Alvin Plantinga

Met dit nieuwe boek heeft de Amerikaanse filosoof Alvin Plantinga (1932-heden) zijn belangrijkste gedachten over de verhouding tussen geloof en wetenschap op één plaats samengebracht. Dit verdient mijns inziens dan ook meer aandacht dan een korte recensie. Plantinga wordt vandaag
de dag als een van de invloedrijkste nog levende filosofen gezien en is met name bekend om zijn werk in de metafysica, de epistemologie en de godsdienstfilosofie. Nauw hieraan gerelateerd heeft hij ook veel geschreven in het vakgebied dat tegenwoordig Science and Religion genoemd wordt. Hij weerlegde ondermeer de psychologische kritiek op religie dat het op wish-fulfillment zou zijn gebaseerd en de gedachte dat religieus geloof na historisch-kritische analyse van heilige
geschriften, zoals de Bijbel, niet langer rationeel kan zijn. Ook gaf hij theïstische argumenten vanuit schijnbaar ontwerp in de kosmos en argumenteerde zelfs tegen atheïsme op basis van de evolutionaire geschiedenis van de mechanismen die onze overtuigingen produceren. Elk van zijn standpunten en argumenten heeft veel discussie opgeroepen in de literatuur en over sommige zijn zelfs hele boeken geschreven. Het zou me niet verbazen als dit nieuwe boek een plek krijgt in de canon over geloof en wetenschap. In dit artikel analyseer ik de opvattingen die Plantinga verdedigt in dit boek. Ook vergelijk ik ze met tegengestelde opvattingen. Verder bekritiseer ik Plantinga’s opvattingen op sommige punten. Ten slotte laat ik zien wat de waarde van Plantinga’s ideeën is voor de contemporaine discussie over geloof en wetenschap.

مقاله‌ای که پیش‌رو دارید، برگرفته از پایان‌نامة دانش‌پژوه محترم، «علاءالدین ملک‌اف»، از جمهوری آذربایجان است که در رشتة فلسفة غرب، با راهنمایی دکتر «محمد سعیدی‌مهر» و مشاورة دکتر «ابوالفضل کیاشمشکی» و داوری دکتر «امیر دیوانی»، در دانشگاه مفید دفاع شده است. یادآوری می‌شود، این پایان‌نامة ارزشمند، در جشنوارة بین‌المللی «حکمت مطهر» رتبة نخست را کسب کرده است.
همان‌طور که می‌دانید، از بحث‌های مهم، در معرفت‌شناسی دینی و فلسفة دین، «عقل و ایمان» است. شیوه‌های گوناگونی، برای توجیه ایمان به خداوند، که شاخص‌ترین مصداق اعتقاد دینی است، وجود دارند؛ در این مقاله، نسبت عقل و ایمان، در تطبیق اندیشه‌های استاد «مرتضی مطهری» و «آلوین پلنتینگا» واکاوی شده است.

O objetivo deste artigo, que se insere no âmbito da filosofia da religião, é tratar o problema lógico do mal e mais concretamente a teoria da defesa do livre-arbítrio de Alvin Plantinga. Quero examinar se esta é uma teoria plausível e se resiste a algumas objeções. Pretendo defender que esta teoria parece resistir a certas objeções.

Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que 1) la teoría de la evolución es ontológicamente neutral en el debate entre naturalismo metafísico y teísmo y 2) que es consistente sostener en conjunto el naturalismo metodológico y el teísmo. Para ello, examinaré en primer lugar el argumento de Plantinga que intenta mostrar que hay consistencia entre teísmo y evolución y que, por el contrario, hay inconsistencia entre la teoría de la evolución y el naturalismo (tanto metodológico como metafísico). Me interesa aceptar la primera parte del argumento de Plantinga, pero rechazar la segunda. Defiendo que el argumento de Plantinga es válido si y sólo si se supone una teoría de la verdad por correspondencia. A continuación, argumento que si se reemplaza dicha noción por la concepción pragmatista de la verdad de James, es posible concluir 1 y 2.

Abstract: This paper aims to show that: 1) theory of evolution is ontologically neutral inside debate about metaphysical naturalism and theism; and 2) that it is consistent to hold simultaneously methodological naturalism and theism. In order to achieve this, I will first examine Plantinga's argument that tries to show that there is consistency between theism and evolution, but, on the contrary, there is inconsistency between theory of evolution and (methodological and metaphysical) naturalism. I accept the first part of this argument, but I reject the second part. I will defend that Plantiga's argument is valid if and only if it is supposed a theory of truth by correspondence. Finally, I will argue that if such notion is replaced by James's pragmatist conception of truth, it is possible conclude 1 and 2.

