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... Vol. 16. 227-240 Peter P. Kirschenmann HEURISTICAL STRATEGIES: ANOTHER LOOK AT IDEALIZATION AND CONCRETIZATION* 1. Introduction Idealizing conceptions play a major role in the sciences. The ... cf. Gutting, 1980]. ...
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Studies in Science and Theology, Volume 3 (1995) 158-164 VIEWS ON DIVINE ACTIVITY IN NATURE: SCIENCE AS A NORM FOR THEOLOGY? PETER P. KIRSCHENMANN (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) 1. INTRODUCTION There have been debates ...
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This epistemological contribution mainly points up invariants in the relationship of theology and science: The relationship is not symmetrical. A diversity of theologies confronts the unity of scientific progress. Although the belief in... more
This epistemological contribution mainly points up invariants in the relationship of theology and science: The relationship is not symmetrical. A diversity of theologies confronts the unity of scientific progress. Although the belief in one reality has led to attempts at integration and dialogue, the questions and answers keep varying. The very question of the relationship itself remains a theological one. The answers to this question vary in dependence upon a number of central (philosophical and theological) concepts and their relations. There is the particular question: Has recent scientific knowledge drastically changed this relationship and led to new demarcations? Some of the central concepts and relations have indeed undergone changes. Yet, rather than leading to a revolution in this relationship, scientific knowledge has, above all, rendered certain formulations of theological assertions untenable. Many people have claimed that modem scientific theories imply novel demarcations or closer ties. Examples show that (philosophically) such claims are virtually indefensible.
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Science, Nature and Ethics: Critical Philosophical Studies KIRSCHENMANN PP.
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Philosophers are continually challenged to comprehend chance phenomena and probabilistic relationships. Those cases are especially intriguing in which we speak of chance or probability but can hardly attribute this manner of speaking to... more
Philosophers are continually challenged to comprehend chance phenomena and probabilistic relationships. Those cases are especially intriguing in which we speak of chance or probability but can hardly attribute this manner of speaking to our being partially or totally ignorant of the situations in question. Those cases, then, can be taken to possess chance as an objective feature. In its intent, this paper is restricted to a discussion of such cases. Among objective chance relationships there is one kind which seems especially incomprehensible. These are stochastic relationships, i.e., chance relationships between consecutive states of physical systems.
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I have discussed a concept of random distribution of properties in classes and defined a concept of random conjunction of properties; I have also discussed measures of various kinds of randomness. In concluding, I shall only mention some... more
I have discussed a concept of random distribution of properties in classes and defined a concept of random conjunction of properties; I have also discussed measures of various kinds of randomness. In concluding, I shall only mention some further problems which await treatment. Both the concept of random conjunction and the measures of randomness rest upon the notion of probability, which was not explicitly dealt with in this paper. Since, however, assumptions of randomness are frequently brought forward as justifications for working with probabilities, the relationship of randomness and probability should be examined in detail. Another task is to show which concepts of randomness are relevant in the sciences. It seems that the concept of random distribution of properties in classes, though interesting in itself and of relevance to statistics, has no use in theories of the empirical sciences. However, the assumption of randomness in the sense of stochastic independence, very often combined with the notion of randomness in the sense of equiprobability, or maximum primitive randomness, undoubtedly plays a role in various fields of science. I do not know of any case where the measures of randomness are directly employed; the idea of stochastic dependence and that of probabilities other than equiprobabilities are, of course, widley used. Finally, some of the assumptions of random conjunction of properties made in the sciences seem to be justifiable in terms of an actual independence of the properties. This raises the question as to whether, and to what extent, the notion of an actual independence is fundamental to concepts of randomness.
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In his recent article (Thagard 2022) in this journal, Paul Thagard uses an array of energy considerations in arguing against the plausibility of functionalism and its idea of multiple realization. I find his argumentation neither... more
In his recent article (Thagard 2022) in this journal, Paul Thagard uses an array of energy considerations in arguing against the plausibility of functionalism and its idea of multiple realization. I find his argumentation neither convincing nor to the point. Thagard takes 'substrate independence' to be a term preferable to '(mind-body) functionalism'. His general argument then is (p. 73): "1. Real-world information processing depend on energy. 2. Energy depends on material substrates. 3. Therefore, information processing depends on material substrates. 4. Therefore, substrate independence is false." He adds (p. 74) that he does not mean it is always false.
