Roderick Chisholm

Psychognosy (Psychognosie) was the original title of the manuscript of the lectures presented by Franz Brentano in Vienna University in 1890. This manuscript is part of the work entitled Descriptive Psychology (Deskriptive Psychologie). The purpose of this manuscript was divided into two parts: (1) the formulation of psychological categories; (2) to establish the demarcation between psychology and genetic  Psychognosy. Something, however, interested us specifi cally in addition to the demarcation of these two branches of psychology. Our point is the new description of intentional psychical acts, explicit by Brentano from the analysis of consciousness developed in this manuscript. In other words, our research will present the Brentano’s way to describe the unity of consciousness as the whole that is the subject of Psychognosy. Moreover, the fundamental point of our investigation show that, assuming the interpretation inaugurated by Roderick Chisholm (1969), the new description of psychical acts introduced a change in the theory of brentaniana`s intentionality, characterized as abandonment of ontological thesis that supported the intentional in-existence of objects.

RESUMO: Psicognose (Psychognosie)  foi o título original do manuscrito das leituras apresentadas por Franz Brentano na Universidade de Viena, em 1890. Tal manuscrito faz parte da obra intitulada  Psicologia descritiva (Deskriptive Psychologie). O propósito desse manuscrito estava divido em duas partes: (1) formular as categorias psicológicas; (2) estabelecer a demarcação entre a Psicologia genética e a Psicognose. Há algo, porém, que nos interessa especificamente, além da demarcação desses dois ramos da psicologia. Trata-se da nova descrição dos atos psíquicos intencionais, explicitada por Brentano a partir da análise da consciência desenvolvida nesse manuscrito. Em outras palavras, esta investigação apresentará o modo como Brentano descreveu a unidade da consciência como o todo que constitui o objeto da Psicognose. Além disso, o ponto fundamental da nossa investigação mostrará que, assumindo a interpretação inaugurada por Roderick Chisholm (1969), a nova descrição dos atos psíquicos introduziu uma mudança na teoria brentaniana da intencionalidade caracterizada como abandono da tese ontológica que sustentava a in-existência dos objetos intencionais.

W artykule niniejszym omawiam kilka klasycznych sposobów podejścia do problemu intencjonalności. Zaczynam od ogólnego naszkicowania problemu. Następnie przechodzę do konkretnych propozycji. Najpierw omówiona zostanie ogólna postać teorii wprowadzającej byty zapośredniczające typu Fregowskiego, następnie teoria przedmiotów intencjonalnych, tak jak występuje ona u Brentana, Ingardena czy Meinonga, a także w wersji operujących ontologią światów możliwych. Kolejnym podejściem będą „przysłówkowe” teorie treści mentalnych, teorie kauzalne, teorie funkcjonalistyczno-reprezentacjonalistyczne oraz teorie behawiorystyczno-funkcjonalistyczne, głoszące pierwszeństwo intencjonalności językowej. Artykuł pomyślany jest jako wprowadzenie do problematyki, i w związku z tym nie znajdą się w nim ani wszystkie istotne zagadki ani też pełne i precyzyjne wersje argumentacji. Starałem się jednak pokazać podstawowe problemy oraz wewnętrzną logikę preferowania tych czy innych podejść.

Nous nous interrogeons sur le rôle du possible dans la définition de l'identité personnelle, à travers les mondes possibles, et plus particulièrement ceux proposés par David Lewis, afin de répondre à plusieurs questions qui n'en forment en fait qu'une seule : « Pourquoi les possibles réalisés serait-ils supérieurs aux possibles non réalisés dans la définition de l'identité personnelle ? », « Est-ce que les possibles d'un individu font partie de son identité ? », « Pour définir ce qu'est un individu, est-on obligé de passer par ce qu'il pourrait-être ? » En d'autres termes, ce qu'un individu pourrait-être n'est-il pas aussi constitutif de son soi, que ses autres qualités ? On identifierait alors les possibles d'un individu à certaines de ses qualités. Ses « qualités possibles ». Cela nous amènera à nous demander si on ne peut pas faire, en un certain sens une identification des possibles à l'essence, ou au moins, si on ne peut pas dire que les possibles d'un individu sont constitutifs de son essence.