Ik ga op zeven belangrijke kwesties in. De eerste en tweede betreffen de apologetische kritiek op denkkaders die men geërfd had en die geloof in God in de weg stonden: het logisch-positivisme uit het begin van de twintigste eeuw en het klassieke funderingsdenken uit de tijd van de Verlichting (met name de 17e eeuw). De derde en vierde betreffen het apologetische antwoord op twee belangrijke argumenten tegen geloof in God. Ten eerste het probleem van het kwaad, dat al eeuwen speelde, maar door bijvoorbeeld de Holocaust nog meer urgentie had gekregen. En ten tweede het probleem van religieuze diversiteit dat na de oorlog pregnanter werd naarmate men meer ontdekte over de variëteit aan religieuze tradities in de wereld. De vijfde en zesde betreffen argumenten vóór het bestaan van God: het kosmologische argument en het argument van afstemming. Nieuwe ontdekkingen in de natuurkunde in de loop van de twintigste eeuw speelden hierbij een cruciale rol. Ten slotte bespreek ik Alvin Plantinga’s argument tegen atheïsme: als God niet bestaat, dan hebben we geen enkele reden om te denken dat we ware overtuigingen hebben en dus ook geen enkele reden om te denken dat atheïsme waar is.  Hierin klinkt de kritiek door op een wereldbeeld waarin neo-Darwinisme de alles verklarende theorie wordt, een ontwikkeling die na de oorlog duidelijk waar te nemen valt.

Moet je gek zijn om in God te geloven? Of op z’n minst naïef, onkritisch en zweverig? Moderne mensen hebben afgerekend met de illusie dat er een God bestaat. Toch wil God maar niet dood. Nog altijd zijn er weinig on derwerpen die meer stof doen opwaaien dan juist religie. Buiten Europa groeit religieus geloof. En zelfs in het seculiere Nederland zijn er mensen die zich tot het geloof in God bekeren. Natuurlijk kunnen we dat zien als een nieuw bewijs voor de onuitroeibare irrationa-liteit van mensen. Maar misschien is er meer aan de hand. Misschien is geloven in God niet zo dom als het lijkt.

Dat laatste is precies wat in dit boek wordt beweerd. Twee wetenschappers zetten hier de argumenten voor en tegen Godsgeloof op een rij. Ze doen dat op een milde manier, zonder polemiek of bekeringsijver, al zijn ze zelf wel gelovig. Het boek is geschreven met vaart en humor en het bevat de laatste wetenschappelijke en filosofische inzichten over religie en Godsgeloof. Het is tot stand gekomen met medewerking van gelovige en niet-gelovige wetenschappers uit verschillende vakgebieden en bedoeld voor mensen die openstaan voor argumenten.

The ontological argument for the existence of God has enjoyed a recent renaissance among philosophers of religion. Alvin Plantinga's modal version is perhaps the most notable example. This essay critically examines Plantinga's rendition, uncovering both its strengths and weaknesses. The author concludes that while the argument is probably formally valid, it is ultimately unsound. Nonetheless, Plantinga's version has generated much interest and discussion. The author spends some time uncovering the reasons for the argument's powerful intuitive appeal. He concludes his essay by appraising Pruss's recent defence of Plantinga's argument.

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the...

There are three major theses in Plantinga’s latest version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. (1) Given materialism, the conditional probability of the reliability of human cognitive mechanisms produced by evolution is low; (2) the same conditional probability given reductive or non-reductive materialism is still low; (3) the most popular naturalistic theories of content and truth are not admissible for naturalism. I argue that Plantinga’s argument for (1) presupposes an anti-materialistic conception of content, and it therefore begs the question against materialism. To argue for (2), Plantinga claims that the adaptiveness of a belief is indifferent to its truth. I argue that this claim is unsupported unless it again assumes an anti-materialistic conception of content and truth. I further argue that Plantinga’s argument for (3) is not successful either, because an improved version of teleosemantics can meet his criticisms. Moreover, this version of teleosemantics implies that the truth of a belief is (probabilistically) positively related to its adaptiveness, at least for simple beliefs about physical objects in human environments. This directly challenges Plantinga’s claim that adaptiveness is indifferent to truth.

In Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism, the probability thesis claims that the probability of cognitive reliability is low given naturalism and evolution.  Using a general mathematical model for a naturalistic universe (assuming little more than physical laws, time, and physical conditions) one can prove a set of theorems showing that mental states are causally irrelevant in such a universe in a way that strongly supports the probability thesis when epistemic probability is used.  To help avoid bias towards our own species, the deductive argument for the epistemic probability thesis focuses initially not on us but aliens for which naturalism and evolution obtain, the theorems being used to argue that it is more likely that the aliens are effectively living in dreamworld rather than possessing reliable cognitive faculties.  Using the theorems and an epistemic probability approach, one can circumvent a number of challenges to the probability thesis such as noncontingent theism and conceptual constraints.  The theorems can also be used to construct a new scientific argument against naturalism.

The Catholic Church has traditionally opposed the doctrine of fideism. Where does Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Fides et Ratio stand in relation the traditional debate about the proper scope of faith and reason? What if anything does the document add to the debate? This essay is concerned with arguing how John Paul II’s encyclical Fides et Ratio serves as a main response against these extreme world views, such as Fideism and Rationalism.

The epistemic problem for God's existence from evil is a problem concerning whether there are instances, kinds, amounts or distributions of evil that are inconsistent with or make it unlikely that a perfect deity exists. This entry begins with a discussion of the relevance of our understanding of God's nature to the problem of evil. The second part of the entry focuses on various formulations and criticisms of the problem of evil including inductive or evidential versions, logical or incompatibility versions, as well as contemporary Bayesian and abductive versions of the problem of evil.

This article presents and explains Alvin Plantinga’s objections against the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity, with a special focus on the objection based on the incompatibility between divine simplicity and the free character of the act of creation. The article analyses and weighs different responses to this objection coming from the Classical Theistic perspective of Thomas Aquinas: a) the rejection of possible worlds semantics; b) the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity; c) the denial of God’s trans-world identity; d) the extrinsic character of God’s relational properties. A nuanced version of this last response is proposed and defended.

Nous nous interrogeons sur le rôle du possible dans la définition de l'identité personnelle, à travers les mondes possibles, et plus particulièrement ceux proposés par David Lewis, afin de répondre à plusieurs questions qui n'en forment en fait qu'une seule : « Pourquoi les possibles réalisés serait-ils supérieurs aux possibles non réalisés dans la définition de l'identité personnelle ? », « Est-ce que les possibles d'un individu font partie de son identité ? », « Pour définir ce qu'est un individu, est-on obligé de passer par ce qu'il pourrait-être ? » En d'autres termes, ce qu'un individu pourrait-être n'est-il pas aussi constitutif de son soi, que ses autres qualités ? On identifierait alors les possibles d'un individu à certaines de ses qualités. Ses « qualités possibles ». Cela nous amènera à nous demander si on ne peut pas faire, en un certain sens une identification des possibles à l'essence, ou au moins, si on ne peut pas dire que les possibles d'un individu sont constitutifs de son essence.

Alvin Plantinga, analitik felsefe düşüncesi içerisinde yetişmiş ve bu gelenek içinde teistik din felsefesinin oluşumuna katkıda bulunmuş bir filozoftur. Ayrıca teizmin savunusu için yaptığı çalışmalarla, çeşitli üniversitelerden aldığı onur ödülleri ve 2017 yılında kazandığı Templeton Prize ödülüyle, haklı bir üne kavuşmuş bir şahsiyettir.  Bu çalışmayı yapmamızdaki en önemli amaç, Plantinga’nın dini epistemoloji üzerine yaptığı çalışmaları analiz edip bu düşüncelerinin ardalanına dair bir tespitte bulunmaktır. Bu çalışmada yararlandığımız öncelikli kaynaklar, Plantinga’nın Nicholas Wolterstorff ile birlikte kaleme aldığı “Faith and Rationality” adlı eser ile birlikte son dönem epistemik fikirlerinin çerçevesini belirleyen üç ciltlik “Warrant and Proper Function”, “Warrant: The Current Debate”, “Warranted: Christian Belief”  isimli eserler olmuştur. Plantinga’nın ilk dönem epistemoloji çalışmalarının gayesini bir tür olumsuzlama diyebileceğimiz klasik temelciliğin ve evidentializmin eleştirisi oluştururken, ikinci döneminde bu eleştirilerden yola çıkarak Tanrı inancının haklı bir temelde ve güvenceye sahip olduğunu gösterme amacına yönelmiştir. Plantinga’nın teolojik fikirlerini oluşturan Kalvinci ekol, onun dini epistemolojisinin de özünü oluşturmaktadır. Plantinga’nın dini epistemolojisini iki boyutlu olarak değerlendirdiğimizde, içe dönük olarak Hristiyan inancıyla ilgilense de çalışmalarının dışsal yönünü daha genel olarak teizmin Tanrı’sı ve onun rasyonelliği oluşturmaktadır.  Açıkçası Plantinga’nın epistemolojik külliyatı bir tür kavram zenginliğini de beraberinde getirmektedir. Çalışmamız içerisinde ele aldığımız kadarıyla uygun işlevsellik, tasarım planı, güvence (warrant) gibi kavramlar onun Tanrı inancının epistemik mahiyetini ortaya koymak için ne derece kararlı olduğunu göstermektedir.  Netice itibariyle Tanrı inancının ve onun bilgisinin rasyonel olabileceğini ifade eden Plantinga, her ne kadar Hristiyan inancının belli bir koluna mensup olsa da diğer mezhepleri dışlamaz. Ayrıca Plantinga, birçok çalışmasında belirttiği üzere projesinin Yahudilik, İslam gibi diğer teistik dinlere yönelik olduğunu da belirtmektedir.

