Andrew Feenberg

In this talk I'm going to address some issues in our understanding of techno-science. I hope this will make it possible to shed new light on questions of method in technology studies. I should say at the outset that I refuse all methodological dogmatism. There is no one “correct” method for studying science and technology. Methods are not true or false, they are more or less fruitful. Methods are perspectives and there is no absolute standpoint. This pragmatic criterion implies methodological pluralism. As Horkheimer and Adorno write, "The proposition that truth is the whole turns out to be identical with its contrary, namely, that in each case it exists only as a part." With this in mind, let me turn now to my subject. Physicists like to say that they're happy they've chosen a field in which the problems are relatively easy to define and solve. The implied contrast is with the study of society which is in fact a lot messier than the world of physics. The diffe...

En 1844, Marx écrit que « [l]a philosophie ne peut être réalisée sans la suppression du prolétariat, et le prolétariat ne peut être supprimé sans la réalisation de la philosophie. » 1 Adorno fera le commentaire suivant : « La philosophie, qui parut jadis dépassée, se maintient en vie parce que le moment de sa réalisation fut manqué. »2 Quel sens donner à cet étrange concept de réalisation de la philosophie ? Nous souhaiterions présenter ici l’ébauche d’une réponse à cette question, réponse dont un développement complet figure dans notre ouvrage The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx, Lukács, and the Frankfurt School.

The concept of function is a hinge between the material world and the cultural world. Analytic philosophy of function has made considerable progress in the conceptual analysis of function, but it has not considered the link between function and culture. That is the purpose of this chapter. We know from social constructivist investigations of technologies that the problems to which technical solutions are addressed depend on the interpretations of actors with the power to influence design. Corresponding functions are designed into technical artifacts. The interpretations and therefore the functions depend on the cultural framework within which the actors understand their own needs and the constraints of the environment. The theory of function must situate it in relation to the culture and way of life it serves. Heidegger and Lukacs offer perspectives on this relation. This chapter explains their approach as it has been appropriated in critical theory of technology.

Marx is at his most persuasive when he shows that technology is not an autonomous thing one can be for or against, but that technological design is relative to political forces which depend in turn on social interests. Thus, technology is an ambivalent dimension of the social process and, like education, law, the military, and the corporate structure, it is involved in social struggles which determine what it is and will become. This position implies the necessity of a democratic technical politics, contrary to the prevailing practice of the existing communist and socialist societies which treat technology as a sociopolitical invariant.

In this reply I discuss Ellen Rose’s observations on online education as she has practiced it and Evan Selinger’s concerns about the introduction of big data in the university. Both authors are in agreement that neo-liberalism is restructuring the university, but add new considerations to the argument.

Prologue: The Cold Fusion Fiasco On March 23, 1989 Martin Fleischman and Stanley Pons appeared at a press conference at the University of Utah where they announced the discovery of cold fusion. The President of the university and several other officials were also present and spoke to the press. The unaccustomed involvement of the press and these officials signalled that cold fusion was more than a scientific advance. Soon the University announced the formation of a research institute with funding from the state. Its goal was not only to produce knowledge of the phenomenon but also to prepare large scale commercial applications. It seemed possible at first that cold fusion would revolutionize electricity production and transform the world economy. We know the end of the story. Within a short time cold fusion was discredited and most researchers lost interest in it. The institute at the University of Utah closed in 1991 and support for further work in this field quickly evaporated. 1 These events provide a particularly clear illustration of the complexity of the relation between science and technology today. The classic but generally discredited account of these relationships holds that science is a body of truths about nature and technology an application of these truths in the production of useful devices. Truth and utility belong to different worlds linked only by the subordination of the latter to the former. But historians have shown that few technologies arose as applications of science until quite recently. Most were developed independent of science and, indeed, in cases such as optics had more impact on science than vice versa. Science is even more dependent on technology today than in the past. It is true that the 20 th century saw a dramatic increase in practical applications of scientific knowledge, but this new situation does not reveal the essence of the science-technology relationship. Rather, it confounds the common sense distinction by establishing the productive character of science itself. In any case, the classic model does not describe cold fusion. Fleischman and Pons did not apply any existing science in their work but made an empirical discovery of the sort that we associate with invention. They were not seeking to confirm or invalidate a theory with experiment as philosophical accounts of scientific method would have it, but rather aimed to produce an unexplained (and ultimately unexplainable) effect. Their discovery employed a technical device that was both an experimental apparatus and a commercial prototype. Accordingly, the two pronged launch of their discovery at a new conference aimed at both the scientific and the business communities. Cases such as this one proliferate in the biological sciences, where scientific techniques are deployed in the search for results of interest not only to researchers but also to pharmaceutical houses. Products and knowledge emerge from the laboratory together. The pursuit of knowledge and the making of money are joined in a single labor. The distinction between science and technology appears to break down. Hence the widespread use of the term “technoscience.”

