Annalisa Coliva is Professor of Philosophy at University of California Irvine. Her research focuses on epistemology, philosophy of mind and history of analytic philosophy. She has published widely on G. E. Moore and L. Wittgenstein, on scepticism, relativism and self-knowledge, as well as on perception, concepts and the first person. She is Chancellor Fellow and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at UC, Irvine, and Co-director of the Minor in Medical Humanities. Supervisors: Eva Picardi and Crispin Wright Address: Department of Philosophy 91 Humanities Instructional Building University of California, Irvine CA-92155
The volume contains fourteen papers by Eva Picardi, one of the leading experts on Frege. The pape... more The volume contains fourteen papers by Eva Picardi, one of the leading experts on Frege. The papers focus on Frege's views about logic, language and his anti-psychologism. Picardi masterfully reconstructs the milieu in which Frege's ideas developed, the influence they had on other logicians and philosophers of his time, such as Peano, Russell and Wittgenstein, and later ones, such as Carnap and Davidson, up to present-day debates between inferentialists (such as Dummett and Brandom) and representationalists (such as Williamson and Fodor).
The Selected Writings of Eva Picardi. Meaning and Norms from Wittgenstein to American Neo-Pragmatism, 2020
This file contains the Table of Contents and the Introduction for the volume The Selected Writing... more This file contains the Table of Contents and the Introduction for the volume The Selected Writings of Eva Picardi. Meaning and Norms from Wittgenstein to American Neo-Pragmatism. It also contains a complete list of Picardi's publications.
This is the second chapter of our book on Relativism. It is a short history of how relativism has... more This is the second chapter of our book on Relativism. It is a short history of how relativism has been variously proposed since Protagoras, up to present days.
This is the first chapter of our book on Relativism. In it, we discuss the key features of any ge... more This is the first chapter of our book on Relativism. In it, we discuss the key features of any genuinely relativistic position, its various motivations and its various forms.
Here is the ToC and Intro of my forthcoming book (with Maria Baghramian) on Relativism (Routledge... more Here is the ToC and Intro of my forthcoming book (with Maria Baghramian) on Relativism (Routledge 2019).
This is the Introduction of the volume Epistemic Pluralism, edited by A. Coliva and N. Pedersen. ... more This is the Introduction of the volume Epistemic Pluralism, edited by A. Coliva and N. Pedersen. Palgrave 2017, forthcoming.
It is natural to think that justifications stem from a system of assumptions. Take, for instance,... more It is natural to think that justifications stem from a system of assumptions. Take, for instance, the mathematical case. Theorems – that is, justified mathematical propositions – are obtained through proofs, given certain axioms. Indeed, different sets of axioms constitute different theories , which give rise to different sets of justified mathematical propositions. However, no matter how many sets of axioms are possible, and no matter whether the propositions eventually justified are different, the former are clearly necessary in order to generate proofs and therefore warrants for certain less basic mathematical propositions. Take a more humdrum case. We see a ball roll between two poles. 1 We form the belief that a goal has just been scored. Yet, clearly, that belief is justified only insofar as it is assumed that a football match is being played and this, in turn, justifies us in inferring that supporters of the team whose player sent the ball between the poles will be cheering. If it were a different game, whose point is actually that of letting the ball roll between the poles in one's mid-field, while players of the other team should prevent that from happening, we would not be justified either in believing that a goal has just been scored, or in inferring that supporters of the team whose player sent the ball between the poles will be rejoicing. Similar examples could be multiplied ad libitum. Many further interesting examples can be found in Wittgenstein's On Certainty (OC). For instance, he noticed that geological beliefs about the specific age of the Earth could only be justified by taking for granted that the Earth had existed for a very long time. Only that way could fossils and other evidence be brought to bear on the issue of the specific age of the Earth. 2 To see why, consider the hypothesis that the Earth, with all its fossils, had just been created five minutes ago. We would still have those fossils yet they could not be taken to prove anything about the long existence of the Earth (...)
The metaphysically robust constitutive account presented in the previous chapter cannot be extend... more The metaphysically robust constitutive account presented in the previous chapter cannot be extended to all mental states. When it comes to past self-ascriptions of commitments, it will have to be integrated with an evidential account resting on mnestic evidence. As to self-knowledge of sensations, basic emotions and perceptions, there appears to be room for a weaker kind of constitutive account, which abandons the metaphysical claim that self-ascriptions bring about the corresponding first-order mental states. Still, it is necessarily and a priori true that, given certain C-conditions, one is in one of these mental states iff one self-ascribes them. The key idea, here, is that these mental states are phenomenologically salient and have characteristic instinctive manifestations. Groundlessness, transparency and authority, then, are redeemed by showing how they are constitutively tied to what it means to be a subject capable of enjoying the relevant mental states. Finally, various cases of third-personal self-knowledge are reviewed. A variety of methods can be implemented with regard to them, like inference to the best explanation, as well as less theory-laden abductive explanations, and simulation. An aspect that sets third-personal self-knowledge apart from third-personal knowledge simpliciter is the fact that the relevant cues are often of a psychological nature and known in a first-personal way. Finally, it is emphasised how the characteristic notes of highly dispositional psychological concepts can make us realise (or sometimes contrive) some of our deep-seated character traits. All that testifies to the plurality of ways in which we do know the vast variety of mental states we in fact enjoy.
In this chapter, several constitutive positions concerning self-knowledge of propositional attitu... more In this chapter, several constitutive positions concerning self-knowledge of propositional attitudes are reviewed and criticised. They all subscribe to the view that so-called self-knowledge is not the result of any cognitive achievement. Rather, what goes by that name is the constitutive thesis, according to which, given certain conditions C, one has a given propositional attitude iff one believes/judges that one does. Sydney Shoemaker is interested in the left-to-right side of the thesis, concerning transparency. Crispin Wright's account is a vindication of the right-to-left direction, concerning authority. In Akeel Bilgrami's account, the C-conditions must refer either to mental states as commitments (when authority is concerned) or to propositional attitudes with an explanatory role (when transparency is at stake). All these constitutive proposals are found problematic both in detail and in general, for not making good two further metaphysical commitments, which should characterise constitutive positions properly so regarded. First, that under appropriate and specifiable conditions, psychological self-ascriptions of propositional attitudes bring about the corresponding first-order mental states. Second, that for conceptually competent subjects, endowed with normal intelligence and rationality, psychological self-ascriptions have the same core realisation as the first-order mental states they are about. Whence the proposal of a " metaphysically robust " kind of constitutivism, according to which both sides of the constitutive thesis need explaining. The left-to-right one is taken to hold only for propositional attitudes as commitments, and knowledge of one's commitments is achieved by employing present-tense attitudinal verbs " blindly " —that is, to give immediate expression to one's ongoing mental states. As to the other side of the constitutive thesis, authority holds as a matter of conceptual necessity: once we are capable of making psychological self-ascriptions, we can actually bring about first-order propositional attitudes just by making those self-ascriptions. Self-deception is accounted for in such a way as not to represent a counterexample to authority.
In this chapter, attention is drawn to expressivist accounts of self-knowledge. These reject the ... more In this chapter, attention is drawn to expressivist accounts of self-knowledge. These reject the idea that self-knowledge is a robust cognitive achievement and hold that psychological avowals are ways of giving immediate expression to one's mind. In Wittgenstein, avowals are seen as profoundly different from third-personal mental ascriptions, in point both of truth-aptness and of meaning. This also entails that there is nothing as self-knowledge properly so regarded. What goes by that name, rather, are the ideas of groundlessness, transparency and authority, that in turn are a by-product of " grammar " —that is to say, of the rules governing the relevant language games. Next, Dorit Bar-On's recent version of expressivism is discussed. In her view, avowals are linguistic acts with a truth-apt semantic content. Yet her further idea that avowals can indeed express a special kind of knowledge is criticised. Also, Bar-On's idea that there can be genuinely false yet sincere and warranted avowals is shown wanting. Ultimately, it appears that expressivism as an all-encompassing theory about knowledge of all kinds of mental states we may enjoy is problematical.
