant l'approche d'Ebbinghaus à celle de Corcoran et montrant comment le travail d'Ebbinghaus est plus proche des textes aristotéliciens.)
• Plus précisément, tel que développé dans la troisième partie de la présente étude, a notre avis, le raisonnement derrière l'établissement des formes d'inférence valides de chaque figure, doit être compris sous l'arrière-plan dialectique des Topiques.
2. La Reconstruction Inférentialiste de K. Ebbinghaus (1964) comparée avec la Reconstruction de J. Corcoran (1972) :
C. Lion et S. Rahman (2018). “Aristote et la question de la completude”. Dans “Philosophie antique”, n°18, pp. 219-243
3. (In English) Syllogisme à la Lumière des Régles Dialectiques des Topiques, inclueant Régles pour Ecthèse, réduction indirecte, réduction à la à la prèmiere figure.
Extraits de
M. Crubellier, Z. McConaughey, M. Marion, S. Rahman (2018) : "Dialectic, The Dictum de Omni and Ecthesis”. History and Philosophy of Logic., vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 207-233.,
Z. McConaughey (2021): Aristotle, Science and the Dialectician's Activity. A Dialogical Approach to Aristotle's Logic. PhD-Université de Lille et
S. Rahman et A. Seck (2022) : Suhrawardī’s Stance on Modalities and his Logic of Presence. Talk presented at the Workshop on Arabic Logic in honour of Tony Street University of California, Berkeley, 24-25 April 2022.
aimed at first year students of philosophy
• Tanto las matemáticas como la lógica se caracterizan por ser ciencias en las cuales conocimiento y significado se adquieren por demostración.
• La lógica se distingue como una teoría normativa, es decir como una ciencia que proporciona los fundamentos conceptuales, los fundamentos filosóficos, de la ciencia demostrativa.
Dichas perspectivas dieron y siguen dando lugar a posiciones antagónicas. Sobre toda la segunda perspectiva, cuya fuente principal sea muy probablemente el texto de los Analytica Posteriora. A los extremos de tales controversias encontramos posiciones que o bien niegan la distinción entre lógica y matemáticas, o entienden teoría en una sentido puramente sintáctico y formal o en un sentido totalmente informal, empírico y desprovisto de toda normatividad.
Hacia 1960, Paul Lorenzen, al que pronto se unió Kuno Lorenz, puso en marcha en Erlangen el proyecto, llamado el Constructivismo de Erlangen, desarrollado en torno a su núcleo conceptual, la Lógica Dialógica, que cuestionaba las principales ideas históricas y sistématicas subyacentes a las polémicas mencionadas. En efecto Lorenzen recordó que el proyecto aristotélico debía leerse sobre el trasfondo de la teoría dialéctica de los Tópica, tan descuidada, salvo contadas excepciones, por las principales corrientes tanto de los lógicos como de los historiadores de la filosofía de la época.
De hecho, según el punto de vista dialógico, el nacimiento de la lógica como teoría de la demostración, la aparición misma de pensamiento conceptual, es inherente a la noción de argumentación crítica, en el curso de la cual afirmaciones, particularmente en contextos éticos y epstemológicos, tienen que someterse al juego de pedir y dar razones frente al tribunal del espacio público. Uno de los principales resultados de este enfoque es que ser racional significa asumir la responsabilidad de las consecuencias teóricas y prácticas de nuestras afirmaciones y acciones.
El volumen, presenta de forma autocontenida los desarrollos más recientes del Marco Dialógico, y por una parte, discute la contribución de la perspectiva Dialógica al concepto inferencial de conocimiento y significado, y en particular respecto a los fundamentos constructivos de la lógica y las matématicas desarrollados en el seno de la Teoría Constructiva de Tipos (TCT) de Per Martin-Löf; y por otra parte muestra nuevos resultados en historia y filosofía de la lógica.
Nuestro estudio incluye, diálogos materiales -adversariales y colaborativos, con contenido matemático y empírico, nuevos cuadros para el desarrollo de lógicas modales, temporales y déonticas, y nuevos cuadros para la teoría de la argumentación. El objetivo principal de nuestra discusión de diálogos con contenido matemático – que se reduce a tratar operaciones elementales en el conjunto de los números naturales y conjuntos finitos – ,es de preparar el terreno para exponer el enfoque dialógico a la operación de evaluación: según este enfoque la operación de evaluación articula el pasaje de diálogos adversariales a colaborativos.