"İÇİNDEKİLER
ÖNSÖZ 7
GİRİŞ 9
BİRİNCİ BÖLÜM
BİLGİNİN ANLAMI TÜRLERİ VE KAYNAKLARI
1. Bilmenin Anlamları 25
Nasıl’ın Bilgisi ve Tanışıklık Bilgisi 26
Önermesel Bilgi 29
Üç Anlamı Birbirinden Ayırma 31
2. Önermesel Bilginin Türleri 34
Zihin Durumları, Olgu Durumları ve Diğer Zihinler 34
Zorunlu ve Zorunlu Olmayan Bilgi 36
A Priori ve A Posteriori 39
Temel Bilgi ve Çıkarıma Dayalı Bilgi 51
3. Bilme Araçları ya da Bilginin Kaynakları 57
Algı İle Gelen Bilgiler 57
Bellek İle Gelen Bilgiler 69
Tanıklık İle Gelen Bilgiler 76
Akıl İle Gelen Bilgi 81
Muhakeme ve İçebakış 88
İçebakış ve Bilinç 95
İKİNCİ BÖLÜM
BİLGİNİN UNSURLARI VE GEREKÇELENDİRME
1. Geleneksel Üç-Parçalı Bilgi Tanımı 103
Bilgi: Gerekçelendirmiş Doğru İnanç 103
Theaetetus Sorunu ve Gettier Sorunu 110
Gettier Karşı-Örnekleri 113
2. İnanç Doğruluk ve Gerekçelendirme 119
İnanç Koşulu 119
Doğruluk Koşulu 123
Gerekçelendirme Koşulu 129
3. Epistemik Olmayan Gerekçelendirme 133
Basirete Dayalı Gerekçelendirme 134
Ahlaki Gerekçelendirme 136
4. Deontolojik Gerekçelendirme 139
ÜÇÜNCÜ BÖLÜM
BİLİŞSEL BAŞARI VE TEMİNAT KOŞULU
1. Bilişsel Başarı vs. Epistemik Şans 151
2. Teminat Koşulu: Bildiğimi Biliyorum 156
3. Gerekçelendirme ve Güvenilircilik 162
4. İçselcilik ve Dışsalcılık 173
İçselcilik 174
Dışsalcılık 186
Karşılaştırma 190
DÖRDÜNCÜ BÖLÜM
BİLGİNİN TANIMI VE MİMARİ YAPISI
1. İçselci Bilgi Tanımları 201
Chisholm: Kanıtlanmış Doğru İnanç 201
Clark: Sağlam Temele Dayanma 210
Lehrer ve Paxson: Sarsılmazlık 214
Üç Koşulun Yeterliliği 219
2. Dışsalcı Bilgi Tanımları 221
Goldman: Sebebe Dayanma 221
Dretske: Sonuca Götüren Neden 226
Nozick: Doğruluğu Takip Etme 230
Plantinga: Uygun İşlevselcilik 235
3. Bilginin Mimari Yapısı 238
İçselci Temelcilik 238
Dışsalcı Temelcilik 248
Bağdaşımcılık 250
Alternatif Bir Yaklaşım 254
BEŞİNCİ BÖLÜM
ALTERNATİF YAKLAŞIMLAR
1. Erdem Epistemolojisi 259
2. Sosyal Epistemoloji 266
3. Doğallaştırılmış Epistemoloji 274
4. Pragmatizm 277
5. Evrimci Epistemoloji 280
Zihnin İşlevi 281
Rasyonellik (Makullük) 288
SONUÇ 295
KAYNAKÇA 305
DİZİN 315"

The aim of the paper is to present the main conceptions in the cotemporary philosophy of mind. The debate is narrated in two ways: The first approach concerns the ontology of mind, with the questions such as: What is the nature of mind?; What is the relation between mind and body?; Is the mind reducible to its physical basis? The second approach has an epistemological character where
especially the problem of self-knowledge in the frame of the discussion between externalism and internalism is pointed out. The last part of the article gives an evaluation of the actual situation in the philosophy of mind which on the one hand tries to evolve in the direction of cognitive science but on the other hand stays in the frame of the traditional philosophy. The reason of it is the nature of the questions, which cannot be answered only by means of scientific disciplines.
It means that in contrast to the cognitive science the philosophical account of the mind-body problem is the preferred one.