This chapter deals with weak epistemic accounts of self-knowledge. It starts with Christopher Pea... more This chapter deals with weak epistemic accounts of self-knowledge. It starts with Christopher Peacocke's rational internalism, which claims that the simple conscious occurrence of first-order mental states grounds and rationalises one's psychological self-ascriptions. The account is found either circular or unsuited to confer a genuinely rationalising role to the self-ascribed states. Tyler Burge's rational externalism is then scrutinised and the instability of its central notion of " entitlement " is noted. Gareth Evans's so-called " transparency method " is then considered, whereby in order to get knowledge of our own beliefs, we have to direct our gaze outward. One, more epistemically oriented development of this view (due to Jordi Fernández) is criticised mainly for claiming that the evidence which justifies one's belief in P would also justify one's self-ascription of that belief. Another, deliberative development (due to Richard Moran) is found wanting mainly because it identifies first-personal self-knowledge solely with the ability to deliberate and make up one's mind.
In this chapter, we consider epistemically robust accounts of self-knowledge. We start with recen... more In this chapter, we consider epistemically robust accounts of self-knowledge. We start with recent inner sense theories (§1), which have been proposed by David Armstrong and William Lycan. Their differences notwithstanding, they hold that self-knowledge is the product of a reliable cognitive mechanism that tracks first-order propositional attitudes and produces the corresponding self-ascriptions. The mechanism is physically realised in our brains and is operative at the subpersonal level. Indeed, according to Lycan, there is a real inner sense faculty, dedicated to keeping track of first-order mental states through the operation of attention. Although the model accounts for groundlessness, transparency and authority, it severs the connection between self-knowledge and rationality and concepts' possession. Hence, it is found to be problematical.
In this chapter, we first present the characteristic features of what may be regarded as truly fi... more In this chapter, we first present the characteristic features of what may be regarded as truly first-personal self-knowledge—namely, groundlessness, transparency and authority (§1). The key idea defended in the following is that they are not contingent but necessary and a priori aspects of what goes by the name of " (first-personal) self-knowledge ". For massive failures at self-knowledge would display either the lack of the relevant psychological concepts or failures at rationality, understood in a " thick " sense, which is accordingly specified. These characteristic traits of first-personal self-knowledge are then defended against possible objections stemming from scepticism about knowledge of the content of our own propositional attitudes deriving from the endorsement of semantic externalism and from recent findings in cognitive sciences (§2). It is argued that none of this shows that we never have essentially first-personal self-knowledge. Rather, it shows that its scope is limited and does not extend to our deep-seated and future dispositions, to the dispositional elements of our feelings and emotions, and to the causal relations among our various mental states, which are known, if and when they are, in a third-personal way. The various modes of third-personal self-knowledge are then presented and discussed (§3). Yet all this is compatible with the fact that we have essentially first-personal knowledge of a wide range of mental states and at least of their " narrow " content, if and when they have it, such as our ongoing sensations, perceptions, basic emotions and propositional attitudes as commitments.
In this chapter, we explore and propose a systematisation of the complex geography of the mental.... more In this chapter, we explore and propose a systematisation of the complex geography of the mental. We first distinguish between sensations and perceptions (§1). We then move on to propositional attitudes and distinguish between beliefs, desires and intentions as " dispositions " and as " commitments " (§2). Finally (§3), we consider the complex case of emotions, whose nature still escapes philosophical consensus. After presenting and criticising several contemporary accounts, we put forward a borderline view of emotions.
The book argues that what goes by the name of "Self-knowledge" is in fact a plurality of states a... more The book argues that what goes by the name of "Self-knowledge" is in fact a plurality of states and methods, depending on the kinds of mental state at issue and the way in which they are known. When genuinely first-personal self-knowledge is at stake, three features hold a priori. That is groundlessness, transparency and authority. They can be redeemed in various ways, depending on the kind of first-order mental state at issue, by showing the interconnections between sets of interlocking concepts. However, self-knowledge is often arrived at in a third-personal way, by using a variety of methods, such as inference to the best explanation, simulation and inferential conceptual deployment. In these cases, it is the result of a genuinely epistemic endavour and none of the three features characteristic of first-personal self-knowledge holds. So psychological self-ascriptions arrived at in a third-personal way are neither groundless, nor transaprent or authoritative. The book analyses in details this plurality of states and methods. It also presents and critically examines all major rival views, often afflicted by an (implicit) commitment to monism -- from inner sense theories, to theory-theory and simulation thories; from internalist and externalist rationalist theories to deliberative accounts; from early and contemporary versions of expressivism to various kinds of constitutivism. While presenting a groundbraking view, it can also profitably be employed in graduate seminars.
The volume contains fourteen papers by Eva Picardi, one of the leading experts on Frege. The pape... more The volume contains fourteen papers by Eva Picardi, one of the leading experts on Frege. The papers focus on Frege's views about logic, language and his anti-psychologism. Picardi masterfully reconstructs the milieu in which Frege's ideas developed, the influence they had on other logicians and philosophers of his time, such as Peano, Russell and Wittgenstein, and later ones, such as Carnap and Davidson, up to present-day debates between inferentialists (such as Dummett and Brandom) and representationalists (such as Williamson and Fodor).
The Selected Writings of Eva Picardi. Meaning and Norms from Wittgenstein to American Neo-Pragmatism, 2020
This file contains the Table of Contents and the Introduction for the volume The Selected Writing... more This file contains the Table of Contents and the Introduction for the volume The Selected Writings of Eva Picardi. Meaning and Norms from Wittgenstein to American Neo-Pragmatism. It also contains a complete list of Picardi's publications.
This is the second chapter of our book on Relativism. It is a short history of how relativism has... more This is the second chapter of our book on Relativism. It is a short history of how relativism has been variously proposed since Protagoras, up to present days.
This is the first chapter of our book on Relativism. In it, we discuss the key features of any ge... more This is the first chapter of our book on Relativism. In it, we discuss the key features of any genuinely relativistic position, its various motivations and its various forms.
Here is the ToC and Intro of my forthcoming book (with Maria Baghramian) on Relativism (Routledge... more Here is the ToC and Intro of my forthcoming book (with Maria Baghramian) on Relativism (Routledge 2019).
This is the Introduction of the volume Epistemic Pluralism, edited by A. Coliva and N. Pedersen. ... more This is the Introduction of the volume Epistemic Pluralism, edited by A. Coliva and N. Pedersen. Palgrave 2017, forthcoming.
It is natural to think that justifications stem from a system of assumptions. Take, for instance,... more It is natural to think that justifications stem from a system of assumptions. Take, for instance, the mathematical case. Theorems – that is, justified mathematical propositions – are obtained through proofs, given certain axioms. Indeed, different sets of axioms constitute different theories , which give rise to different sets of justified mathematical propositions. However, no matter how many sets of axioms are possible, and no matter whether the propositions eventually justified are different, the former are clearly necessary in order to generate proofs and therefore warrants for certain less basic mathematical propositions. Take a more humdrum case. We see a ball roll between two poles. 1 We form the belief that a goal has just been scored. Yet, clearly, that belief is justified only insofar as it is assumed that a football match is being played and this, in turn, justifies us in inferring that supporters of the team whose player sent the ball between the poles will be cheering. If it were a different game, whose point is actually that of letting the ball roll between the poles in one's mid-field, while players of the other team should prevent that from happening, we would not be justified either in believing that a goal has just been scored, or in inferring that supporters of the team whose player sent the ball between the poles will be rejoicing. Similar examples could be multiplied ad libitum. Many further interesting examples can be found in Wittgenstein's On Certainty (OC). For instance, he noticed that geological beliefs about the specific age of the Earth could only be justified by taking for granted that the Earth had existed for a very long time. Only that way could fossils and other evidence be brought to bear on the issue of the specific age of the Earth. 2 To see why, consider the hypothesis that the Earth, with all its fossils, had just been created five minutes ago. We would still have those fossils yet they could not be taken to prove anything about the long existence of the Earth (...)
