- 首都师范大学政法学院哲学系，
北京市西三环北路83号首都师大北一区文科楼
邮编：100089
Feng Ye
Capital Normal University, Department of Philosophy, Faculty Member
心智哲学中的还原的物理主义认为，心智实体和属性都原则上可还原为物理、化学或生物-生理实体及属性，尤其是人脑神经元网络的活动及状态。还原包括本体论还原与认识论还原，而且有必要特别强调原则上可还原与实际上可还原之间的区别。支持还原的物理主义的理由包括正反两方面：正面理由是认知科学的正面进展；反面理由则在于，认知科学的进展中迄今还未发现任何原则上不可还原的东西，而一些哲学家所提出的还原的障碍，经仔细分析可以确认，都不是原则性的障碍。综合这些理由，还原的物理主义是比非还原的物理主义相... more
心智哲学中的还原的物理主义认为，心智实体和属性都原则上可还原为物理、化学或生物-生理实体及属性，尤其是人脑神经元网络的活动及状态。还原包括本体论还原与认识论还原，而且有必要特别强调原则上可还原与实际上可还原之间的区别。支持还原的物理主义的理由包括正反两方面：正面理由是认知科学的正面进展；反面理由则在于，认知科学的进展中迄今还未发现任何原则上不可还原的东西，而一些哲学家所提出的还原的障碍，经仔细分析可以确认，都不是原则性的障碍。综合这些理由，还原的物理主义是比非还原的物理主义相对更可信的观点。
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人工智能研究中人工神经元网络进路之成功促使我们重新思考语言在人类认知活动中的作用。人类语言是一维符号系统，但世界是四维的，因此语言难以有效地记录事物的时空结构信息。人类大脑中的表征系统很可能是多维而非一维的。人类语言的主要功能是在大脑间传递对世界的多维表征而不是用一维符号序列去表征世界。分析哲学中的所谓语言转向夸大了语言在人类认知活动中的作用，提供了一幅关于人类认知活动的不真实的图画。
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钟磊最近发表的一篇论文提出，伍德瓦德（Woodward）的干预主义（interventionism）因果理论预言没有向上、向下因果关系，因此可以拒绝金在权关于心物因果关系的排斥论证，保留心智属性的独立因果效力。本文就钟磊对伍德瓦德的干预主义的理解以及钟磊的论证策略提出几点疑问，与钟磊商榷。本文还提出，用因果理论来反驳金在权的排斥论证这种一般性策略很难有说服力。
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In a recent debate, Rosenberg claims that only the methods of natural science can deliver genuine knowledge, while Williamson rejects Rosenberg’s extreme methodological naturalism and insists that we have genuine philosophical and... more
In a recent debate, Rosenberg claims that only the methods of natural science can deliver genuine knowledge, while Williamson rejects Rosenberg’s extreme methodological naturalism and insists that we have genuine philosophical and humanistic knowledge not achievable by hard-scientific methods alone. This paper responds to the debate. I will argue that physicalism, together with contemporary neurocognitive and evolutionary knowledge, implies that some of our intuitions and mental simulations used in the humanities and philosophy are justified methods for achieving knowledge but are practically irreplaceable with hard-scientific methods. That is, extreme methodological naturalism is in conflict with physicalism. The argument also shows that some moderate version of methodological naturalism can be consistent with physicalism. Physicalism is the strong version of ontological naturalism and is supposed to be accepted by strongly committed naturalists like Rosenberg. Therefore, to be self-consistent, these naturalists should adopt physicalism (as ontological naturalism) plus a moderate version of methodological naturalism, rather than Rosenberg’s extreme version.