Respecto a los resultados en lógica modal y temporal y en teoría de la argumentación, mostraremos cuanto podemos aún aprender de la tradición árabe, particularmente en relación con los desarrollos posteriores a Avicena, lamentablemente descuidados en la mayor parte de los estudios contemporáneos sobre lógica y teoría de la argumentación. En efecto, tales desarrollos de la tradición árabe, asombrosamente ricos en extensión y profundidad, propusieron nuevos y originales enfoques que invitan a explorar nuevos caminos para la comprensión del rol de la perspectiva dialógica en la constitución de la lógica, el conocimiento y el significado.
El texto, que abunda en ejemplos y ejercicios resueltos, está dividido en dos partes principales. A saber:
I La primera parte, que lleva el título Razonamiento Inmanente II (RI-II), iniciado por Rahman & Gallois (2024), incluye una introducción somera pero autónoma a la logica dialógica básica que hace hincapié en los principios lógicos y filosóficos que fundamentan el marco dialógico– para una lectura detallada véase el volumen de Redmond & López Orellana (2023) y un estudio pormenorizado de RI- II.
La segunda parte, La Sabiduría de Nuestros Mayores: Lecturas Contemporáneas, contiene estudios recientes en lógica Aristotélica y post-Aristotélica, que subraya una de las aplicaciones más fructíferas del marco dialógico, a saber: la reconstrucción dialógica de ciertos enfoques en la historia y filosofía de la lógica que propone nuevos desarrollos en lógica temporal-modal, déontica y teoría de la argumentación.
Modèles scientifiques et objets
théoriques. By Matthieu Gallais.
Based on the thesis adviced by T. Tulenheimo and S. Rahman
Essai d’épistémologie modale.London: College Publications, 2019
https://www.collegepublications.co.uk/cahiers/?00025
Dans cet ouvrage, nous proposons une analyse épistémologique des
objets théoriques, s’inscrivant dans la conceptualisation philosophique
des modèles utilisés dans une grande variété de disciplines scientifiques.
Notre étude concerne la portée des connaissances pouvant être tirées
de modèles scientifiques, et les conditions selon lesquelles elles peuvent
concerner certains aspects du monde actuel. D’une part, nous envisageons
les modèles scientifiques selon un point de vue fictionnaliste ; les
diverses idéalisations marquant les définitions d’objets théoriques au sein
de modèles scientifiques nous incitent à questionner le mode d’existence
de ces objets, et à en concevoir des exemplaires stricts dans des contextes
rigoureusement compatibles. Toutefois, d’autre part, nous considérons la
nature intrinsèquement modale des modèles scientifiques qui visent une
multitude de contextes actuels ou possibles, au sein desquels l’identification
d’objets théoriques doit être examinée relativement aux conditions
d’application des modèles en question dans ces contextes. En effet, nous
suggérons que le statut épistémologique accordé aux connaissances tirées
d’un modèle scientifique, dans le cadre d’une argumentation visant
certaines situations particulières, doit dépendre de la manière dont ce
modèle peut être appliqué au sein de ces situations. En particulier, nous
questionnons les conditions selon lesquelles des connaissances portant
strictement sur des exemplaires de certains objets théoriques dans une
situation donnée, peuvent concerner d’autres exemplaires de ces mêmes
objets théoriques, identifiés dans d’autres situations.
Immanent Reasoning or Equality in Action
A Plaidoyer for the Play Level
This monograph proposes a new way of implementing interaction in logic. It also provides an elementary introduction to Constructive Type Theory (CTT). The authors equally emphasize basic ideas and finer technical details. In addition, many worked out exercises and examples will help readers to better understand the concepts under discussion.
One of the chief ideas animating this study is that the dialogical understanding of definitional equality and its execution provide both a simple and a direct way of implementing the CTT approach within a game-theoretical conception of meaning.
In addition, the importance of the play level over the strategy level is stressed, binding together the matter of execution with that of equality and the finitary perspective on games constituting meaning.
According to this perspective the emergence of concepts are not only games of giving and asking for reasons (games involving Why-questions), they are also games that include moves establishing how it is that the reasons brought forward accomplish
their explicative task. Thus, immanent reasoning games are dialogical games of Why and How.
