Ursula Renz
Karl-Franzens-University of Graz, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- 17th Century & Early Modern Philosophy, History of Philosophy, History Of Modern Philosophy, Baruch Spinoza, Self-Knowledge and Self-Awareness, Early Modern Philosophy (Descartes, and 25 moreNeokantianism, Hermann Cohen, Ernst Cassirer, Social Epistemology, Philosophy as Therapy, Kant & neo-Kantianism, Philosophy of Emotion, Immanuel Kant, Philosophy, Thomas Hobbes, Shaftesbury, 18th Century Philosophy, 17th- and 18th-century Philosophy, John Locke, Forms of life, Life-Form, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Ralph Cudworth, Philosophical Scepticism, Pyrrhonism, Descartes, Metaphysics, Metaphilosophy, Self-Knowledge, and Spinozaedit
- I am Professor of Philosophy at Karl-Franzens-University Graz, Austria, where I teach classes in the history of philo... moreI am Professor of Philosophy at Karl-Franzens-University Graz, Austria, where I teach classes in the history of philosophy with an emphasis on Early Modern Philosophy to Kant and on themes in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral psychology. My major research focuses on Early Modern Philosophy (Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Shaftesbury), Kant, the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer), the History of Analytic Philosophy as well as on the emotions, self-knowledge, the nature of metaphysics and its relation with epistemology. I am chairing the Section of the History of Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy, and I am chair of the Alexius-Meinong-Institute and leader of FWF-project 'Spinoza and the Concept of the Human Life Form'.edit
This is an obituary on Wolfgang Bartuschat (May 13, 1938 – August 10, 2022), an eminent Spinoza scholar at Universität Hamburg. As an interpreter, Bartuschat emphasized the human and individual perspective in Spinoza’s metaphysical and... more
This is an obituary on Wolfgang Bartuschat (May 13, 1938 – August 10, 2022), an eminent Spinoza scholar at Universität Hamburg. As an interpreter, Bartuschat emphasized the human and individual perspective in Spinoza’s metaphysical and political thought. Bartuschat will also be remembered as an excellent translator and editor.
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as prideful. Krom’s attempt to reduce everything to pride is least convincing when it comes to his discussion of charity and ‘charitable obedience’. Why should we think that ‘love of God’ must be motivated by something that violates the... more
as prideful. Krom’s attempt to reduce everything to pride is least convincing when it comes to his discussion of charity and ‘charitable obedience’. Why should we think that ‘love of God’ must be motivated by something that violates the ninth law of nature? While some who obey do so out of love for God rather than fear of the earthly punishment of the sovereign, it is not clear why we need to cash this out in terms of pride. I suspect that Krom is gesturing toward a more general point: the need for motivations that go beyond narrow self-interest (self-preservation and commodious living). At a couple of points later in the book, Krom offers a much more general characterization of pride. For example, he says ‘Pride is a general condition in which one pursues the satisfaction of certain passions despite the fact that doing so runs contrary to one’s own interest’ (166). But this is not how Krom defines pride originally, and it is certainly notHobbes’s understanding of the term. More argument is needed to show that charity, generosity and loving obedience to God can be linked to a conception of pride that is true to our everyday understanding, and to Hobbes’s own understanding of the concept. While Krom’s case for the claim that ‘Hobbes’s rational commonwealth depends on irrational motivations’ is compelling, it is less clear that those irrational motivations are all reducible to pride. Yet while Krom’s conclusions may not ultimately be convincing, his discussion of the irrational in the Hobbesian state nevertheless makes for a valuable contribution to a growing literature on Hobbes’s political psychology.
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Emotionen wurden in der Fruhen Neuzeit in den unterschiedlichsten wissenschaftlichen Kontexten und – damit verbunden – philosophischen Disziplinen und Subdisziplinen erortert. Seit Descartes bildeten Leidenschaften, Gefuhle, Empfindungen... more
Emotionen wurden in der Fruhen Neuzeit in den unterschiedlichsten wissenschaftlichen Kontexten und – damit verbunden – philosophischen Disziplinen und Subdisziplinen erortert. Seit Descartes bildeten Leidenschaften, Gefuhle, Empfindungen etc. einen zentralen Gegenstand der Psychologie, Philosophie des Geistes und Erkenntnistheorie, und das sowohl im Rationalismus als auch im Empirismus. Wenig uberraschend waren sie ferner ein zentraler Bezugspunkt in der moralischen und moralphilosophischen Reflexion, wobei verschiedene Arten von Ansatzen zu unterscheiden sind.