The metaphysically robust constitutive account presented in the previous chapter cannot be extend... more The metaphysically robust constitutive account presented in the previous chapter cannot be extended to all mental states. When it comes to past self-ascriptions of commitments, it will have to be integrated with an evidential account resting on mnestic evidence. As to self-knowledge of sensations, basic emotions and perceptions, there appears to be room for a weaker kind of constitutive account, which abandons the metaphysical claim that self-ascriptions bring about the corresponding first-order mental states. Still, it is necessarily and a priori true that, given certain C-conditions, one is in one of these mental states iff one self-ascribes them. The key idea, here, is that these mental states are phenomenologically salient and have characteristic instinctive manifestations. Groundlessness, transparency and authority, then, are redeemed by showing how they are constitutively tied to what it means to be a subject capable of enjoying the relevant mental states. Finally, various cases of third-personal self-knowledge are reviewed. A variety of methods can be implemented with regard to them, like inference to the best explanation, as well as less theory-laden abductive explanations, and simulation. An aspect that sets third-personal self-knowledge apart from third-personal knowledge simpliciter is the fact that the relevant cues are often of a psychological nature and known in a first-personal way. Finally, it is emphasised how the characteristic notes of highly dispositional psychological concepts can make us realise (or sometimes contrive) some of our deep-seated character traits. All that testifies to the plurality of ways in which we do know the vast variety of mental states we in fact enjoy.
In this chapter, several constitutive positions concerning self-knowledge of propositional attitu... more In this chapter, several constitutive positions concerning self-knowledge of propositional attitudes are reviewed and criticised. They all subscribe to the view that so-called self-knowledge is not the result of any cognitive achievement. Rather, what goes by that name is the constitutive thesis, according to which, given certain conditions C, one has a given propositional attitude iff one believes/judges that one does. Sydney Shoemaker is interested in the left-to-right side of the thesis, concerning transparency. Crispin Wright's account is a vindication of the right-to-left direction, concerning authority. In Akeel Bilgrami's account, the C-conditions must refer either to mental states as commitments (when authority is concerned) or to propositional attitudes with an explanatory role (when transparency is at stake). All these constitutive proposals are found problematic both in detail and in general, for not making good two further metaphysical commitments, which should characterise constitutive positions properly so regarded. First, that under appropriate and specifiable conditions, psychological self-ascriptions of propositional attitudes bring about the corresponding first-order mental states. Second, that for conceptually competent subjects, endowed with normal intelligence and rationality, psychological self-ascriptions have the same core realisation as the first-order mental states they are about. Whence the proposal of a " metaphysically robust " kind of constitutivism, according to which both sides of the constitutive thesis need explaining. The left-to-right one is taken to hold only for propositional attitudes as commitments, and knowledge of one's commitments is achieved by employing present-tense attitudinal verbs " blindly " —that is, to give immediate expression to one's ongoing mental states. As to the other side of the constitutive thesis, authority holds as a matter of conceptual necessity: once we are capable of making psychological self-ascriptions, we can actually bring about first-order propositional attitudes just by making those self-ascriptions. Self-deception is accounted for in such a way as not to represent a counterexample to authority.
In this chapter, attention is drawn to expressivist accounts of self-knowledge. These reject the ... more In this chapter, attention is drawn to expressivist accounts of self-knowledge. These reject the idea that self-knowledge is a robust cognitive achievement and hold that psychological avowals are ways of giving immediate expression to one's mind. In Wittgenstein, avowals are seen as profoundly different from third-personal mental ascriptions, in point both of truth-aptness and of meaning. This also entails that there is nothing as self-knowledge properly so regarded. What goes by that name, rather, are the ideas of groundlessness, transparency and authority, that in turn are a by-product of " grammar " —that is to say, of the rules governing the relevant language games. Next, Dorit Bar-On's recent version of expressivism is discussed. In her view, avowals are linguistic acts with a truth-apt semantic content. Yet her further idea that avowals can indeed express a special kind of knowledge is criticised. Also, Bar-On's idea that there can be genuinely false yet sincere and warranted avowals is shown wanting. Ultimately, it appears that expressivism as an all-encompassing theory about knowledge of all kinds of mental states we may enjoy is problematical.
This chapter deals with weak epistemic accounts of self-knowledge. It starts with Christopher Pea... more This chapter deals with weak epistemic accounts of self-knowledge. It starts with Christopher Peacocke's rational internalism, which claims that the simple conscious occurrence of first-order mental states grounds and rationalises one's psychological self-ascriptions. The account is found either circular or unsuited to confer a genuinely rationalising role to the self-ascribed states. Tyler Burge's rational externalism is then scrutinised and the instability of its central notion of " entitlement " is noted. Gareth Evans's so-called " transparency method " is then considered, whereby in order to get knowledge of our own beliefs, we have to direct our gaze outward. One, more epistemically oriented development of this view (due to Jordi Fernández) is criticised mainly for claiming that the evidence which justifies one's belief in P would also justify one's self-ascription of that belief. Another, deliberative development (due to Richard Moran) is found wanting mainly because it identifies first-personal self-knowledge solely with the ability to deliberate and make up one's mind.
In this chapter, we consider epistemically robust accounts of self-knowledge. We start with recen... more In this chapter, we consider epistemically robust accounts of self-knowledge. We start with recent inner sense theories (§1), which have been proposed by David Armstrong and William Lycan. Their differences notwithstanding, they hold that self-knowledge is the product of a reliable cognitive mechanism that tracks first-order propositional attitudes and produces the corresponding self-ascriptions. The mechanism is physically realised in our brains and is operative at the subpersonal level. Indeed, according to Lycan, there is a real inner sense faculty, dedicated to keeping track of first-order mental states through the operation of attention. Although the model accounts for groundlessness, transparency and authority, it severs the connection between self-knowledge and rationality and concepts' possession. Hence, it is found to be problematical.
In this chapter, we first present the characteristic features of what may be regarded as truly fi... more In this chapter, we first present the characteristic features of what may be regarded as truly first-personal self-knowledge—namely, groundlessness, transparency and authority (§1). The key idea defended in the following is that they are not contingent but necessary and a priori aspects of what goes by the name of " (first-personal) self-knowledge ". For massive failures at self-knowledge would display either the lack of the relevant psychological concepts or failures at rationality, understood in a " thick " sense, which is accordingly specified. These characteristic traits of first-personal self-knowledge are then defended against possible objections stemming from scepticism about knowledge of the content of our own propositional attitudes deriving from the endorsement of semantic externalism and from recent findings in cognitive sciences (§2). It is argued that none of this shows that we never have essentially first-personal self-knowledge. Rather, it shows that its scope is limited and does not extend to our deep-seated and future dispositions, to the dispositional elements of our feelings and emotions, and to the causal relations among our various mental states, which are known, if and when they are, in a third-personal way. The various modes of third-personal self-knowledge are then presented and discussed (§3). Yet all this is compatible with the fact that we have essentially first-personal knowledge of a wide range of mental states and at least of their " narrow " content, if and when they have it, such as our ongoing sensations, perceptions, basic emotions and propositional attitudes as commitments.
In this chapter, we explore and propose a systematisation of the complex geography of the mental.... more In this chapter, we explore and propose a systematisation of the complex geography of the mental. We first distinguish between sensations and perceptions (§1). We then move on to propositional attitudes and distinguish between beliefs, desires and intentions as " dispositions " and as " commitments " (§2). Finally (§3), we consider the complex case of emotions, whose nature still escapes philosophical consensus. After presenting and criticising several contemporary accounts, we put forward a borderline view of emotions.
