... Vol. 16. 227-240 Peter P. Kirschenmann HEURISTICAL STRATEGIES: ANOTHER LOOK AT IDEALIZATION A... more ... Vol. 16. 227-240 Peter P. Kirschenmann HEURISTICAL STRATEGIES: ANOTHER LOOK AT IDEALIZATION AND CONCRETIZATION* 1. Introduction Idealizing conceptions play a major role in the sciences. The ... cf. Gutting, 1980]. ...
Studies in Science and Theology, Volume 3 (1995) 158-164 VIEWS ON DIVINE ACTIVITY IN NATURE: SCIE... more Studies in Science and Theology, Volume 3 (1995) 158-164 VIEWS ON DIVINE ACTIVITY IN NATURE: SCIENCE AS A NORM FOR THEOLOGY? PETER P. KIRSCHENMANN (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) 1. INTRODUCTION There have been debates ...
This epistemological contribution mainly points up invariants in the relationship of theology and... more This epistemological contribution mainly points up invariants in the relationship of theology and science: The relationship is not symmetrical. A diversity of theologies confronts the unity of scientific progress. Although the belief in one reality has led to attempts at integration and dialogue, the questions and answers keep varying. The very question of the relationship itself remains a theological one. The answers to this question vary in dependence upon a number of central (philosophical and theological) concepts and their relations. There is the particular question: Has recent scientific knowledge drastically changed this relationship and led to new demarcations? Some of the central concepts and relations have indeed undergone changes. Yet, rather than leading to a revolution in this relationship, scientific knowledge has, above all, rendered certain formulations of theological assertions untenable. Many people have claimed that modem scientific theories imply novel demarcations or closer ties. Examples show that (philosophically) such claims are virtually indefensible.
Philosophers are continually challenged to comprehend chance phenomena and probabilistic relation... more Philosophers are continually challenged to comprehend chance phenomena and probabilistic relationships. Those cases are especially intriguing in which we speak of chance or probability but can hardly attribute this manner of speaking to our being partially or totally ignorant of the situations in question. Those cases, then, can be taken to possess chance as an objective feature. In its intent, this paper is restricted to a discussion of such cases. Among objective chance relationships there is one kind which seems especially incomprehensible. These are stochastic relationships, i.e., chance relationships between consecutive states of physical systems.
I have discussed a concept of random distribution of properties in classes and defined a concept ... more I have discussed a concept of random distribution of properties in classes and defined a concept of random conjunction of properties; I have also discussed measures of various kinds of randomness. In concluding, I shall only mention some further problems which await treatment. Both the concept of random conjunction and the measures of randomness rest upon the notion of probability, which was not explicitly dealt with in this paper. Since, however, assumptions of randomness are frequently brought forward as justifications for working with probabilities, the relationship of randomness and probability should be examined in detail. Another task is to show which concepts of randomness are relevant in the sciences. It seems that the concept of random distribution of properties in classes, though interesting in itself and of relevance to statistics, has no use in theories of the empirical sciences. However, the assumption of randomness in the sense of stochastic independence, very often combined with the notion of randomness in the sense of equiprobability, or maximum primitive randomness, undoubtedly plays a role in various fields of science. I do not know of any case where the measures of randomness are directly employed; the idea of stochastic dependence and that of probabilities other than equiprobabilities are, of course, widley used. Finally, some of the assumptions of random conjunction of properties made in the sciences seem to be justifiable in terms of an actual independence of the properties. This raises the question as to whether, and to what extent, the notion of an actual independence is fundamental to concepts of randomness.
... Vol. 16. 227-240 Peter P. Kirschenmann HEURISTICAL STRATEGIES: ANOTHER LOOK AT IDEALIZATION A... more ... Vol. 16. 227-240 Peter P. Kirschenmann HEURISTICAL STRATEGIES: ANOTHER LOOK AT IDEALIZATION AND CONCRETIZATION* 1. Introduction Idealizing conceptions play a major role in the sciences. The ... cf. Gutting, 1980]. ...
Studies in Science and Theology, Volume 3 (1995) 158-164 VIEWS ON DIVINE ACTIVITY IN NATURE: SCIE... more Studies in Science and Theology, Volume 3 (1995) 158-164 VIEWS ON DIVINE ACTIVITY IN NATURE: SCIENCE AS A NORM FOR THEOLOGY? PETER P. KIRSCHENMANN (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) 1. INTRODUCTION There have been debates ...