Research Interests: Philosophy and Emotionen
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Versucht man die philosophische Entwicklung von Hermann Cohen zu uberblicken, so sticht ins Auge, dass er genuin rationalistischen Uberzeugungen immer naher ruckt. Welche Bedeutung dabei der Philosophie von Leibniz fur die Entwicklung... more
Versucht man die philosophische Entwicklung von Hermann Cohen zu uberblicken, so sticht ins Auge, dass er genuin rationalistischen Uberzeugungen immer naher ruckt. Welche Bedeutung dabei der Philosophie von Leibniz fur die Entwicklung einer rein idealistischen Urteilslogik zukommt, ist bekannt. Ich denke aber daruber hinausgehend, dass Cohens Ansatz im Verlauf der Jahre ganz zentralen erkenntnistheoretischen Grundintuitionen des klassischen Rationalismus immer naher kommt.
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Among the most peculiar traits of Kant’s critical philosophy is the contention that, while we can know our moral maxims and can thus reflect on our actions from a moral point of view, we cannot really know whether in a given situation our... more
Among the most peculiar traits of Kant’s critical philosophy is the contention that, while we can know our moral maxims and can thus reflect on our actions from a moral point of view, we cannot really know whether in a given situation our actions are actually motivated by those maxims. This means that, although we have a firm sense of our moral duties, we can never be certain whether some particular action of ours is done from duty or simply in accordance with it. This view is voiced in several of Kant’s writings. Most prominent is its appearance in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, but we also find it in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and in The Metaphysics of Morals, and it is even present in smaller writings such as “On a Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy” or “On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but is of no use in practice”. It is against this background that I revisit Kant’s remarks on the lack of self-knowledge regar...
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Spinoza's ethics is grounded by a conviction which is as simple as it is programmatic: Subjective experience can be explained, and its successful explanation is of ethical relevance. For it makes us smarter, freer and happier. This is... more
Spinoza's ethics is grounded by a conviction which is as simple as it is programmatic: Subjective experience can be explained, and its successful explanation is of ethical relevance. For it makes us smarter, freer and happier. This is the programmatic conviction behind Spinoza's ethics and motivates many of the theses it puts forward. Ursula Renz shows which kind of a theory of the human mind informs this program. The systematic differentiation of theory parts in the architecture of ethics proves to be a decisive move: A theory part that deals with questions of the ontology of the mental is followed by a definition of the human mind as a kind of subject theory, which in turn is separated from a theory part dealing with the constitution of content. This structure makes it possible to deal separately with different problems that arise in the course of the explanation of experience. In the end, Spinoza succeeds in avoiding both reductionisms and skepticisms right from the start...
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Although Spinoza refrains from providing a definition of man, he is much concerned with developing an understanding of the special features of both the human constitution and the human life. Moreover, Spinoza assumes that there is in man,... more
Although Spinoza refrains from providing a definition of man, he is much concerned with developing an understanding of the special features of both the human constitution and the human life. Moreover, Spinoza assumes that there is in man, but not in animals, a specific kind of striving that goes beyond the mere satisfaction of bodily needs, a striving which is also described in terms of man’s invention of a model of human perfection. The essay accounts for this by suggesting a reading of Spinoza’s Ethics in terms of a theory of the good life for humans. It begins by elaborating on Spinoza’s notion of a specifically human good and the role it plays for human motivation. It continues by defending a reading of his doctrine of conatus that is not committed to some form of species-related essentialism. The essay concludes by showing how Spinoza’s ideas on goodness in general allow for the conception of human perfection and blessedness.