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There were some chaps from Vienna, that's 'Wien' They thought of themselves as especially keen They scrutinized science: On facts place reliance! For values, they issued, one shouldn't give a bean
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Central to the foregoing descriptions were views of information as a real connection. These views generally followed the doctrine of reflection. The common starting point of the discussions which follow is the Shannon information measure,... more
Central to the foregoing descriptions were views of information as a real connection. These views generally followed the doctrine of reflection. The common starting point of the discussions which follow is the Shannon information measure, entropy H.376 However, the doctrine of reflection also plays a role here. Relative to entropy H, Marxist-Leninist philosophers have discussed a great variety of problems.
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Questions of ‘meaning’ come up frequently in the dialectical-materialist discussion of ‘information’. Our discussion of their views on the ‘nature of information’ led directly to the problem of the ‘meaning’ of signals or signs.510... more
Questions of ‘meaning’ come up frequently in the dialectical-materialist discussion of ‘information’. Our discussion of their views on the ‘nature of information’ led directly to the problem of the ‘meaning’ of signals or signs.510 Moreover, the view that one has to develop a contentful information theory is usually justified by the fact that contemporary information theory does not deal with the semantic aspect of information. This is not surprising in view of the ambiguity of ‘information’ and our semiotic investigation of it.511 The question on the ‘meaning’ of messages and signs belongs to semantics.
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Biosemioticians oppose the dominant physico-chemical molecular-biological approach to life. They regard many, if not all, organic processes as semiotic processes, processes involving “signs”, “information”, “representation” or even... more
Biosemioticians oppose the dominant physico-chemical molecular-biological approach to life. They regard many, if not all, organic processes as semiotic processes, processes involving “signs”, “information”, “representation” or even “interpretation”. I am rather skeptical or critical about their views. Given the growing diversity of their specific views, I can consider only a few of their ideas, some being all-encompassing, others more detailed. I criticize the global idea that “all life is semiosis” and also the view, used to back up this global idea, that the concepts of function and semiosis are coextensive. Among other things, I suggest that such views confuse means and ends. A related and very intriguing idea is that all biological and psychic processes, as teleological processes, have a quasi-semiotic relationship to an “absent content”. I argue that explanations should refer to actual, present factors. Another proposal, which is meant to avoid bothersome questions of where there could be interpretation in “biological semiosis”, is to regard biological processes like protein synthesis as “manufacturing semiosis”. I oppose this view as well as the other biosemiotic views with my own ideas about emergent forms of structural determination and co-determination in biology.
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ABSTRACT
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The systems approach has become a major trend in contemporary thought. It has penetrated, and sometimes even dominates, a variety of disciplines, ranging from the practical to the theoretical, including philosophy. Concomitantly, diverse... more
The systems approach has become a major trend in contemporary thought. It has penetrated, and sometimes even dominates, a variety of disciplines, ranging from the practical to the theoretical, including philosophy. Concomitantly, diverse labels have come into circulation which are meant to cover smaller or larger sections of systems studies: systems engineering, systems analysis, systems research, systems thinking, systems science, systemology, systems theory, systems philosophy. As with any other incipient intellectual trend, the systems approach itself, as well as many of its particular implementations, have been the object of much controversy. The best-known example is the debate about The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972). It concerns the rather gloomy predictions of the so-called Club of Rome and, in particular, the dynamic world-models by means of which the predictions were obtained. Another example is the controversy about the methodology of the social sciences which was initiated by the neo-Marxist philosopher J. Habermas and the systems philosopher N.Luhmann (Habermas and Luhmann, 1971; Maciejewski, 1973). This intricate controversy touches less on implications of a practical application of the systems approach than on some of its theoretical presuppositions.