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在物理主义者看来，认知与行为的主体是作为自然事物的大脑。既然主体自身是彻底的自然事物，主体所能认识的属性，主体的行为等等，应该都不会有一些人所设想的那种超自然的，或不可自然化的规范性，规范性应该是自然属性与自然事实的自然特征。明确认知与行为的主体是大脑，进而提出关于大脑的认知过程和大脑对行为的触发与控制过程的假说，然后在这些假说的基础上分析大脑对伦理属性的认识，以及大脑的伦理信念与行为动机之间的联系，使得我们可以更好地回应因规范性问题而产生的对自然主义元伦理学的质疑，尤其是对... more
在物理主义者看来，认知与行为的主体是作为自然事物的大脑。既然主体自身是彻底的自然事物，主体所能认识的属性，主体的行为等等，应该都不会有一些人所设想的那种超自然的，或不可自然化的规范性，规范性应该是自然属性与自然事实的自然特征。明确认知与行为的主体是大脑，进而提出关于大脑的认知过程和大脑对行为的触发与控制过程的假说，然后在这些假说的基础上分析大脑对伦理属性的认识，以及大脑的伦理信念与行为动机之间的联系，使得我们可以更好地回应因规范性问题而产生的对自然主义元伦理学的质疑，尤其是对自然主义伦理实在论的质疑，也可以更好地澄清自然主义元伦理学内部的一些争议。
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This article introduces my research project exploring a nominalistic, strictly finitistic, and truly naturalistic philosophy of mathematics. There are two distinctive features of my approach compared with other contemporary naturalistic... more
This article introduces my research project exploring a nominalistic, strictly finitistic, and truly naturalistic philosophy of mathematics. There are two distinctive features of my approach compared with other contemporary naturalistic and/or nominalistic philosophies of mathematics. First, it is strict finitism, which means a position that does not assume reality of infinity in any sense, any format. Second, it takes physicalism as its philosophical basis, and in particular, it emphasizes physicalism about cognitive subjects and processes. The technical work in this research tries to propose a logical explanation of the applicability of classical mathematics in the sciences consistent with nominalism and strict finitism [29]. The philosophical work starts from methodological naturalism and argues that a coherent naturalist should adopt physicalism about cognitive subjects and that this should imply nominalism and strict finitism in philosophy of mathematics. The research is still in progress, but I hope it has accomplished enough to make it attractive.
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The premises of Kripke’s modal argument against type identity physicalism are carefully examined under explicit assumptions about the nature of a subject of cognition and experience. It turns out that these premises are reasonable and... more
The premises of Kripke’s modal argument against type identity physicalism are carefully examined under explicit assumptions about the nature of a subject of cognition and experience. It turns out that these premises are reasonable and acceptable when the subject is conceived of as a supernatural self that faces the entire natural world as something external to the self. However, physicalism implies that a subject of cognition and experience is itself a bio-physical system within the natural world, and under this physicalistic conception of a subject, one of Kripke’s premises becomes false. Therefore, Kripke’s argument begs the question against physicalism by implicitly assuming a supernatural, non-physical self in one of its premises. This analysis of Kripke’s modal argument corroborates the general idea that philosophers’ unconscious obsession with a supernatural self is the source of many problems in their arguments and theories.
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This paper compares Frege’s philosophy of mathematics with a naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics developed in Ye (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011), and it defends the latter against the former. The paper focuses on Frege’s... more
This paper compares Frege’s philosophy of mathematics with a naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics developed in Ye (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011), and it defends the latter against the former. The paper focuses on Frege’s account of the applicability of mathematics in the sciences and his conceptual realism. It argues that the naturalistic and nominalistic approach fares better than the Fregean approach in terms of its logical accuracy and clarity in explaining the applicability of mathematics in the sciences, its ability to reveal the real issues in explaining human epistemic and semantic access to objects, its prospect for resolving internal difficulties and developing into a full-fledged theory with rich details, as well its consistency with other areas of our scientific knowledge. Trivial criticisms such as “Frege is against naturalism here and therefore he is wrong” will be avoided as the paper tries to evaluate the two approaches on a neutral ground by focusing on meta-theoretical features such as accuracy, richness of detail, prospects for resolving internal issues, and consistency with other knowledge. The arguments in this paper apply not merely to Frege’s philosophy. They apply as well to all philosophies that accept a Fregean account of the applicability of mathematics or accept conceptual realism. Some of these philosophies profess to endorse naturalism.
