Relativism

Relativism New Problems of Philosophy Maria Baghramian and Annalisa Coliva  Table of contents Acknowledgements and credits Introduction Chapter 1 The What and Why of Relativism 1.1 Defining relativism 1.2. Motivating relativism 1.2.1 Overcoming persistent disagreement 1.2.2 Accommodating difference 1.2.3 The inevitability of perspectivalism 1.2.4 The virtues of relativism 1.3 Forms of relativism 1.3.1 Global vs. local relativism 1.3.2 Varieties of local relativism 1.3.3 New relativism Summary Further readings Chapter 2 A Brief History of a Complex Idea The beginnings 2.1.1The first relativist 2.1.2 Pyrrhonian relativism Relativism and Modern philosophy 2.2.1The Counter Enlightenment Relativism in the 19th century Historicism and its impact Neo-Kantian relativism The British discussion The French Discussion The impact of science Relativism in contemporary philosophy Relativism and contemporary European philosophy Relativism and contemporary Analytic philosophy Summary Further readings Chapter 3 Relativizing Truth 3.1 The many faces of alethic relativism 3.1.1 Classic alethic relativism 3.1.2 The charge of self-refutation 3.2 New truth-relativism 3.2.1 New truth-relativism: Kölbel 3.2.2 New truth-relativism: MacFarlane 3.2.3 Against New truth-relativism 3.3 Other ways to be alethic relativists? Summary Further readings Chapter 4 Relativizing Conceptual Schemes 4.1 The many faces of conceptual relativism 4.1.1 Conceptual relativism 1: the holistic model 4.1.2 Against conceptual relativism 1: Davidson 4.2 Conceptual relativism 2: the Wittgensteinian model Summary Further readings Chapter 5 Relativizing the World 5.1 The social construction of reality 5.2 Linguistic constructivism 5.3 Ontological constructivism 5.4 Epistemic constructivism Summary Further readings Chapter 6 Relativizing Science 6.1 The background: Kuhn and Feyerabend 6.1.1 Kuhn’s alleged relativism 6.1.2 Feyerabend’s democratic relativism 6.2 Grounds for relativism about science 6.2.1 Underdetermination of theory by data 6.2.2 Holism 6.2.3 Theory-ladenness and observation 6.2.4 Incommensurability 6.3 Applications 6.3.1 Sociology of science and the “Strong programme” 6.3.2 Feminist epistemology and relativist interpretations of science 6.4 Relativism as a normative stance Summary Further readings Chapter 7 Relativizing Justification 7.1 The many faces of epistemic relativism 7.2 Relativizing justification 7.2.1 Conflicting evidentiary principles: The dispute between Bellarmine and Galileo 7.2.2 Conflicting principles of logic: the Azande’s example 7.2.3 Alterative explanatory principles: The Zande notion of causal explanation 7.3 Against relativism about justification 7.4 Hinge epistemology and relativism Summary Further readings Chapter 8 How to Formulate Epistemic Relativism 8.1 The Replacement model 8.1.1 Boghossian on the Replacement model 8.1.2 Kusch on the Replacement model 8.1.3 Problems with the Replacement model 8.2 New epistemic relativism 8.2.1 Problems with New epistemic relativism Summary Further readings Chapter 9 Relativizing Moral Values 9.1 The many faces of ethical relativism 9.2 Metaethical relativism 9.2.1The metaphysical argument for meta-ethical relativism 9.2.2 Against the metaphysical argument 9.3 New ethical relativism 9.3.1 Against New ethical relativism 9.4 Argument from incommensurable alternatives 9.4.1 Ethical relativism and value-incommensurability 9.4. 2 Against metaethical relativism of incommensurable alternatives Summary Further Readings Chapter 10 Questioning Relativism 10.1 Relativism as perspectivalism 10.2 Relativism as multimundialism 10.3 Relativism and dialetheism 10.4 Relativism and subvaluationism 10.5 Relativism and superassertibility Summary Further Readings Glossary Bibliography  Acknowledgements and credits This volume has developed over a considerable length of time. Many colleagues and friends have kindly given us a lot of feedback on previous versions of it. Among them, special thanks are due to, in alphabetical order, Delia Belleri, Adam Carter, Tom Hodgson. Parts of the book were used as teaching material at the University of Irvine and in the course of a summer school at the American University of Armenia. We are also grateful to our students for their feedback. We also thank three anonymous referees for very helpful comments on the penultimate version of this book. The book has been planned by the two authors together and each part has been re-worked together. Yet, Maria Baghramian has to be considered the main author responsible for chapter 1, sect. 1.2-1.3; chapter 2; chapter 3, sect. 3.1-3.1.2; chapter 4, sect. 4.5; chapter 5, 6 and 9, sect. 9.1, 9.4-9.4.2; while Annalisa Coliva is mainly responsible for the Introduction; chapter 1, sect. 2.1; chapter 3, sect. 3.2-3.3; chapter 4, sect. 4.1-4.4, chapters 7, 8; chapter 9, sect. 9.2-9.3.2; and chapter 10. The volume draws in part on Baghramian (2004) and Coliva (2009). For pedagogical purposes, we have made each chapter self-standing, while also giving cross-references for interested readers, at the expense of some repetitions. A grant from UCD Seedfunding Scheme allowed us to work together for periods in UCD and at University of California, Irvine in 2016 and 2017. We are grateful for having received it.  