... Although some of these lessons would be less relevant to online technical education than to our type of program, any institution that introduces educational CMC ... 4 But outside engineering itself, simplicity, not power, is a sine qua non of successful communications software. ...

SIXTEEN From Essentialism to Constructivism: Philosophy of Technology at the Crossroads Andrew Feenberg What Heidegger called" the question of technology" has a peculiar status in the academy today. After World War II, the humanities and social sciences were swept ...

This paper explains the philosophy of praxis of four Marxist thinkers, the early Marx and Lukacs, and the Frankfurt School philosophers Adorno and Marcuse. The philosophy of praxis holds that fundamental philosophical problems are in reality social problems abstractly conceived. This argument has two impli-cations: on the one hand, philosophical problems are significant insofar as they reflect real social contra-dictions; on the other hand, philosophy cannot resolve the problems it identifies because only social revo-lution can eliminate their social causes. I call this a “metacritical” argument. I argue that metacritique in this sense underlies the philosophy of praxis and can still inform our thinking about social and philosophical transformation. The various projections of such transformations distinguish the four philosophers discussed in this paper. They also differ on the path to social change. They develop the metacritical argu-ment under the specific historical conditions in...

This article argues that Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of technology is useful for both science and technology studies (STS) and critical theory. The synthesis has political implications. It offers an argument for the rationality of democratic interventions by citizens into decisions concerning technology. The new framework opens a perspective on the radical transformation of technology required by ecological modernization and sustainability. In so doing, it suggests new applications of STS methods to politics as well as a reconstruction of the Frankfurt School’s “rational critique of reason.”

Recent enthusiasm for on-line distance learning among administrators in American colleges and universities has provoked a strong faculty reaction in favour of traditional classroom teaching. Overlooked in the controversy is the long history of experimentation with text-based computer-mediated communication. This article argues that that experience has lessons for us today which may help to resolve the controversy over distance learning.

Fernando Elichirigoity has written an impassioned plea for a postmodern philosophy of technology that would go beyond the limits of my project in writing Questioning Technology.1 Elichirigoity praises my turn to constructivism and my critique of Habermas but, failing to understand post-humanist insights, I supposedly remain bound to tired old modernist prescriptions which prevent me from adequately analyzing technology in its contemporary context. This diagnosis of my problems is expressed with more regret than satisfaction. The critic would be delighted if I would make 'encore un effort pour etre postmoderne' and surrender my lingering modernist nostalgia. Then, I could contribute to the strictly localized studies of particular technological systems which alone offer insight into the new forms of struggle appropriate to our postmodern condition. As it is, my analyses of the Internet, environmental politics and suchlike are marred by a reliance on the old demonology of the Left, and an abstractness and apriority typical of modernist critique. I hope this is a fair summary of an interesting comment on my book which may represent the views of a whole segment of readers I would like to reach. I assume that many readers of this journal will not yet have seen Questioning Technology, and so cannot measure these criticisms against the text. I regret this very much, as I do not think that these complaints fairly represent my book. In fact, it seems to me that most of these criticisms should be turned around and aimed at the critic. Who belabours apriori oppositions, who thinks abstractly and reifies his objects, the author of the book or the critic who treats it as a straw man for the overworked struggle of postmodernism against modernism? As I will show, in the most important respects for any contemporary politics of technology, I have already met the general methodological requirements that underlie this

Like many of Marcuse’s lectures in this period, the text must be read at two levels. Superficially, the argument is one that any listener can understand: we live in a bad society that ought to be replaced by a better one. The remainder of the lecture, considered in this light, details some of the problems and proposed solutions. But at a deeper level there is a lot going on that would be difficult for listeners untrained in philosophy to fully appreciate. This mattered to Marcuse and there are lectures such as the one on “The Rationality of Philosophy” that attempt to explain those depths to ordinary listeners.