I am a philosopher and a Ramón y Cajal researcher at the Spanish National Research Council in Madrid (in Spanish: CSIC, or Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas).
Conceptual engineering projects are sometimes criticised for 'changing the subject'. In this pape... more Conceptual engineering projects are sometimes criticised for 'changing the subject'. In this paper, I first discuss three strategies that have been proposed to address the change of subject objection. I notice that these strategies fail in similar ways: they all deploy a 'loose' notion of subject matter, while the objector can always reply deploying a 'strict' notion. Based on this, I then argue that at least current formulations of the change of subject objection (together with the response strategies just mentioned), create an overall defective dialectic, whereby no progress can be made on either side. After considering how such defective dialectic could be (at least partly) fixed, it is concluded that current formulations of the change of subject objection may be dismissed on dialectical grounds, even though some practical lessons may still be retained from the objection.
Conceptual engineering has been linked by Herman Cappelen to a position called "representational ... more Conceptual engineering has been linked by Herman Cappelen to a position called "representational skepticism", described as one's refusal to uncritically take over the conceptual representations one is handed. This position is contrasted with an uncritical attitude, called "representational complacency". Arguably, neither position, or a hybrid of the two, is rationally sustainable. This paper therefore proposes an alternative option, called "critical concept conservatism", stating that having a concept makes it rational (in a suitable sense of "rational") for one to retain it, unless there are grounds to question it. Critical concept conservatism avoids the drawbacks of skepticism and complacency; plus, it is independently supported by both positive and negative considerations. Furthermore, it complies with the demanding attitude towards conceptual representations that a conceptual engineer would be expected to have.
Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between "equivalent" langu... more Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between "equivalent" languages, and that the principle of charity compels each disputant to interpret the other as speaking truly in their own language. For Hirsch, a language's semantics maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds but assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue-whereby ontologists who speak "equivalent" languages can only argue about syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self-conception of the disputants-and particularly what I will call "the weak self-conception". As a result, Hirsch's deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it.
Pluralism is relevant to conceptual engineering in many ways. First of all, we face the issue of ... more Pluralism is relevant to conceptual engineering in many ways. First of all, we face the issue of pluralism when trying to characterise the very object(s) of conceptual engineering. Is it just concepts? Could concepts be pluralistically conceived for the purposes of conceptual engineering? Or rather, is it concepts and other representational devices as well? Second, one may wonder whether concepts have only one function in our mental life (representation) or, rather, a plurality of functions (including non-representational ones). Third, it is a contended question whether conceptual engineering projects should pursue only one set of values and goals (epistemic ones) or, rather, a variety of values and goals, including non-epistemic ones. Finally, the engineering of a concept may result in a form of "local" conceptual pluralism, which gives rise to its own ontological and semantic challenges. Having explored the various ways in which pluralism becomes important for conceptual engineers, this contribution presents and summarizes the articles published in this special issue.
The reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying expla... more The reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying explanation is available of how one can have true ontological beliefs, given that the relevant belief-forming methods are noncausal (e.g., not perception-or memory-based). This paper first presents a version of the reliability challenge against realist approaches to ontology, put forward by Jared Warren. It then explores a response to the challenge on behalf of the realist that appeals to the use of abduction. This response does not satisfactorily deal with the reliability challenge, though, and even leads to a further epistemic impasse. At this point, a version of ontological pluralism is presented, according to which all the competing theories in a certain ontological dispute can be true-in a sense of "true" to be articulated. The last step is to show how this version of pluralism deals with the reliability challenge, and especially with the complaint that we lack an explanation for our true ontological beliefs.
in The Language of Ontology, ed. by J.T.M. Miller, Oxford University Press, 2021
An influential critique of ontology, traditionally linked to Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricism an... more An influential critique of ontology, traditionally linked to Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricism and verificationism, has it that ontological questions and statements are meaningless. In recent years, Amie Thomasson has revived this Carnapian critique, albeit in a non-verificationist version. This paper argues that the meaningfulness of ontological statements can be vindicated by appealing to considerations compatible with Thomasson's Carnapian approach. Two possible avenues are explored. The first is that of specifying the assertibility conditions of ontological statements like "There are Fs", by providing an adequate rule of use. The second is that of spelling out the truth-conditions of the same ontological statements by means of a T-schema where the right-hand side is a sentence formulated in a language specifically introduced for doing ontologywhat several authors call "Ontologese". It is proposed that Ontologese be introduced as a bona-fide Carnapian framework, and this option is defended against a number of objections.
Conceptual engineering projects have been criticized for creating discontinuities of subject-matt... more Conceptual engineering projects have been criticized for creating discontinuities of subject-matter and, as a result, discontinuities in inquiries: call this the Change of Subject objection. In this paper, I explore a way of dealing with the objection that clarifies its scope and eventually downplays it. First, two strategies aimed at saving subject-continuity are examined and found wanting: Herman Cappelen's appeal to topics, and the account in terms of concept function. Second, the idea is introduced that one can begin an object-level inquiry either with a "semantically conservative" approach, whereby semantic change is not permitted, or with a "semantically progressive" approach, whereby semantic change is permitted. This distinction helps one significantly downplay the Change of Subject objection.
Paradigmatic cases of ontological disputes are taken to concern whether or not certain objects ex... more Paradigmatic cases of ontological disputes are taken to concern whether or not certain objects exist. Some theorists, however, prefer to view ontologists as really debating about what we should mean with the term “exist” (or other cognate terms). This implies interpreting ontological disputes as metalinguistic negotiations , in keeping with a recent trend to interpret other philosophical disputes along these lines (Plunkett and Sundell. Philosopher's Imprint ; 2013;13:1–37). A number of issues arise from such proposal. The first is what counts as evidence that an object‐level dispute is actually a metalinguistic negotiation. The second regards the dialectical relevance of considering metalinguistic negotiation as even just a possible interpretative option. The third issue concerns whether, and why, certain object‐level disputes (and especially ontological ones) should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations.
It is common to criticize a debate by alleging that it is a merely verbal dispute. But how conclu... more It is common to criticize a debate by alleging that it is a merely verbal dispute. But how conclusive would an argument based on such allegations be? I will take the material composition debate as a case-study and argue that the merely verbal dispute-objection is less decisive than one might expect. While assessing the dialectical effectiveness of the mere-verbality move, I will also try to mark some progress in the philosophical understanding and appreciation of the phenomenon itself of merely verbal disputes. My contribution will consist in shedding light on a distinction between the " faultlessness " and " faultiness " of a merely verbal dispute.
S. Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
The relationship between contextualism and Gettier cases is controversial. Yet, David Lewis, in h... more The relationship between contextualism and Gettier cases is controversial. Yet, David Lewis, in his influential " Elusive Knowledge " , links his contextualist thoughts to the discussion of some standard Gettier cases. This chapter explores the question whether contextualism can provide a satisfactory account of Gettier scenarios. We compare a contextualist account of lottery cases and of fake-barn cases (which Lewis seems to regard as very close to Gettier examples) with a contextualist account of standard Gettier problems. We conclude that contextualism may at best provide a partial reconstruction and explanation of the problem underlying Gettier scenarios.
in Coliva, A. and Pedersen, N. J. L. L., Epistemic Pluralism, London-Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017
Epistemicism about the debate on material composition (Bennett 2009) has it that there are too li... more Epistemicism about the debate on material composition (Bennett 2009) has it that there are too little grounds to believe any of the competing theories—Nihilism, Universalism and intermediate positions. Although an epistemic critique of this debate deserves serious consideration, I wish to resist epistemicism by countering it with a form of epistemic relativism. I will argue that each party to the debate is justified relative to the ranking of theoretical features and virtues that is "internal" to each position. I will urge that this view is to be preferred to epistemicism on account of its greater charity towards the participants involved in the relevant ontological debate.
The aim of this paper is to explore the view that some ontological disputes are " metalinguistic ... more The aim of this paper is to explore the view that some ontological disputes are " metalinguistic negotiations " (to employ a recent term coined by David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell), and to make sense of the significance of these controversies in a way that is still compatible with a broadly deflationist approach. I start by considering the view advocated by Eli Hirsch to the effect that some ontological disputes are verbal. I take the Endurantism-Perdurantusm dispute as a case-study and argue that, while it can be conceded that the dispute is verbal at the object-level, this does not rule out the possibility of a non-verbal disagreement at the metalinguistic level. I then explore the metalinguistic dispute hypothesis by seeing how it can be defended from a first objection playing on the idea of inter-translatability, as well as a second objection raising the question of equal theoretical virtues.
It has been argued by many authors that sentences fail to express full-blown propositions: a phen... more It has been argued by many authors that sentences fail to express full-blown propositions: a phenomenon known as semantic underdeterminacy. In some cases, this thesis is accompanied by a conception of thought as fully propositional. This implies that sentences fail to fully express our thoughts. Against this, I argue that many thoughts can be fully expressed by sentences, where by " fully expressed " I mean encoded by a sentence plus minimal contextual information. These are thoughts that may be characterized as less than fully propositional. I provide examples of such thoughts and argue that they plausibly constitute a non-negligible part of our mental life. As I show, these thoughts can be fully expressed by sentences that fail to express full-blown propositions. So it is not the case that sentences even generally fail to fully express our
Conceptual engineering projects are sometimes criticised for 'changing the subject'. In this pape... more Conceptual engineering projects are sometimes criticised for 'changing the subject'. In this paper, I first discuss three strategies that have been proposed to address the change of subject objection. I notice that these strategies fail in similar ways: they all deploy a 'loose' notion of subject matter, while the objector can always reply deploying a 'strict' notion. Based on this, I then argue that at least current formulations of the change of subject objection (together with the response strategies just mentioned), create an overall defective dialectic, whereby no progress can be made on either side. After considering how such defective dialectic could be (at least partly) fixed, it is concluded that current formulations of the change of subject objection may be dismissed on dialectical grounds, even though some practical lessons may still be retained from the objection.
Conceptual engineering has been linked by Herman Cappelen to a position called "representational ... more Conceptual engineering has been linked by Herman Cappelen to a position called "representational skepticism", described as one's refusal to uncritically take over the conceptual representations one is handed. This position is contrasted with an uncritical attitude, called "representational complacency". Arguably, neither position, or a hybrid of the two, is rationally sustainable. This paper therefore proposes an alternative option, called "critical concept conservatism", stating that having a concept makes it rational (in a suitable sense of "rational") for one to retain it, unless there are grounds to question it. Critical concept conservatism avoids the drawbacks of skepticism and complacency; plus, it is independently supported by both positive and negative considerations. Furthermore, it complies with the demanding attitude towards conceptual representations that a conceptual engineer would be expected to have.
Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between "equivalent" langu... more Eli Hirsch argues that certain ontological disputes involve a conflict between "equivalent" languages, and that the principle of charity compels each disputant to interpret the other as speaking truly in their own language. For Hirsch, a language's semantics maps sentences (in context) onto sets of possible worlds but assigns no role to reference. I argue that this method leads to an overly uncharitable portrayal of the disputes at issue-whereby ontologists who speak "equivalent" languages can only argue about syntax. Lack of charity stems from the fact that this portrayal likely fails to uphold the self-conception of the disputants-and particularly what I will call "the weak self-conception". As a result, Hirsch's deflationism falls victim of the same principle of charity that informs it.
Pluralism is relevant to conceptual engineering in many ways. First of all, we face the issue of ... more Pluralism is relevant to conceptual engineering in many ways. First of all, we face the issue of pluralism when trying to characterise the very object(s) of conceptual engineering. Is it just concepts? Could concepts be pluralistically conceived for the purposes of conceptual engineering? Or rather, is it concepts and other representational devices as well? Second, one may wonder whether concepts have only one function in our mental life (representation) or, rather, a plurality of functions (including non-representational ones). Third, it is a contended question whether conceptual engineering projects should pursue only one set of values and goals (epistemic ones) or, rather, a variety of values and goals, including non-epistemic ones. Finally, the engineering of a concept may result in a form of "local" conceptual pluralism, which gives rise to its own ontological and semantic challenges. Having explored the various ways in which pluralism becomes important for conceptual engineers, this contribution presents and summarizes the articles published in this special issue.
The reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying expla... more The reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying explanation is available of how one can have true ontological beliefs, given that the relevant belief-forming methods are noncausal (e.g., not perception-or memory-based). This paper first presents a version of the reliability challenge against realist approaches to ontology, put forward by Jared Warren. It then explores a response to the challenge on behalf of the realist that appeals to the use of abduction. This response does not satisfactorily deal with the reliability challenge, though, and even leads to a further epistemic impasse. At this point, a version of ontological pluralism is presented, according to which all the competing theories in a certain ontological dispute can be true-in a sense of "true" to be articulated. The last step is to show how this version of pluralism deals with the reliability challenge, and especially with the complaint that we lack an explanation for our true ontological beliefs.
in The Language of Ontology, ed. by J.T.M. Miller, Oxford University Press, 2021
An influential critique of ontology, traditionally linked to Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricism an... more An influential critique of ontology, traditionally linked to Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricism and verificationism, has it that ontological questions and statements are meaningless. In recent years, Amie Thomasson has revived this Carnapian critique, albeit in a non-verificationist version. This paper argues that the meaningfulness of ontological statements can be vindicated by appealing to considerations compatible with Thomasson's Carnapian approach. Two possible avenues are explored. The first is that of specifying the assertibility conditions of ontological statements like "There are Fs", by providing an adequate rule of use. The second is that of spelling out the truth-conditions of the same ontological statements by means of a T-schema where the right-hand side is a sentence formulated in a language specifically introduced for doing ontologywhat several authors call "Ontologese". It is proposed that Ontologese be introduced as a bona-fide Carnapian framework, and this option is defended against a number of objections.
Conceptual engineering projects have been criticized for creating discontinuities of subject-matt... more Conceptual engineering projects have been criticized for creating discontinuities of subject-matter and, as a result, discontinuities in inquiries: call this the Change of Subject objection. In this paper, I explore a way of dealing with the objection that clarifies its scope and eventually downplays it. First, two strategies aimed at saving subject-continuity are examined and found wanting: Herman Cappelen's appeal to topics, and the account in terms of concept function. Second, the idea is introduced that one can begin an object-level inquiry either with a "semantically conservative" approach, whereby semantic change is not permitted, or with a "semantically progressive" approach, whereby semantic change is permitted. This distinction helps one significantly downplay the Change of Subject objection.
Paradigmatic cases of ontological disputes are taken to concern whether or not certain objects ex... more Paradigmatic cases of ontological disputes are taken to concern whether or not certain objects exist. Some theorists, however, prefer to view ontologists as really debating about what we should mean with the term “exist” (or other cognate terms). This implies interpreting ontological disputes as metalinguistic negotiations , in keeping with a recent trend to interpret other philosophical disputes along these lines (Plunkett and Sundell. Philosopher's Imprint ; 2013;13:1–37). A number of issues arise from such proposal. The first is what counts as evidence that an object‐level dispute is actually a metalinguistic negotiation. The second regards the dialectical relevance of considering metalinguistic negotiation as even just a possible interpretative option. The third issue concerns whether, and why, certain object‐level disputes (and especially ontological ones) should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations.
It is common to criticize a debate by alleging that it is a merely verbal dispute. But how conclu... more It is common to criticize a debate by alleging that it is a merely verbal dispute. But how conclusive would an argument based on such allegations be? I will take the material composition debate as a case-study and argue that the merely verbal dispute-objection is less decisive than one might expect. While assessing the dialectical effectiveness of the mere-verbality move, I will also try to mark some progress in the philosophical understanding and appreciation of the phenomenon itself of merely verbal disputes. My contribution will consist in shedding light on a distinction between the " faultlessness " and " faultiness " of a merely verbal dispute.
S. Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
The relationship between contextualism and Gettier cases is controversial. Yet, David Lewis, in h... more The relationship between contextualism and Gettier cases is controversial. Yet, David Lewis, in his influential " Elusive Knowledge " , links his contextualist thoughts to the discussion of some standard Gettier cases. This chapter explores the question whether contextualism can provide a satisfactory account of Gettier scenarios. We compare a contextualist account of lottery cases and of fake-barn cases (which Lewis seems to regard as very close to Gettier examples) with a contextualist account of standard Gettier problems. We conclude that contextualism may at best provide a partial reconstruction and explanation of the problem underlying Gettier scenarios.
in Coliva, A. and Pedersen, N. J. L. L., Epistemic Pluralism, London-Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017
Epistemicism about the debate on material composition (Bennett 2009) has it that there are too li... more Epistemicism about the debate on material composition (Bennett 2009) has it that there are too little grounds to believe any of the competing theories—Nihilism, Universalism and intermediate positions. Although an epistemic critique of this debate deserves serious consideration, I wish to resist epistemicism by countering it with a form of epistemic relativism. I will argue that each party to the debate is justified relative to the ranking of theoretical features and virtues that is "internal" to each position. I will urge that this view is to be preferred to epistemicism on account of its greater charity towards the participants involved in the relevant ontological debate.
The aim of this paper is to explore the view that some ontological disputes are " metalinguistic ... more The aim of this paper is to explore the view that some ontological disputes are " metalinguistic negotiations " (to employ a recent term coined by David Plunkett and Timothy Sundell), and to make sense of the significance of these controversies in a way that is still compatible with a broadly deflationist approach. I start by considering the view advocated by Eli Hirsch to the effect that some ontological disputes are verbal. I take the Endurantism-Perdurantusm dispute as a case-study and argue that, while it can be conceded that the dispute is verbal at the object-level, this does not rule out the possibility of a non-verbal disagreement at the metalinguistic level. I then explore the metalinguistic dispute hypothesis by seeing how it can be defended from a first objection playing on the idea of inter-translatability, as well as a second objection raising the question of equal theoretical virtues.
It has been argued by many authors that sentences fail to express full-blown propositions: a phen... more It has been argued by many authors that sentences fail to express full-blown propositions: a phenomenon known as semantic underdeterminacy. In some cases, this thesis is accompanied by a conception of thought as fully propositional. This implies that sentences fail to fully express our thoughts. Against this, I argue that many thoughts can be fully expressed by sentences, where by " fully expressed " I mean encoded by a sentence plus minimal contextual information. These are thoughts that may be characterized as less than fully propositional. I provide examples of such thoughts and argue that they plausibly constitute a non-negligible part of our mental life. As I show, these thoughts can be fully expressed by sentences that fail to express full-blown propositions. So it is not the case that sentences even generally fail to fully express our
In this paper, I will trace a distinction between two different ways of thinking about doxastic c... more In this paper, I will trace a distinction between two different ways of thinking about doxastic conflicts. The first way emphasises what is going on at the level of semantics, when two subjects disagree by uttering certain sentences or accepting certain contents. The second way emphasises some aspects that are epistemic in kind, which concern what subjects are rationally required to do whenever they disagree with someone. The semantics-oriented and epistemically-oriented notions will serve for the purpose of assessing some aspects of the debate that revolves around the notions of disagreement on matters of inclination. These aspects include: (i) the idea that disagreements in areas of inclination are somehow defective (Egan 2010); (ii) the idea that Relativism makes disagreement epistemically insignificant (Carter 2013); (iii) the idea that there can be faultless disagreements in which faultlessness is epistemic in kind (Schafer 2011).
- Papers should be prepared for anonymous review, no longer than 8,000 words, and submitted via h... more - Papers should be prepared for anonymous review, no longer than 8,000 words, and submitted via https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/inquiry. - The deadline is September 30th, 2020. - For further information, please contact the guest editor: delia.belleri@univie.ac.at.
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- The deadline is September 30th, 2020.
- For further information, please contact the guest editor: delia.belleri@univie.ac.at.