Joe Cunningham
University of Oxford, Jesus College, Department Member
- I am a Career Development Lecturer at Jesus College, Oxford. Prior to that I was an Early Career Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study, University of Warwick, the university at which I completed my doctoral thesis entitled 'The Remit of Reasons', in March 2016. I also hold an MPhil.Stud from UCL (2008-2010) and a BA in Philosophy from Heythrop College, London (2005-2008). At Warwick I was supervised by Prof. Matthew Soteriou and Dr Johannes Roessler. At UCL I was super... moreI am a Career Development Lecturer at Jesus College, Oxford. Prior to that I was an Early Career Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study, University of Warwick, the university at which I completed my doctoral thesis entitled 'The Remit of Reasons', in March 2016. I also hold an MPhil.Stud from UCL (2008-2010) and a BA in Philosophy from Heythrop College, London (2005-2008). At Warwick I was supervised by Prof. Matthew Soteriou and Dr Johannes Roessler. At UCL I was supervised by Prof. Paul Snowdon.
My research focuses on the question of what epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of mind we need in order to account for what it is for an agent to respond to a normative reason, and how our account of that phenomenon should in turn influence the accounts we offer of perceptual rationality and mental agency.edit
This paper begins with a Davidsonian puzzle in the epistemology of perception and introduces two solutions to that puzzle: the Truth-Maker View (TMV) and the Content Model. The paper goes on to elaborate (TMV), elements of which can be... more
This paper begins with a Davidsonian puzzle in the epistemology of perception and introduces two solutions to that puzzle: the Truth-Maker View (TMV) and the Content Model. The paper goes on to elaborate (TMV), elements of which can be found in the work of Kalderon (2011) and Brewer (2011). The central tenant of (TMV) is the claim that one's reason for one's perceptual belief should, in all cases, be identified with some item one perceives which makes the proposition believed true. I defend an argument against (TMV) which appeals to (a) the claim that the reason for which one believes should always to be identified with the explanans of the rationalising explanation to which one's belief is subject and (b) the claim that the explanantia of rationalising explanations must be identified with truths. I finish by replying to two objections to the argument.
Research Interests:
It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge... more
It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the latter to the former. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I label Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism, or (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust.