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A double special issue of the International Journal for the Study of Scepticism, edited by A. Coliva and D. Moyal-Sharrock, 2015, forthcoming
Skepsis
In this paper, I present and criticize three influential anti-skeptical proposals inspired by Wittgenstein´s On Certainty. I argue that these proposals are either ineffective anti-skeptical strategies or, more importantly, might lead us to another, subtle form of skepticism
Hinge Epistemology is a special issue devoted to the relevance of Wittgenstein's conception of certainty in epistemology. This special issue, edited by A. Coliva & D. Moyal-Sharrock, is forthcoming (2015) in the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Contributions by Yves Bouchard, Annalisa Coliva, Pascal Engel, H.-J. Glock, John Greco, Allan Hazlett, Martin Kusch, Michael Lynch. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Luigi Perissinotto, Duncan Pritchard, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, and Claudine Tiercelin.
Skepsis
Hinge epistemology is concerned with a particular approach to certain central epistemological questions that is inspired by Wittgenstein's remarks on knowledge, certainty, and related notions in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. I here describe the version of hinge epistemology that I have articulated in recent work, along with its relevance to some fundamental epistemological topics. These topics include the problem of radical scepticism, the nature of epistemic vertigo and its relationship to Wittgensteinian quietism, epistemic relativism, and quasi-fideism regarding the epistemology of religious belief.
Extending Hinge Epistemology, Anthem Press, 2022
The aim of this paper is to evaluate a family of responses to Cartesian scepticism whose common point is to rely on the non-contextualist restriction of one or more epistemic principles; more precisely, principles asserting the closure of knowledge under various logical operations. I will attempt to show that one cannot respond to closure-based scepticism without considering other applications of closure principles than that which is usually the exclusive subject of discussion in the contemporary literature. Those other applications of closure principles give rise to different sceptical arguments, and I will argue that if one takes those other closure-based arguments into account (and understands the challenge raised by the sceptic in a minimally internalist and rational sense) then one is faced with serious difficulties, for it seems that no theoretical solution can be found unless one settles for some questionable dialectical misbehaviour, such as begging the question against the sceptic, most notably. In particular, I will defend the view that any solution relying on the Wittgensteinian idea of ‘hinge’ falls prey to those problems, if it is interpreted in such a way that it lends to a special kind of propositional attitude, distinct from ordinary belief.
Philosophical Investigations, 2018
Synthese, 2019
Part one offers a précis of my book, Epistemic Angst (Princeton UP, 2015), with particular focus on the themes discussed by the participants in this symposium. Part two then examines a number of topics raised in this symposium in light of this précis. These include how best to understand the 'non-belief' account of hinge epistemology, whether we should think of our hinge commitments as being a kind of procedural knowledge, whether hinge epistemology can be used to deal with underdetermination-based scepticism, what the status of my acceptance of the closure principle amounts to, whether one's total evidence in fact supports our hinge commitments, and the nature of the kind of reasoning that Wittgenstein employs when advancing a hinge epistemology. Finally, I offer some remarks on the notion of epistemic risk in the context of the sceptical problematic, and show how this has application to legal epistemology.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2019
This paper explores how hinge epistemology (specifically, Duncan Pritchard’s brand of hinge epistemology) might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific (or ‘local’) skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper explains the idea of a domain specific skepticism, and how domain specific skepticisms contrast with radical skepticism. I argue that a domain specific skeptical problem can be resolved in just the same way as radical skepticism, if there are hinge commitments within that domain. I then suggest that there are hinge commitments in the moral domain, and use this to address a moral skeptical problem due to our apparent inability to know moral nihilism to be false.
Synthese, 2019
Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper is to show that the argument for the claim that there can be no rational basis to believe our anti-sceptical hinge commitments relies upon an implicit assumption about rational support that I label The Pritchensteinian Rational Grounds Principle. I argue that, insofar as this principle is intended to apply to closure-style inferences, it leads to irrational doxastic attitudes. I consider a seemingly plausible modification of the principle that would avoid this result but show that this modified principle faces serious problems of its own.
This is the handout of my talk at the RIFAJ Epistemology Workshop, Modena December 11 2013.
vol.2 Răzbunarea de la Bella Terra
Arte, Individuo y Sociedad, 2023
The Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA), South Africa, 2018
bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory), 2020
Frontiers in Immunology, 2015
Proceeding Series of the Brazilian Society of Computational and Applied Mathematics, 2013
Organic letters, 2016
Asian Journal of Research in Computer Science, 2021
SIGNOS - Investigación en sistemas de gestión, 2019