The book argues that what goes by the name of "Self-knowledge" is in fact a plurality of states a... more The book argues that what goes by the name of "Self-knowledge" is in fact a plurality of states and methods, depending on the kinds of mental state at issue and the way in which they are known. When genuinely first-personal self-knowledge is at stake, three features hold a priori. That is groundlessness, transparency and authority. They can be redeemed in various ways, depending on the kind of first-order mental state at issue, by showing the interconnections between sets of interlocking concepts. However, self-knowledge is often arrived at in a third-personal way, by using a variety of methods, such as inference to the best explanation, simulation and inferential conceptual deployment. In these cases, it is the result of a genuinely epistemic endavour and none of the three features characteristic of first-personal self-knowledge holds. So psychological self-ascriptions arrived at in a third-personal way are neither groundless, nor transaprent or authoritative. The book analyses in details this plurality of states and methods. It also presents and critically examines all major rival views, often afflicted by an (implicit) commitment to monism -- from inner sense theories, to theory-theory and simulation thories; from internalist and externalist rationalist theories to deliberative accounts; from early and contemporary versions of expressivism to various kinds of constitutivism. While presenting a groundbraking view, it can also profitably be employed in graduate seminars.
2013 International Wittgenstein Symposium Proceedings
Preface
The 2013 International Wittgens... more 2013 International Wittgenstein Symposium Proceedings
Preface
The 2013 International Wittgenstein Symposium was an exceptional event in many ways: it was an intellectually and socially vibrant meeting, reminiscent of earlier symposia in which the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein was not background rumble, but the resounding main event. Many of the contributors to this volume are well-known Wittgenstein scholars: H.-J. Glock, Cora Diamond, David Stern, Paul Standish, Charles Travis, Diego Marconi, Laurence Goldstein, John Preston, Anat Biletzki, Garry Hagberg, Anat Matar as well as the next generation of Wittgenstein scholars whose names you may encounter here for the first time; other contributors are prominent representatives of contemporary philosophy or psychology: Shaun Gallagher, David Bakhurst, Jerome Dokic, Elizabeth Pacherie, Josef Rothhaupt, Erik Myin, Louise Barrett, John Sutton and Christopher Peacocke.
The 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium sought to explore the nature of mind in its relationship to language and action or behaviour. Questions such as: 'What is mind?', 'What is it to be a minded being?', 'How is mentality manifested?' were raised in the context of views that favour an understanding of mentality as enacted or embodied. The nature of mental states, with special emphasis on perceiving and remembering were investigated as well as the nature of action, from its basic forms to mental agency, in its relation to mentality. The rootedness of language in action, and its acquisition in social practices, was also a focus of interest.
As per the tradition of this Symposium, contributions devoted to Wittgenstein's work were not bound to address the topics of the conference. They constitute the largest section of this volume and are as rich in their diversity as they are in their content. Other sections, though not focused on Wittgenstein, were highly inspired by his philosophy. The section dedicated to enactivism and extended mind explores views that promote an understanding of mentality – cognition, perception, memory, emotion – as enacted, embodied, embedded and extended/extensive. Such approaches are united in rejecting traditional representationalist approaches that favour internalist assumptions. The section on memory presents current alternatives to 'archival' or 'localist' models of memory (memory as information storage), particularly views of memory as a dynamic activity that is not stored in the person or brain but rather emerges from interaction of the person (and their brain) with the surrounding environment. Contributions on language-acquisition evoke the rootedness of language in action, such as primitive reactions and interactions, as well as social practices; while the section on intentional mental contents explores the question of whether these need to be representational and propositional, and investigates the nature of concepts, self-knowledge, and perceptual content.
We hope that this volume reflects the extraordinary energy and the intellectual stimulation, insight and promise that abounded at the 36th Wittgenstein Symposium.
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker A. Munz. Annalisa Coliva
In J.A. Carter, M. Baghramian, and R. Rowland (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, London, Routledge, 2022
Disagreement in philosophy has the tendency to pull us toward philosophical skepticism: skepticis... more Disagreement in philosophy has the tendency to pull us toward philosophical skepticism: skepticism about the extent to which we can know or justifiably believe the philosophical views we defend and advance. One reason for this is because widespread disagreement, whether in philosophy or elsewhere, is typically thought of as a symptom of a larger problem. Where there is pervasive, systematic disagreement there is thought to be little convergence to the truth, where there is little convergence to the truth there is thought to be little progress, and where there is little progress, there is a floundering discipline; a discipline of experts with big opinions to be sure, but with a seemingly unreliable connection to the truth. Disagreement, then, seems to be a good sign, not of progress, but a lack of it. On this picture of things, what is epistemically problematic about disagreement, specifically disagreement in philosophy-i.e., widespread, pervasive disagreement-is that it yields no clear convergence to the truth. On the assumption that large, collective, expert convergence to the truth on an is
There is nowadays a tendency, to be dated back to Gordon Baker's reading, to interpret the later ... more There is nowadays a tendency, to be dated back to Gordon Baker's reading, to interpret the later Wittgenstein as proposing a thoroughly therapeutic view of philosophy. Accordingly, he was not dealing with philosophical problems to show how they originated in a misunderstanding of our language. For that would have presupposed his advancing theses about how language works. Rather, his therapeutic method was in the service of liberating philosophers from the kind of intellectual prejudices that would prompt them to ask philosophical questions. The article examines the complex interconnections between Wittgenstein and Wais mann to show how the thorough-going therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein proposed by Baker is in fact a projection of Wais mann's ideas onto Wittgenstein. Moreover, by looking at Wittgenstein's complex anti-skeptical strategies in On Certainty, it shows that his aim was not to provide therapy against philosophers' inclinations, but to show that skeptical doubts are misguided and nonsensical.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2021
Stebbing is typically portrayed as indebted to Moore for many of her ideas concerning the relatio... more Stebbing is typically portrayed as indebted to Moore for many of her ideas concerning the relationship between common sense and philosophy, and about analysis. However, if we look at her work, particularly “The method of analysis in metaphysics” (read to the Aristotelian Society in 1932), a different picture emerges – one in which Stebbing did in fact anticipate some of Moore’s ideas in “Proof of an external world” (1939) (and even Wittgenstein’s in On Certainty (1969, but written in between 1949 and 1951)), with respect to the relationship between philosophy and common sense, and one in which she cast a particular and original light on the method of analysis, while at the same time being much more aware of its limitations than Moore himself in “A defence of common sense” (1925). In fact, her reservations regarding the method of analysis anticipated some of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Philosophical Investigations against his earlier logical atomism in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. “The method of analysis in metaphysics” is thus a treasure trove of seminal ideas both in metaphysics and in epistemology, whose full significance is better appreciated by reading it in connection with the work of these founding fathers of analytic philosophy.
International journal for the study of skepticism, 2021
In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have clai... more In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like "2x2=4" or "12x12=144", much like G. E. Moore's truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these more simple mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a normative function. I then maintain that these mathematical examples were introduced merely as objects of comparison to bring out some peculiar features of the only hinges he countenanced in On Certainty, which were all outside the realm of mathematics. I then close by gesturing at how the distinction between mathematical hinges and non-hinges could be exemplified and by exploring its consequences with respect to (Wittgenstein's) philosophy of mathematics.