While C. S. Lewis and his theology are loved by Christians as diverse as Anglicans and Eastern Orthodox, Pentacostals and Catholics, he remains unread, and at times even reviled, by many Calvinists. This is partly due to Lewis's uncharacteristic hostility to the major figures in Calvinism, and partly due to the quick-to-judge spirit that has often characterized zealous Calvinists. In neither case, however, is Lewis's actual theology and Christian world view deeply antithetical to Calvinism. Emotion more than reason has caused this sad divide. Thus, this paper endeavors to show how Lewis is actually very close to Calvinism, and why both need to pay more attention to this.

Wä hrend so unterschiedliche Christen wie Anglikaner, Orthodoxe, Anhän-ger der Pfingstbewegung und Katholiken C. S. Lewis und seine Theologie schä tzen, wird er von vielen Kalvinisten nicht gelesen, ja manchmal sogar geschmä ht. Zum Teil ist das zurü ckzufü hren auf Lewis' untypische Feind-seligkeit gegenü ber herausragenden Vertretern des Kalvinismus, zum Teil auch auf die Neigung zu vorschnellen Verurteilungen, die einige eifrige Kal-vinisten an den Tag gelegt haben. Auf keinen Fall aber stehen Lewis' tat-sä chliche Theologie und sein christliches Weltbild in einem tiefen Gegensatz zum Kalvinismus. Der Antagonismus grü ndet eher auf Gefü hlen als auf rationalen Urteilen. Dieser Aufsatz versucht daher zu zeigen, dass Lewis eigentlich dem Kalvinismus sehr nahe steht, und weshalb beide Seiten stä r-ker auf diese Gemeinsamkeiten achten sollten.

The broad scope of apologetical models that exist today can take the novice by surprise if he is not careful. The differences between apologetical methodologies can be overwhelming, even for that seminary student who is eager to learn all of it. Who knew about all of the different approaches to defending the Christian faith? Christian apologists throughout the history of the church have been faithful to rise to the challenges of their day and show that Christianity is compatible with reality. But the challenges have varied and thus, so have the methods. This has led to a considerable amount of disagreement over metapologetical issues. Issues such as epistemology, the value of theistic proofs, degree of certainty, the relationship between faith and reason, the role of evidence, and the existence and nature of common ground between believers and non-believers have been main topics of discussion and disagreement among apologists (Boa and Bowman 33).