Juan Redmond · Olga Pombo Martins · Ángel Nepomuceno Fernández Editors
Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction
With this volume of the series Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science edited by
S. Rahman et al. a challenging dialogue is being continued. The series’ first volume
argued that one way to recover the connections between logic, philosophy of sciences,
and sciences is to acknowledge the host of alternative logics which are currently being
developed. The present volume focuses on four key themes. First of all, several chapters
unpack the connection between knowledge and epistemology with particular focus on
the notion of knowledge as resulting from interaction. Secondly, new epistemological
perspectives on linguistics, the foundations of mathematics and logic, physics, biology
and law are a subject of analysis. Thirdly, several chapters are dedicated to a discussion
of Constructive Type Theory and more generally of the proof-theoretical notion of
meaning. Finally, the book brings together studies on the epistemic role of abduction
and argumentation theory, both linked to non-monotonic approaches to the dynamics
of knowledge
semantics, which provide an alternative to traditional
Tarski-style semantics, implementing Wittgenstein’s
idea of the meaning as use. The basic idea is that the
meaning is obtained in a game between two players,
one trying to defend and the other trying to falsify
the expression at stake. The notion of truth, or that
of validity, is based on the existence of a winning
strategy of the initial verifi er in a game. The direction
is the opposite of that in Tarski-style semantics: the
game starts with the entire expression and runs
until its component parts are reached. In this book
I will be interested in two different game theoretical
traditions: Game Theoretical Semantics, developed
by Jaako Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu, and Dialogical
logic, fi rst introduced by Paul Lorenzen and Kuno
Lorenz and further developed by Shahid Rahman and
his associates.
the publication of the volume of "Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction" edited by himself, Angel Nepomuceno and Olga Pombo
Des Dialogues au calcul des séquents pour la Théorie Constructive des Types : pour une perspective dynamique sur la théorie de la preuve.
“The Corrrectness of Names and it’s ethical Component, from the perspective of Confucius)”. (début : 1.10.2015 -)
Logical modelling of reasoning and learning :
a bio-inspired approach
« Si la connaissance se donne comme connaissance de la vérité, c’est qu’elle produit la vérité par le jeu d’une falsification première et toujours reconduite qui pose la distinction du vrai et du faux . » Leçons sur la volonté de savoir, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2011 (1re éd. : 1971).
"If knowledge is given as knowledge of the truth, it is because it produces the truth by the game of a first, primary falsification renewed again and again which raises the distinction of true and false" [my translation]. Michel Foucault, Lessons on the will to know, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2011 (1st ed .: 1971)
At a first reading this looks as being either nonsense or product of a too hasty reflection. In fact, I wonder how can Foucault, who refers to Nietzsche as source of inspiration, speak of falsification and deny at the same time objectivity of truth – besides the obvious pun. The challenge of Nietzsche is to contest the objectivity of truth as human desiderata, in such a context Foucault's notion of falsification (of what? falsification of an objective reality?) does either make no sense at all or encodes some other meaning beyond being false – a possible reading would be to take it that Foucault means "distortion", or better “will to deceive “ we will come to this further on.
Curiously by a kind of inversion of Foucault’s argument Social Sciences are now having the role of instrument of power within the Humanities. In contrast under the dialogical perspective the sociological views on epistemology vindicated by Foucault are not seen here as launching a kind of naturalistic sociological enterprise but rather as an invitation to participate in the open-ended dialogue that articulates the human pursuit of knowledge and collective understanding, since philosophy’s endeavour is immanent to the kind of dialogical interaction that makes reason happen.
Description in English and French of the main perspectives on Research and Teaching in Logic and Epistemology at the Univeristy of Lille
shahid.rahman@univ-lille.fr badaraseven@gmail.com
Abstract. The present study on al-Dīn Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, develops some preliminary explorations on his logic under the background of his remarkable epistemology of presence. The paper paves the way for responding to the challenges of Tony Street on the compatibility of Suhrawardī's critique of Ibn Sīnā with the development of a temporal and modal syllogism that at first sight seems quite close to that of Ibn Sīnā. Suhrawardī’s modalities are to be understood as the different ways a predicate relates to its subject rather than as propositional operators. Necessarily necessary modality relates actual instances (presences) of the Subject-Term with actual (presences) of the Predicate-Term; in contrast, necessarily contingent modality relates these terms conditionally, notably involving states of the Subject-Term within time intervals. Suhrawardī’s main innovation, so we claim, is the explicit role presences or actual instances have in his modal-temporal logic, and particularly so in shaping his notion of contingency that admits both a generic and an individual or de re form of plenitude.