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In addition to the task of clarifying the ‘nature of information’, dialectical-materialist philosophers have taken it upon themselves to elaborate the doctrine of reflection. In doing this they have tried to use ideas which are borrowed... more
In addition to the task of clarifying the ‘nature of information’, dialectical-materialist philosophers have taken it upon themselves to elaborate the doctrine of reflection. In doing this they have tried to use ideas which are borrowed from cybernetics, information theory and connected fields. One emphasis is on the theory of perception, which is central to a realist epistemology like dialectical materialism. V. S. Tjuxtin has devoted several works to this subject and we will present his basic views below. This is followed by further, sometimes critical, views on a cybernetic theory of perception, dealing especially with the notion of isomorphy. The problem of perception is generally handled by dialectical materialism in a naturalist way and translated into how the conscious subject of perception comes to be.445 In the attempts to answer this last question, the notion of the ‘universality of reflection’ and that of the possible prefigurations of psychic reflection play a leading role. This is why we will devote a special section to this supposed prefiguration and to reflection as property of inorganic nature.
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Since most of the recent questions having to do with information arise in the context of cybernetics, we will begin with a description of this domain which is both scientific and technological. We will also deal with the reasons why... more
Since most of the recent questions having to do with information arise in the context of cybernetics, we will begin with a description of this domain which is both scientific and technological. We will also deal with the reasons why cybernetic ideas and procedures have given rise to controversies. Finally, we shall mention some views on information itself, thereby indicating the variety of possible opinions on the subject.
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Interestingly, information and reflection that you really wait for now is coming. It's significant to wait for the representative and beneficial books to read. Every book that is provided in better way and utterance will be expected... more
Interestingly, information and reflection that you really wait for now is coming. It's significant to wait for the representative and beneficial books to read. Every book that is provided in better way and utterance will be expected by many peoples. Even you are a good reader or not, feeling to read this book will always appear when you find it. But, when you feel hard to find it as yours, what to do? Borrow to your friends and don't know when to give back it to her or him.
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In Marxist-Leninist epistemology the category of reflection is handled within the limits set by the theses of the classics. Where there is a closer explication of this category, it happens mainly in ontological investigations which are... more
In Marxist-Leninist epistemology the category of reflection is handled within the limits set by the theses of the classics. Where there is a closer explication of this category, it happens mainly in ontological investigations which are closely bound up with the natural sciences. The special task is an elaboration of the Leninist hypothesis of universal reflection; i.e., discovery of a logically clear, scientific and developmentally established connection between the various forms of reflection, including an explication of the relational dependence between matter and consciousness. This elaboration has not yet reached a satisfactory stage. The classification of the various forms of reflection, which has become a component of dialectical materialism, is to be considered part of this elaboration.
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In order to understand the category of reflection, one must begin with the “great basic question of all philosophy”244, as formulated by Engels, which forms the point of departure in the systematic presentation of Marxist-Leninist... more
In order to understand the category of reflection, one must begin with the “great basic question of all philosophy”244, as formulated by Engels, which forms the point of departure in the systematic presentation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. This is the question of the relationship between thought and being, spirit and nature, consciousness and matter. According to Engels the answers to this question divide philosophers into two large camps — idealists, asserting the primacy of spirit over nature, and materialists, holding nature to be primary. The solution of all important philosophical problems is said to depend on the answer to the basic question.
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Our later discussion of dialectical-materialist handling of problems of information will go into detail on many of the questions which we will only touch on here. These general considerations provide the background — both historical and... more
Our later discussion of dialectical-materialist handling of problems of information will go into detail on many of the questions which we will only touch on here. These general considerations provide the background — both historical and systematic — for an understanding of the importance of the discussion on information in the Marxist-Leninist world.