Keywords
Philosophy of mind, mind-body problem, externalism, internalism, cognitive sciences

In his book Person and Object Roderick Chisholm defended the view that persons have individual essences, or haecceities.  However, three years after the publication of this book, Chisholm repented his essentialism and adopted a position that he later called ‘existentialism.’  As it turns out, both this view and Chisholm’s arguments for it are problematic given certain other philosophical positions that he maintained.

In this paper I present a sketch of a theory of intentionality introducing special entities called intentional objects. Elaborated theories of this kind can be found in the works of Franz Brentano and Roman Ingarden. Nowadays those philosophers who are sympathetic to intentional objects are accused of planting an ontological jungle. All the problems of the theory of intentionality, it is claimed, can be resolved within the framework of a theory assuming a much more parsimonious ontology, like the theory of mental content proposed by the early Husserl or the so-called “adverbial” theory of intentionality. However, I show that the competitors of the theory of intentional objects face serious difficulties, the most important being that within their framework the relation between the representing entity (mental content or “adverbially specified” mental property of the subject) and the external target object has to be construed as primitive, while in the theory of intentional objects it can be easily defined. The consequence is that the partisans of mental contents and adverbialists are forced to require a distinguished kind of epistemic access not only to the representing entity but also to this “representing relation”. This consequence, which is very seldom made explicit, seems indeed to be fatal. Intentional objects appear in this light not as products of an ontological extravagance but instead as entities that are indispensable, if we are to be able to explain the phenomenon of intentionality at all. Moreover, it turns out that we gain nothing if we introduce mental contents in addition to intentional objects. The approach to intentionality that I finally advocate postulates an external relation between a conscious subject and an intentional object, and is thus at bottom Brentanian.

Plantinga’s God and Other Minds, Reformed Epistemology articles, and Warrant Trilogy are all part of the same epistemological project.  Although the project develops in phases focusing progressively on anti-theism, evidentialism, and internalism, the epistemology is consistently a Reidian particularism.  It follows Roderick Chisholm’s famous particularist strategy for finding an epistemic criterion, uses principles of common sense from Thomas Reid as clear cases of beliefs satisfying that criterion, and applies that criterion to belief in God in order to show that this belief is epistemically respectable. Understanding this will help to clarify Plantinga’s philosophical contributions to our understanding of religious belief.

In my article I introduce Plantinga’s epistemological sources, explain the structure of his project, overview its development in these three phases, and correct some misunderstandings of Plantinga that arise from inattention to his Reidian particularism. I also show how Reidian particularism itself suggests an improvement to Plantinga’s epistemology which his critics often recommend: that we recognize that evidence for the existence of God, even if it is not necessary for theistic belief to be warranted, may yet be valuable.

THE DOCUMENT HERE DOES NOT HAVE THE SAME PAGINATION AS THE PUBLISHED VERSION.

This paper analyzes a single theoretical aspect of the so-called «problem of the criterion», which was for the first time formulated by Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. It stresses the circularity of arguments  designed to conclusively justify the criterion of justication postulated by a theory of knowledge. Formulated in this manner, this problem can be defined a metaepistemological one. Roderick Chisholm has tried to deal with it in a manner that maybe misses the point of Sextus’ argument.

Common-sense philosophy is important. It is important because it maintains that we know many things about the world, about ourselves, about morality, and even many things of a metaphysical nature. These important things are at the same time often in some specific sense unexciting or unsurprising as they are truisms, platitudes, things that almost no one in their right mind would deny. However, denying these truisms and platitudes, common-sense philosophers hold wreaks havoc in both our intellectual and our practical lives. At the same time, common-sense philosophy is highly exciting, as these truisms and platitudes give rise to many philosophical challenges. This book traces the history of the concept of common-sense and the roles it was assigned to play in the history of philosophy. These newly commissioned chapters are all written by specialists in the history of philosophy. This book also contains chapters in which contemporary epistemologists, moral philosophers, and metaphysicians in the common-sense tradition explain what they think is the value and power of common-sense philosophy.