This epistemological contribution mainly points up invariants in the relationship of theology and... more This epistemological contribution mainly points up invariants in the relationship of theology and science: The relationship is not symmetrical. A diversity of theologies confronts the unity of scientific progress. Although the belief in one reality has led to attempts at integration and dialogue, the questions and answers keep varying. The very question of the relationship itself remains a theological one. The answers to this question vary in dependence upon a number of central (philosophical and theological) concepts and their relations. There is the particular question: Has recent scientific knowledge drastically changed this relationship and led to new demarcations? Some of the central concepts and relations have indeed undergone changes. Yet, rather than leading to a revolution in this relationship, scientific knowledge has, above all, rendered certain formulations of theological assertions untenable. Many people have claimed that modem scientific theories imply novel demarcations or closer ties. Examples show that (philosophically) such claims are virtually indefensible.
Philosophers are continually challenged to comprehend chance phenomena and probabilistic relation... more Philosophers are continually challenged to comprehend chance phenomena and probabilistic relationships. Those cases are especially intriguing in which we speak of chance or probability but can hardly attribute this manner of speaking to our being partially or totally ignorant of the situations in question. Those cases, then, can be taken to possess chance as an objective feature. In its intent, this paper is restricted to a discussion of such cases. Among objective chance relationships there is one kind which seems especially incomprehensible. These are stochastic relationships, i.e., chance relationships between consecutive states of physical systems.
I have discussed a concept of random distribution of properties in classes and defined a concept ... more I have discussed a concept of random distribution of properties in classes and defined a concept of random conjunction of properties; I have also discussed measures of various kinds of randomness. In concluding, I shall only mention some further problems which await treatment. Both the concept of random conjunction and the measures of randomness rest upon the notion of probability, which was not explicitly dealt with in this paper. Since, however, assumptions of randomness are frequently brought forward as justifications for working with probabilities, the relationship of randomness and probability should be examined in detail. Another task is to show which concepts of randomness are relevant in the sciences. It seems that the concept of random distribution of properties in classes, though interesting in itself and of relevance to statistics, has no use in theories of the empirical sciences. However, the assumption of randomness in the sense of stochastic independence, very often combined with the notion of randomness in the sense of equiprobability, or maximum primitive randomness, undoubtedly plays a role in various fields of science. I do not know of any case where the measures of randomness are directly employed; the idea of stochastic dependence and that of probabilities other than equiprobabilities are, of course, widley used. Finally, some of the assumptions of random conjunction of properties made in the sciences seem to be justifiable in terms of an actual independence of the properties. This raises the question as to whether, and to what extent, the notion of an actual independence is fundamental to concepts of randomness.
I present Platonic views of nature and the cosmos as expressed in the Timaeus, concentrating on ... more I present Platonic views of nature and the cosmos as expressed in the Timaeus, concentrating on elements or themes which, it appears, can also be found in views of Johannes Kepler: the use of regular polyhedra, the belief in a well-ordering divine agent, the conviction of an intimate relation between astronomy and harmonics. I discuss Kepler’s polyhedra-model and questions of the number and distances of the planets, which were not only touched on by Plato, but also treated by the Pythagoreans. I comment on the topic of the Music of the Spheres, where Kepler was closer to the numerical speculations of the Pythagoreans than to Plato. I add a recent view about the mathematical nature of reality. I conclude that Kepler, while indeed following up on general concerns of the ancient philosophers, cannot be considered anything like a full-fledged Platonist or Pythagorean, if only because he definitely abolished the distinction between celestial and terrestrial motion, between celestial and terrestrial physics.
I survey and discuss obstacles to forecasting the future, especially to making accurate predictio... more I survey and discuss obstacles to forecasting the future, especially to making accurate predictions, in various areas: in economics with its inadequate models and financial crashes, big business ventures with their cost overruns, the role of novelties, affective forecasting, and ecology. Given the great diversity of these areas, the kind of obstacles are equally diverse. Altogether, I conclude, they should certainly not prevent us from planning for the future as best as we can, if not by means of accurate predictions, then e.g. by means of qualitative estimates and prognoses, or by working out alternative scenarios.
Consciousness appears to be a mystery. One question is: Is consciousness immanent in nature or do... more Consciousness appears to be a mystery. One question is: Is consciousness immanent in nature or does it transcend nature? There are idealist, dualist, materialist answers. Is there-or can there be-a conclusive explanation? I discuss three renowned philosophical accounts of consciousness. In Daniel Dennett's materialist reductionist view, consciousness is a 'user-illusion'. As an illusion it would be neither immanent in nature nor transcending it. In contrast, for Thomas Nagel, consciousness is irreducibly subjective. He countenances partly mental cosmic constituents and teleological laws for an explanation of the evolution of consciousness. Thus, he considers consciousness as cosmos-immanent. Max Velmans' reflexive monism involves a panpsychism. This places consciousness within nature or the universe. Less speculatively, he argues convincingly for the interchangeability of objective and subjective perspectives, important for any progress in consciousness studies. None of the proposed accounts could strike one as final. Their speculative or sketchy character shows that consciousness remains some mystery. Some say, it will disappear as the problem of life has supposedly vanished with ever growing knowledge of life processes. I have my doubts. Yet, in view of domains like electricity, with very precise knowledge, but still some mystery about what it is and why it is there, I should say that we can safely place electricity, life, and consciousness inside nature.