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The foregoing sketch of information theory is based mainly on the concepts of symbol, set and sequence of symbols. However, the mathematical expressions of the various information measures contain only the number of the symbols of a set,... more
The foregoing sketch of information theory is based mainly on the concepts of symbol, set and sequence of symbols. However, the mathematical expressions of the various information measures contain only the number of the symbols of a set, and the statistical measures include, in addition, the probabilities assigned to the symbols. Clearly, reference to symbols — in general, the way in which these measures are introduced — is not of decisive importance for the mathematical expressions of these measures. This is peculiar to mathematics as a whole: i.e., its magnitudes, formulae and theorems are indifferent to special interpretations. As has been mentioned, the mathematical part of information theory belongs to probability theory. It can be handled with the help of concepts and methods of this mathematical theory without reference to communication technology and its problems.196 Further, it is even possible, using an information measure defined on another basis, to define the mathematical concept of probability as a derivative measure.197
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Communication between men happens for the most part with the help of speech and writing. It can be quite well described as the exchange of information. It is therefore an advantage to begin with the phenomenon of language in the... more
Communication between men happens for the most part with the help of speech and writing. It can be quite well described as the exchange of information. It is therefore an advantage to begin with the phenomenon of language in the explanation of what information is in human communication. Those aspects of information which cannot be directly connected with natural language can often be understood as special cases or extrapolations of the relations between language and information. While heretofore the use of the word ‘information’ in ordinary language has led the discussion, we will not investigate how we are talking about ‘information’ here, but will discuss what information is in the context of the phenomenon of language.
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I present Platonic views of nature and the cosmos as expressed in the Timaeus, concentrating on elements or themes which, it appears, can also be found in views of Johannes Kepler: the use of regular polyhedra, the belief in a... more
I present Platonic views of nature and the cosmos as expressed in the Timaeus, concentrating on elements or themes which, it appears, can also be found in views of Johannes Kepler: the use of regular polyhedra, the belief in a well-ordering divine agent, the conviction of an intimate relation between astronomy and harmonics. I discuss Kepler’s polyhedra-model and questions of the number and distances of the planets, which were not only touched on by Plato, but also treated by the Pythagoreans. I comment on the topic of the Music of the Spheres, where Kepler was closer to the numerical speculations of the Pythagoreans than to Plato. I add a recent view about the mathematical nature of reality. I conclude that Kepler, while indeed following up on general concerns of the ancient philosophers, cannot be considered anything like a full-fledged Platonist or Pythagorean, if only because he definitely abolished the distinction between celestial and terrestrial motion, between celestial and terrestrial physics.
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I survey and discuss obstacles to forecasting the future, especially to making accurate predictions, in various areas: in economics with its inadequate models and financial crashes, big business ventures with their cost overruns, the role... more
I survey and discuss obstacles to forecasting the future, especially to making accurate predictions, in various areas: in economics with its inadequate models and financial crashes, big business ventures with their cost overruns, the role of novelties, affective forecasting, and ecology. Given the great diversity of these areas, the kind of obstacles are equally diverse. Altogether, I conclude, they should certainly not prevent us from planning for the future as best as we can, if not by means of accurate predictions, then e.g. by means of qualitative estimates and prognoses, or by working out alternative scenarios.
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Consciousness appears to be a mystery. One question is: Is consciousness immanent in nature or does it transcend nature? There are idealist, dualist, materialist answers. Is there-or can there be-a conclusive explanation? I discuss three... more
Consciousness appears to be a mystery. One question is: Is consciousness immanent in nature or does it transcend nature? There are idealist, dualist, materialist answers. Is there-or can there be-a conclusive explanation? I discuss three renowned philosophical accounts of consciousness. In Daniel Dennett's materialist reductionist view, consciousness is a 'user-illusion'. As an illusion it would be neither immanent in nature nor transcending it. In contrast, for Thomas Nagel, consciousness is irreducibly subjective. He countenances partly mental cosmic constituents and teleological laws for an explanation of the evolution of consciousness. Thus, he considers consciousness as cosmos-immanent. Max Velmans' reflexive monism involves a panpsychism. This places consciousness within nature or the universe. Less speculatively, he argues convincingly for the interchangeability of objective and subjective perspectives, important for any progress in consciousness studies. None of the proposed accounts could strike one as final. Their speculative or sketchy character shows that consciousness remains some mystery. Some say, it will disappear as the problem of life has supposedly vanished with ever growing knowledge of life processes. I have my doubts. Yet, in view of domains like electricity, with very precise knowledge, but still some mystery about what it is and why it is there, I should say that we can safely place electricity, life, and consciousness inside nature.
