Reason

Without doubt, the relationship between reason and religion, cognitive methods for better understanding Religion and divine teachings are some of the most important concerns of the present-day scholars. The most fundamental questions in this regard are the following: What is the interplay between reason and religion? Are reason and religion compatible and reconcilable with each other? In the case of incompatibility, what are the criteria or standards through which religion can be understood? Basically, is reason considered to be a method for understanding religion and divine teachings or it can also play a role as a source of religious knowledge?
In this study, the writer has drawn a comparison between the view of Abu Hamed Ghazali and that of Mortaza Mutahhari about the role of reason in religion. Ghazali maintains that Shariah precedes reason in every term. Although he admired reason, he confined its function to nature and mundane considerations and believed that it was unable to perceive metaphysical and religious truths as well as the relationship between God and His attributes.
Reason or intellect according to Mortaza Mutahhari is a human faculty that perceives external truths and discerns wrong from right, truth from falsehood, aught from aught not. In regards to the relationship between religion and reason from Mutahhari`s perspective, the writer has reached the conclusion that he holds both of them in reverence and considers reason to be a faculty that enable`s man to discover religious beliefs. In his view, reason serves as a criterion for the validity and invalidity of a belief. Hence, it is posssible to attain a belief system through reason with reliance on the methods of logical reasoning and it is also possible to use reason to substantiate a belief system an a way such that it is acceptable to all.

مقاله‌ای که پیش‌رو دارید، برگرفته از پایان‌نامة دانش‌پژوه محترم، «علاءالدین ملک‌اف»، از جمهوری آذربایجان است که در رشتة فلسفة غرب، با راهنمایی دکتر «محمد سعیدی‌مهر» و مشاورة دکتر «ابوالفضل کیاشمشکی» و داوری دکتر «امیر دیوانی»، در دانشگاه مفید دفاع شده است. یادآوری می‌شود، این پایان‌نامة ارزشمند، در جشنوارة بین‌المللی «حکمت مطهر» رتبة نخست را کسب کرده است.
همان‌طور که می‌دانید، از بحث‌های مهم، در معرفت‌شناسی دینی و فلسفة دین، «عقل و ایمان» است. شیوه‌های گوناگونی، برای توجیه ایمان به خداوند، که شاخص‌ترین مصداق اعتقاد دینی است، وجود دارند؛ در این مقاله، نسبت عقل و ایمان، در تطبیق اندیشه‌های استاد «مرتضی مطهری» و «آلوین پلنتینگا» واکاوی شده است.

Euthanasiais a serious problem in the end of
life cares. Many peoples want the end of life, without the pain and suffering,
and are not burdensome for their family members; besides these people, many
doctors try to prepare for them the comfortable and quiet death. Many countries
are attempting to legitimize this practice and in many countries is now being
done legally. Of course, there are very serious opponents. Among the Reviews of
the medical, legal, ethical and etc., ethical analysis of Euthanasiais a very important. This paper tries to review
Euthanasia in terms of reason-based Deontologism, According to some of the most
importantprinciples
of Kantian ethics.In this
study,it has shown thatonlytwo kindsofeuthanasiacould be allowedbased on these principles

There are three sources for moral theology: tradition, scripture, and reason and experience. This paper analyses the second source, and investigates what claims lie behind scripture being the “soul of theology” and what it means for a source to be normative and authoritative in Christian Ethics.

Contemporary political theorists have used Dewey's thought to revitalise practical reason (Bernstein 1966, 1986), and the policy sciences tradition has drawn upon and extended Dewey's ideas (Lasswell 1971, Lerner and Lasswell 1951, Torgerson 1995). Central to Dewey's philosophy is the concept of questioning, in both his theory of 'inquiry'and his attention to practical 'problem solving'.

