As several commentators have observed, most notably Peter Strawson, there are clearly close paral... more As several commentators have observed, most notably Peter Strawson, there are clearly close parallels between Wittgenstein’s discussion of our ‘hinge’ commitments in his final notebooks (published as On Certainty) and Hume’s discussion of our natural commitments that are impervious to sceptical attack. These parallels are explored here, and also the extent to which these proposals come apart. Several disanalogies are noted that are of overlapping significance, including that Hume and Wittgenstein are targeting different versions of the sceptical problem; that Wittgenstein, unlike Hume, doesn’t treat the fact that one is obliged to have certain fundamental commitments as having anti-sceptical import; and that for Wittgenstein our hinge commitments are essentially mundane everyday propositions.
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, 2024
An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of ... more An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.
The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception, 2024
There seems to be an important intuition that there is a distinctive value associated with direct... more There seems to be an important intuition that there is a distinctive value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality, in the sense of a sensory experience of it. This intuition is unpacked. It is claimed that it is important to keep this thesis apart from related debates about the special value of first-hand knowledge, and cognate issues concerning the eudaimonic value of understanding and strong cognitive achievements. It is argued that there is an intellectual value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality. It is maintained that this thesis is not to be understood as a general preference for sensory experience of the world, but rather as the view that one desires to have a conception of reality that is experientially anchored to reality at critical junctures. It is argued that such a claim, while on the face of it in conflict with the veritist thesis that truth is the fundamental epistemic good, is in fact better understood as a natural consequence of veritism, at least insofar as that proposal is properly understood.
Sosa's influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background c... more Sosa's influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background commitments, which he in turn relates to the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. A critique is offered of Sosa's proposal, particularly with regard to how he aims to apply it to the problem of radical scepticism. In light of this critique, an alternative conception of hinge commitments is offered that enables them to play a very different role in our treatment of radical scepticism.
It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one ... more It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of, and interrelationship between, delusions and the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. Are we to understand either or both of these notions as beliefs? Are delusions a kind of hinge commitment? In answering these questions we will appeal to a distinction between folk belief and knowledge-apt belief. It is argued that while both delusions and hinge commitments count as beliefs in the former sense, neither is a belief in the latter sense. Moreover, once we understand what is involved in the notion of a hinge commitment, it will also become clear why delusions are not hinge commitments. It is claimed that by gaining an understanding of delusions and hinge commitments, and thereby of two fundamental ways of thinking about belief, we will be in a better position to determine what is at issue in the ethics of belief debate.
Towards Skepticism: Neo-Pyrrhonism and its Critics
In his 'Scepticism and the External World', Oswaldo Porchat offered a compelling diagnosis of wha... more In his 'Scepticism and the External World', Oswaldo Porchat offered a compelling diagnosis of what is problematic about external world scepticism. In outline, he claimed that far from this scepticism representing the true critical spirit of philosophy, whereby doubt is extended to its maximal scope, it instead uncritically turns on contentious claims in the philosophy of mind. While broadly sympathetic to this critique, I argue that it nonetheless misses out an important feature of external world scepticism, which is that this is really two radical sceptical arguments in disguise. While these two sceptical arguments are overlapping, they are nonetheless distinct and either can be used to motivate the radical sceptical conclusion. Porchat's diagnosis, I contend, only targets what is problematic about one of these radical sceptical arguments. I draw out this distinction by comparing how epistemological disjunctivism and Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology responds to external world scepticism.
Evidentialism is usually thought of as an inherently conservative epistemological proposal; indee... more Evidentialism is usually thought of as an inherently conservative epistemological proposal; indeed, as a kind of antidote to epistemological radicalism. In an irenic spirit, however, I want to argue that the core evidentialist theses are in fact compatible with some quite heterodox positions in epistemology. I focus on two in particular that are close to my heart: Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and epistemological disjunctivism. My goal is not to defend these positions, much less defend the combination of these positions with evidentialism. It is rather to demonstrate, on the occasion of its anniversary, that what makes evidentialism epistemologically conversative is not the core theses associated with this view, but rather the ancillary commitments of its main proponents. This is a result that, I contend, evidentialists should welcome.
