Kant's Ethics

Este libro relaciona distintos análisis de la concepción moral de nuestra época con estudios de autores clásicos de la filosofía, con el fin de sostener la propuesta de una ética abierta, o ética del crecimiento, basada en diversas consideraciones sobre la naturaleza humana. El objetivo  central no es exponer una doctrina de preceptos morales, sino mostrar la relevancia de la responsabilidad morar al realizar juicios de valor.

In the second Critique, Kant argues that for the highest good to be possible we need to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in a future world. In his other writings, however, he suggests that the highest good is attainable through mere human agency in this world. Based on the apparent incoherence between these texts, Andrews Reath, among others, argues that Kant’s texts reveal two competing conceptions of the highest good, namely a secular and a theological conception. In this paper, I argue that Kant has a coherent conception of the highest good which applies to two different domains, namely the domain of the individual humans and the domain of the human species.

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

Provides a brief, but relatively systematic introduction to the basic elements of Kant's critical methodology. Begins by discussing how Kant conceives of the proper ends of rational inquiry, and how those ends inform his conception of the proper methodology for philosophy. Then discusses the foundational role that self-conscious capacities play within Kant's philosophical system. Concludes by discussing Kant's famous claim that the philosopher - unlike the mathematician - must be a legislator, and not an artist, of reason.

In Groundwork III, Kant attempts to give a deduction of the categorical imperative. There is widespread disagreement as to how Kant’s argument is supposed to proceed. Many com-mentators believe that Kant’s deduction fails because some of its argumentative moves are unjustified. In particular, Kant makes a mistaken inference from theoretical freedom to prac-tical freedom, and his axiological ‘superiority claim’ regarding the noumenal world’s priority over the sensible world is unjustified. According to the standard incompatibilist story, Kant came to see that his deduction was flawed by the time he wrote the Critique of Practical Reason, at which point he claimed that the truth of the moral law does not require a deduc-tion since it is a “fact of pure reason”. The moral law is no longer the conclusion of his argu-ment; instead, it functions as the premise of an argument that establishes our freedom. Other commentators endorse a compatibilist reading, according to which the justification of the moral law in Groundwork III and the second Critique are compatible because Kant never attempted to give the strong kind of deduction that he rightly rejects in the second Critique. On the view I develop here, the particular argumentative moves that the standard incompat-ibilist takes issue with are not flawed and incompatible with Kant’s second Critique. I argue for a compatibilist reading of these moves. I think the compatibilist is right to claim that the deduction Kant considered impossible in both the Groundwork and the second Critique is what I call a strong deduction. I also agree with compatibilists that the deduction he actually delivers in Groundwork III is only a weak deduction that makes use of a merely problematic conception of transcendental freedom. However, I do think that Kant’s argument in Groundwork III remains question begging in the final analysis. The facticity claim in the se-cond Critique, by contrast, can provide a non-question-begging account of moral obligation. Here, I agree with the optimistic incompatibilist, who views the argument in the second Cri-tique as an improvement on his argument in the Groundwork. However, in my novel account of Kant’s argument, I endorse what I call ‘radical incompatibilism’ because it concerns the roots of Kant’s approach to the justification of the moral law. What is novel about my ac-count is the claim that the deduction in Groundwork III rests on the false assumption that practical cognition, like theoretical cognition, requires a critique of pure reason. In the se-cond Critique, Kant revised his argument because he realized that, in contrast to synthetic a priori judgments of theoretical cognition, the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments of practical cognition can be derived from the actuality of a “deed”. With respect to pure prac-tical reason, the second Critique proceeds metaphysically—i.e. dogmatically—rather than critically. Hence Kant came to view a deduction of the categorical imperative as unnecessary and abandoned the project of a critique of pure practical reason. We should, for this reason, resist the generality of Kant’s claim in the first Critique to the effect that, for all synthetic judgments a priori, “if not a proof then at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its assertion must unfailingly be supplied” (CPR, B 286).

Kant based his ethical theory on the belief that reason should be used to determine how people ought to act. He did not attempt to prescribe specific actions but instructed that reason should be used to determine how to behave.