"Part of the PhD thesis Marx and Rational Freedom by Peter Critchley

Plato and Aristotle defined the concept and established the philosophical foundations of what may be called ‘rational freedom’. Plato and Aristotle defined the key themes of ‘rational freedom’ and sought to show how these could be embodied in the polity. The most important question discussed by Plato and Aristotle concerns the nature of the relation of the individual to the political community. The human being as a zoon politikon or social animal is not an isolated, autonomous entity but a part of society, living in a social context. It follows that the flourishing of the individual required a social context that is devoted to realising the good life. Individuals as social beings realise their essential human potentialities in and through the political community, in relation to rather than as against each other. The principal concern of Plato and Aristotle was to discover the norms and rules that govern the life of the political community as the good life enabling the flourishing of the human individual."

'Reason, voluntariness and moral responsibility' argues against the theory of responsibility and blame of T.M. Scanlon, that reduces moral responsibility to a form of rational appraisability for our psychological attitudes generally - as opposed to leaving it a distinctive kind of responsibility for how we act, dependent on a power to determine for ourselves which actions we perform.

Scanlon's theory is shown to ignore obvious and central features of blame; and to be the result of a theory of action defended by Hobbes, Davidson and others, and widely held in English-language philosophy - a 'voluntariness-based' theory that action is by its nature an expression and effect of prior motivating pro attitudes to its performance.

To accommodate our ordinary understanding of blame and moral responsibility, we need instead to adopt a 'practical reason-based' theory of action: intentional action consists in a distinctively practical mode of exercising reason.

Existence is a matter of human and it exposes itself in different situations, preferences, and attitudes of human. In this regard, the emphasis that comes into prominence is that every human being has an existence that peculiar to his or her. Therefore, qualities of existence of every human are different from each other. This kind of approach faces us to some challenges while we are defining what we call "human". We can express these are; How can we understand each individual? What will be our foundation while we try to understand? Which one is more appropriate the realist and idealist systems? Or Should we understand individual in his/her existence? What is the meaning to oppose the general and abstract definitions such as "Human being is an animal who thinks", "Man is a social being"? Another context is the issue that whether there is a higher reality which become a source to the existence. Such a debate inevitably encounters us with the problem that distinction of the essentialist and non-essentialist existence. Is there a rational definition that everyone will understand for "Individual existence”, "being for itself", "Dasein"? If there is no, shall we see them as irrational? We will try to deal with all the issues in this article.

RE: Facades, illusions & ideological concepts created & promoted by ancient royalty out of necessity; effective creation of an alternate version of reality. It is only by knowing this information that the true nature of ancient texts may be understood correctly. Not knowing, means making incorrect assumptions & conclusions. Important!

This book has now been published and is available on Amazon

This book conceives philosophy in terms of philosophizing as an active process. The intention of the argument is to restore philosophy to its origins as an ethos, a practice, a way of living for rational beings. Philosophy is therefore presented more as a practice or an activity than as an intellectual exercise or subject discipline. Philosophy is something that one does as a rational being. This is not an invitation to sloppy thinking; it is an invitation to all to philosophize as rational beings. A questioning, critical approach grounded in the rational faculty is taken to be the most salient characteristic of philosophy. This emphasizes intelligence and its application over knowledge.Philosophy is not a question of knowledge but of the application of intelligence. The book proceeds from Socrates as the key figure in this conception of philosophy as philosophizing. Socrates was no ivory tower philosopher but took philosophy to the men and women of 'the real world' in an attempt to get them to support their views and activities with arguments, with good reasons for doing, thinking, stating the things they did. The 'real world' is not the one revealed to ordinary sense experience. This book shows that only by philosophizing can individuals enter the real world.