Abstract. My main question is whether there is a sense in which one can say that (some of) our p... more Abstract. My main question is whether there is a sense in which one can say that (some of) our perceptions are true. I survey some quasi-perceptions, mainly illusions. I present the so-called problem of perception. I comes in the form of arguments from hallucinations and illusions entailing that even in genuine, veridical perceptions we are not aware of ordinary objects. I comment on the notion of veridicality and the conditions for applying the notion of truth, which are not clearly satisfied by perceptions. I discuss five major types of philosophy of perception, in their role as answers to the problem of perception and to my main question. I conclude that three of have some place for truth. Finally, I suggest that illusions could be said to be ‘half-true' and even hallucinations might be accorded some particular variant of truth.
Should one creatively proliferate models, in science and theology, amongst other areas? Now, mode... more Should one creatively proliferate models, in science and theology, amongst other areas? Now, models come in many types and roles. In view of the question raised, I consider cognitive or epistemic models, which include theoretical and explanatory models or models fostering insight and understanding. I take the accounts of two pioneering thinkers about models in the philosophy of science and theology, Mary Hesse and Ian Ramsey, to find out what they might imply for the proliferation question, which will always also involve the question of how to test models, how to choose between possibly incompatible models. I present Hesse’s analysis of scientific models in terms of analogies, and point out that her idea that what she called ‘neutral analogies’ should be further examined implies that there will be successive improved models. Being aware of the many models considered and used in science, she also discussed the issue of choosing between competing models; she concluded that there was no unfailing way of justifying such choices, although eventually there usually are decisive tests. Ramsey distinguished between “picturing” and “disclosure” models. Picturing models are purely descriptive, also in theology, and therefore leave to place for mystery. Disclosure models, which for Ramsey have also become significant in science, are born in moments of insight when the universe discloses itself. Theological disclosure models are metaphoric rather than analogical, with metaphors rooted in disclosures. These models are not explanatory, but attempts at articulating, and reaching some understanding of, the divine mystery. They do not entail testable consequences, but are judged by their “empirical fit”, their capacity of harmonizing the most diverse events. To articulate what a cosmic disclosure discloses, he asserted, we shall need a never-ending succession of theological metaphors; he supported this assertion with his further analysis of theological metaphors into experiential model and logical qualifiers. Ramsey, thus, gave explicit reasons for a necessary proliferation of models. Whether his account, with its liberally conceived criterion of empirical fit can avoid relativism and subjectivism, remains a question for discussion. I have a few comments on models in psychology and the social sciences, on Ramsey’s discussion of them, and on whether there are incompatible models, say, of human behavior.
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Papers by peter p kirschenmann
I present Hesse’s analysis of scientific models in terms of analogies, and point out that her idea that what she called ‘neutral analogies’ should be further examined implies that there will be successive improved models. Being aware of the many models considered and used in science, she also discussed the issue of choosing between competing models; she concluded that there was no unfailing way of justifying such choices, although eventually there usually are decisive tests.
Ramsey distinguished between “picturing” and “disclosure” models. Picturing models are purely descriptive, also in theology, and therefore leave to place for mystery. Disclosure models, which for Ramsey have also become significant in science, are born in moments of insight when the universe discloses itself. Theological disclosure models are metaphoric rather than analogical, with metaphors rooted in disclosures. These models are not explanatory, but attempts at articulating, and reaching some understanding of, the divine mystery. They do not entail testable consequences, but are judged by their “empirical fit”, their capacity of harmonizing the most diverse events. To articulate what a cosmic disclosure discloses, he asserted, we shall need a never-ending succession of theological metaphors; he supported this assertion with his further analysis of theological metaphors into experiential model and logical qualifiers. Ramsey, thus, gave explicit reasons for a necessary proliferation of models. Whether his account, with its liberally conceived criterion of empirical fit can avoid relativism and subjectivism, remains a question for discussion.
I have a few comments on models in psychology and the social sciences, on Ramsey’s discussion of them, and on whether there are incompatible models, say, of human behavior.