Skepticism and Naturalism: Hume, Wittgenstein, Strawson
Strawson famously proposed a naturalistic response to radical scepticism, one that he thought was... more Strawson famously proposed a naturalistic response to radical scepticism, one that he thought was not only Humean in spirit but also reflected in Wittgenstein's later work, especially On Certainty. A reappraisal of this naturalistic line is offered. A number of critical points are made. These include: that Hume is not so opposed to rational doubt of the propositions that are the (traditional) target of sceptical attack as Strawson suggests; that Wittgenstein regards the anti-sceptical propositions that are the focus of the Humean naturalism as contentless; that Wittgenstein's contentful arational 'hinge' commitments that lie at the heart of one's rational practices are essentially mundane everyday certainties (as opposed to the kind of theoretical propositions that Strawson is concerned with); and, most importantly, that Wittgenstein does not regard the fact that our hinge commitments are nonoptional as having anti-sceptical import by itself.
Vices of the Mind: MIS/DISinformation and Other Epistemic Pathologies
The digital age has exacerbated the perennial epistemic problem posed by
misinformation, as it no... more The digital age has exacerbated the perennial epistemic problem posed by misinformation, as it now comes to us in a range of new guises and is amplified by social media. It is argued that at least part of the solution to this contemporary problem is at the individual level (with the other part of the solution being at the structural level). But what, exactly, is required of a good epistemic subject in dealing with misinformation? This problem is approached by considering how one would educate individuals to deal with misinformation in the digital age. It is argued that what is required is specifically educating for the integrated set of intellectual virtues that comprise virtuous intellectual character.
According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenste... more According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the 'hinge' role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting, on account of how our hinge commitments are effectively a groundless kind of presupposition. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that it is crucial to our understanding of Wittgenstein's proposal especially in terms of its implications for radical scepticism to realize that hinge commitments are not presuppositions and that the hinge propositional attitude is not one of trusting.
One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this wa... more One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this way, public expertise can combat ignorance. Crucially, however, it is also explained how a surprising central role of public expertise is often to manufacture the very ignorance that is being combatted. This is because there is more to ignorance than simply the absence of knowledge, as ignorance more specifically concerns lacking the knowledge that one should have. In this way, ignorance is never normatively neutral (in the manner that mere lack of knowledge can be). What expert-led public information does is thus create a reasonable expectation that one should know certain important truths, and hence ensures that those who remain unaware of them are now ignorant of them. Ignorance must thus often be manufactured by public experts before those same experts can combat it. This role of public expertise--informative public expertise--in responding to ignorance is contrasted with another important role of public expertise--critical public expertise--that often has an explicitly political bearing. The aim of critical public expertise is to show how members of the public ought to know truths of which they are unaware, and hence charge them with ignorance. Rather than manufacturing ignorance, as informative public expertise does, it thus instead reveals hidden ignorance. In this fashion it serves an explicitly critical social function. By appealing to the normative nature of ignorance we are thus able to capture two very different ways in which public expertise relates to, and ultimately combats, ignorance.
Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is important... more Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is importantly distinct from what the sceptic is herself arguing for. In previous work (Pritchard 2021), I've argued for a particular interpretation of this claim in terms of the notion of epistemic vertigo. This is meant to capture what Cavell thought was a terrifying feature of our overall epistemic position without in the process collapsing into a version of radical scepticism. I've further suggested that epistemic vertigo is best understood in terms of appreciating the radical nature of Wittgenstein's account of hinge commitments in On Certainty-viz., that our very system of rational evaluation requires a prior visceral arational certainty in one's worldview, as manifested in one's complete conviction in a range of apparently mundane quotidian claims. In this paper I want to extend this interpretative approach to Cavell's work by considering how it enables us to capture an important variety of existential angst. This variety of angst is generated by the kind of disengagement from our ordinary practices that is prompted by philosophical reflection. It is constituted by an awareness of the contingent nature of one's worldview, and thus the fundamental values expressed by that worldview. In this way, the ultimate groundlessness of one's reasons and practices, as powerfully articulated by Wittgenstein and Cavell, is thus related to a fundamental axiological groundlessness. This is the deep truth in the idea that life is meaningless that corresponds to the deep truth in scepticism. But just as the latter deep truth can be granted without conceding the truth of scepticism, so the former deep truth can also be granted without conceding that life is thereby meaningless.