Going against both the naive techno-optimist of ‘greening business as usual’ and a resurgent ‘catastrophism’ within green thinking and politics, The Politics of Unsustainability offers an analysis of the causes of unsustainability and diminished human flourishing. It makes a case for seeing that it is profound and deepening unsustainability and growing injustice that characterises the modern world, and that therefore the focus of green or other progressive thinking should shift from its current framing in terms of ‘sustainability’ ‘sustainable development’ and ‘theories of justice’. The books locates the causes of unsustainability in dominant capitalist modes of production, debt-based consumer culture, the imperative for orthodox economic growth and the dominant ideology of neo-classical economics. At the level of developing a progressive and critical theoretical understanding of unsustainability, it argues for the importance of integrating vulnerability, which has been largely neglected by both mainstream western political theory and analyses of the current global ecological crisis. It suggests that valuable insights into the causes of and alternatives to unsustainability can be found in a critical embracing of human vulnerability and dependency as both constitutive and ineliminable aspects of what it means to be human. Rather than seeing invulnerability as the appropriate response, the book defends resilience, the ability to ‘cope with’ rather than ‘solve’ vulnerability, as more productive. The Politics of Unsustainability offers a trenchant critique of the dominant neo-classical economic groupthink, which the book argues must be seen not as some value neutral form of ‘expert knowledge’ but as a thoroughly ideological ‘commonsense’ that has corrupted and limited creative ways of thinking about and through our current predicament. It offers a green political economic alternative which replaces economic growth with economic security, and views economic growth as having done its work in the minority, affluent world, which should now focus on human flourishing and lowering socio-economic equality and fostering solidarity as part of that new re-orientation of public policy. Complementing this green political economy, The Politics of Unsustainability outlines and develops an account of ‘green republicanism’, which represents an innovative and original contribution to debates on the political responses to the crises and opportunities that constitute global unsustainability. The Politics of Unsustainability draws widely from a range of disciplines and thinkers, from cultural critic Susan Sontag to the critical theory of the Frankfurt school, contemporary debates in green political thinking, and the latest thinking in heterodox and green economics, to produce a highly relevant, timely and provocatively original statement on the human predicament in the 21st century.

This book approaches the contemporary environmental crisis as a crisis of civilisation and as a call to generate a new way of life. The purpose of the book is to bring philosophical perspectives concerning reason and freedom to bear upon the moral, economic and ecological crisis of modernity with a view to constituting the good life. The book proceeds from a commitment to the good, the true and the beautiful as established by Pythagoras and developed by Plato. The attempt is made to overcome the bifurcation of culture and nature to show reason as the realisation of nature.

Praxis is the central category of the philosophy which is not merely an interpretation of the world, but is an integral part of its transformation. In transcending a philosophy which remains abstract from the practical construction and cognition of reality, revolutionary-critical praxis represents the most developed consciousness as well as the strongest link with actual practice. The conception of praxis does not imply replacing idealism with a return to metaphysical materialist philosophy, which vas still tied to ordinary consciousness and which preceded the more developed expositions of Idealist philosophy (in Kant, Fichte and Hegel). Nor does praxis imply pragmatism or a prephilosophical attitude. Rather, the conception of praxis incorporates the essential features of both idealism and materialism, particularly idealism which affirmed human practical activity, albeit in an abstract and mystified form. Praxis represents the closing of all the classic dualisms and alienating separations which have characterised human society - theory and practice, subject and object, agency and structure, reality and the social world, philosophy/knowledge and reality, the 'is' and the 'ought', the state and civil society, the base and superstructure were all integrated in a dialectical synthesis. This conception, of revolutionary-critical praxis is thus the fundamental 'philosophical' foundation of any project of human emancipation.

Political Philosophy and Ethics
This part examines the emancipatory potentialities of reason and freedom to constitute the good life for human beings. The argument considers politics as creative human self-realisation to possess an ineliminable normative dimension concerning the appropriate regiment for the good. Green political theory is analysed in the context of a philosophical concept of ‘rational freedom’ drawn from the work of Aristotle, Plato, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel.