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ABSTRACT This paper examines the concept of history of philosophy as established in Marburg Neo-Kantianism. It does so by discussing the methodological concepts and principles underlying the formation of the kind of Neo-Kantianism... more
ABSTRACT This paper examines the concept of history of philosophy as established in Marburg Neo-Kantianism. It does so by discussing the methodological concepts and principles underlying the formation of the kind of Neo-Kantianism advocated by Hermann Cohen, as well as by looking into the roots of the term ‘problem' as employed in Neo-Kantian ‘problem history'. It turns out that, although Marburg Neo-Kantians valued historical scholarship highly, they were not primarily driven by historical interests; rather, they mainly engaged with past philosophies for philosophical reasons. I further argue that, to the extent they drew attention to scientific or cultural contexts, this should not be taken to imply commitment to some kind of historical contextualism. Their turn to contexts was, on the contrary, motivated by the idealist contention that developments in science and cultural history are shaped by philosophical concepts and tenets. I will conclude by showing how both Cohen and his major student Ernst Cassirer could understand philosophical reasoning as a genuinely historical, and yet irreducibly rational, practice.
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Kulturelle Identität ist zu einem Kampfbegriff des politischen Populismus geworden. Im vorliegenden Buch wirft Ursula Renz einen kritischen Blick auf die Rede von der kulturellen Identität und deckt zahlreiche begriffliche... more
Kulturelle Identität ist zu einem Kampfbegriff des politischen Populismus geworden. Im vorliegenden Buch wirft Ursula Renz einen kritischen Blick auf die Rede von der kulturellen Identität und deckt zahlreiche begriffliche Missverständnisse auf. Obwohl kulturelle Prägungen großen Einfluss auf uns ausüben und unser Leben nachhaltig prägen, ist es irreführend zu glauben, es ginge dabei um eine Frage unserer Identität. Auf der Shortlist für den Tractatus-Preis 2019!
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In the past few years, the philosophical debate about self-knowledge has presented itself in a strikingly ‘pre-Kantian’ fashion. Some claimed that all sorts of self-knowledge can be analyzed in the manner of the empiricists, or in terms... more
In the past few years, the philosophical debate about self-knowledge has presented itself in a strikingly ‘pre-Kantian’ fashion. Some claimed that all sorts of self-knowledge can be analyzed in the manner of the empiricists, or in terms of cognitive psychology (to use a more contemporary label), whereas defenders of rationalism have not grown tired of voicing the claim that there must be some sort of self-knowledge present and underlying, as it were, all sorts of epistemic self-concern. It is against this background that this paper advocates what I would call a ‘Kantian’ strategy to approach the problem of self-knowledge. Taking Kant as a model, it argues, we may come to see how the current divide between empiricism and rationalism may be overcome in philosophical theorizing about self-knowledge.
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Research Interests: Feeling and De Gruyter
In my paper, I examine the development of Spinoza’s philosophy of mind from the early KV to the Ethics. I will argue that there is fundamental shift in the general scheme of Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. Somewhere between his early works... more
In my paper, I examine the development of Spinoza’s philosophy of mind from the early KV to the Ethics. I will argue that there is fundamental shift in the general scheme of Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. Somewhere between his early works and the Ethics, I claim, Spinoza changed his views on what a philosophical conception of the mind has to account for, and this made it necessary to conceive of the mind as an active rather than as a passive entity. To corroborate this view I first the attention on the fact that Spinoza does not use this term in the same way as in the Ethics, where it is roughly equivalent with ‘modus cogitandi’. The second section argues that while the metaphysical assumptions remain the same in his later philosophy, the Ethics develops a more explanatory or analytical approach to the mental. In the third section, I show how the several observation connected with the different usage of the term ‘idea’ may be accounted for this change of framework in the general approach to the mental.
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Relying on the assumption that Spinoza makes a double use of the principle of sufficient reason, Michael Della Rocca has defended a reconstruction of Spinoza’s approach as a metaphysical outlook according to which all particulars vanish... more
Relying on the assumption that Spinoza makes a double use of the principle of sufficient reason, Michael Della Rocca has defended a reconstruction of Spinoza’s approach as a metaphysical outlook according to which all particulars vanish in the only and one divine substance. This implies nothing less than a radical attempt to suggest a new and completely revisionary form of metaphysics. After a short discussion of Strawson’s distinction between revisionary and descriptive metaphysics and an exposition of the basic principles of Della Rocca’s interpretation, I critically assess his attack of the use of intuitions in analytic philosophy. After discussing the extent to which the first book of Spinoza’s Ethics is appropriately described as a revisionary project, I conclude with an argument for the necessity of both descriptive and revisionary elements in metaphysics.