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本文探讨一个真正物理主义的指称论和真理论应该有怎样的目的、形式、与基本假设，并尝试在物理主义的框架下回答有关指称与真理的一些常见哲学问题，比如，“真”属性的承载者（truth bearer）是信念、语句还是命题？是信念或语句的具体实例（token）还是抽象类型（type）？真是否某种对应？真理与被核证的（justified）信念、有用的信念之间的关系是怎样的？一个指称论和真理论是否应该蕴涵实在论或反实在论？
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本文前半部分解释自然主义是什么、不是什么，尝试澄清一些对自然主义的误解，阐明支持自然主义的理由，并回应一些对自然主义的疑虑。这主要是综述在英语哲学界人们熟知的一些东西，但本文也有所发挥，特别是在阐释自然主义可接受的直觉方法上，以及在自然主义是“无我”的世界观这一点。另外，针对国内读者对自然主义的特有疑虑，本文有所侧重，尤其是力图论证，与一些误解相反，自然主义蕴涵着积极的道德观、价值观与生存观。本文的后半部分讨论当前英语哲学界中自然主义内部关于物理主义与属性二元论的争论，尤其是... more
本文前半部分解释自然主义是什么、不是什么，尝试澄清一些对自然主义的误解，阐明支持自然主义的理由，并回应一些对自然主义的疑虑。这主要是综述在英语哲学界人们熟知的一些东西，但本文也有所发挥，特别是在阐释自然主义可接受的直觉方法上，以及在自然主义是“无我”的世界观这一点。另外，针对国内读者对自然主义的特有疑虑，本文有所侧重，尤其是力图论证，与一些误解相反，自然主义蕴涵着积极的道德观、价值观与生存观。本文的后半部分讨论当前英语哲学界中自然主义内部关于物理主义与属性二元论的争论，尤其是两个主要的反物理主义论证，即知识论证与模态论证。本文将尝试从物理主义是“无我”的世界观这一点出发，改进一种现有的对知识论证的回应，并利用笔者曾提出的一种对形而上学模态性的自然主义解释，来回应模态论证。
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There are three major theses in Plantinga’s latest version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. (1) Given materialism, the conditional probability of the reliability of human cognitive mechanisms produced by evolution is low;... more
There are three major theses in Plantinga’s latest version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. (1) Given materialism, the conditional probability of the reliability of human cognitive mechanisms produced by evolution is low; (2) the same conditional probability given reductive or non-reductive materialism is still low; (3) the most popular naturalistic theories of content and truth are not admissible for naturalism. I argue that Plantinga’s argument for (1) presupposes an anti-materialistic conception of content, and it therefore begs the question against materialism. To argue for (2), Plantinga claims that the adaptiveness of a belief is indifferent to its truth. I argue that this claim is unsupported unless it again assumes an anti-materialistic conception of content and truth. I further argue that Plantinga’s argument for (3) is not successful either, because an improved version of teleosemantics can meet his criticisms. Moreover, this version of teleosemantics implies that the truth of a belief is (probabilistically) positively related to its adaptiveness, at least for simple beliefs about physical objects in human environments. This directly challenges Plantinga’s claim that adaptiveness is indifferent to truth.
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I argue that the most popular versions of naturalism imply nominalism in philosophy of mathematics. In particular, there is a conflict in Quine’s philosophy between naturalism and realism in mathematics. The argument starts from a... more
I argue that the most popular versions of naturalism imply nominalism in philosophy of mathematics. In particular, there is a conflict in Quine’s philosophy between naturalism and realism in mathematics. The argument starts from a consequence of naturalism on the nature of human cognitive subjects, physicalism about cognitive subjects, and concludes that this implies a version of nominalism, which I will carefully characterize. The indispensability of classical mathematics for the sciences and semantic/confirmation holism does not affect the argument. The disquotational theory of reference and truth is discussed but rejected. This argument differs from the Benacerrafian arguments against realism, because it does not rely on any specific assumption about the nature of knowledge or reference. It differs from the popular objections to the indispensability argument for realism as well, because it can admit both indispensability and holism. This argument motivates a new, radically naturalistic and nominalistic approach to philosophy of mathematics.
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This paper explores how to explain the applicability of classical mathematics to the physical world in a radically naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics. The applicability claim is first formulated as an ordinary... more
This paper explores how to explain the applicability of classical mathematics to the physical world in a radically naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics. The applicability claim is first formulated as an ordinary scientific assertion about natural regularity in a class of natural phenomena and then turned into a logical problem by some scientific simplification and abstraction. I argue that there are some genuine logical puzzles regarding applicability and no current philosophy of mathematics has resolved these puzzles. Then I introduce a plan for resolving the logical puzzles of applicability.