The research group “Origins of Contemporary Philosophy” held its 10th annual international meeting in 2019. To celebrate it we organized this dossier of essays from various professors that have participated in the meetings throughout its history; the dossier offers a fair representation of the network of institutional relations the group is part of, as well as the intellectual work produced by this environment. This dossier is composed of contributions from Christian Krijnen (VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands); Claude Imbert (École normale supérieure, Paris); Gottfried Gabriel (Friedrich-Schiller-Universität, Germany); Thomas Übel (University of Manchester, United Kingdom); Ingolf Max (Leipzig University, Germany); Pedro Alves (University of Lisbon, Portugal); Hernan Pringe (Universidad Diego Portales, Chile; Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina), and Luis Niel (Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Argentina),
The research group is officially registered at the National Research Council (CNPq) and directed by Prof. Dr. Mario Porta. The group’s headquarters are at the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), but its research network has a national branch and is linked to several Philosophy departments of Brazilian universities.
The aim of the group is to study the relations between analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutical philosophy with a focus on the origins of contemporary philosophy, starting from the establishment of its common roots and their subsequent reciprocal isolation. The group’s working hypothesis is that both analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutical philosophy represent a common change, from the point of view of the history of philosophy, that can be characterized as the displacement of the concept of validity (Geltung) to the concept of sense (Sinn).  To pursue this aim, the group considers 19th century philosophy highlighting authors who have not yet been properly studied (such as Bolzano, Trendelenburg, Lotze, Brentano, Dilthey, Cohen, Natorp, Windelband, and Rickert). These authors' work preceded the current split between analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutical philosophy and from this starting point, the group formulates modifications in the periodization and classification of the various philosophical trends of the period, especially in epistemology, logic, the philosophy of language, and metaphysics.
We are grateful to Camila Moreira, Diego Azizi, and Alessandro Francisco who assisted us in the task of editing the articles, as well as to Alexandre Hahn, editor of the “Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea," who led the project to publish this dossier.
We hope that this commemorative dossier is an invitation, not only to read the essays published here, but also to take part in the larger initiative that is relevant to the debate on the origins of contemporary philosophy.

We hope you find these essays illumintating.

Introduction

by Ernest Lepore and Yi Jiang

It is our great pleasure to introduce this volume of essays, which represent (in our modest opinion) the beginning of an era of Chinese and English language philosophical cooperation. The Chinese philosophical tradition and the Western philosophical tradition (starting with the Ancient Greeks) have often been considered orthogonal to each other – two ships passing in the night without much to say to each other. Whatever the merits of this thesis, we believe that recent developments in the Anglo-American philosophy and Chinese philosophy of language not only suggest a tableau of shared problems, but also a number of similar methods and goals. It is the goal of this volume to juxtapose these recent philosophical developments to illustrate the similarities between the traditions, but also to spur common dialogue and hopefully efforts to jointly engage shared philosophical problems.

The essays in this volume (by contributors from the United States, Great Britain, Australia and China) address issues about language and value from philosophical perspectives that overlap in surprising ways. The issues engaged range from the role of cultural and biological factors in linguistic competence and language use, to figurative speech in different languages, the comparative study of work in semantics and philosophy, and the role of language in establishing the legal and ethical norms and values. 

This volume represents the first substantial collaborative work from Chinese and Western scholars on philosophy of language. Although there has previously been some collaboration between Chinese and English language academics, there has never been a contemporary philosophical collection of this design, where each essay appears in both Chinese and English, and the two versions are presented side by side. It is our hope that by this endeavor we will be able to encourage greater collaborations among scholars both in China and in the English-speaking world.  Our mission is to provide a bridge between traditions, leading to mutual understanding, philosophical collaboration, and ultimately a level of philosophical progress that could not be achieved were we working separately. We believe there is much to be gained by our working together in such an enterprise.

To this end, in addition to assembling the essays in this volume, we paired each contributor from China with an English speaking philosopher; the paired philosophers read, edited and commented on each others work.  The philosophers were thus able to rewrite their papers with the help of advice from a fresh perspective. In some cases this led to the introduction of arguments and moves that had not previously been considered; in other cases it led to a better handle on how the ideas should be presented – it opened the ideas to a broader philosophical audience.  We believe that this has made for a compelling, globally accessible, and yes revolutionary new body of philosophical work.

The Chinese philosophers who have contributed represent a broad spectrum of the current academic world in China.

CHEN Bo is a professor of Philosophy at Peking University. He is one of most distinguished scholars in logic and analytic philosophy in China. He has published several essays in top journals in A&HCI list. His interests are philosophy of logic, Quine's philosophy, and philosophy of language.