İslam hukukunda, sebep-netice ilişkisinin birçok açıdan dikkate alındığı görülmek-tedir. Bu makalede inceleyeceğimiz " sebebin netice gibi hüküm doğurması " şeklinde ifa-de ettiğimiz kuralın sebeb-netice ilişkisinin bir parçası olarak değerlendirilmesi mümkün gözükmektedir. İlgili kural, hukukun diğer alanlarında da etkili olmakla birlikte bu ma-kalede asıl olarak aile hukukuyla ilgili meseleler incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, araştırma-mızda halvet, nesep, talak gibi konularda sebebin netice hükmünde değerlendirildiği meseleler analiz edilecektir. Örneğin, bazı mezheplere göre tartışmalı olmakla birlikte halvetin cinsel ilişki gibi değerlendirilerek ona birtakım hukukî sonuçların bağlanması bu bağlamda zikredilebilir.
In Islamic law reason-result relationship is taken into account by jurists. The rule of " interpreting reason as result " that we will analyse in this article can be thought a part of reason-result relationship. Because aforesaid principle is very effective in Islamic family law, we focus on this legal area. For this reason, we analyse in this research being of husband and wife in private room (halvet), paternity suit (neseb), divorcement (talak), etc. For example, " halvet " is regarded as intercourse and causes some legal effect althoa-ugh some jurists do not accept this.

The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is commonly thought to be an important benefit to the accused. The history of the standard is much more complex and demonstrates lesser commitments to the truth and to the defendant.
This article develops the history of the reasonable doubt instruction in the United States and its English antecedents. Examining the development of the instruction in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and its evolution through the nineteenth and twentieth, this history reveals the dual nature of the instruction. It both encapsulated a theory of knowledge and articulated a level of confidence in the evidence. Further, the history describes twentieth-century changes in the meaning of the legal standard, particularly the divorce of the jury instruction from a broader theory of knowledge and the failure of the legal language to reflect changing definitions of reason in public discourse. The most significant of these changes in the jury instruction is to define reasonableness as the assignment of reasons. The result of these changes has been both to lower standards of criminal proof and to diminish the autonomy of the juror as the finder of fact. This outcome is the opposite of that believed by the majority of the Supreme Court that made proof beyond a reasonable doubt a constitutional requirement in In re Winship. In particular, these changes in the standard may have altered the operation of the presumption of innocence, so that the defense now has the burden of proving the reasons for innocence. This result has all but escaped scholarly notice, although it is felt keenly by some judges, and it is worthy of both further study and reform.

This article discusses the justification of value judgments. It distinguishes between monological approaches, according to which justification is a single a-temporal argument, and procedural approaches according to which justification is a process stretched out in time, and very often consists of a kind of dialogue between the proponent of a thesis and an audience which the proponent aims to convince. The article uses the procedural approach to elucidate how an argument can be presented in, for example, a scientific paper.
Within the category of monological approaches, a distinction is made between argumentation in the form of a deductively valid argument or at least something similar, and argumentation based on balancing reasons for and against a thesis. Special attention is paid to the issues that arise from the fact that value judgments are supervenient, can be universalised and presuppose a standard which has no truth value. Comparative value judgments, stating that one alternative is better than some other alternative, or even the best, also receive special attention.

This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one can be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.

In the 1890s the political and artistic ambitions of the neo-impressionist artist Paul Signac were embodied by a series of decorative projects. This article contends that Signac, inspired by anarcho-communist discourse and the prospect of revolution, attempted to synthesize in these works the didactic logic of propaganda and "purely aesthetic emotion." This synthesis was epitomized by the explicit deployment of two systems, divisionism and decorative pattern. With these systems, Signac hoped to initiate contemporary viewers into the aesthetic and social harmony of an anarcho-communist future. In the interest of addressing larger audiences, particularly among workers, he imagined proletarian spaces for his work. But the didactic elements of Signac's painting met with critical resistance, and public sites he envisioned never materialized. Faced with this lack of recognition, and with a diminished revolutionary outlook in the wake of the Procès des Trente, Signac focused his painting on atemporal landscapes. This trajectory has been read as one of aesthetic liberation; this article seeks to retrieve the extent to which it was also one of constraint, tied to the frustration of Signac's political aspirations.

Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi grew up in central Europe and, having escaped from Nazism, went on to pursue academic careers in Britain where they wrote prolifically on science and politics. Popper and Polanyi corresponded with each other, and met for discussions in the late 1940s and early 50s, but they seldom referred to each other in their publications. This article examines their correspondence so as to produce a picture of their intellectual relations. The most important of the letters was one that Popper wrote in 1952, which we reproduce in its entirety, indicating his dissatisfaction with ideas that Polanyi had expressed in a paper of that year, ‘The Stability of Beliefs’. In this paper, Polanyi used the example of the framework of Zande witchcraft to shed analogical light on science and other systems of belief, arguing that ‘frameworks of belief’ equip their adherents with intellectual powers whose use reinforces commitment to the framework, inoculating adherents against criticism. Polanyi’s 1952 paper and his 1951 and 1952 Gifford Lectures (to which that paper is intimately tied) are the first articulation of Polanyi’s sharp rejection of the modern critical philosophical tradition that by implication included Popper’s philosophical ideas. The 1952 paper is also part of Polanyi’s constructive philosophical effort to set forth a fiduciary philosophy emphasizing commitment. Popper regarded Polanyi’s position as implying cognitive relativism and irrationalism, and from the time of Polanyi’s 1952 paper their personal relationship became strained. Discord between them became publicly manifest when Polanyi subtitled his book Personal Knowledge (1958), Towards a post-critical philosophy, and Popper lambasted the idea of a ‘post-critical’ philosophy in his Preface in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959).

In this paper I want to compare and contrast Kant and Hegel on reason. While both emphasize the close connection between reason and its ends, motivations and needs, and denounce a futile understanding of reason as a formal, instrumental, or simply logical reasoning, they diverge on how to interpret reason’s restlessness, teleology and life. After a section illustrating some uncritical assumptions widespread among readings of Kant, I move to a treatment of their respective views on reason’s self-realization (the relation between thought and the I, concepts and intuitions, faith and history), and conclude by showing the main differences in their respective understandings of method, dialectic, limit and ideas.

Abstract Since the postpositivist critique of the policy sciences, policy theory has come into question. More particularly, the 'problem orientation'upon which Lasswell defined the policy sciences has come into question because policy making does not conform to his problem solving logic.

A Christian sexual ethic on homosexuality will take seriously into consideration the sources of its own theological-ethical system: Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience. However, while we take seriously the insights of Scripture and tradition (and will use these sources throughout the study), the problem of this paper is more situated in the sources of reason and experience. Thus, the fundamental questions put before us are these: is homosexuality normal and is homosexuality natural?

Homosexuality is normal in that it is not abnormal; it is not a psychological disorder, even though the anxiety of being homosexual in a culture where it is not accepted can become a neurosis or even a psychosis. Homosexuality is not normal in that it is not the norm; it is a minority position. Homosexuality is natural in that for many it is a state where one could not change without doing violence to oneself. Homosexuality is not natural in that it does not serve the biological purpose of procreation.

However, homosexuality is supranatural in that it is a love that exists beyond the biological purpose of procreation and supranormal in that it is a love that manifests itself outside the norm of heterosexuality. No one can say that one loves another for the sole purposes of procreation, or that one loves within the limits of one’s society and culture; this is not the testimony of love. The task for Christian ethics is to recognize the dynamics of love within homosexual relationships, to develop a just ethic for an all-encompassing ethic of love for heterosexual and homosexual relationships, and to recognize the unique place and perspective of queer persons within the very same ethic.