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This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear... more
This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs to anti-realism, but can meet those challenges and can perhaps convince some realists, at least those who are also naturalists.
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The Kripkean metaphysical modality (i.e. possibility and necessity) is one of the most important concepts in contemporary analytic philosophy and is the basis of many metaphysical speculations. These metaphysical speculations frequently... more
The Kripkean metaphysical modality (i.e. possibility and necessity) is one of the most important concepts in contemporary analytic philosophy and is the basis of many metaphysical speculations. These metaphysical speculations frequently commit to entities that do not belong to this physical universe, such as merely possible entities, abstract entities, mental entities or qualities not realizable by the physical, which seems to contradict naturalism or physicalism. This paper proposes a naturalistic interpretation of the Kripkean modality, as a naturalist’s response to these metaphysical speculations. It will show that naturalism can accommodate the Kripkean metaphysical modality. In particular, it will show that naturalism can help to resolve the puzzles surrounding Kripke’s a posteriori necessary propositions and a priori contingent propositions.
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数学实在论与反实在论之争，是当代数学哲学的中心议题；哥德尔（K. Gödel）的柏拉图主义实在论与蒯因（W. V.... more
数学实在论与反实在论之争，是当代数学哲学的中心议题；哥德尔（K. Gödel）的柏拉图主义实在论与蒯因（W. V. Quine）的实用主义实在论，是数学实在论的两种主要形式；数学实在论面临的主要难题，则在于解释人类如何能够获得对抽象数学对象，尤其是无穷数学对象的知识；哥德尔的，由胡塞尔现象学本质直观所启发的，阐释人类的抽象数学直觉的尝试，与蒯因的，对抽象数学对象的实在性的“不可或缺性论证”，是解决这一难题的两个主要策略。本文先通过哥德尔手稿所提供的线索，从哥德尔的抽象直觉和胡塞尔的本质直观的联系入手，探讨哥德尔与胡塞尔现象学产生共鸣的根源，并简要分析哥德尔“精密哲学规划”未能实现的可能原因。然后本文介绍、评述了蒯因的“不可或缺性论证”以及最近二十年来国际上围绕“不可或缺性论证”的争议的主要文献，指出当前种种对“不可或缺性论证”的分析、批评的不足之处，并提出可能的改进。
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本文介绍弗雷格的算术哲学, 包括它失败的原因即罗素悖论, 并对它做一 些简单的评价。
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自然主义是一种一般的哲学世界观。它蕴含着对本体论、认识论等哲学问题的答案。本文将从说明什么是自然主义的基本信念开始，然后阐述它蕴含的对关于抽象数学对象的本体论问题的回答。它将是反实在论的回答，即它否认抽象数学对象客观存在。最后，本文将说明这种反实在论的自然主义将如何回答它所面临的两个重要问题，即解释数学语言的意义在于什么、数学知识是关于什么的知识，还有解释数学在科学中的可应用性。这是作者本人提出的一种彻底的自然主义的数学哲学的一个部分。
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本文是对笔者最近几年提出的一个自然主义数学哲学研究方案的介绍。在简要介绍这个研究的背景之后，本文将首先说明这个研究的哲学基础，即自然主义，然后介绍这个研究方案的基本思想及一些具体的成果，它们涉及到意义、真理与逻辑的自然化，解释数学知识的本性，解释数学的客观性与先天性，及解释数学的可应用性等等。
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表征内容理论（theory of... more
表征内容理论（theory of content）是当代心灵哲学的一个重要研究领域。最近二十年以来，由Dretske、Fodor、Millikan、Papineau、Prinz等人提出的几种主要的、有影响的理论,以及围绕这些理论的一些争议，是这一研究领域的热点。本文将讨论这些理论的几个最实质性的难点。首先，本文将提出一个对其中多数理论都接受的因果-历史条件的一般性质疑。然后，本文将分析这些理论的拥护者解决其它一些实质性难点的最新尝试，论证这些尝试仍旧不成立。结论是，这些理论包含一些跟本性的缺陷。本文将分析这些缺陷的内在原因。最后，本文将简要介绍由作者本人提出的、能够解决这些问题的一种涉身的内在图表征理论。
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克里普克的形而上学模态性（即可能性与必然性）概念，是目前分析哲学中最重要的概念之一，是许多形而上学思辨的基础。这些思辨有时导致承诺一些超出自然物质世界之外的形而上学实体，因此显得与自然主义（即物理主义）相冲突。本文提出一个对克里普克形而上学模态性概念的自然主义解释，作为自然主义者对这些形而上学思辨的回应，并论证自然主义可以解释克里普克的形而上学模态性，包括他的后天必然命题与先天偶然命题。
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The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there... more
The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly: first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical entities; second, the thoughts that we create in imagining infinite mathematical entities are bounded by external conditions.