The doctrine of divine simplicity has been upheld across various religious traditions, including Christianity and Islam. The mainstream interpretation of divine simplicity identifies God with His attributes. I examine and discuss certain criticisms of this doctrine. I consider Alvin Plantinga's arguments from the recent Western literature, and certain arguments given by 'Abd al-Qāhir Baghdādī and Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī from the Ash'arite tradition. After reconstructing these arguments, I discuss two main objections that can be directed to them. Plantinga's criticism aims to indicate some unacceptable consequences of divine simplicity. First, if divine simplicity is accepted, then all the divine attributes would be identical with divine essence, and thus divine attributes would be identical to each other. That is to say, there would be only one attribute if they are all identical. However, this result is not easy to accept given the multiplicity of divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. Second, via similar reasoning, it can be shown that God is not a personal being who created the universe but an abstract object since properties are abstract objects. These absurd consequences follow from divine simplicity. If they are not to be accepted, divine simplicity must be rejected. These arguments exemplify the form of reductio ad absurdum, and the same form of arguing against divine simplicity is also found within the Ash'arite tradition. On the one hand, 'Abd al-Qāhir Baghdādī argues that divine attributes would be identical if divine simplicity is accepted. The identity of divine attributes implies that their scopes are identical as well. However, the scope of divine power and divine knowledge cannot be identical since God knows Himself, but His power does not apply to Himself. Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, on the other hand, holds that attributes are not independent beings but can exist only as dependent upon something else. If divine attributes are assumed to be identical with divine essence, then divine essence would be a dependent being as attributes are. As we have seen, these arguments also purport to show some absurdities following from the doctrine of divine simplicity and deny this doctrine on the basis of those absurdities. Thus, they exemplify the form of reductio ad absurdum as Plantinga's arguments. The first objection that could be directed against the above arguments aims to show that we cannot make any distinction in God since God is absolutely distinct from any other being. Thus, we cannot even differentiate between divine attributes and God's essence. If this is the case, all the arguments considered rely on a mistaken presumption about some kind of distinction between God and divine attributes. I argue that this position is inconsistent with the doctrine of divine simplicity. Divine simplicity is a theoretical position that identifies divine attributes with God. To be able to make that identification, the doctrine already presumes some kind of distinction between God and divine attributes. The second objection does not deny that there is some kind of distinction. It aims to explain it in terms of the distinction between sense and reference as proposed by Frege and analogical predication as introduced by Aquinas. I argue that this attempt is futile and amounts to the first objection.
I would like to thank Safaruk Z. Chowdhury, David S. Jalajel and Edward O. Moad for their feedback on the earlier drafts of this paper.

Öz
Tanrı’nın basitliği doktrini Hristiyanlık ve İslamiyet’in de dahil olduğu çeşitli dini gelenekler tarafından savunulmuş bir düşüncedir. Tanrı’nın basitliği, ana-akım yoruma göre Tanrı’nın sıfatlarının Tanrı’nın kendisiyle aynı olmasını gerekli kılar. Bu makale, Tanrı’nın basitliği doktrinine karşı yöneltilen birtakım eleştirileri inceleyip tartışmaktadır. Dikkate alınan argümanlar günümüz Batı literatüründen Alvin Plantinga’ya ve Eş‘ari gelenekten ise Abdülkāhir el-Bağdâdî ve Sa‘düddîn et-Teftâzânî’ye aittir. Bu argümanların mantıksal yapısını açığa çıkaracak şekilde yeniden inşası yapıldıktan sonra onlara karşı getirilebilecek iki önemli eleştirinin nasıl yanıtlanabileceği hakkında öneriler sunulmaktadır.
Plantinga’nın Tanrı’nın basitliği doktrinine karşı getirmiş olduğu eleştiri, Tanrı’nın sıfatları ile aynı kabul edilmesi durumunun yol açacağı kabul edilemez sonuçlar üzerine kuruludur. Eğer Tanrı’nın zatı ilahi sıfatlar ile aynı ise, bu durumda sıfatların hepsi zatıyla aynı olacak, bu sonuç ise sıfatların birbiriyle aynı olmasını beraberinde getirecektir. Bütün sıfatların birbiriyle aynı olması ise sadece tek bir sıfatın olması anlamına gelecektir ki bu hal Tanrı’nın kudret, bilgi vs. gibi farklı sıfatlarının inkârı demektir. Benzer bir akıl yürütmeyle, Tanrı’nın basitliği tezinin, sıfatların soyut nesneler olmasından dolayı, soyut bir nesne olduğu, dolayısıyla evreni yaratabilecek kudret ve iradeye sahip şahsi bir varlık olmadığı sonucuna da yol açtığı gösterilebilir. Olmayana ergiye (kıyâsu’l-hulf, reductio ad absurdum) dayalı bu argümanların benzerlerini Eş‘ari gelenekte de bulmaktayız.
‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī, Tanrı’nın sıfatları ile aynı kabul edilmesi durumunda sıfatların da birbirleriyle aynı kabul edilmesi gerekeceğini, bu kabulün ise ilahi ilim ve kudretin taallukatının da aynı olması sonucunu doğuracağını söyler. Ne var ki Allah’ın zatını bildiği halde kudretinin zatına taalluk etmemesi bu iki sıfatın taalluklarının aynı olmadığını, dolayısıyla ilahi basitlik tezinin yanlışlığını gösterir. Sa‘düddîn et-Teftâzânî’ye göre ise sıfatlar kendi başlarına kaim varlıklar değildir, ancak başka bir varlığa bağlı olarak var olabilirler. Eğer Tanrı sıfatlarıyla aynı kabul edilecek olursa, Tanrı’nın da benzer şekilde başkasına bağımlı bir varlık olarak kabul edilmesi gerekir. Görüldüğü üzere, her iki Eş‘ari düşünür de Plantinga’nın argümanlarına benzer şekilde olmayana ergiye dayalı bir akıl yürütme yöntemini takip ederek Tanrı’nın basitliği doktrinini eleştirmektedir.
Bu argümanlar, Tanrı ve sıfatları arasında bir ayrım olduğu varsayımından hareketle kurulmuştur. Nitekim hiçbir şekilde ayrım yapılamayacak olsa ne diye sıfatların ilahi zat ile aynı olduğu tezi savunulmaya çalışılsın. Bu argümanlara getirilecek eleştirilerin de böyle bir ayrımı büsbütün reddetmeden Tanrı ve sıfatları arasındaki ayniyeti açıklayan bir modele dayanması gerekir. Bu açıdan dikkate alınabilecek en seviyeli eleştiri, Frege’nin manâ (Sinn/sense) ve gönderim/mâsadak (Bedeutung/referent) ayrımına atıfla yapılacak bir ayniyet söylemine dayanabilir. Edward Feser bu ayrıma dayalı bir basitlik tezini Aquinas’ın analojik yüklemleme teziyle de destekleyerek savunmaktadır. Fakat böyle bir savunmanın da, yakından incelendiğinde, başarılı olamadığı görülecektir.

Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that the naturalist who accepts evolutionary theory has a defeater for all of her beliefs, including her belief in naturalism and evolution. Hence, he says, naturalism, when conjoined with evolution, is self-defeating and cannot be rationally accepted. This is known as the evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN). However, Tyler Wunder (Religious Studies 51:391-399, 2015) has recently shown that if the EAAN is framed in terms of objective probability and theism is assumed to be non-contingent, then either theism is necessarily false or the EAAN is unsound. Neither option is attractive to the proponent of the EAAN. Perry Hendricks (Religious Studies 1-5, 2018) has responded to Wunder's criticism, showing that the EAAN can be salvaged and, indeed, strengthened, by framing it in terms not of naturalism (N), but of a proposition that is entailed by N that is also consistent with theism. We will show that once Hendricks' solution to Wunder's objection is accepted, a puzzle ensues: if the EAAN provides the naturalist with a defeater for all of her beliefs, then an extension of it appears to provide God with a defeater for all of his beliefs. After bringing out this puzzle, we suggest several ways in which the proponent of the EAAN might solve it, but also show some potential weaknesses in these purported solutions. Whether the solutions to the puzzle that we consider ultimately succeed is unclear to us. (Translation: the authors disagree. One author thinks that the solutions (or, at least, some of them) that we consider do solve the puzzle while the other author does not.) However, it is clear to us that this is an issue that proponents of the EAAN need to address.

The purpose of the first part of this paper is to examine the major turning point events that transformed the attitude of analytic philosophers towards metaphysical discourse. We will focus on one such turning point, the modal revolution, based on the resources of possible world semantics, developed by Kripke (who devised suitable models for modal logic) and by philosophers such as Lewis and Plantinga (who offered influential metaphysical interpretations of those models). We shall see how the modal revolution, by bringing an unprecedented change in the way in which modal notions were understood by analytic philosophers, was central to the revival of metaphysics in contemporary philosophy. Yet, analytic philosophers encountered serious obstacles in their attempt to understand the ontological and epistemological foundations and implications of one of the most basic notions of the modal revolution, that of a possible world. In the second part of the paper, it will be argued that, surprisingly enough, the work of the pre-Kripkean " middle " analytic philosopher Wilfrid Sellars, especially as interpreted and reconstructed by Robert Brandom, can perhaps throw light on the semantic, epistemic and ontological dimension of possible world talk. Sellars does this mainly through 1) (what Brandom calls) the " Kant-Sellars thesis about modality " , 2) his understanding of modal discourse as non-descriptive, expressive, categorial and " metaliguistic " , and 3) his nominalism about abstract entities. Thus, it will be suggested that the implications of this Sellars-inspired position are such that make it an unexpectedly relevant and novel contribution to contemporary debates in analytic metaphysics.