Professor JIANG Yi of the School of Philosophy and Sociology, at Beijing Normal University,  is one of most distinguished scholars in analytic philosophy and philosophy of language in China. He has published several books in Chinese on Wittgenstein and analytic philosophy. His interests are analytic philosophy, philosophy of language and Wittgenstein.

Professor LIU Limin, of School of Foreign Languages, is at Sichuan University. His interests are philosophy of language and linguistics.

Professor QIAN Guanlian, of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, has for some time now been a important and distinguished scholars in pragmatics and the philosophy of language. He has published several books in Chinese on pragmatics.

YUGUO Fei, is a member of the Philosophy of Department at Yunnan University in Kunming. He received his PhD from Wuhan University, and his chief interests include logic and philosophy of language.

WANG Aihua is an Associate Professor of School of Foreign Language, at the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China in Chengdu. Her interests are also in pragmatics and philosophy of language.

ZHANG Ying, of Philosophy Department, at Huazhong University of Science and Technology, received her PhD from Sun Yat-sen University. She was a visiting professor at Rutgers for two years, and her chiefs interests are the philosophy of language, logic and pragmatics.

Lastly, Professor ZHU Zhifang, of Philosophy Department, at Wuhan University. He is one of more distinguished scholars in analytic philosophy and logic in China. He has published several books and essays in logic and philosophy of language. His interests are logic, philosophy of language and semiotics.

From the English speaking community our volume includes previously unpublished papers by a number of distinguished theorists of language.

Adam SENNET,  an Associate Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, UC Davis, specializes in the philosophy of language and has published papers in Mind and Language, Philosophical Studies, and the Journal of Philosophical Logic. 

Samuel CUMMING, an Assistant Professor of Philosophy, UCLA, has interests in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, semantics and pragmatics.

Peter LUDLOW is Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University. He has published on topics ranging from the philosophy of linguistics to the metaphysics of time. His current interests include the dynamics of communication (including the dynamics of the lexicon) and the optimization of group knowledge in adversarial environments.

Christopher HOM, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Texas Tech University.  He earned his PhD from the University of California, Irvine (LPS).  His research interests are in philosophy of language, metaethics, and philosophy of race.  He has published articles on racial slurs and normative language generally.

Paul PIETROSKI, Professor of Linguistics and Professor of Philosophy, University of Maryland. His research interests are focused on how linguistic meaning is related to human psychology.

Robert MAY is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Linguistics at the University of California, Davis.  He is the author of Logical Form:  Its Structure and Derivation,and with Robert Fiengo of Anaphora and Identity and De Lingua Belief.  He is well-known for his work in the syntax and semantics of natural language, especially on natural language quantification, and has written extensively on Frege, along with other topics in philosophy of language and philosophy of logic.

William STARR, Assistant Professor at the Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University. His research is on communication and cognition, drawing on ideas across philosophy, linguistics, logic, artificial intelligence and psychology. His published work explores these themes through various linguistic phenomena including conditionals, questions, imperatives, modality and speech acts.

Matthew STONE completed his Ph.D. in the Computer and Information Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania in 1998.  Since then he has had an appointment in the Computer Science Department and Center for Cognitive Science at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.  Stone has had visiting positions at the University of Edinburgh and the Universität Potsdam.  He works on problems of meaning in human-human and human-computer conversation.

Barry C SMITH is a Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Institute of Philosophy in the School of Advanced Study, University of London, where he co-directs the Centre for the Study of the Senses. He has written mostly on the philosophy of mind and language, on the topics of self-knowledge and our knowledge of language. He co-edited The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language (2006) with Ernest Lepore. Following his 2007 collection, Questions of Taste - the philosophy of wine (Oxford University Press), he began working with psychologists, neurologists and neuroscientists on flavour perception and is now the co-organiser of an international research project on the Nature of Taste. He has been a Visiting Professor at the University of California at Berkeley and at the Ecole Normale Supèriere, and was the writer and presenter of the BBC World Service radio series, The Mysteries of the Brain. 

Ernest Lepore is the Director of the Center for Cognitive Science at Rutgers University and a Professor of philosophy. His chief interests are philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.