Hinge epistemology maintains that that our justification and knowledge of empirical propositions ... more Hinge epistemology maintains that that our justification and knowledge of empirical propositions always take place within a system of hinge propositions, such as that there exists an external world. Hinge epistemology has to dispel the worry that disagreeing over hinges is rationally inert. In a companion piece (Coliva and Palmira 2020), we offer a constitutivist solution to the problem of rational inertia by maintaining that a Humean sceptic and a hinge epistemologist disagree over the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. In this paper we explore the implications of such a solution. First, we clarify in what sense a disagreement over genuine hinges would be a conceptual disagreement. Secondly, we use considerations about the (alleged) rational inertia of hinge disagreement to offer a test whereby to demarcate genuine hinges from merely entrenched beliefs. Thirdly, we offer a response to the shm-challenge, that is, the challenge of explaining why we have reason to engage in the epistemic practices hinges are constitutive of in the first place. Fourthly, we argue that the constitutivist approach to hinge disagreement does not result in a relativist view.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2021
In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have clai... more In this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like "2x2=4" or "12x12=144," much like G. E. Moore's truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a normative function. I then maintain that these mathematical examples were introduced merely as objects of comparison to bring out some peculiar features of the only hinges he countenanced in On Certainty, which were all outside the realm of mathematics. I then close by gesturing at how the distinction between mathematical hinges and non-hinges could be exemplified and by exploring its consequences with respect to (Wittgenstein's) philosophy of mathematics.
Skepticism and Invariantism, C. Kyriachou & K. Wallbridge (eds.), Routledge, 2021
In this paper, I first present and discuss in some depth Wittgenstein's radical form of contextua... more In this paper, I first present and discuss in some depth Wittgenstein's radical form of contextualism about knowledge ascriptions (§1). Accordingly, though superficially similar, uses of "I know" can serve three fundamentally different functions: an ordinary, genuinely epistemic one; a grammatical, non-epistemic one; and a 'philosophical', nonsensical one (§ §1.1-1.3). I then briefly present Wittgenstein's anti-skeptical strategies (§2), and compare my reading of On Certainty with therapeutic ones (§3.1), and with contextualist ones, such as Travis' and Williams' (§3.3-3.3). On reflection, the ordinary use of "I know" turns out to be the only common ground between Wittgenstein's position and contemporary contextualism regarding knowledge ascriptions. With respect to such a use, Wittgenstein was in fact an invariantist. I explore Wittgenstein's invariantism in (§4). In closing (§5), I consider the relationship between my own version of hinge epistemology, contemporary contextualism and skepticism. While I do not follow Wittgenstein in his claim that skeptical doubts are nonsensical, I don't think they pose a threat to our ordinary knowledge either. Yet, we do not have knowledge of hinges, since reasons for them would be circular. Hinges, rather, are rationally assumed, albeit without any justification, because they are constitutive of epistemic rationality. With that picture in hand, I then close by defusing the objection, raised by contextualists such as DeRose, that if we don't have knowledge of hinges, we would have to condone abominable conjunctions such as "I know there is a hand here, but I don't know
Hinge Epistemology, eds. D. Moyal-Sharrock & C. Sandis, Anthem, 2020
The paper examines and compare, on historial and theretical grounds, the three most developed for... more The paper examines and compare, on historial and theretical grounds, the three most developed forms of hinge epistemology to date - that is, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s "animal" hinge epistemology, Duncan Pritchard’s bioscopic one and Annalisa Coliva's constitutivist hinge epistemology.
Atomism in Philosophy, ed. U. Zilioli, Bloomsbury, 2020
The paper examines Wittgenstein's rejection, in Philosophical Investigations, of his earlier endo... more The paper examines Wittgenstein's rejection, in Philosophical Investigations, of his earlier endorsement of logical atomism in the Tractatus. It argues that key to that rejection is Wittgenstein's new conception of meaning as use.
The paper explores the anti-skeptical bearing of the kind of hinge epistemology I have developed ... more The paper explores the anti-skeptical bearing of the kind of hinge epistemology I have developed in Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, and the denial of the unconditional validity of the Closure principle, which is key in rebutting Cartesian skepticism. Along the way, a comparison with Wittgenstein’s own views in On Certainty and with the positions held by other prominent hinge epistemologists, particularly Moyal-Sharrock, Pritchard and Wright, is provided.
M Kusch (ed.) Social epistemology and epistemic relativism, Routledge, 2020, 2020
The aim of this chapter is to take up two problems that supporters of hinge epistemology have to ... more The aim of this chapter is to take up two problems that supporters of hinge epistemology have to face: the lost hinge disagreement problem and the problem of rational inertia. The lost hinge disagreement problem challenges the very possibility of disagreeing over hinges. The problem of rational inertia is, in a nutshell, the problem that we can never rationally resolve our hinge disagreements. We first argue that we can make sense of genuine hinge disagreement in a limited but epistemologically significant number of cases by deploying the notion of deflationary truth. Focusing on such cases, we then turn to the problem of rational inertia. We begin with critically examining an attempt at solving the problem that rests on an entitlement version of hinge epistemology championed by Crispin Wright. We then develop a solution to the problem of rational inertia which deploys the resources of the constitutivist version of hinge epistemology. The key contention of the constitutivist-based solution is that a disagreement between a hinge epistemologist and a sceptic concerns the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. Interpreted this way, the disagreement between a constitutivist and a sceptic is not rationally inert: first, a constitutivist offers a reason why we should take her explication of the concept of rationality to be superior to the sceptic's; and second, a sceptic cannot simply dismiss the constitutivist's stance as merely dogmatic or ad hoc, but must engage with the constitutivist pattern of reasoning head on.
The paper presents an extension of the kind of hinge epistemology proposed in Extended Rationalit... more The paper presents an extension of the kind of hinge epistemology proposed in Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology (Coliva, 2015) to the case of testimonial justification. This extension stems naturally from a reinterpretation of the classic dispute between reductionists and anti-reductionists with respect to testimonial justification. The interesting and novel aspect of that reinterpretation is that it brings to light the deep analogy between that classic dispute and the contemporary debate between so-called “liberals” and “conservatives” with respect to the structure of perceptual justification. The paper first presents the reinterpretation; it subsequently proposes the extension of hinge epistemology to the case of testimonial justification; it then turns to a detailed discussion of the exact “hinges” testimonial justification is taken to depend on, and closes by considering some possible objections.
S. Shapiro and D. Makovec (eds.) Friedrich Waismann. The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy, 2019
Waismann’s position with respect to belief and knowledge has been neglected for years, partly bec... more Waismann’s position with respect to belief and knowledge has been neglected for years, partly because it is contained in two incomplete, posthumously published papers – “Belief and knowledge” and “Two accounts of knowing” –, composed in English in the 1950’s and collected in his Philosophical Papers (1977); and partly because it is difficult to extract a clear view from the vast number of remarks he makes about the various and disparate uses we make of “belief”, “knowledge” and their cognates. This article intends to remedy the situation, to some extent, by focusing on these neglected papers and by comparing Waismann’s position with its closer kin, namely Wittgenstein’s. The affinity between them is both methodological and thematic, although ultimately there are definitely points of divergence too. The two papers are the topic of §§1-2, where I focus on belief and knowledge respectively. The comparison between Waismann and Wittgenstein is developed in §3, and some concluding remarks are put forward in §4.
Looking at things from the point of view of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, N. Da Costa and S. Wuppuluri (eds.), Springer, 2019
Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification (and knowledge) which give centre-... more Hinge epistemology is a family of theories about justification (and knowledge) which give centre-stage to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “hinge”. In the following, I will first put forward some basic methodological considerations regarding the relationship between merely exegetical work on, in particular, Wittgenstein’s texts, and more theoretically committed work, which aims at developing suggestions that can be found in the texts, even though they are not clearly attributable as such to their author (§1). I will then summarize the main tenets of what, to date, is still the most widespread reading of On Certainty (§2) – the so-called “framework reading”. In light of the initial methodological considerations and of this exegesis of On Certainty, I will then review some contemporary attempts at developing Wittgenstein’s ideas in an anti-skeptical direction, such as Crispin Wright’s, Michael Williams’ and Duncan Pritchard’s (§3). I will argue that, their intrinsic merits notwithstanding, they fail to take proper measure of Wittgenstein’s own position. I will then close by sketching my own version of hinge epistemology and by highlighting points of contact and disagreement with Wittgenstein’s own views as portrayed by the framework reading (§4).