Colloque en philosophie ancienne et médiévale – Perspectives féminines*
Montréal, 15 – 17 mars 2018.
Argumentaire
Conférencières invitées :
Marguerite Deslauriers, Université McGill – Christina Van Dyke, Calvin College
Les perspectives féminines* sur l’Antiquité et le Moyen Âge demeurent peu valorisées. En effet, il n’échappe à personne, au sein de la communauté universitaire, que femmes et autres populations marginalisées (quelles qu’elles soient) tendent à être sous-représentées lors d’événements académiques. Ce constat est d’autant plus regrettable que les femmes* ne sont absentes ni des départements de philosophie, ni des auditoires qui assistent à ces événements. Ce colloque propose de mettre en valeur les recherches des femmes* en philosophie ancienne et médiévale. En ouvrant un espace d’échange sur leurs savoirs et leurs questionnements, il a pour but d’améliorer leur visibilité et leur représentation dans le milieu de la recherche.
Les chercheuses* intéressées sont invitées à soumettre des propositions de communication portant sur la question du genre dans l’Antiquité et du Moyen Âge, les femmes* philosophes de cette période, ou encore le traitement du féminin* chez un ou une philosophe en particulier. Il est également possible de proposer une communication sur tout intérêt de recherche touchant les périodes historiques visées.
Le colloque sera l’occasion pour les participantes* d’apprécier la diversité des recherches menées par les femmes* en philosophie, mais aussi d’échanger avec des chercheuses* à différentes étapes de leur carrière lors des discussions et des conférences.
Interesting is that, while teaching logic, on view of the existing plurality of logics, a philosophical decision on how to classify the different logical systems is unavoidable. The main objective of my presentation today is to discuss a novel approach to both, the distinction between truth-functional operators and inferentially defined connectives, and the interplay of the former with the latter. The idea is to embed both classifying systems under the same framework. In order to limit the scope of the discussion I will only consider those truth-functional variations, usually known as many-valued logics, rather than including other logics such as modal logics, that are also constructed with the help of a formal semantics.
My general claim here is that one fruitful way to teach to study the logical kaleidoscope we are confronted today is to carry out such teaching and research tasks in a unifying framework where dialogical interaction mingles with the expressive power of constructive type theory.
Epistemic and dynamic features of Co-Relational Inferences
Shahid Rahman
shahid.rahman@univ-lille3.fr
(Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 8163 - STL- Savoirs Textes Langage, F-59000 Lille, France)
(The talk is based based on a joint work in progress with Muhammad Iqbal (Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 8163 - STL- Savoirs Textes Langage, F-59000 Lille, France ; and Islamic University Antasari, Banjarmasin, Indonesia)),
(
One of the epistemological results emerging from this initial study, is that the different forms of co-relational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provide new epistemological insights of legal reasoning in general but they also furnish a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning that can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and that does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied in contemporary philosophy of science.
More specifically the main claim is that a dialectical framework provides the right instrument to stress three of the most salient features of this form of inference: (1) the interaction of heuristic with logical steps, (2) the interactive feature of the meaning-explanation of the terms involved (3) the unfolding of parallel reasoning as similarity in action. In the present talk we will focus in the case of the so-called co-relational inferences of the occasioning factor. However; I will briefly motivate and provide an overview of the second main model, namely the case-based similarity model.
More precisely, the main claim of our paper is that the dialectical understanding of the qiyās also displays the logical and epistemic features of this form of inference if casted in a formal system for rational interaction able to express content-based reasoning. Furthermore, according to our view, the dialogical conception of Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory provides both a natural understanding and a fine-grained instrument for the analysis of:
1) The dialectical processes by the means of which the conclusion is inferred by relating it to a reason or occasioning factor which provided the cause for the sanction of a case already recorded by the sources.
2) The type-bounded notion of “case” within jurisprudence.
3) The meaning-structure of the general rule of jurisprudence on the basis of which the legal meaning of the root-case is grounded. This structure shows that the meaning of the ruling results from its dependence upon-the occasioning factor.
4) The move that yields an epistemic assumption as some strengthened form of pondered perspective.
5) The hypothetical form of those co-relational inferences that are drawn in absence of knowledge about the grounds for a juridical ruling.
6) The notion of epistemic priority that introduces degrees of evidence and that structures the typology of the qiyās.
7) The dynamic deployment of a dialectical process in order to achieve a rational decision concerning a new case not yet recorded by the juridical sources