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This chapter suggests a new interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of mind claiming that the goal of the equation of the human mind with the idea of the body is not to solve the mind-body problem, but rather to show how we can, within the... more
This chapter suggests a new interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of mind claiming that the goal of the equation of the human mind with the idea of the body is not to solve the mind-body problem, but rather to show how we can, within the framework of Spinoza’s rationalism, conceive of finite minds as irreducibly distinguishable individuals. To support this view, the chapter discusses the passage from E2p11 to E2p13 against the background of three preliminaries, i.e. the notion of a union between mind and body as it appears in Thomas Aquinas’ refutation of Averroism, Spinoza’s views on knowledge of actually existing things in E2p8c, and the phenomenological character of E2a2-4. It argues that while this view on the human mind does not undermine radical rationalism, it does require its amendment by some irreducibly empirical concessions
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... für exemplarische Analysen etwa Theunissen 2000 und Williams 1993. ... Gerade Emoti-onen und der Umgang mit ihnen sind vielfach Gegenstand von Lob und Tadel. ... Emotionsforschung zu reagieren, findet man in der amerikanischen... more
... für exemplarische Analysen etwa Theunissen 2000 und Williams 1993. ... Gerade Emoti-onen und der Umgang mit ihnen sind vielfach Gegenstand von Lob und Tadel. ... Emotionsforschung zu reagieren, findet man in der amerikanischen Philosophie bei Alfred North Whitehead ...
Comment la conception de l’homme impliquee dans les notions et principes metaphysiques de la premiere et de la deuxieme partie de l’Ethique peut-elle etre conciliee avec le role que l’orientation vers le bien de l’homme joue dans la... more
Comment la conception de l’homme impliquee dans les notions et principes metaphysiques de la premiere et de la deuxieme partie de l’Ethique peut-elle etre conciliee avec le role que l’orientation vers le bien de l’homme joue dans la pensee ethique et politique de Spinoza ? L’article suivant propose de dissoudre cette tension en attribuant a Spinoza une sorte d’existentialisme. Or, cet existentialisme n’est caracterise ni par une reflexion sur la mortalite humaine, ni par l’invocation de la notion des possibilites humaines. En revanche, l’existentialisme spinoziste fait usage d’une notion tout a fait positive de la finitude humaine, et c’est de cette derniere idee que derive la notion d’humanite. Cette lecture existentialiste du spinozisme exige que nous renoncions a toute interpretation de la doctrine du conatus dans des termes essentialistes. Mais elle ne conteste pas que la notion de conatus soit utilisee par Spinoza pour defendre son naturalisme. Contrairement aux approches exist...
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This book provides a novel interpretation of Spinoza’s Ethics and his views on the human mind in particular by showing how the text is both in its main part as well an in many details motivated by the twofold notion that subjective... more
This book provides a novel interpretation of Spinoza’s Ethics and his views on the human mind in particular by showing how the text is both in its main part as well an in many details motivated by the twofold notion that subjective experience is explainable and that its successful explanation is of ethical relevance, because it makes us wiser, freer, and happier. It argues that this allows Spinoza to reconcile seeming inconsistent convictions, viz. on the one hand the assumption that experience is irreducibly subjective and on the other hand the conviction of there being better and worse explanations of experiences. The proposed reconstruction establishes a specific view on the architecture of Spinoza’s theory of the human mind, according to which Spinoza’s account carefully distinguishes between three different parts: an ontology of the mental, a theory of the individual human subject, and a theory of mental content combining psychological and epistemological claims. Based on the distinction between these three parts, or kinds of consideration, Spinoza can avoid, from the outset, both any reductionism and any skepticism with respect to the subjective character of human experience.
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Self-Knowledge is often taken to constitute both the beginning and the end of humans' search for wisdom. Not surprisingly, the Delphic injunction 'Know thyself' has fascinated philosophers of different times, backgrounds, and tempers.... more
Self-Knowledge is often taken to constitute both the beginning and the end of humans' search for wisdom. Not surprisingly, the Delphic injunction 'Know thyself' has fascinated philosophers of different times, backgrounds, and tempers. This book explores how the search for wisdom is reflected in conceptions of self-knowledge throughout the history of philosophy and human culture.