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本文以康德以来的关于数学认识论问题和关于分析性概念的研究的进展为例子，阐明关于哲学史与哲学研究的关系的如下观点：现代哲学对一些哲学问题的研究，有了真实的积累与进步，使得现代哲学中探讨这些问题的各种理论，在很大程度上替代了传统思想，使得今天对这些问题的继续探讨，只有在现代知识与现代哲学研究的背景下进行才有意义。本文最后简要讨论了现代哲学研究能够产生积累与进步原因。
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对抽象数学对象的实在性的“不可或缺性论证”，是最近几十年来数学哲学的争论焦点。现有的对“不可或缺性论证”的质疑的有一些重要缺陷。弥补这些缺陷以更有力地质疑不可或缺性论证引出了一种新的，反实在论的数学哲学观。
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现代物理学告诉我们，宇宙可能是有穷的，时空也可能是离散而非连续的，但在现代数学中我们似乎有着非常确定的、关于某些无穷和连续的数学对象和结构的真理。这些独立于物质世界的数学对象和结构果真存在吗？数学定理果真是关于它们的客观真理？我们的物质性的、有限的大脑又如何真的可能认识那些独立于物质世界的、而且是无穷的事物？也许不应该以这种方式理解数学真理？这是令当代西方一些哲学家困惑的一个问题。本文的目的是向哲学专业以外的读者介绍近代与当代一些哲学家对这个问题的思考，并作一些评述。
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This book intends to show that, in philosophy of mathematics, radical naturalism (or physicalism), nominalism and strict finitism (which does not assume the reality of infinity in any format, not even potential infinity) can account for... more
This book intends to show that, in philosophy of mathematics, radical naturalism (or physicalism), nominalism and strict finitism (which does not assume the reality of infinity in any format, not even potential infinity) can account for the applications of classical mathematics in current scientific theories about the finite physical world above the Planck scale. For that purpose, the book develops some significant applied mathematics in strict finitism, which is essentially quantifier-free elementary recursive arithmetic (with real numbers encoded as elementary recursive Cauchy sequences of rational numbers). Applied mathematical theories developed in the book include the basics of calculus, metric space theory, complex analysis, Lebesgue integration, Hilbert spaces, and semi-Riemann geometry (sufficient for the basic applications in classical quantum mechanics and general relativity). The fact that so much applied mathematics can be developed within such a weak, strictly finitisitc system is perhaps surprising in itself. It also shows that the applications of those classical theories to the finite physical world can be translated into the applications of strict finitism, which demonstrates the applicability of those classical theories without assuming the literal truth of those theories or the reality of infinity. The first chapter of the book contains an informal introduction to its philosophical motivation and technical strategy. The book is intended for students and researchers in philosophy of mathematics.