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Abstract. My main question is whether there is a sense in which one can say that (some of) our perceptions are true. I survey some quasi-perceptions, mainly illusions. I present the so-called problem of perception. I comes in the form of... more
Abstract. My main question is whether there is a sense in which one can say that (some of) our perceptions are true. I survey some quasi-perceptions, mainly illusions. I present the so-called problem of perception. I comes in the form of arguments from hallucinations and illusions entailing that even in genuine, veridical perceptions we are not aware of ordinary objects. I comment on the notion of veridicality and the conditions for applying the notion of truth, which are not clearly satisfied by perceptions. I discuss five major types of philosophy of perception, in their role as answers to the problem of perception and to my main question. I conclude that three of have some place for truth. Finally, I suggest that illusions could be said to be ‘half-true' and even hallucinations might be accorded some particular variant of truth.
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Should one creatively proliferate models, in science and theology, amongst other areas? Now, models come in many types and roles. In view of the question raised, I consider cognitive or epistemic models, which include theoretical and... more
Should one creatively proliferate models, in science and theology, amongst other areas? Now, models come in many types and roles. In view of the question raised, I consider cognitive or epistemic models, which include theoretical and explanatory models or models fostering insight and understanding. I take the accounts of two pioneering thinkers about models in the philosophy of science and theology, Mary Hesse and Ian Ramsey, to find out what they might imply for the proliferation question, which will always also involve the question of how to test models, how to choose between possibly incompatible models.
I present Hesse’s analysis of scientific models in terms of analogies, and point out that her idea that what she called ‘neutral analogies’ should be further examined implies that there will be successive improved models. Being aware of the many models considered and used in science, she also discussed the issue of choosing between competing models; she concluded that there was no unfailing way of justifying such choices, although eventually there usually are decisive tests.
Ramsey distinguished between “picturing” and “disclosure” models. Picturing models are purely descriptive, also in theology, and therefore leave to place for mystery. Disclosure models, which for Ramsey have also become significant in science, are born in moments of insight when the universe discloses itself. Theological disclosure models are metaphoric rather than analogical, with metaphors rooted in disclosures. These models are not explanatory, but attempts at articulating, and reaching some understanding of, the divine mystery. They do not entail testable consequences, but are judged by their “empirical fit”, their capacity of harmonizing the most diverse events. To articulate what a cosmic disclosure discloses, he asserted, we shall need a never-ending succession of theological metaphors; he supported this assertion with his further analysis of theological metaphors into experiential model and logical qualifiers. Ramsey, thus, gave explicit reasons for a necessary proliferation of models. Whether his account, with its liberally conceived criterion of empirical fit can avoid relativism and subjectivism, remains a question for discussion.
I have a few comments on models in psychology and the social sciences, on Ramsey’s discussion of them, and on whether there are incompatible models, say, of human behavior.
I present Hesse’s analysis of scientific models in terms of analogies, and point out that her idea that what she called ‘neutral analogies’ should be further examined implies that there will be successive improved models. Being aware of the many models considered and used in science, she also discussed the issue of choosing between competing models; she concluded that there was no unfailing way of justifying such choices, although eventually there usually are decisive tests.
Ramsey distinguished between “picturing” and “disclosure” models. Picturing models are purely descriptive, also in theology, and therefore leave to place for mystery. Disclosure models, which for Ramsey have also become significant in science, are born in moments of insight when the universe discloses itself. Theological disclosure models are metaphoric rather than analogical, with metaphors rooted in disclosures. These models are not explanatory, but attempts at articulating, and reaching some understanding of, the divine mystery. They do not entail testable consequences, but are judged by their “empirical fit”, their capacity of harmonizing the most diverse events. To articulate what a cosmic disclosure discloses, he asserted, we shall need a never-ending succession of theological metaphors; he supported this assertion with his further analysis of theological metaphors into experiential model and logical qualifiers. Ramsey, thus, gave explicit reasons for a necessary proliferation of models. Whether his account, with its liberally conceived criterion of empirical fit can avoid relativism and subjectivism, remains a question for discussion.
I have a few comments on models in psychology and the social sciences, on Ramsey’s discussion of them, and on whether there are incompatible models, say, of human behavior.