Hinge epistemology is a trend in contemporary epistemology, which takes its lead from Wittgenstei... more Hinge epistemology is a trend in contemporary epistemology, which takes its lead from Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certainty. The paper explores its connections with epistemic relativism
The paper discusses some themes in Duncan Pritchard's last book, Epistemic Angst.
Radical Skeptic... more The paper discusses some themes in Duncan Pritchard's last book, Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. It considers it in relation to other forms of Wittgenstein-inspired hinge-epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the proposed treatment of Closure in relation to entailments containing hinges, the treatment of Underdetermination-based skeptical paradox and the avail to disjunctivism to respond to the latter. It argues that, although bold and thought-provoking, the mix of hinge epistemology and disjunctivism Pritchard proposes is not motivated.
Non-evidentialist Epistemology, N. Pedersend and L. Moretti (eds.), Routledge, 2021
In this paper, I respond to criticisms raised in three contributions to the present volume. Namel... more In this paper, I respond to criticisms raised in three contributions to the present volume. Namely, Luca Zanetti's paper on " Inescapable hinges. Steps towards a transcendental hinge epistemology " , Natalie Ashton's on " Extended rationality and epistemic relativism " , and Sebastiano Moruzzi's on " Hinge epistemology and alethic pluralism ".
Handout of the paper presented at the "Philosophy of perception" conference, Leuven Sept. 25-26, ... more Handout of the paper presented at the "Philosophy of perception" conference, Leuven Sept. 25-26, 2014
This is the handout of my talk at IJN, Paris, November 7-8 2013 at the w-shop "Thinking of onself... more This is the handout of my talk at IJN, Paris, November 7-8 2013 at the w-shop "Thinking of onself" (IJN & NIP)
This is the handout of my talk for the workshop on François Recanati organized by Paris IV, Paris... more This is the handout of my talk for the workshop on François Recanati organized by Paris IV, Paris 06/03/2014.
This is the ppt presentation of my comments on Michael Brady's *Emotional Insight* for the SIFA m... more This is the ppt presentation of my comments on Michael Brady's *Emotional Insight* for the SIFA mid-term conference *Emotions and Knowledge*, Modena December 9-10, 2013.
"These are the files of several presentations, in Italian and English, on Tyler Burge's *Origins ... more "These are the files of several presentations, in Italian and English, on Tyler Burge's *Origins of Objectivity*. The full paper is available, in English, in the book reviews-section.
Milano, Statale, novembre 2011;
Roma, La Sapienza, gennaio 2012;
Bologna, COGITO, marzo 2012"
Questo è il file della mia presentazione al workshop su "La differenza" a Reggio Emilia, nella pr... more Questo è il file della mia presentazione al workshop su "La differenza" a Reggio Emilia, nella primavera del 2012
This is the file of my presentations at
Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS, Paris, in the Spring 2012, a... more This is the file of my presentations at
Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS, Paris, in the Spring 2012, and at
Stirling, in the Spring 2012
This is the file of my presentations at
Herts, in the Fall 2011
Edinburgh, in the Spring 2012 a... more This is the file of my presentations at
Herts, in the Fall 2011
Edinburgh, in the Spring 2012 and in
Bologna, at the European Epistemology Network Meeting in June 2012
The full paper, now published in *Philosophia*, can be found in the papers-section.
This is the review, for the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, of Sandy Goldberg'... more This is the review, for the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, of Sandy Goldberg's collection Externalism, Self-knowledge and Skepticism, CUP, 2015.
This is the review of Thinking About Oneself, M. Garcia-Carpintero and S. Torre (eds.), Analysis,... more This is the review of Thinking About Oneself, M. Garcia-Carpintero and S. Torre (eds.), Analysis, forthcoming.
The paper is a critical review of Cappelen and Dever's *The inessential indexical* and of Peacock... more The paper is a critical review of Cappelen and Dever's *The inessential indexical* and of Peacocke's *The Mirror of the World*.
Coliva’s position stems from the conviction that there should be pluralism about self-knowledge. ... more Coliva’s position stems from the conviction that there should be pluralism about self-knowledge. Coliva seems to be drawn to explore varieties of self-knowledge in virtue of her acknowledgment of a wide variety of mental states, most of which are not properly covered by monistic accounts of self-knowledge, that is, accounts that purport to tell us how we know our own mind by applying just one general theory of self-knowledge to all kinds of mental states. ...Given this specific advantage of epistemological pluralism as a primary means of further clearing up our cartography of the mental, I believe it may be reasonable to think that once one removes one’s prejudice in favor of monism, as Coliva invites us to do, the intellectual move concerned may naturally lead us to explore further whether our inventory of the mind should be even more extensive than Coliva has shown us in this book. ...One very crucial case that perfectly suits the purpose of making both the metaphysics of the mind and our epistemic grasp of it more accurate is offered by a quite ground-breaking topic in epistemology and philosophy of mind alike — one that Coliva tackles in her book: the quite pervasive evidence in human psychology of the so-called internal promptings. I will show why internal promptings may pose a challenge to the constitutivism about first-personal self-knowledge defended by Coliva.
Philosophy seems to progress very slowly and sometimes due to small steps that reveal blatant tru... more Philosophy seems to progress very slowly and sometimes due to small steps that reveal blatant truths that nobody has noticed before. Coliva’s The Varieties of Self-Knowledgestands as one such an advance in our investigations on self-knowledge. The central idea of the book––namely: given that our mental states are intrinsically different, a unitary account of self-knowledge is unlikely to succeed––is so convincing that it is hard to finish reading the book without being a pluralist about self-knowledge. Coliva’s pluralist proposal sharply contrasts with a tradition centered on unitary explanations of self-knowledge. This paper, however, does not focus on the points of agreement with Coliva’s treatment of self-knowledge. Rather, this paper raises some concerns regarding one of the pillars of her substantial account of first-personal self-knowledge: the notion of authority. Against her view that authority is a necessary and apriori feature of self-knowledge, I argue that there are cases where the individual’s self-knowledge is retained while her authority is undermined. Such counter-examples derive from cases of epistemic injustice.
Annalisa Coliva’s The Varieties of Self-Knowledge (2016) is the best book-length defense availabl... more Annalisa Coliva’s The Varieties of Self-Knowledge (2016) is the best book-length defense available of pluralism about self-knowledge.Pluralism, moreover, is correct. Therefore, Coliva’s is the best book-length defense available on the correct view of self-knowledge. But while this praise is sincere, it is my unfortunate task to quibble with some of her details. And in this, I will limit myself to Coliva’s treatment of Moore’s paradox in the appendix. While this may seem restrictive, the issues addressed are in fact fundamental to Coliva’s overall position, especially regarding her views of commitments (an important class of intentional states) and self-knowledge thereof. The paper ends by noting points of convergence between Coliva’s constitutivism about commitments, and the constitutivism in Parent (2017).
PPTx della lezione del 4/12 per il corso di Laurea Magistrale Filosofia Interateneo, "Linguaggio ... more PPTx della lezione del 4/12 per il corso di Laurea Magistrale Filosofia Interateneo, "Linguaggio e conoscenza", Ferrara
Sono qui raccolti i programmi dei tre corsi che terrò nell'a.a. 2014-15, I° semestre.
Filosofia ... more Sono qui raccolti i programmi dei tre corsi che terrò nell'a.a. 2014-15, I° semestre.