Contents
Preface
1 Introduction
2 Strict Finitism
3 Calculus
4 Metric Space
5 Complex Analysis
6 Integration
7 Hilbert Space
8 Semi-Riemann Geometry
References
Index
Contents
Preface
1 Introduction
2 Strict Finitism
3 Calculus
4 Metric Space
5 Complex Analysis
6 Integration
7 Hilbert Space
8 Semi-Riemann Geometry
References
Index
Research Interests:
物理主义是一种“无我”的世界观，接受物理主义世界观可能影响一个人的道德、价值观及一般生存态度，包括在一定程度上抑制激烈的贪、嗔、痴等情绪反应以及消弭道德焦虑。物理主义“无我”观还是自然化的佛教价值体系的基础。在一定的前提下，宣扬这种价值体系对社会是有益的，虽然这种价值体系在现实中难以被普遍地实践。认真接受物理主义“无我”观的物理主义者不是虚无主义者或悲观主义者。物理主义者不将价值寄托于超自然的事物或目标，但可以赋予生活中的许多世俗的事物以意义、价值，可以持一种世俗“中道”的，... more
物理主义是一种“无我”的世界观，接受物理主义世界观可能影响一个人的道德、价值观及一般生存态度，包括在一定程度上抑制激烈的贪、嗔、痴等情绪反应以及消弭道德焦虑。物理主义“无我”观还是自然化的佛教价值体系的基础。在一定的前提下，宣扬这种价值体系对社会是有益的，虽然这种价值体系在现实中难以被普遍地实践。认真接受物理主义“无我”观的物理主义者不是虚无主义者或悲观主义者。物理主义者不将价值寄托于超自然的事物或目标，但可以赋予生活中的许多世俗的事物以意义、价值，可以持一种世俗“中道”的，率真平实的生存态度。
哲学研究者常以探求真相自诩。但是，假如获知真相将带来有害的后果，那么更合理、更有益的策略其实是用某种形式的自欺来回避真相。能做到聪明、有益地自欺是一种无意识的生存能力，有些人具备这种能力，但有一些可说是重度求真强迫症患者的人不具备这种能力。物理主义者正是这样的重度求真强迫症患者，他们探求关于人类自身的真相的结果，是得出关于人类心灵及关于人类价值与道德的物理主义结论，而许多学者认定，相信这些结论将带来对人类自身极为有害的后果。但是，也有可能，当人类社会具备了一些先决条件之后，接... more
哲学研究者常以探求真相自诩。但是，假如获知真相将带来有害的后果，那么更合理、更有益的策略其实是用某种形式的自欺来回避真相。能做到聪明、有益地自欺是一种无意识的生存能力，有些人具备这种能力，但有一些可说是重度求真强迫症患者的人不具备这种能力。物理主义者正是这样的重度求真强迫症患者，他们探求关于人类自身的真相的结果，是得出关于人类心灵及关于人类价值与道德的物理主义结论，而许多学者认定，相信这些结论将带来对人类自身极为有害的后果。但是，也有可能，当人类社会具备了一些先决条件之后，接受这些关于人类自身的真相不但无害于社会，反而有助于解决社会面临的一些根本性问题，进一步提升社会。这是作为重度求真强迫症患者的物理主义者对自救的期待。
Research Interests:
物理主义者不认为有超自然的道德、价值真理，但他们不是虚无主义者，他们可以持有自己的道德、价值观，可以为自己的道德、价值观作辩护，以及向他人推销自己的道德、价值观。特别地，他们可以接受自由主义价值观，而且他们相信，物理主义世界观可以为自由主义、多元化等价值准则作更好的辩护。他们还可以很自然地吸收东方佛教传统中的“无我”、“慈悲”等观念，提出比今天的基本自由主义价值观更理想化的、更高的价值观，满足那些认为基本自由主义价值观还有所不足的人的需求。
Research Interests:
这个发言将从当代数学哲学研究出发提出两个哲学问题，期待现象学研究者能够提供一些解决问题的思路，或作某种回应。
Research Interests:
通过明确地假设 概念、 表征、现象经验 表征、现象经验 表征、现象经验 等 在大脑中的实现 在大脑中的实现 在大脑中的实现 方式 ，可以 ，可以 更好地 更好地 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 对知识论证的意义做 对知识论证的意义做 对知识论证的意义做 对知识论证的意义做 对知识论证的意义做... more