In ‘Brentano’s Methodology as a Path through the Divide’, Röck makes two related claims. Röck argues that there exists a philosophical dilemma between description and logical analysis, and that the current divide between continental phenomenology and analytic philosophy may be seen as a consequence of the dilemma. Röck further argues that Brentano’s work integrates description and logical analysis in a way which ‘can provide a suitable starting point for an equally successful integration of these methods in contemporary philosophy’. Without disputing Röck’s claim about the suitability of Brentano’s work for such an integration, this paper questions by examining the influence of Brentano and his school on early analytic philosophy. As recent scholarship in the history of analytic philosophy demonstrates, contrary to Röck’s contention, many prominent analytic philosophers conversed with Brentano and his school’s conceptions of phenomenological description.

According to Roderick Chisholm, there are three ways of responding to the Problem of the Criterion and they all leave something to be desired. Michael DePaul, Paul Moser, and Earl Conee have each proposed variations of a fourth way of responding to this problem that rely on reflective equilibrium. We argue that these four options for responding to the Problem of the Criterion leave one with a tough choice: accept one of the three that Chisholm des­cribes or DePaul’s reflective equilibrium approach and beg the question or accept a reflective equilibrium response of the sort Conee and Moser propose and embrace epistemic circularity.

Speakers : Richard CROSS ; Howard ROBINSON ; Hud HUDSON ; Fréderic NEF ; Peter VAN INWAGEN ; Dean ZIMMERMAN ; Annalisa COLIVA ; John HAWTHORNE ; Isabelle PARIENTE ; Francis WOLFF ; Nil Hours  ; Eric T. OLSON ; Maurizio FERRARIS ; Timothy CAMPBELL ; Alberto VOLTOLINI 
(Program: https://www.academia.edu/8516924/Symposium_program_Objet_et_Personne_-_16_17_18_October_Aix_en_Provence)

SEMa is proposing an international symposium on the topic of Object and Person in contribution to the profound and overall renewal of topics related to the reflexion on human nature which has occurred during the past fifteen years, specifically that of the relatively technical metaphysics sub-field of personal identity, which has in turn grown to include personal ontology – largely formalized in the Anglo-Saxon world by Eric Olson, Lynne Rudder-Baker and Peter Van Inwagen, but also nourished by the majority of the most influential metaphysicians.
In speaking of personal ontology, the dividing line between object and person (the question of personhood) is both precise and vast in order to provide a powerful angle of attack, achieved through calibrated interventions, while allowing one to raise the most urgent and recent issues. Variety, freshness and uniqueness of theories, here gathered, match with the importance of horizons into which they are de facto included: ethics, bioethics, medicine, philosophical and scientific anthropology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy of art, science of movement, and issues relative to the survival of the species (usually called: problem of trans-humanism).

Metaphysics does not intend to replace any of these disciplines. Instead, the analytical precision and logical rigor of its arguments belong to a specific dimension of thought, which involves unique reflections about the basic conceptual categories relevant from medieval thought until today, and still structuring entire sides of those disciplines we mentioned. Put in another way: contemporary metaphysics could provide regulatory instruments, putting into perspective some concepts which are extensively indistinguishable in principle, such as those involved in Humanities and Social Sciences: mind, body, intention, powers (eg intellectual powers), and finally object and person. In many ways, here, the evidence of the person has not been really questioned, remaining a rough concept that deserves much more than what philosophical archeology – including the most elegant ones, as shown by Alain de Libera – made it confess. Lynne Rudder Baker conceptualized anew this concept, through the notion of constitution-without-identity, in order to challenge the idea of identity between body and person. All these works are rooted in Derek Parfit’s early essays. Unlike identity, the constitutive relation is non- reflexive, non-symmetric and non-transitive. Rudder Baker sees also no objection in principle to the idea that our organic bodies might be, by hypothesis, entirely replaced by prostheses and artificial organs, i.e. by a bionic body that might properly be the person.