In numerous works Alvin Plantinga has argued that classical foundationalism is a failed theory of knowledge due to its self- referential incoherence. Plantinga’s argument, however, falls short of demonstrating that classical foundationalism is self-refuting. To bring this to light, I will review the form of Plantinga’s argument in comparison with other examples of self-refutation. Upon closer inspection, it will be clear that classical foundationalism is not self- refuting as Plantinga claims. Furthermore, I will expose another flaw in Plantinga’s argument against classical foundationalism, which shows at best that Plantinga’s argument cannot be reconstructed to show that classical foundationalism is improbable. While Plantinga’s argument may highlight a challenge for classical foundationalism, his argument does not establish the falsity of classical foundationalism, nor does it offer any other overriding reason to reject it. Thus, Plantinga’s criticisms of classical foundationalism are not sufficient by themselves to rule out the theory’s viability.

Reformed epistemology, roughly, is the thesis that religious belief can be rational without argument. After providing some background, I present Plantinga's defense of reformed epistemology and its influence on religious debunking arguments. I then discuss three objections to Plantinga's arguments that arise from the following topics: skeptical theism, cognitive science of religion, and basicality. I then show how reformed epistemology has recently been undergirded by a number of epistemological theories, including phenomenal conservatism and virtue epistemology. I end by noting that a good objection to reformed epistemology must criticize either a substantive epistemological theory or the application of that theory to religious belief; I also show that the famous Great Pumpkin Objection is an example of the former. [Word Count: 118]

Although the problem of evil receives a large amount of attention in the literature, focus is mainly reserved for the threat of moral evil; the threat that natural evil poses to theism is often ignored, receiving only a small fraction of the attention the moral argument receives. This is especially true of the logical problem of natural evil, which suggests that the existence of natural evil is logically incompatible with God’s existence. This is mostly because Alvin Plantinga’s response to the logical problem of natural evil is considered by most to be definitive. I will argue that it is not; in fact, Plantinga misunderstands what the problem of natural evil is and, as a result, fails utterly in responding to it. Consequently, since the assumed success of Plantinga’s argument has caused theist to ignore it, more attention needs to be paid by theists to the logical problem of natural evil. To establish this, I will lay out Plantinga’s solution, show how it misunderstands the logical problem of natural evil and in turn clearly articulate how the problem presents itself to the modern academic theist. I will conclude by observing that no one else has responded to the logical problem of natural evil directly, and then briefly outlining how adapting popular solutions to other versions of the problem of evil fall short in solving the problem I have presented.

In this chapter, I provide a chronological survey of Plantinga’s changing conceptions of the project of natural theology, and of the ways in which those conceptions of the project of natural theology interact with his major philosophical concerns. In his earliest works, Plantinga has a very clear and strict conception of the project of natural theology, and he argues very clearly (and correctly) that that project fails. In his middle works, Plantinga has a tolerably clear and slightly less strict conception of the project of natural theology, and he argues—in my view unsuccessfully—that this project succeeds. In his later works, Plantinga has a much less clear and less strict conception of the project of natural theology, and it is much harder to determine whether there is any merit in the claims that he makes for natural theology as thus conceived.

It is usually supposed that biological design arguments (where biological complex order is seen as evidence of a Creator) are made obsolete by Darwinian evolutionary theory. However, philosopher Alvin Plantinga and others have defended the continued possibility of a rational “design discourse”, in which biological order is taken as a sign of God’s purposeful action. In this article, I consider two objections to design discourse: (1) a theological objection to biological design based on the problem of natural evil, and (2) the evolutionary objection, according to which evolutionary theory removes the justification for any biological design perception. Whereas Plantinga’s own response utilizes the arguments of the Intelligent Design movement, I argue in favor of utilizing “design discourse” as part of a theistic evolutionist view.

La notion d'essence est centrale tant dans la métaphysique que dans l'ontologie. Dans ce qui suit, on adoptera une perspective génétique d'abord pour montrer la constitution du concept d'essence dans le paradigme aristotélicien. Cette approche permet en effet de saisir à la fois un point d'origine et un point d'arrimage aux débats contemporains sur l'essentialisme. Puisqu'il ne s'agit pas ici de faire l'histoire de la notion d'essence, mais plutôt d'en identifier les traits conceptuels et d'en évaluer la pertinence philosophique, on s'arrêtera surtout sur les critiques, principalement de type empiriste.