通过明确地假设 概念、 表征、现象经验 表征、现象经验 表征、现象经验 等 在大脑中的实现 在大脑中的实现 在大脑中的实现 方式 ，可以 ，可以 更好地 更好地 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 澄清围绕知识论证的一些争议， 对知识论证的意义做 对知识论证的意义做 对知识论证的意义做 对知识论证的意义做 对知识论证的意义做 出更客观的评价 出更客观的评价 出更客观的评价 。本文 在这些关于大脑的假设基础上， 在这些关于大脑的假设基础上， 在这些关于大脑的假设基础上， 在这些关于大脑的假设基础上， 在这些关于大脑的假设基础上， 在这些关于大脑的假设基础上， 分析 了物理主 义者 回应知识论证的 回应知识论证的 回应知识论证的 “能力策略” “能力策略” “能力策略” 、“亲知策略”、 “亲知策略”、 “亲知策略”、 “亲知策略”、 “亲知策略”、 “索引策略”、 “索引策略”、 “索引策略”、 “索引策略”、 “现象概 “现象概 “现象概 念策略”、 念策略”、 以及丹尼特的“直截否认策略” 以及丹尼特的“直截否认策略” 以及丹尼特的“直截否认策略” 以及丹尼特的“直截否认策略” 以及丹尼特的“直截否认策略” ，由此 得到几个 得到几个 结论 ：（ 1）围 绕知识论证的 大多数 争议其实与物理主义 /属性二元论 之争 无关 ，只是由 于我们的 “概念”、 “概念”、 “概念”、 “知识” 、表征能力“知识” 、表征能力“知识” 、表征能力“知识” 、表征能力“知识” 、表征能力“知识” 、表征能力“知识” 、表征能力“知识” 、表征能力“知识” 、表征能力、“亲知” 、“亲知” 等这些概念中 等这些概念中 等这些概念中 的模糊性 才引起的 引起的 ；（ 2）模糊地 ）模糊地 谈论玛丽、的知识 谈论玛丽、的知识 谈论玛丽、的知识 谈论玛丽、的知识 ，而不是明 而不是明 而不是明 确地对 玛丽的 玛丽的 大脑说事，是 大脑说事，是 大脑说事，是 这些 混乱 争议的根源 争议的根源 争议的根源 ；（ 3）明确地对大脑说 明确地对大脑说 明确地对大脑说 明确地对大脑说 事，并 澄清了 澄清了 这些争议和 这些争议和 这些争议和 物理主义者与属性二元论的真实立场 物理主义者与属性二元论的真实立场 物理主义者与属性二元论的真实立场 物理主义者与属性二元论的真实立场 物理主义者与属性二元论的真实立场 物理主义者与属性二元论的真实立场 物理主义者与属性二元论的真实立场 与依据 之后，再综合我们的多方面证据可以 之后，再综合我们的多方面证据可以 之后，再综合我们的多方面证据可以 之后，再综合我们的多方面证据可以 之后，再综合我们的多方面证据可以 之后，再综合我们的多方面证据可以 得出， 对黑白屋中的玛丽这个思想 对黑白屋中的玛丽这个思想 对黑白屋中的玛丽这个思想 对黑白屋中的玛丽这个思想 对黑白屋中的玛丽这个思想 对黑白屋中的玛丽这个思想 实验的 物理主义 的解说，要比属性二元论有更高可信度 。
Research Interests:
卡尔纳普与蒯因在阐述他们的哲学的时候，隐含地采取了一个超自然的认知主体的视角, 这使得他们的哲学具有内在不一致性。而且这个问题在当代哲学中是普遍的。在我们认识到人类大脑这个神经元网络能够思考，能够指称与认识事物之后，再假设一个与此不同的，超自然的，非物质的“主体”对事物的指称与认知过程，应该没有意义。要解决卡尔纳普、蒯因及当代哲学中的这个问题，我们只能接受一种“无我”的物理主义世界观，它是唯一与我们在科学中迄今所已经认识到的一切真正相容的世界观。
Research Interests:
If abstract mathematical entities do not really exist, then what really exist in human mathematical practices? For a naturalist and nominalist, they can only be human brain activities in doing and applying mathematics. This paper belongs... more
If abstract mathematical entities do not really exist, then what really exist in human mathematical practices? For a naturalist and nominalist, they can only be human brain activities in doing and applying mathematics. This paper belongs to a research project exploring a naturalistic and nominalistic account of human mathematical practices by treating them as cognitive activities of human brains. I will introduce some basic assumptions about human cognitive architecture and then discuss several aspects of human mathematical practices on that basis.