The Categorical Imperative is supposed to provide a way for us to evaluate moral actions and to make ml judgments. It is not a command to perform specific actions -- it does not say, respect your elders". As commands or moral laws all persons must follow, regardless of their desires or extenuating circumstances. As morals, these imperatives are binding on everyone and imperatives are simply an ought. If the action is represented as goods in itself and therefore as necessary for a will which it accords with reason then that's a categorical imperative.

U ovom tekstu, autor ukazuje na jednu donekle zanemarenu Kantovu
metaforu – metaforu „moralnog kompasa“. Zamisao „moralnog kompasa“ nije ništa
drugo nego zamisao samog moralnog zakona kao „kategoričkog imperativa“. Autor
sugeriše da ova jednostavna metafora ukazuje na dve stvari koja se često zaboravlja
u interpretaciji Kantove etike: 1) da Kant smatra da je moralno saznanje dostupno
doslovno svakom, i 2) da se put saznanja u moralu razlikuje od puta moralnog saznanja
u Kantovoj opštoj epistemologiji. Konačno, autor na primeru „lažnog obećanja“
nudi objašnjenje mehanizma delovanja „moralnog kompasa“.

In § 42 of the third Critique, ‘On the intellectual interest in the beautiful,’ Kant claims that it is ‘always the mark of a good soul’ (5:298) to take an ‘immediate interest’ in natural beauty because it indicates a moral interest in harmony between nature and moral freedom. In the same pages, however, he denies the possibility of a similarly morally significant interest in artistic beauty. This paper argues that according to his own theory of fine art Kant ought not to deny this value to artistic beauty. In the pages that immediately follow his discussion of immediate interest Kant defines artistic beauty as the joint product of a ‘natural gift’ of genius and a freely exercised discipline of skill and taste. This commits him to the claim that artistic beauty embodies and expresses a harmony between nature and freedom in the productive act of a human being, and thus to the claim that one can take an immediate and morally significant interest in artistic beauty, just as much as in natural beauty.

Bu çalışmada, Alman filozof Immanuel Kant'ın Königsberg Üniversitesi'nde pedagoji dersleri okuturken tuttuğu notlardan derlenmiş olan "Über Pädagogik (Pedagoji Üzerine)" adlı eseri temel alınarak, eğitime özellikle de ahlak ve karakter eğitimine dair görüşleri açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Kant, eğitimde aydınlanma dönemini başlatan ve çağdaş pedagoji düşüncesi ile uygulamasının temelini oluşturan düşünürler arasında yer almıştır. Ona göre insan eğitilmesi zorunlu olan ve ancak eğitim ile insanlaşan bir varlıktır. İyi bir eğitim ise, dünyadaki iyi şeyleri ortaya çıkaracaktır. Bu bağlamda insanın eğitimi, ahlak yasasına uygun bir şekilde ve insanın tüm doğal yeteneklerini geliştirmeye yönelik olmalıdır çünkü ahlak eğitiminde öncelikli amaç, insanın karakterinin oluşması ve iyi insan olabilmesidir. Öğreti biçimine (Lehreform) uygun bir yaşam biçimi (Lebensform) sürdüren Kant (Cassirer, 2017a, s. 23) insanın, gerçek anlamda 'insan' olabilmesi için ahlaki yönden en iyi şekilde eğitilmesi gerektiğini savunmuştur.

Can practical reason be artificial? The answer, from a Kantian point of view, is clearly negative: Practical reason cannot be artificial. After a preliminary remark on the possibility of Kantian moral machines (1.1) and some basics on the concept of practical reason (1.2) and Kant’s intuitionism (1.3), I will argue that in a Kantian model of moral obligation, the typical (human) moral subject has moral feelings and must have them in order to cognize the validity of the moral law as a categorical imperative (1.3). Using the knowledge argument against physicalism and functionalism, I shall argue that computers have no feelings and, a fortiori, no moral feelings; therefore, computers are not moral subjects (1.4). This conclusion is based on a Kantian I feel rather than I think (2.). I will then tackle two problems with this argument (3). I will conclude with an analogy (4): Just as planets do not fly, computers do not feel.