Introduction Relativism is an ancient philosophical doctrine, which made its first appearance in Western philosophy in the fifth century BCE, with Protagoras of Abdera. Refuted time and again, only to repeatedly appear throughout the history of Western philosophy, it is once more a topic of heated debate in contemporary philosophy. This book aims to present, as even-handedly as possible, reasons for or against some of the most prominent relativistic positions. It also aims at clarifying whether, underneath the apparent variety of relativistic proposals, there is, after all, a single doctrine deserving of the label; to investigate its motivations and to see whether it can be coherently stated. The book intends to perform two interconnected functions: It introduces students, and those more generally interested in the topic of relativism, to some of the main types of relativism and the arguments adduced in their favor. But in each instance, we also go beyond the expository material and engage in more detailed critical responses to the positions and authors under discussion. Instructors using this book, as well as our general readers, will have the opportunity to choose various chapters or sections of single chapters as appropriate to their degree of familiarity with the topic of relativism or the teaching requirements of an undergraduate or postgraduate course. The book, thus, aims to fill what we believe to be a noticeable gap in publications in this area where comprehensive books on relativism that go beyond the introductory are in short supply. Over the next 10 chapters we first introduce the conceptual and historical contours of relativism, we then focus on four core types of relativism. Namely, alethic relativism or relativism about truth, conceptual relativism, epistemic relativism and moral relativism. The final chapter returns to the metaphilosophical question we started with, in chapter 1, whether it is possible to make sense of relativism as a philosophical thesis. Chapter 1 addresses the difficult question of whether there are any features common to all relativist doctrines. We propose six. The chapter also identifies two main forms that relativism has taken, depending on its main motivations. Relativism has often been invoked to make sense of irresolvable and yet apparently faultless disagreements, about taste, for instance, which could be appreciated from parties to the debate and external observers alike. Yet, it has also been appealed to in order to make sense of an unbridgeable distance between people holding different views in ethics, for example. We also argue that this second form of relativism – “relativism of difference” –, which trades on the idea of “incommensurability” between frameworks, is in fact less theoretically well-motivated than the first. To say that it is less well motivated, however, does not mean to say that it makes no sense or, of course, that it hasn’t been made use of by relativists. Indeed, we find it operative in many authors and defended, in a particularly strong form, even recently, by Carol Rovane. With these working characterizations of relativism, we then proceed, in chapter 2, to present an overview of the various relativistic proposals that have been maintained throughout the history of Western philosophy. The main difference between Ancient relativism and later versions of it is the abandonment of any global aspiration. Contrary to Protagoras, the view that all truths are relative has not found many supporters throughout the history of philosophy. Rather, relativistic proposals have been advanced only for specific areas of discourse. For this reason, our subsequent discussion is organized accordingly. Thus, in chapter 3, we examine relativism about truth, with special attention to the contemporary versions of it presented in philosophy of language by Max Kölbel and John MacFarlane. While finding them wanting vis-à-vis the aim of making sense of the normative trappings of the relevant areas of discourse, we also take issue with the methodology they employ. For, arguably, linguistic data are messy and don’t decisively favor one relativistic account over the other. To select only some of them seems arbitrary and yet holding them all together (as we propose) may lead to forms of local revisionism, contrary to the descriptivist attitude that seems to animate these projects. In chapter 4, we discuss conceptual relativism and present two main versions