R. M. Gale, Q. Smith, K. Nielsen gibi ateist felsefecilerin, analitik felsefenin en nitelikli seviyesinde metinler üreten bir analitik felsefeci olarak gördükleri Alvin Plantinga, bir teistin, Carnap, Russell, Quinn, Grünbaum ve diğer naturalistlerle aynı alanda felsefe yapabileceğini göstermiştir. Plantinga, 1960’lardan sonra, akademide Tanrı’nın “ölmediği” ve teizmin “akademik olarak saygıdeğer” olduğu düşüncesine belki de en önemli katkıyı yapan analitik bir din felsefecisidir. Time dergisinin 1980’de, önde gelen Protestan Tanrı felsefecisi olarak nitelendirdiği Plantinga’nın yaptığı işi, “sessiz devrim” olarak görenler de vardır.
Elinizdeki eserde, Plantinga’nın, ilk olarak, ontolojik argümana bakışı incelenmektedir. Özellikle modal mantığın mümkün dünyalar semantiği çerçevesinde incelenen Plantingacı versiyondan önce, Plantinga’nın bu argümana tarihsel olarak bakışına da yer verilmiştir.
İkinci ve üçüncü bölümde, Tanrı inancına önermesel bir delile ihtiyaç duymaması anlamında “temel” bir inanç gözüyle bakan Plantinga, yoğun bir epistemolojik arka plânla konuyu tartışır. Tanrı inancının rasyonel, gerekçelendirilmiş, haklı temel, temel bir inanç olduğunu savunan bu perspektife göre, Tanrı inancının yanında Hristiyan inancı da bu inanç niteliklerine sahiptir. Epistemik olarak “dışsalcı” olan bu duruşa göre, Hristiyan inancı, sadece rasyonel değildir; aynı zamanda, Plantinga’nın rasyonaliteden daha güçlü bir anlamda kullandığı, “güvence” niteliğine de sahiptir. Bu nedenle Tanrı inancı ve Hristiyan inancı, Plantinga’ya göre, “bilgi” olarak görülebilir. Plantinga’nın bu görüşlerinin Türkiye’de de tartışmayı ve değerlendirmeyi hak ettiği açıktır.

I advance a challenge to the coherence of Alvin Plantinga’s brand of
theism that focuses on Plantinga’s celebrated free-will defence. This challenge draws on (but goes beyond) some ideas advanced by Wes Morriston. The central claim of my challenge is that Plantinga’s free-will defence, together with certain claims that are plausible and/or to which Plantinga is committed, both requires and rules out the claim that it is possible that God is capable of engaging in moral goodness. I then critically evaluate an interesting strategy for responding to my
challenge inspired by some recent work by Kevin Timpe, arguing that the response ultimately fails. The upshot of the article is that Plantinga’s brand of theism is internally inconsistent; furthermore, because the claims that are in tension with the free-will defence are ones that many theists are likely to find attractive, many theists are not able to appeal to Plantinga’s free-will defence in responding to the logical problem of evil.

Dit hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de belangrijkste vraagstukken
in de huidige analytische godsdienstfilosofie. Ik bespreek achtereenvolgens
de kritiek op het verificatiecriterium van het logisch positivisme, dat
de mogelijkheid van godsdienstfilosofie in de weg stond, het debat over
de rationaliteit van religieus geloof, de argumenten tegen het bestaan van
God en de argumenten voor het bestaan van God. Ten slotte benoem ik
kort twee belangrijke ontwikkelingen van de laatste jaren: de bijdrage van
analytische filosofen aan de discussie over de verhouding tussen wetenschap en religie en de filosofische theologie, een nieuw veld waarin met behulp van de analytisch-filosofische methode klassieke thema’s uit vooral de christelijke geloofsleer geanalyseerd worden, zoals de Drie-eenheid, de twee naturen van Christus en de eucharistie. Ik zal me in dit hoofdstuk richten op de weergave van de discussie, met een overzicht van de belangrijkste argumenten voor en tegen diverse posities. Ik zal ze niet kritisch evalueren; dat heb ik elders gedaan.

Faith ranges employment from trivial, everyday practice, all the way to diverse religious application. However, if epistemologist Peter Boghossian is right, that faith is “pretending to know things we don‟t know,” then clearly faith is a mundane, silly, failed venture of human peculiarity. Contrary to Boghossian's dismissal however, I will argue 1) Faith is epistemic in nature, 2) Faith is active, 3) Faith is trust, 4) Faith can be virtuous, and finally, 5) Faith is an adjunct avenue in acquiring knowledge.