Bu yazıda işlemek istediğimiz konular; ofansif mizah nedir, ifadeye-mizaha bir sınır çekilebilir mi veya çekilmeli midir, ifade özgürlüğünün savunusunu kendi aleyhimize olan söylemlerde de savunabilir miyiz ve tamamen bağımsız bir nevi üçüncü bakış açısıyla yani ‘Allah-Tanrı’ bakış açısıyla bir adalet tesisi mümkün müdür?
Bunlara paralel olarak; mevcut yasalarda ifade özgürlüğünün tanımının ne olduğunun ve sınırlarının nasıl çizildiğinin açıklamasını yaparak, bu bağlamda ofansif mizaha karşı hukuki bir yaptırım olmalı mı yoksa olmamalı mı sorusuna yanıt bulmaya çalışacağız.
Tüm bunlara ek olarak; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin kurucu ideolojisinin ve onun devlet anlayışının, ayrıca mevcut iktidarın mutlak ve yegâne güç olma arayışının yarattığı dogmaların ifade özgürlüğüne ve dolayısıyla ofansif mizaha etkileri tartışılacaktır. Kurucu parti olması nedeniyle devlet aygıtında uzun süre söz sahibi olan ama son zamanlarda muhalefet partisi konumuna düşen CHP’nin de ve diğer muhalefet partilerinin de özellikle ifade özgürlüğü konusunda devlet refleksleri sergilemesinin sebebi ortaya konmaya çalışılacaktır.
Bu çalışmada Kant’ın Ahlak Metafiziğinin Temellendirilmesi ve John Stuart Mill’in Düşünce ve Tartışma Özgürlüğü Üzerine kitaplarından faydalanacağız.

The permissibility of actions depends upon facts about the flourishing and separateness of persons. Persons differ from other creatures in having the task of discovering for themselves, by conjecture and refutation, what sort of life will fulfil them. Compulsory slavery impermissibly prevents some persons from pursuing this task. However, many people may conjecture that they are natural slaves. Some of these conjectures may turn out to be correct. In consequence, voluntary slavery, in which one person welcomes the duty to fulfil all the commands of another, is permissible. Life-long voluntary slavery contracts are impermissible because of human fallibility; but fixed-term slavery contracts should be legally enforceable. Each person has the temporarily alienable moral right to direct her own life.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

There is little consensus among Kantian commentators on whether Kant is a moral realist, moral anti-realist, or moral constructivist. In this paper, I argue that Kant’s moral philosophy is realist. Based on a close reading of the ‘Fact of Reason’ and the role it plays in Kant’s moral philosophy, I ultimately argue that the Fact confirms what Kant calls the “objective reality” of the moral law, bound up with a metaphysically real conception of “supersensible” freedom. I consider the objection that Kant’s conception of “the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law” denotes clear moral anti-realism, and reply that this objection misunderstands Kant’s use of ‘idea’ [Idee] as a regulative concept of reason.

Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don’t state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear.
Despite the growing literature on Kant’s moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant’s answer to this apparent dilemma is. According to the moral realist the objectivity of our moral judgments can only be preserved if moral values are independent of our voluntary approval. Objectivity requires that there are mind-independent moral facts so that our moral judgments can be true or false. Since Kant wants to hold on to the objectivity of our moral judgments, he would need to endorse the second horn of the dilemma. Thus, many have tried to ascribe some sort of realism to Kant. Allen Wood, for example, claims that Kant “is a moral realist in the most agreed-upon sense that term has in contemporary metaphysics and metaethics. [Since] Kant holds that moral truth is irreducible either to what people think or to the results of any verification procedures […].“ (Wood 1999, 157 f.). According to the moral realist interpretation the categorical imperative in its universal law formulation is merely a reliable goodness-tracking device. It detects moral goodness but is not itself the source of the good (Stern, Stratton-Lake, Langton, Timmons et al.). The mind-independent moral facts, which the moral realist takes to be necessary in order to account for objectivity, are facts about how our actions relate to what is absolutely valuable: our “humanity”.
John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard, by contrast, hold that the procedure itself is the source of values. “Values for Kant are constructed by a procedure of making laws for ourselves […] [and are then] projected onto the world” (Korsgaard, SN 112). Many have argued that Rawls’ and Korsgaard’s constructivism makes moral facts dependent on our choices and thus commits them to anti-realism (Cohen 1996, Nagel 1996, Stern 2012). According to these critics, Kantians either have to give up on the objectivity of moral judgments or on constructivism. Korsgaard, by contrast, believes that even though she rejects the second horn of the dilemma, this does not necessarily lead into anti-realism or subjectivism. Since there is a correct procedure through which we arrive at our particular moral judgments, the objectivity of these judgments is preserved and moral values are not merely subjective.
Sharon Street has recently argued that Rawlsian constructivism is merely “restricted”; it cannot count as a metaethical theory at all because it is begging the question at issue. It purports to explain why and how something has value, but in fact the procedure (the original position and the veil of ignorance) simply presupposes freedom and equality to be good. All other results of the construction procedure owe their value properties to this initial presupposition. Korsgaard’s constructivism attempts to overcome the restrictedness and is, in contrast to Rawls’ constructivism, not merely a normative constructivism but indeed a metaethical constructivism. But her attempt is, according to Street, based on the false assumption that we can derive certain “substantive values” from a “purely formal understanding of the nature of practical reason“ (Street 2008, 244).
This rough sketch shows how wide ranging the disagreement about Kant’s moral epistemology and ontology has become. On a deeper level it reveals our fundamental dissatisfaction with the way some conceptual distinctions are drawn in contemporary metaethics. Thinking through Kant’s theory will put us in a position to see some of the presuppositions we have been taking for granted more clearly. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives.

Temas tan variados no se podrían encontrar en este volumen, sin embargo, están unidos por una simple cualidad, a saber, la reflexión, pero aquella que va de los asuntos éticos a los bioéticos. Tales áreas de reflexión han tomado un revuelo tan importante en las últimas décadas por todo lo que significa el siglo XXI, pero más aún, por todo lo que seguimos arrastrando del siglo XX: el constante desarrollo de la tecnología y la implicación con la vida humana en tanto relaciones personales, relaciones con otros seres vivos y con el medio ambiente; la terrible separación entre la ética y la política; los problemas suscitados al momento de tomar decisiones respecto de la vida en un ambiente clínico; el problema del desarrollo económico que no necesariamente implica un desarrollo social ni humano; la aplicación creciente de transgénicos sobre el medio; la terrible desigualdad social al interior de los Estados Nación; el progreso (todavía existe la idea) ligado al problema del calentamiento global; el fenómeno de la migración; la crisis producida por la relación entre el capitalismo y el sistema neoliberal; nuevas formas de violencia que ya no son expresadas en contra de las Naciones sino al interior de ellas, en contra de sus propios ciudadanos; la crisis de la seguridad; la guerra contra las drogas, el narcotráfico y su relación con los consumidores; los siempre acalorados debates sobre el aborto y un largo etcétera.

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

All'interno del pensiero kantiano, è possibile parlare di un'evoluzione della problematica della libertà, tale da metterne in gioco l'interna coerenza?
Dall'uscita della Critica della ragion pura sino alla Critica della ragion pratica, il testo prende in esame lo sviluppo della dottrina kantiana della libertà per illustrare e tentare di chiarire le principali questioni interpretative ad esso collegate, analizzando direttamente la terminologia filosofica del criticismo kantiano. Con quale diritto è possibile utilizzare le categorie per un uso diverso da quello della conoscenza dei fenomeni? Può la ragione estendere la propria conoscenza oltre i limiti del mondo sensibile? Sono alcuni degli interrogativi che la determinazione positiva della libertà porta con sé
e che fanno di questo concetto la chiave di volta dell'intero sistema della conoscenza umana, sia pratica che speculativa.

In this article, I outline a logic of design of a system as a specific kind of conceptual logic of the design of the model of a system, that is, the blueprint that provides information about the system to be created. In section two, I introduce the method of levels of abstraction as a modelling tool borrowed from computer science. In section three, I use this method to clarify two main conceptual logics of information (i.e., modelling systems) inherited from modernity: Kant's transcen-dental logic of conditions of possibility of a system, and Hegel's dialectical logic of conditions of in/stability of a system. Both conceptual logics of information analyse structural properties of given systems. Strictly speaking, neither is a conceptual logic of information about (or modelling) the conditions of feasibility of a system, that is, neither is a logic of information as a logic of design. So, in section four, I outline this third conceptual logic of information and then interpret the conceptual logic of design as a logic of requirements, by introducing the relation of " suffici-entisation ". In the conclusion, I argue that the logic of requirements is exactly what we need in order to make sense of, and buttress, a constructionist (poietic) approach to knowledge.