The exploratory discussion in this article starts from the fact that it is the realism of photographic representations which enables them, in an indexical sense, to point back to a reality beyond themselves as images. In the same vein, it is as a metonymic space-time fragment that the photograph can indicate a continuation of reality beyond its own framing of the visible. Or, putting it differently, rather than constituting transparent representations, presence in photographs is evoked through absence of the real. What is not problematized in photographic theory and visual anthropology is that photographs thus depend on imagination for their interpretative connection to reality. My argument sees photographic practice as interference, which pushes the medium past the implicit positivist premise for visual knowledge production in anthropology. Furthermore, when understanding the ability to imagine as movements in reason, the separation between imagination and reason, presumed necessary for the scientific production of knowledge, is also challenged. Concerned with rethinking photography in visual anthropology, imagination’s role in knowledge production will be explored through my photographic art project, Houses/Homes.

"This article takes as its starting point the Enlightenment and its epistemological break with christian tradition by stating that the only valid source of knowledge for the human beings was the reason. The analysis is intended to distinguish, through the review of the press, the arguments expressed by the catholics to reject the concept of the enlightened reason, to define their idea of faith and, finally, to defend the position that the peaceful coexistence of faith and reason was noy only possible but also desirable to reach the truth.
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ÖZET Toplumsal ve şuurlu bir varlık olan insan; sosyal, dînî, hukukî ve ahlâkî faaliyetler içinde bir takım görev ve sorumluluklarla yükümlüdür. İnsanın görev ve sorumluluklarını istenilen şekilde yerine getirebilmesi için akıl ve muhakeme gücünün sağlıklı olması lazımdır. Sağlıklı bir insan yaptığı iş ve tercihlerde birçok seçenek içinden birini bilinçli olarak seçip yapar. Bu eylemleri gerçekleştirmede fonksiyon akıl mı irade mi diye bir soru sorulacak olsa, cevap, fazla düşünmeden, alışılmış olarak 'irade' şeklinde olur. Halbuki üzerinde biraz düşünülürse, bu, tartışılması gereken bir sorundur. İrade, kelimesi Arapça RVD kökünden gelmektedir. Dilbilimcilerin ve filozofların müşterek ifadelerine göre istemek ve arzu etmek anlamına gelmekte olup sağlıklı aklın bir işlevidir. İnsan aklına gelen birçok söz, iş ve etkinliker arasından kendine gerekli olanı önce düşünür sonra uygun olanı seçip karar verir ve onu imkanı dâhilinde gerçekleştirmeye çalışır. Görülüyor ki bu seçimde düşünce ve karar akılla olur; irade (istek) ile olmaz. Aklı ve muhakemesi sağlıklı olmayan bir insan, hangi şeyin daha güzel ve iyi olacağını bilemeyeceği gibi neticesinin de zararlı olup olmayacağını bilemez. Aklı ve muhakemesi sağlıklı ve normal olmayan bir insan için, iradesi sağlıklıdır, tercihleri ve yaptıkları iyi olur denebilir mi? Bu makalede her türlü etkinliğin yapımında fonksiyoner irade (istek) demenin yerinde olmadığını, 'irade'ye sorumluluk verilmesinin de 'nass'a aykırı olduğunu ancak aklın fonksiyoner olduğunu konu edinmiş olacağız. Çünkü Kur'an 'irade'ye değil akla hitap edilmektedir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Akıl, irade/istek, fiil, kişilik, fazilet, insanın tercihleri. Abstract Human being who is social and conscious creature has number of duties and responsibilities within the social, legal, religious and moral activities. Judgment and reason capacity of human being should be healthy in order to fulfill his duties and responsibilities duly. A mentally healthy person consciously chooses an option among the many alternatives and affairs, and fulfill it. If we would ask that 'does main function belong to reason or will to fulfill these activities', the answer, without any doubt, is 'will'. However, if deeply thought, it is controversial issue. The will comes from Arabic etymon of RVD.Linguisticiansand philosophers unanimously have pointed out that the will means 'to desire' and 'to wish' and is function of mentally healthy mind.Human being firstly thinks about many words, affairs and activities