of it. The first one goes back to W. v. O. Quine and it is based, according to its main critic – Donald Davidson –, on the “third dogma of empiricism”. Namely, the distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content. The second version of this view we consider is based on a certain interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views about meaning and use. We argue, however, that such an interpretation is misleading and therefore claim that there is little room to maintain that Wittgenstein was a conceptual relativist. In chapter 5, we consider the more radical view that by means of our concepts and descriptions we actually create facts. We examine, in particular, the linguistic version of the constructivism that we attribute to Richard Rorty, the ontological “world-making” of Nelson Goodman and the epistemological constructivism of Bruno Latour and find them all wanting. In chapter 6, we consider the application of conceptual relativism and of constructivism to the case of science. We present its main tenets, prominent in the writings of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. Namely, the thesis of the underdetermination of theory by data, the thesis of confirmation holism, the thesis of the theory ladenness of observation and the thesis of incommensurability between competing scientific theories. We then consider some recent applications of these theses in the arguments for relativism about science by the so-called “Strong programme” in the sociology of science and feminist epistemologies. We conclude the chapter by raising a general problem for their approach. In chapter 7, we turn to a third key variant of relativism, or what is known as epistemic relativism or relativism about knowledge. To know, or to be able to claim to know is to possess justification for your beliefs. We consider three main arguments for relativising justification: relativism regarding evidentiary principles, as exemplified by the dispute between Galileo and Bellarmine; relativism about logic; and relativism about explanatory principles. We also examine the popular interpretation of Wittgenstein’s views in On Certainty as fostering a form of relativism about justification and reject it. In chapter 8, we consider the important issue of how best to characterize epistemic relativism – that is relativism about justification and knowledge – and consider two main proposals. One, due to Paul Boghossian (who eventually rejects it), and indebted to Gilbert Harman, holds that claims of the form “S is justified in believing that P” should be replaced by relativized statements such as “According to the epistemic system ES (that I/we adopt), S is justified in believing that P”. Another, due to John MacFarlane, holds that knowledge ascriptions are relative because their semantic assessment is. We raise problems for each of these formulations. Chapter 9 is the only chapter of the volume devoted to relativism in evaluative areas of discourse, such as morals. We consider three main versions that ethical relativism can take. One, due mainly to Harman, holds that the truth-conditions of moral statements are relative to ethical systems or standards. Another one, due to Kölbel, claims that the very truth of moral statements is to be relativized to their holders. Finally, we consider the version of ethical relativism in terms of “relativism of distance” put forth by Bernard Williams and, more recently defended by Rovane, who appeals to the idea of “multimundialism”. We raise objections to all these views. Chapter 10 is a meta-philosophical chapter. As evidenced by our previous discussions, there is scope for characterizing relativism in at least two main ways: one that aims to make sense of irresolvable yet faultless disagreement, and one that aims at making sense of the idea of an unbridgeable distance – often cashed out in terms of incommensurability – between parties to certain debates. In this chapter, we take up the issue of whether each of these characterizations is ultimately stable. That is to say, whether a model for their respective desiderata can indeed be found. We explore several possible proposals and find them wanting. Yet, while this diminishes our confidence that relativism can be given any consistent formulation, it also indicates a direction for future research. For we think the time has come to address this meta-philosophical issue head on, by mobilizing our best intellectual resources, afforded to us by developments in logic and philosophy of language. Each chapter is completed by a set of proposed further readings, falling into two broad categories: some of them provide a background to the topic and facilitate a better understanding of the material under discussion, while some others help readers become familiar with the more advanced discussions of the topics at hand. 11