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Hinter Spinozas Ethik steht eine ebenso simple wie programmatische Überzeugung: Subjektive Erfahrung ist erklärbar, und ihre gelungene Erklärung ist von ethischer Relevanz. Denn sie macht uns klüger, freier und glücklicher. Dieses Buch... more
Hinter Spinozas Ethik steht eine ebenso simple wie programmatische Überzeugung: Subjektive Erfahrung ist erklärbar, und ihre gelungene Erklärung ist von ethischer Relevanz. Denn sie macht uns klüger, freier und glücklicher. Dieses Buch zeigt, was für eine Theorie des menschlichen Geistes diesem Programm zugrunde liegt.
Als entscheidender Schachzug erweist sich die in der Architektur der Ethik angelegte systematische Unterscheidung von Theorieteilen: Auf einen Theorieteil, der sich mit Fragen der Ontologie des Mentalen befasst, folgt mit der Definition des menschlichen Geistes eine Art Subjekttheorie, welche wiederum von einem mit der Konstitution von Inhalten befassten Theorieteil getrennt ist. Dieser Aufbau macht es möglich, verschiedene bei der Erklärung von Erfahrung auftauchende Probleme getrennt zu behandeln. Und dank der Methode des mos geometricus können argumentative Abhängigkeiten und Unabhängigkeiten verschiedener Themen präzise abgebildet werden. Im Endeffekt gelingt es Spinoza, sowohl Reduktionismen als auch Skeptizismen bereits im Ansatz zu vermeiden. So werden zwei Intuitionen zusammen geführt, die oft für unvereinbar gehalten werden: einerseits die Auffassung, dass Erfahrung etwas irreduzibel Subjektives sei, andererseits die Annahme, dass es bessere und schlechtere Erklärungen von Erfahrungen gibt.
Als entscheidender Schachzug erweist sich die in der Architektur der Ethik angelegte systematische Unterscheidung von Theorieteilen: Auf einen Theorieteil, der sich mit Fragen der Ontologie des Mentalen befasst, folgt mit der Definition des menschlichen Geistes eine Art Subjekttheorie, welche wiederum von einem mit der Konstitution von Inhalten befassten Theorieteil getrennt ist. Dieser Aufbau macht es möglich, verschiedene bei der Erklärung von Erfahrung auftauchende Probleme getrennt zu behandeln. Und dank der Methode des mos geometricus können argumentative Abhängigkeiten und Unabhängigkeiten verschiedener Themen präzise abgebildet werden. Im Endeffekt gelingt es Spinoza, sowohl Reduktionismen als auch Skeptizismen bereits im Ansatz zu vermeiden. So werden zwei Intuitionen zusammen geführt, die oft für unvereinbar gehalten werden: einerseits die Auffassung, dass Erfahrung etwas irreduzibel Subjektives sei, andererseits die Annahme, dass es bessere und schlechtere Erklärungen von Erfahrungen gibt.
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Hanjo Glock has recently argued that, while the study of the past can be useful to substantive philosophy, it is by no means indispensable, and he advocates a pragmatic attitude which considers the study of the past as useful insofar as... more
Hanjo Glock has recently argued that, while the study of the past can be useful to substantive philosophy, it is by no means indispensable, and he advocates a pragmatic attitude which considers the study of the past as useful insofar as it allows for a better argumentative analysis of trans-historical problems. To get beyond this perspective, the present paper first examines Glock’s characterisation of philosophical problems, which resonates with Bertrand Russell’s conception, and compares it with Paul Natorp’s view, before discussing the principles underlying Hans-Georg Gadamer’s epistemology of interpretive understanding, which results from the latter’s critique of problematic history. The paper concludes by arguing that even though engagement with classical philosophical texts might not be necessary to the solution of specific problems, it is nonetheless essential to philosophy as a whole discipline.
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Trump wähnte sich unfehlbar. Descartes hätte zu dieser Haltung viel zu sagen gehabt
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How does Spinoza's TTP answer to crises?