Ned Block在论文“Wittgenstein and Qualia”（Block 2007）中，试图以一个逆转色感谱（inverted... more
Ned Block在论文“Wittgenstein and Qualia”（Block 2007）中，试图以一个逆转色感谱（inverted spectrum）思想实验，论证有公共语言不能捕捉的东西，即私有的感受（qualia）。Canfield（2009）对此提出了一些反驳。本文先从物理主义的角度分析他们之间的争论，指出物理主义对感受（qualia）问题的回答稍微不同于Canfield的维特根斯坦的回答，并由此引申出物理主义对私人语言、遵循规则及哲学的治疗作用等其它问题的回答。
本文概述筆者在其它一些論文中提出的一種結構-目的論的（structural- teleological）自然主義表徵理論（naturalistic theory of... more
本文概述筆者在其它一些論文中提出的一種結構-目的論的（structural- teleological）自然主義表徵理論（naturalistic theory of representation）。該理論嘗試綜合認知心理學中的概念理論、目的論語義（teleosemantics）及塔斯基語義的基本思想，力圖更好地解決現有的各種自然主義表徵理論未能解決的哲學難題。本文先說明筆者所理解的自然主義表徵理論的目的，然後羅列自然主義表徵理論應該解決的一些哲學難題，並簡要地（不做充分論證地）說明，現有的各種自然主義表徵理論還未能解決其中什麼難題。然後本文將概述筆者的理論，並簡要說明它如何解決那些哲學難題。對該理論的更詳細的論述及該理論的一個應用請見本文後所列的筆者的論文。
This paper reports the technical work in the monograph Strict Finitism and the Logic of Mathematical Applications (available online). The monograph proposes a strictly
nitistic system and then showes that some signi
cant applied... more
This paper reports the technical work in the monograph Strict Finitism and the Logic of Mathematical Applications (available online). The monograph proposes a strictly
nitistic system and then showes that some signi
cant applied mathematics, including the basics of unbounded linear operators on Hilbert space, can be developed within that system. Potential philosophical implications or applications of the work are briey discussed.
Since most human biological traits are selected by evolution, the semantic representation relation may also be selected by evolution, but obviously, false beliefs with survival value can arise in biologically normal situations. Therefore,... more
Since most human biological traits are selected by evolution, the semantic representation relation may also be selected by evolution, but obviously, false beliefs with survival value can arise in biologically normal situations. Therefore, there is a genuine puzzle. I first argue that teleosemantic answers to the puzzle offered by Papineau and Millikan are inadequate. Then, I offer an answer based on a structural theory of content proposed in a previous paper. It suggests that evolution selects only the content of the most primitive components of inner representations. Moreover, false beliefs with survival value for the entire bio-system can be biologically normal, because semantic content and truth is determined by a subsystem of the entire bio-system.
This is a sequel to a previous paper, which presents a theory for content naturalization and postulates structures for all concepts. This paper, which can be read independently, defends the theory against the well-known objections to... more
This is a sequel to a previous paper, which presents a theory for content naturalization and postulates structures for all concepts. This paper, which can be read independently, defends the theory against the well-known objections to postulating conceptual structures by Fodor and Lepore. I will show that the theory can account for having concepts, concept individuation, compositionality, and analyticity, and I will argue that accounting for these actually requires postulating conceptual structures, and that Fodor’s conceptual atomism cannot really circumvent the genuine complexities there.
This paper develops a structural theory for naturalizing content. I will show that it resolves the common problems for a naturalistic theory of content, including the Twin-Earth problem, the Swampman problem, the Fregean problem, and the... more
This paper develops a structural theory for naturalizing content. I will show that it resolves the common problems for a naturalistic theory of content, including the Twin-Earth problem, the Swampman problem, the Fregean problem, and the problems of indeterminacy, vacuity, disjunctive content, and conceptual changes. Therefore, it has obvious advantages over its alternatives, such as Dretske’s informational-teleosemantic theory, Fodor’s asymmetric dependence theory, teleosemantics, and Prinz’ initial cause theory among others.
漢語特有的“數詞-量詞-名詞”結構，提示了一種對關於事物的數、量屬性的判斷的邏輯分析，及一種對數詞的意義的解釋。它有別于弗雷格、新弗雷格主義、及其它邏輯主義的解釋。它更支持一種經驗論的、唯名論的算術哲學。