An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in ... more An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in debate about a subject matter of common interest. How are such conversations to be properly conducted, from a specifically epistemic point of view? It is argued that the intellectual virtues are crucially important to answering this question. In particular, it is maintained that an intellectual virtues-based conception of good arguing is preferable to alternative ways of thinking of about good arguing in purely formal or strategic terms, in that it can capture what is attractive about these proposals while also avoiding some fundamental problems that they face.
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives
An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of ... more An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.
As several commentators have observed, most notably Peter Strawson, there are clearly close paral... more As several commentators have observed, most notably Peter Strawson, there are clearly close parallels between Wittgenstein’s discussion of our ‘hinge’ commitments in his final notebooks (published as On Certainty) and Hume’s discussion of our natural commitments that are impervious to sceptical attack. These parallels are explored here, and also the extent to which these proposals come apart. Several disanalogies are noted that are of overlapping significance, including that Hume and Wittgenstein are targeting different versions of the sceptical problem; that Wittgenstein, unlike Hume, doesn’t treat the fact that one is obliged to have certain fundamental commitments as having anti-sceptical import; and that for Wittgenstein our hinge commitments are essentially mundane everyday propositions.
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, 2024
An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of ... more An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.
The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception, 2024
There seems to be an important intuition that there is a distinctive value associated with direct... more There seems to be an important intuition that there is a distinctive value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality, in the sense of a sensory experience of it. This intuition is unpacked. It is claimed that it is important to keep this thesis apart from related debates about the special value of first-hand knowledge, and cognate issues concerning the eudaimonic value of understanding and strong cognitive achievements. It is argued that there is an intellectual value associated with direct cognitive contact with reality. It is maintained that this thesis is not to be understood as a general preference for sensory experience of the world, but rather as the view that one desires to have a conception of reality that is experientially anchored to reality at critical junctures. It is argued that such a claim, while on the face of it in conflict with the veritist thesis that truth is the fundamental epistemic good, is in fact better understood as a natural consequence of veritism, at least insofar as that proposal is properly understood.
Sosa's influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background c... more Sosa's influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background commitments, which he in turn relates to the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. A critique is offered of Sosa's proposal, particularly with regard to how he aims to apply it to the problem of radical scepticism. In light of this critique, an alternative conception of hinge commitments is offered that enables them to play a very different role in our treatment of radical scepticism.
It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one ... more It is argued that in order to properly engage with the debate regarding the ethics of belief one first needs to determine the nature of the propositional attitude in question. This point is illustrated by discussing a related topic from social philosophy, broadly conceived, concerning the nature of, and interrelationship between, delusions and the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. Are we to understand either or both of these notions as beliefs? Are delusions a kind of hinge commitment? In answering these questions we will appeal to a distinction between folk belief and knowledge-apt belief. It is argued that while both delusions and hinge commitments count as beliefs in the former sense, neither is a belief in the latter sense. Moreover, once we understand what is involved in the notion of a hinge commitment, it will also become clear why delusions are not hinge commitments. It is claimed that by gaining an understanding of delusions and hinge commitments, and thereby of two fundamental ways of thinking about belief, we will be in a better position to determine what is at issue in the ethics of belief debate.
Towards Skepticism: Neo-Pyrrhonism and its Critics
In his 'Scepticism and the External World', Oswaldo Porchat offered a compelling diagnosis of wha... more In his 'Scepticism and the External World', Oswaldo Porchat offered a compelling diagnosis of what is problematic about external world scepticism. In outline, he claimed that far from this scepticism representing the true critical spirit of philosophy, whereby doubt is extended to its maximal scope, it instead uncritically turns on contentious claims in the philosophy of mind. While broadly sympathetic to this critique, I argue that it nonetheless misses out an important feature of external world scepticism, which is that this is really two radical sceptical arguments in disguise. While these two sceptical arguments are overlapping, they are nonetheless distinct and either can be used to motivate the radical sceptical conclusion. Porchat's diagnosis, I contend, only targets what is problematic about one of these radical sceptical arguments. I draw out this distinction by comparing how epistemological disjunctivism and Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology responds to external world scepticism.