* Winner of the North American Kant Society's 2023 Senior Scholar Prize. *

Sex, Love, and Gender is the first volume to present a comprehensive philosophical theory that brings together all of Kant's practical philosophy — found across his works on ethics, justice, anthropology, history, and religion — and provide a critique of emotionally healthy and morally permissible sexual, loving, gendered being. By rethinking Kant's work on human nature and making space for sex, love, and gender within his moral accounts of freedom, the book shows how, despite his austere and even anti-sex, cisist, sexist, and heterosexist reputation, Kant's writings on happiness and virtue (Part I) and right (Part II) in fact yield fertile philosophical ground on which we can explore specific contemporary issues such as abortion, sexual orientation, sexual or gendered identity, marriage, trade in sexual services, and sex- or gender-based oppression. Indeed, Kant's philosophy provides us with resources to appreciate and value the diversity of human ways of loving and the existential importance of our embodied, social selves. Structured on a thematic basis, with introductions to assist those new to Kant's philosophy, this book will be a valuable resource for anyone who cares about these issues and wants to make sense of them.

Alternatively: Sex, Love, and Gender identifies a set of possibilities that define human beings’ sexuality. These sets come with their own concepts, which specify how the possibilities are realized and what effects they have on our lives lived together. Partly the task is descriptive. The description has to be plausible. Plausibility comes from the phenomenology (and not the other way around). Partly the task is normative. The normative content also has to be plausible. Plausibility here comes from vindicating the principles that underwrite the possibilities that define human beings’ sexualities and sexual experiences and behaviors lived by human beings and from the philosophical explanations and conclusions that follow. Overall plausibility, then, comes from discursive analysis of alternatives, from a priori argument, and, in the evaluative case, from showing how the Kantian account of a good life fits with reasonable conceptions of goodness consistent with the phenomenology of human lives. Although this exploration leads us, as we will see, to most corners of Kant’s practical philosophy, including his metaethics and metaphysics, the main focus is on an account of human sex, love, and gender explored explicitly with respect to happiness and ethics (virtue) and justice (right). It is because of this focus that the book is divided into two parts: Part 1 (“Human Sexuality and Virtue”) and Part 2 (“Human Sexuality and Right”).

A diagnosis of why it is that many contemporary moral theorists affiliated with Kantian ideas exhibit consequentialist tendencies.  That this is not obvious arises from some unargued assumptions about reasons as primitive, on the one hand, and, perhaps, a failure to take seriously enough how radical Kant's view of value is, on the other.

In this essay, I outline a Kantian line of defense for the liberal arts. Despite the essential function of education in moral life for Kant, it has only been in recent years that Kant scholarship has paid close attention to the importance of education for his moral theory. I believe that, in addition to our understanding of how education can shape the moral character of individuals, Kant also affords insight into how education–and the university, in particular–may make a contribution to our role as citizens. In this paper, I trace how Kant’s view of history, the arts, and philosophy can be seen to make a contribution to the fulfillment of our civic duty to exercise free speech. After outlining the relationship of these disciplines to the government along with a brief analysis of our duty to exercise our reason publicly, I draw out the distinctive ways each of these disciplines supports our efforts to improve society.

Martha Nussbaum attempts to improve the clarity of the obscure talk of feminists and conservatives about objectification in connection with sexual matters. Her discussion is a substantial improvement. However, it is inconsistent and opaque, and she continues to apply the pejorative term ‘objectification’ to activities which she herself admits are morally unproblematic and which may even be a joyous part of life. I explain the deficiencies in Nussbaum’s discussion, including the fact that she does not notice the one way of objectification that seems inherently problematic, and I show that casual sex, prostitution and pornography are normally not morally problematic even while they exhibit some of Nussbaum’s ways of objectification. The term ‘objectification’ should be eschewed because it is a barrier to clear thinking.