With animalism (the metaphysical view according to which we are nothing but biological organisms) Eric Olson defends an opposite thesis: we would strictly be identical to our biological bodies – the English thinkers are more Darwinian than the French ones on such a subject matter and have no problem to say that men and animals have the same pedigree. The Relationship to the prosthesis is an issue that should be addressed at the conference: is the disturbing intimacy that some amputees have with their prostheses (which eventually "hurt" – this is the old question of the phantom limb) nothing more than a proprioceptive illusion? Eric Olson also conceives of the person as a simple transient and accidental property of the animal: then, we are not primarily people. Are persons conceived in a serious manner in that case? Actually, in a reverse movement, to take them too seriously, are we not lead to believe in divine persons which constitute since Boethius an invincible yardstick, though this idea is also comprehensive of human persons, as it is reminded by Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman thanks to metaphysical arguments paradoxically (both) materialistic and Christians? Can we go so far as to eliminate people on the basis of a claimed nihilism – which does not always depend on a Buddhist inspiration? (let us be clear : to eliminate the concept of person from our vocabulary). Neither Merricks nor Chisholm do encourage it. The first one conceives the person as a causal agent irreducible to the elementary particles that make up our body, although this body is similar to the other ones in a strict mereological (or constitutional) perspective. The second one also thinks, albeit from a different perspective, that the person introduces an ontological break in the world thanks to his ability to say “I” – that is, thanks to the occurrence of a grammatically first person and linguistically ineliminable. What matters now from the metaphysical point of view is not only to understand what is constitutive of us, but also to justify the ethical and epistemic importance that we attach to the notion of person – a question that naturally leads to a metaphysics of the self, as this is shown by V. Descombes and H. Hudson.

As it is really difficult to talk about these concepts independently of each other, and as these concepts semantically overlap, then some authors choose to revise them by modifying their epistemic contour: like Carol Rovane who tries to conceive, in particular, a « quasi- person », a « multiple person » and a « group person ». R. Tuomela is close to this line of thought. This metaphysical revisionism is neighboring with another strategy: devaluation (and symmetrical revaluation) of some of the key concepts contained in the categorical framework of metaphysics. For Olson, as we saw, the person is a simple accidental property – not an essence. Before this, Derek Parfit has famously disqualified the notion of identity for everything linked to our survival– the individual as well as the collective one (note that for him, they are the same, since no individual substance is the substrate of these bundle of thought occurring in our brains). Parfit had this formula: identity is not what matters – a much debated formula, which takes place as a chapter in one of the most important philosophical work in the twentieth century and still not translated into French: Reasons and Persons. A bilingual publication, in line with the best editorial standards, should follow the symposium.

We believe that this event represents an opportunity for our University and our Graduate School. The seminar of metaphysics (SEMa) includes, since several years in Aix en Provence, doctoral and post-doctoral enthusiast scholars. The aim is to share, in our language and in terms of our own philosophical tradition (called : Continental), texts, theories and debates that are raging everywhere else, and from which our country, by a very strange anti-low-pressure phenomenon, always seems sidelined. Object and Person Symposium resonates with the program and agenda of our Graduate School. The same theme of the Symposium will indeed build intellectual bridges and border zones to foster genuine interdisciplinary exchanges.

Die Frage, ob diachrone Personenidentität - zumindest manchmal - strikt und kriterienlos ist, stand zuletzt in einer Auseinandersetzung zwischen Peter Strawson und Roderick Chisholm zur Debatte, ohne dabei indes auf befriedigende Weise beantwortet worden zu sein. Ich möchte  einen neuen Anlauf versuchen, indem ich u.a. zwei Beispiele diskutiere, die  Chisholm mobilisiert hat, um seine affirmative Antwort auf diese Frage zu verteidigen. Ich kontrastiere Chisholms Sichtweise mit den Beschreibungen dieser oder ähnlicher Exempel, die von Strawson und  außerdem  von Williams, Parfit, Wiggins und Carruthers vorgeschlagen  wurden. Zunächst erkläre ich den Begriff der strikten Identität, um sodann  Chisholms  Argument gegen die These zu kritisieren, daß psychische Verbindung (psychological connectedness) eine conditio sine qua non der  Identität  von Personen über  die Zeit hinweg  bildet. Anschließend  erörtere ich sein Argument gegen die These, daß physische Kontinutität (bzw. Identität des Leibes) notwendig für Personenidentität ist, und trete daraufhin den Nachweis  an,  daß  es  in  gewissen Kontexten sehr wohl  entscheidend auf physische Kontinuität ankommt: wenn nämlich zwei zukünftige  Personen beide denselben Grad an psychischer Verbindung  mit einer gegebenen Person aufweisen, so entscheidet Identität des Leibes über Identität der Person.Diese Auffassung könnte man als gemäßigten  Externalismus  in bezug auf Personenidentität  bezeichnen. Alles in allem gelange ich zu dem Schluß, daß physische Kontinuität und psychische Verbindung kontext-abhängige Kriterien der Personenidentität darstellen - in dem von Wittgenstein eingeführten Sinne des Wortes 'Kriterium'. In diesem Sinne kann Personenidentität in keinem Falle kriterienlos sein. Abschließend  stelle ich eine These über den metaphysischen Status von Personen auf und argumentiere, von dieser These ausgehend, daß Personenidentität lediglich in einem trivialen Sinne strikt sein kann.