Evidentialism is usually thought of as an inherently conservative epistemological proposal; indee... more Evidentialism is usually thought of as an inherently conservative epistemological proposal; indeed, as a kind of antidote to epistemological radicalism. In an irenic spirit, however, I want to argue that the core evidentialist theses are in fact compatible with some quite heterodox positions in epistemology. I focus on two in particular that are close to my heart: Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and epistemological disjunctivism. My goal is not to defend these positions, much less defend the combination of these positions with evidentialism. It is rather to demonstrate, on the occasion of its anniversary, that what makes evidentialism epistemologically conversative is not the core theses associated with this view, but rather the ancillary commitments of its main proponents. This is a result that, I contend, evidentialists should welcome.
Skepticism and Naturalism: Hume, Wittgenstein, Strawson
Strawson famously proposed a naturalistic response to radical scepticism, one that he thought was... more Strawson famously proposed a naturalistic response to radical scepticism, one that he thought was not only Humean in spirit but also reflected in Wittgenstein's later work, especially On Certainty. A reappraisal of this naturalistic line is offered. A number of critical points are made. These include: that Hume is not so opposed to rational doubt of the propositions that are the (traditional) target of sceptical attack as Strawson suggests; that Wittgenstein regards the anti-sceptical propositions that are the focus of the Humean naturalism as contentless; that Wittgenstein's contentful arational 'hinge' commitments that lie at the heart of one's rational practices are essentially mundane everyday certainties (as opposed to the kind of theoretical propositions that Strawson is concerned with); and, most importantly, that Wittgenstein does not regard the fact that our hinge commitments are nonoptional as having anti-sceptical import by itself.
Vices of the Mind: MIS/DISinformation and Other Epistemic Pathologies
The digital age has exacerbated the perennial epistemic problem posed by
misinformation, as it no... more The digital age has exacerbated the perennial epistemic problem posed by misinformation, as it now comes to us in a range of new guises and is amplified by social media. It is argued that at least part of the solution to this contemporary problem is at the individual level (with the other part of the solution being at the structural level). But what, exactly, is required of a good epistemic subject in dealing with misinformation? This problem is approached by considering how one would educate individuals to deal with misinformation in the digital age. It is argued that what is required is specifically educating for the integrated set of intellectual virtues that comprise virtuous intellectual character.
According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenste... more According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the 'hinge' role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting, on account of how our hinge commitments are effectively a groundless kind of presupposition. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that it is crucial to our understanding of Wittgenstein's proposal especially in terms of its implications for radical scepticism to realize that hinge commitments are not presuppositions and that the hinge propositional attitude is not one of trusting.
One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this wa... more One of the roles of public expertise is to spread useful knowledge throughout society. In this way, public expertise can combat ignorance. Crucially, however, it is also explained how a surprising central role of public expertise is often to manufacture the very ignorance that is being combatted. This is because there is more to ignorance than simply the absence of knowledge, as ignorance more specifically concerns lacking the knowledge that one should have. In this way, ignorance is never normatively neutral (in the manner that mere lack of knowledge can be). What expert-led public information does is thus create a reasonable expectation that one should know certain important truths, and hence ensures that those who remain unaware of them are now ignorant of them. Ignorance must thus often be manufactured by public experts before those same experts can combat it. This role of public expertise--informative public expertise--in responding to ignorance is contrasted with another important role of public expertise--critical public expertise--that often has an explicitly political bearing. The aim of critical public expertise is to show how members of the public ought to know truths of which they are unaware, and hence charge them with ignorance. Rather than manufacturing ignorance, as informative public expertise does, it thus instead reveals hidden ignorance. In this fashion it serves an explicitly critical social function. By appealing to the normative nature of ignorance we are thus able to capture two very different ways in which public expertise relates to, and ultimately combats, ignorance.
Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is important... more Cavell famously argued that there is a deep truth in scepticism, albeit a truth that is importantly distinct from what the sceptic is herself arguing for. In previous work (Pritchard 2021), I've argued for a particular interpretation of this claim in terms of the notion of epistemic vertigo. This is meant to capture what Cavell thought was a terrifying feature of our overall epistemic position without in the process collapsing into a version of radical scepticism. I've further suggested that epistemic vertigo is best understood in terms of appreciating the radical nature of Wittgenstein's account of hinge commitments in On Certainty-viz., that our very system of rational evaluation requires a prior visceral arational certainty in one's worldview, as manifested in one's complete conviction in a range of apparently mundane quotidian claims. In this paper I want to extend this interpretative approach to Cavell's work by considering how it enables us to capture an important variety of existential angst. This variety of angst is generated by the kind of disengagement from our ordinary practices that is prompted by philosophical reflection. It is constituted by an awareness of the contingent nature of one's worldview, and thus the fundamental values expressed by that worldview. In this way, the ultimate groundlessness of one's reasons and practices, as powerfully articulated by Wittgenstein and Cavell, is thus related to a fundamental axiological groundlessness. This is the deep truth in the idea that life is meaningless that corresponds to the deep truth in scepticism. But just as the latter deep truth can be granted without conceding the truth of scepticism, so the former deep truth can also be granted without conceding that life is thereby meaningless.
An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in ... more An important kind of conversation is essentially adversarial in nature, as two parties engage in debate about a subject matter of common interest. How are such conversations to be properly conducted, from a specifically epistemic point of view? It is argued that the intellectual virtues are crucially important to answering this question. In particular, it is maintained that an intellectual virtues-based conception of good arguing is preferable to alternative ways of thinking of about good arguing in purely formal or strategic terms, in that it can capture what is attractive about these proposals while also avoiding some fundamental problems that they face.
Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives
An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of ... more An account is offered of the nature and value of understanding. In particular, an explanation of the special value of understanding is presented which flows from the account given of its nature. In terms of the nature of understanding, it is argued that it essentially involves a strong kind of cognitive achievement. This explains the distinctive relationship that understanding bears to epistemic luck and thus how it diverges from propositional knowledge, such that it is usually a more demanding epistemic standing but not always (as in cases of environmental epistemic luck). It is then shown how treating understanding as a strong cognitive achievement can account for its special value, both in broad terms and in terms of epistemic value specifically.
Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First... more Ignorance is a neglected issue in philosophy. For at least two reasons, this is surprising. First, contrary to what one might expect, it is not clear what ignorance is. Some philosophers say or assume that it is lack of knowledge, whereas others claim or presuppose that it is absence of true belief. What is one ignorant of when one is ignorant? And how does ignorance of a specific fact relate to ignorance on some topic or to being an ignorant person (an ignoramus)?
Second, ignorance is of crucial importance in several domains of life, but the roles it plays in those domains have mostly received little attention. In the epistemic realm, ignorance might unexpectedly have some epistemic value, focusing on ignorance sheds new light on knowledge and epistemic justification, and the concept of culpable ignorance returns time and again in religious epistemology. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse, some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character, and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Finally, ignorance has certain social dimensions: it has been claimed to be the engine of science, it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy, and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. But if the nature of ignorance is more elusive than one would initially think and if ignorance plays a pivotal role in such important realms of life as the epistemic, the moral, and the social domains, then one could hardly wish for a better object of philosophical analysis and discussion.
The focus of this edited collection is on the epistemic dimension of ignorance. This volume addresses such issues as the nature of ignorance, the contextual dimension of ignorance, the epistemic value of ignorance, and social epistemological issues pertaining to ignorance. Together, these topics will add depth and insight into the question of how ignorance should be understood epistemologically. It will be the first in its kind in having as its focus exactly those problems associated with this dimension. It will draw together twelve commissioned chapters that are written by leading philosophers in the field and that represent diverse reflections on a rich topic.
Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hy... more Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain that evidence. As Peter Lipton (2000, 184) puts it, the core idea driving IBE is that explanatory considerations
are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest (e.g., Boyd 1985; Psillos 1999; Boghossian 2001; Enoch & Schechter 2008) is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non-objectionably circular. We aim to carve out some new space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others.
Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the wor... more Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is also important to recognize that in contemporary philosophy, marked by the linguistic turn, there is a wealth of intellectual production on ethical (e.g. McKenna 2012), psycho-linguistic (e.g. Clark 1996), logical-linguistic (e.g. Grice 1989) and pragmatic (e.g. Walton 1992) aspects of the conversation. Despite all this, this is the first collection of texts dedicated exclusively to the strictly epistemic aspects of this phenomenon which is so decisive for the very constitution of our humanity. This book brings together the contributions of fifteen leading philosophers on some of the most relevant issues of what we could call the Epistemology of Conversation.
O disjuntivismo epistemológico─pelo menos como eu defendi a posição─sustenta que, em casos paradi... more O disjuntivismo epistemológico─pelo menos como eu defendi a posição─sustenta que, em casos paradigmáticos de conhecimento perceptivo, o agente sabe em virtude de ter suporte racional que é tanto factivo (i.e. ele implica a proposição alvo) quanto acessível reflexivamente. Em particular, a posição mantém que o agente pode ter conhecimento perceptivo de que p em virtude de ver que p, em que ver que p é factivo, e é acessível reflexivamente ao agente que ele vê que p.
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Papers by Duncan Pritchard
misinformation, as it now comes to us in a range of new guises and is amplified by social media. It is argued that at least part of the solution to this contemporary problem is at the individual level (with the other part of the solution being at the structural level). But what, exactly, is required of a good epistemic subject in dealing with misinformation? This problem is approached by considering how one would educate individuals to deal with misinformation in the digital age. It is argued that what is required is specifically educating for the integrated set of intellectual virtues that comprise virtuous intellectual character.
misinformation, as it now comes to us in a range of new guises and is amplified by social media. It is argued that at least part of the solution to this contemporary problem is at the individual level (with the other part of the solution being at the structural level). But what, exactly, is required of a good epistemic subject in dealing with misinformation? This problem is approached by considering how one would educate individuals to deal with misinformation in the digital age. It is argued that what is required is specifically educating for the integrated set of intellectual virtues that comprise virtuous intellectual character.
Second, ignorance is of crucial importance in several domains of life, but the roles it plays in those domains have mostly received little attention. In the epistemic realm, ignorance might unexpectedly have some epistemic value, focusing on ignorance sheds new light on knowledge and epistemic justification, and the concept of culpable ignorance returns time and again in religious epistemology. In the moral realm, ignorance is sometimes considered as an excuse, some specific kind of ignorance seems to be implied by a moral character, and ignorance is closely related to moral risk. Finally, ignorance has certain social dimensions: it has been claimed to be the engine of science, it seems to be entailed by privacy and secrecy, and it is widely thought to constitute a legal excuse in certain circumstances. But if the nature of ignorance is more elusive than one would initially think and if ignorance plays a pivotal role in such important realms of life as the epistemic, the moral, and the social domains, then one could hardly wish for a better object of philosophical analysis and discussion.
The focus of this edited collection is on the epistemic dimension of ignorance. This volume addresses such issues as the nature of ignorance, the contextual dimension of ignorance, the epistemic value of ignorance, and social epistemological issues pertaining to ignorance. Together, these topics will add depth and insight into the question of how ignorance should be understood epistemologically. It will be the first in its kind in having as its focus exactly those problems associated with this dimension. It will draw together twelve commissioned chapters that are written by leading philosophers in the field and that represent diverse reflections on a rich topic.
Editors: Martijn Blaauw, Rik Peels
are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest (e.g., Boyd 1985; Psillos 1999; Boghossian 2001; Enoch & Schechter 2008) is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non-objectionably circular. We aim to carve out some new space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others.