Filosofia del linguaggio SDC + LCE
Epistemologia delle scienze umane
Filosofia del linguaggio LM
Deadline: 30.06.2018
This special issue of RIFL is devoted to the re-contextualization of Wittge... more Deadline: 30.06.2018
This special issue of RIFL is devoted to the re-contextualization of Wittgenstein's ideas regarding the nature of our linguistic competence and abilities at large, in the light of recent developments in the philosophy of mind, such as the raise of the enactivist program (Hutto, Myin, Noë) and the development of a usage-based theory of language acquisition (Tomasello). Central to these approaches is the idea, proposed by Wittgenstein in On Certainty, that at the bottom of our language games is a practice ("In the beginning it was the deed", writes Wittgenstein in On Certainty, quoting Goethe). Some interpreters, have taken this to mean that our basic certainties, on which our language games hinge, are ultimately non-propositional, but enacted in our everyday practices. The implications of these ideas for our understanding of language, language acquisition, and other human abilities, such as for instance reading, are enormous. In particular, these ideas have been taken as a start for a thorough anti-representationalist program, in the philosophy of mind, but also in linguistics and in developmental psychology, capable of challenging dominant views in each of these areas, championed, for instance, by Fodor in the philosophy of mind, by Chomsky in linguistics and by Gopnik in developmental psychology. At the same time, this topic connects with reflections at the interface between epistemology, the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, regarding the nature of these abilities. Namely, if they have to be considered, ultimately, as specimens of propositional knowledge, as Chomsky and more recently Williamson and Stanley have maintained, or whether they are irreducibly practical, as Ryle and Wittgenstein, as well as enactivists nowadays maintain.
We invite contributions on the following topics:
- the nature of linguistic competence;
- practical vs propositional knowledge;
- abilities and skills;
- reading;
- situated and embodied cognition;
- action and perception;
- memory;
- the later Wittgenstein's conception of linguistic abilities.
Submissions may be in English, French, Italian and Spanish. Abstract in English of no more than 250 words is required for all manuscripts submitted. Each manuscript should have title and 5 keywords in English. Submissions must be prepared for blind review. The author’s name, the institutional affiliation and the title’s paper must be placed in a separate file. Manuscripts must be sent as Microsoft Word file (.doc or .rtf) to: segreteria.rifl@gmail.com
L'avvento dell'era digitale sta avendo conseguenze enormi sulle nostre vite. Siamo oramai sempre ... more L'avvento dell'era digitale sta avendo conseguenze enormi sulle nostre vite. Siamo oramai sempre più " connessi " in rete, accessibili ovunque, dipendenti dal funzionamento della rete nello sbrigare una moltitudine di attività quotidiane che fino a poco tempo fa espletavamo in maniera del tutto diversa: dalla ricerca di indicazioni stradali, al reperimento di notizie utili a orientare le nostre scelte, da quelle più banali come scegliere un ristorante o un albergo, a quelle più importanti, riguardanti noi stessi come singoli – la comprensione dei sintomi di un qualche malessere fisico o psichico che ci affligge, la scelta di un medico, di un partner o della scuola o dell'Università in cui iscrivere i nostri figli – e come membri di una collettività – quale partito votare, quale candidato eleggere, ecc. Internet è ormai parte integrante del modo in cui lavoriamo. Per prendere solo uno tra i molti esempi possibili, il nostro mestiere di intellettuali è profondamente diverso da come era fino a non molto tempo fa: la frequentazione di biblioteche è ormai obsoleta, possiamo impartire e seguire corsi a distanza, nonché svolgere, a distanza, molti dei nostri compiti istituzionali – dal ricevimento studenti, agli esami e alle riunioni collegiali –. La nostra identità sociale, inoltre, è ormai inevitabilmente legata al web: le nostre " amicizie " , la nostra appartenenza a gruppi professionali, sociali, politici, sono in gran parte determinate dalla nostra presenza on-line. La nostra reputazione in generale, e come intellettuali in particolare, oggigiorno dipende sempre più dalla nostra presenza on-line e dalla rete di rapporti che vi intratteniamo. Chi, come molti tra i lettori di questo Nodi, non è un nativo digitale, sa che cosa c'era prima dell'avvento dell'era digitale e, sebbene a volte possa sentirsi sorpassato dai tempi, può fare confronti, nonché svolgere certe mansioni ed eventualmente risolvere problemi anche in assenza della connessione alla rete. I nativi digitali, invece, si trovano in una situazione molto diversa: la scrittura manuale è sempre meno praticata; forse, un giorno non troppo lontano, non sarà più insegnata; la lettura e lo studio si fanno on-line o su strumenti elettronici che se, da un lato, consentono rapidi collegamenti ipertestuali, dall'altro non permettono l'utilizzo della memoria visiva nel reperimento delle informazioni in un testo, rendono la lettura veloce e superficiale, e la parola scritta, priva di immagini, video, colonne sonore, noiosa. Le capacità attentive, quindi, sono inevitabilmente diverse. La memoria, inoltre, è sempre meno necessaria, perché si può far conto sulla " memoria estesa " , cioè una serie di strumenti che ci permettono di immagazzinare informazioni, facilmente reperibili ovunque ci troviamo. La lettura di mappe cartacee, la ricerca su un dizionario o un'enciclopedia in ordine alfabetico, sono, probabilmente, competenze in via di estinzione, rese superflue dall'avvento di strumenti digitali sempre disponibili on-line. D'altro canto, l'abilità nell'uso degli strumenti digitali diventa sempre più richiesta, visto che è ciò che serve, ormai, a pilotare aerei, e anche droni e a manovrare complessi strumenti tecnologicamente avanzati utilizzati in ogni ambito della vita umana, dalla sala operatoria ai siti bellici. Tale abilità richiede una destrezza manuale che a molti fa difetto, ma anche un modo di filtrare l'informazione visiva e di agire a distanza che a loro volta dipendono da capacità cognitive complesse e non egualmente presenti nella popolazione. Di ciò faccia fede il fatto che l'Università della California a Irvine ha deciso di puntare moltissimo sul reclutamento di matricole che si distinguono negli e-games, agevolandone l'iscrizione con un lauto numero di cospicue borse di studio. Le implicazioni sociali, politiche, pedagogiche ed etiche dell'avvento dell'era digitale sono evidentemente enormi, ma in questo Nodi ci concentreremo su quelle epistemiche. Vale a dire quelle riguardanti il modo in cui
A double special issue of the International Journal for the Study of Scepticism, edited by A. Col... more A double special issue of the International Journal for the Study of Scepticism, edited by A. Coliva and D. Moyal-Sharrock, 2015, forthcoming
The special issue contains selected contributions originally presented at the European Epistemolo... more The special issue contains selected contributions originally presented at the European Epistemology Network Meeting, Bologn&Modena June 2012
The book investigates the phenomenon of disagreement from the perspective both of philosophy of l... more The book investigates the phenomenon of disagreement from the perspective both of philosophy of languge and epistemology.
The book investigates the phenomenon of underdeterminacy and show why and how it matters to commu... more The book investigates the phenomenon of underdeterminacy and show why and how it matters to communication.
The paper deals with intrapersonal disagreement and contends that not only is it possible to disa... more The paper deals with intrapersonal disagreement and contends that not only is it possible to disagree with oneseld diachronically but also syncronically. It investigates the conditions in which the latter form of disagreement arises and draws out its consequences for our notion of belief and belief revision.
This is a free MOOC on Coursera on Relativism I have designed.
It features Duncan Pritchard, Case... more This is a free MOOC on Coursera on Relativism I have designed. It features Duncan Pritchard, Casey Perin, Tyrus Miller, Georges van den Abbeele, Renee Raphael. It deals with relativism about truth, morals and justification
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The book analyses in details this plurality of states and methods. It also presents and critically examines all major rival views, often afflicted by an (implicit) commitment to monism -- from inner sense theories, to theory-theory and simulation thories; from internalist and externalist rationalist theories to deliberative accounts; from early and contemporary versions of expressivism to various kinds of constitutivism.
While presenting a groundbraking view, it can also profitably be employed in graduate seminars.