Dans ses écrits sur l’éthique, Brentano affirme que les propriétés morales — comme « bon » — sont l’objet d’une représentation intuitive non sensible dont le contenu est de nature « mentale ». Si la nature mentale de ces contenus en garantit le caractère d’évidence, elle en complexifie aussi l’élucidation ontologique et épistémologique, qui doit tenir compte de la classification brentanienne des actes psychiques. C’est justement cette complexité constitutive qui a fait de la théorie éthique de Brentano un passage obligé pour beaucoup de courants philosophiques importants du xxe siècle, par exemple pour la phénoménologie des valeurs et l’intuitionnisme éthique. Le but de cette étude est de rappeler les aspects les plus significatifs de la théorie éthique de Brentano et de montrer si — et si oui, en quel sens — elle peut être qualifiée de « réaliste ».

Contemporary scholars have generally labeled Adolf Reinach, a founding member
of early phenomenology’s Göttingen Circle, a Platonist. Because Reinach conceives of states
of affairs as neither real nor ideal, as involved with timeless essences and necessary logical
laws, many have hastily concluded that states of affairs are Platonic entities. In this essay, I
analyze Barry Smith’s argument that Reinach is a Platonist. Smith’s widely accepted
argument often becomes utilized to show that Reinach and other phenomenologists,
including Husserl, are Platonic Realists (or, simply, Platonists). A closer look at Reinach’s
text indicates, however, that he is not committed to Platonic Realism.

Common-sense philosophy is important. It is important because it maintains that we know many things about the world, about ourselves, about morality, and even many things of a metaphysical nature. These important things are at the same time often in some specific sense unexciting or unsurprising as they are truisms, platitudes, things that almost no one in their right mind would deny. However, denying these truisms and platitudes, common-sense philosophers hold wreaks havoc in both our intellectual and our practical lives. At the same time, common-sense philosophy is highly exciting, as these truisms and platitudes give rise to many philosophical challenges. This book traces the history of the concept of common-sense and the roles it was assigned to play in the history of philosophy. These newly commissioned chapters are all written by specialists in the history of philosophy. This book also contains chapters in which contemporary epistemologists, moral philosophers, and metaphysicians in the common-sense tradition explain what they think is the value and power of common-sense philosophy.

Opening with an overview of possible positions on the relation of epistemology to ethics, Haack begins with  discussion of the (confused)  debate between Chisholm and forth on "the ethics of belief," but soon proceeds to a detailed and punchy analysis of the more famous debate between w. K. Clifford and William James.

Presented in French in 1995 at a conference inc Cerisy la Salle, this paper was described by an audience member as "division Panzer!"

In this revised entry (2015), I consider the latest attempts by philosophers to define lying, in particular those attempts to define lying according to which a lie involves both an assertion and a breach of faith (Complex Deceptionism), and those attempts to define lying in which an intent to deceive is not necessary for lying (Non-Deceptionism). I also say more about the traditional definition of lying, and the traditional definition of deception, and the attempts to expand the definition of deception to include negative deception (not adding to someone's stock of true beliefs) as well as positive deception (adding to someone's stock of false beliefs). Please note that I have not uploaded a copy of the article; click on the URL link above (plato.stanford.edu) to the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The encyclopedia entry is updated online every couple of years.

In this paper, I offer an understanding of G.E. Moore's epistemology as presented in, "A Defence of Common Sense" and "Proof of an External World". To frame the discussion, I look to Roderick Chisholm's essay, The Problem of the Criterion. I begin by looking at two ways that Chisholm believes one can respond to the problem of the criterion, and, referring back to Moore's essays, explain why it is not unreasonable for Chisholm to believe that he is following a line of reasoning that Moore might take. I then show why I believe Chisholm is actually trying to do something quite different from what Moore was, and thus misses Moore's actual point. I conclude that Moore is best understood as rejecting traditional epistemological concerns. By forcing Moore to deal with a traditional epistemological problem, it will become clear how bold Moore's "epistemology" is.