The book analyses in details this plurality of states and methods. It also presents and critically examines all major rival views, often afflicted by an (implicit) commitment to monism -- from inner sense theories, to theory-theory and simulation thories; from internalist and externalist rationalist theories to deliberative accounts; from early and contemporary versions of expressivism to various kinds of constitutivism.
While presenting a groundbraking view, it can also profitably be employed in graduate seminars.
Preface
The 2013 International Wittgenstein Symposium was an exceptional event in many ways: it was an intellectually and socially vibrant meeting, reminiscent of earlier symposia in which the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein was not background rumble, but the resounding main event. Many of the contributors to this volume are well-known Wittgenstein scholars: H.-J. Glock, Cora Diamond, David Stern, Paul Standish, Charles Travis, Diego Marconi, Laurence Goldstein, John Preston, Anat Biletzki, Garry Hagberg, Anat Matar as well as the next generation of Wittgenstein scholars whose names you may encounter here for the first time; other contributors are prominent representatives of contemporary philosophy or psychology: Shaun Gallagher, David Bakhurst, Jerome Dokic, Elizabeth Pacherie, Josef Rothhaupt, Erik Myin, Louise Barrett, John Sutton and Christopher Peacocke.
The 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium sought to explore the nature of mind in its relationship to language and action or behaviour. Questions such as: 'What is mind?', 'What is it to be a minded being?', 'How is mentality manifested?' were raised in the context of views that favour an understanding of mentality as enacted or embodied. The nature of mental states, with special emphasis on perceiving and remembering were investigated as well as the nature of action, from its basic forms to mental agency, in its relation to mentality. The rootedness of language in action, and its acquisition in social practices, was also a focus of interest.
As per the tradition of this Symposium, contributions devoted to Wittgenstein's work were not bound to address the topics of the conference. They constitute the largest section of this volume and are as rich in their diversity as they are in their content. Other sections, though not focused on Wittgenstein, were highly inspired by his philosophy. The section dedicated to enactivism and extended mind explores views that promote an understanding of mentality – cognition, perception, memory, emotion – as enacted, embodied, embedded and extended/extensive. Such approaches are united in rejecting traditional representationalist approaches that favour internalist assumptions. The section on memory presents current alternatives to 'archival' or 'localist' models of memory (memory as information storage), particularly views of memory as a dynamic activity that is not stored in the person or brain but rather emerges from interaction of the person (and their brain) with the surrounding environment. Contributions on language-acquisition evoke the rootedness of language in action, such as primitive reactions and interactions, as well as social practices; while the section on intentional mental contents explores the question of whether these need to be representational and propositional, and investigates the nature of concepts, self-knowledge, and perceptual content.
We hope that this volume reflects the extraordinary energy and the intellectual stimulation, insight and promise that abounded at the 36th Wittgenstein Symposium.
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker A. Munz. Annalisa Coliva
Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. It considers it in relation
to other forms of Wittgenstein-inspired hinge-epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on
the proposed treatment of Closure in relation to entailments containing hinges, the
treatment of Underdetermination-based skeptical paradox and the avail to disjunctivism
to respond to the latter. It argues that, although bold and thought-provoking, the mix of
hinge epistemology and disjunctivism Pritchard proposes is not motivated.
Milano, Statale, novembre 2011;
Roma, La Sapienza, gennaio 2012;
Bologna, COGITO, marzo 2012"
Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS, Paris, in the Spring 2012, and at
Stirling, in the Spring 2012
Herts, in the Fall 2011
Edinburgh, in the Spring 2012 and in
Bologna, at the European Epistemology Network Meeting in June 2012
The full paper, now published in *Philosophia*, can be found in the papers-section.
to tell us how we know our own mind by applying just one general theory of self-knowledge to all kinds of mental states. ...Given this specific advantage of epistemological pluralism as a primary means of
further clearing up our cartography of the mental, I believe it may be reasonable to think that once one removes one’s prejudice in favor of monism, as Coliva invites us to do, the intellectual move concerned may naturally lead us to explore further whether our inventory of the mind should be even more extensive than Coliva has shown us in
this book. ...One very crucial case that perfectly suits the purpose of making both the metaphysics of the mind and our epistemic grasp of it more accurate is offered by a quite ground-breaking topic in epistemology and philosophy of mind alike — one that Coliva tackles
in her book: the quite pervasive evidence in human psychology of the so-called internal promptings. I will show why internal promptings may pose a challenge to the constitutivism about first-personal self-knowledge defended by Coliva.
account of self-knowledge is unlikely to succeed––is so convincing that it is hard to finish reading the book without being a pluralist about self-knowledge. Coliva’s pluralist proposal sharply contrasts with a tradition centered on unitary explanations of self-knowledge.
This paper, however, does not focus on the points of agreement with Coliva’s treatment of self-knowledge. Rather, this paper raises some concerns regarding one of the pillars of her substantial account of first-personal self-knowledge: the notion of authority. Against her view that authority is a necessary and apriori feature of self-knowledge, I argue that there are cases where the individual’s self-knowledge is
retained while her authority is undermined. Such counter-examples derive from cases of epistemic injustice.
Coliva’s is the best book-length defense available on the correct view of self-knowledge. But while this praise is sincere, it is my unfortunate task to quibble with some of her details. And in this, I will limit myself to Coliva’s treatment of Moore’s paradox in the appendix. While this may seem restrictive, the issues addressed are in fact fundamental to Coliva’s overall position, especially regarding her views of commitments (an important class of intentional states) and self-knowledge
thereof. The paper ends by noting points of convergence between
Coliva’s constitutivism about commitments, and the constitutivism in Parent (2017).
Filosofia del linguaggio SDC + LCE
Epistemologia delle scienze umane
Filosofia del linguaggio LM
This special issue of RIFL is devoted to the re-contextualization of Wittgenstein's ideas regarding the nature of our linguistic competence and abilities at large, in the light of recent developments in the philosophy of mind, such as the raise of the enactivist program (Hutto, Myin, Noë) and the development of a usage-based theory of language acquisition (Tomasello). Central to these approaches is the idea, proposed by Wittgenstein in On Certainty, that at the bottom of our language games is a practice ("In the beginning it was the deed", writes Wittgenstein in On Certainty, quoting Goethe). Some interpreters, have taken this to mean that our basic certainties, on which our language games hinge, are ultimately non-propositional, but enacted in our everyday practices. The implications of these ideas for our understanding of language, language acquisition, and other human abilities, such as for instance reading, are enormous. In particular, these ideas have been taken as a start for a thorough anti-representationalist program, in the philosophy of mind, but also in linguistics and in developmental psychology, capable of challenging dominant views in each of these areas, championed, for instance, by Fodor in the philosophy of mind, by Chomsky in linguistics and by Gopnik in developmental psychology. At the same time, this topic connects with reflections at the interface between epistemology, the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, regarding the nature of these abilities. Namely, if they have to be considered, ultimately, as specimens of propositional knowledge, as Chomsky and more recently Williamson and Stanley have maintained, or whether they are irreducibly practical, as Ryle and Wittgenstein, as well as enactivists nowadays maintain.
We invite contributions on the following topics:
- the nature of linguistic competence;
- practical vs propositional knowledge;
- abilities and skills;
- reading;
- situated and embodied cognition;
- action and perception;
- memory;
- the later Wittgenstein's conception of linguistic abilities.
Submissions may be in English, French, Italian and Spanish. Abstract in English of no more than 250 words is required for all manuscripts submitted. Each manuscript should have title and 5 keywords in English. Submissions must be prepared for blind review. The author’s name, the institutional affiliation and the title’s paper must be placed in a separate file. Manuscripts must be sent as Microsoft Word file (.doc or .rtf) to: segreteria.rifl@gmail.com
It features Duncan Pritchard, Casey Perin, Tyrus Miller, Georges van den Abbeele, Renee Raphael.
It deals with relativism about truth, morals and justification