Karl James
Dr Karl James is the Head of the Military History Section at the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. The Memorial is a shrine, a museum and an archive. It commemorates those Australians who have died in war and conflict, leads the nation’s remembrance and understanding of Australia’s experience of war.
A graduate from the University of Wollongong, Karl's research focuses on Australia’s involvement in the Second World War. He has worked on several major exhibitions at the Memorial, including as lead curator of "From the shadows: Australia’s Special Forces" (2017–18), and the 70th anniversary exhibition "Rats of Tobruk, 1941" (2011). His publications include "Double diamonds: Australian commandos in the Pacific War, 1941–45" (2016); "The hard slog: Australians in the Bougainville campaign, 1944–45" (2012); and, as editor, "Kokoda: beyond the legend" (2016). He was appointed to the editorial board of the "Australian Dictionary of Biography" in 2021 as the co-chair of the Armed Services working group. In 2022 he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
Karl has also worked on Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan. He is currently leading a curatorial team developing a new permanent exhibition focused on the activities and experiences of the Australian Army rotations of CH-47D Chinooks to Afghanistan between 2006 and 2013.
Please feel free to contact him to discuss these projects or if you have unpublished documents relating to either of these topics.
Phone: +612 6263 6601
Address: Dr Karl James
Military History Section
Australian War Memorial
GPO Box 345
Canberra ACT 2601
A graduate from the University of Wollongong, Karl's research focuses on Australia’s involvement in the Second World War. He has worked on several major exhibitions at the Memorial, including as lead curator of "From the shadows: Australia’s Special Forces" (2017–18), and the 70th anniversary exhibition "Rats of Tobruk, 1941" (2011). His publications include "Double diamonds: Australian commandos in the Pacific War, 1941–45" (2016); "The hard slog: Australians in the Bougainville campaign, 1944–45" (2012); and, as editor, "Kokoda: beyond the legend" (2016). He was appointed to the editorial board of the "Australian Dictionary of Biography" in 2021 as the co-chair of the Armed Services working group. In 2022 he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
Karl has also worked on Australia’s commitment to Afghanistan. He is currently leading a curatorial team developing a new permanent exhibition focused on the activities and experiences of the Australian Army rotations of CH-47D Chinooks to Afghanistan between 2006 and 2013.
Please feel free to contact him to discuss these projects or if you have unpublished documents relating to either of these topics.
Phone: +612 6263 6601
Address: Dr Karl James
Military History Section
Australian War Memorial
GPO Box 345
Canberra ACT 2601
less
InterestsView All (36)
Uploads
Books by Karl James
Kokoda: Beyond the Legend critically assesses not only the campaigns in Papua and their context in the wider lengthy Pacific war, but also the actions of senior Australian, American and Japanese military leaders. Moving beyond the legend, this book addresses the central question of why Kokoda holds such a significant place in Australian military history.
In this book, Karl James brings together eminent military historians and scholars from Great Britain, the United States, Japan and Australia, including Sir Antony Beevor, Richard B. Frank, John B. Lundstrom, Edward J. Drea, and David Horner, to reassess the principal battles from both Allied and Japanese perspectives, providing readers with a more complete understanding of one of the major turning points in the Second World War.
The story of these elite independent companies and commando squadrons, whose soldiers wore the distinctive double-diamond insignia, is told here for the first time.
Through 130 powerful images from the Australian War Memorial’s unparalleled collection – some never published before – Double Diamonds captures the operational history of these units and the personal stories of the men who served in them, many of whom lost their lives or the friends who trained and fought alongside them.
Book chapters by Karl James
In partnership with Sturdee, Rowell did much to shape Australia’s post-war army. At a time when recruits and resources were limited, Rowell was a strong advocate for the new Australian Regular Army. With the onset of the Cold War he oversaw the army’s expansion, the deployment of Australian forces to the Korean War, and the introduction of compulsory military service under the National Service scheme in 1951. Rowell believed in the continued importance of the British Empire, and saw the spread of communism in South-East Asia as a direct threat to Australia.
Despite his long service, Rowell is best known for his clash with Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey. This chapter will examine Rowell’s contribution to the Australian Army by concentrating on his relationships with the three men who most shaped his career: Lieutenant General Ernest Squires, Blamey and Sturdee.
The bitter campaign fought in Papua along the Kokoda Trail between July and November 1942 has become one of the defining wartime experiences of Australia during the Second World War. The attributes displayed by the Australian soldiers – their courage, determination, resourcefulness and, above all else, mateship – have become closely identified with perceived “Australian values”. It is this association that in part helps explain the significance of the name “Kokoda” today.
It is easy to be parochial. Kokoda and Milne Bay were significant battles in Papua, but it was the naval battles of Coral Sea and Midway fought in May and June 1942, and the epic struggle for Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands from August to February 1943, that blunted the Japanese thrust south into the Pacific. The fighting in Papua was conducted on the fringe of a vast war fought by the Allies to defeat Japan. This war was waged from the frozen Aleutian Islands in the North Pacific, across China and Burma, over the vastness of the Central Pacific, to the dense jungles of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific. The British Commonwealth – including Australian airmen and sailors – and the United States continued the fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in North Africa, the Atlantic Ocean, and in the skies above occupied Europe. The titanic German and Soviet clashes on the Eastern Front dwarfed anything experienced by Australian forces in the war. It is important to remember that the fighting in Papua was just one front in a global war.
There is no question that in 1944 and 1945 Australian soldiers were fighting and dying in areas where their blood and sweat could do nothing to bring about Japan’s surrender any sooner. But this does not equate to a conclusion that such campaigns were an ‘unnecessary waste’. They were fought by General Sir Thomas Blamey, in an aggressive manner, in order to shorten the campaigns and free up Australian manpower, as he had been directed. They were also fought in accordance with the Australian Government’s clear desire and intention to see Australian servicemen shouldering such a burden of the fighting as would ensure favourable post-war political positioning. It is worth remembering in this regard that armies exist, their raison d’être, is not to win glory in what might later be seen as watershed battles, but rather to act as instruments of national policy.
Articles by Karl James
The significance and understanding of Australia’s involvement in the Second World War have evolved over the decades since the conflict.
Seventy-five years ago, on 15 August 1945, Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley addressed the country with the following: “Fellow citizens, the war is over. The Japanese government has accepted the terms of surrender imposed by the Allied nations.” In cities around Australia spontaneous rejoicing broke out with wild scenes of celebration. One Sydney resident remembers: “We joined the deliriously happy throng celebrating in the city streets, particularly in Martin Place, which was awash with torn paper, streamers and unrolled toilet paper rolls.”
Australia played its part towards the eventual Allied victory. Almost a million Australian men and women served in the war, and more than half of those went overseas. Australians served around the world: from the deserts of north Africa to the Arctic convoys taking aid to the Soviet Union; from the skies over occupied Europe to the jungles of Malaya and New Guinea. Some 40,000 Australians died in the conflict, while more than 30,000 were taken prisoner. Thousands more were wounded or injured. The Japanese also interned some 1,500 Australian civilians; more than 300 of those were interned in New Guinea, Nauru, and the Ocean Islands. During 1944–45 Australian forces in the Pacific participated in seven separate campaigns: fighting slow, gruelling campaigns in New Guinea and Bougainville, on Borneo, and contributing to the liberation of the Philippines. Australian forces were more heavily committed in 1945 than at any other time during the war. Australia’s final campaigns remain controversial, with many questioning their necessity and the justification for what were referred to as “mopping up” operations.
Kokoda: Beyond the Legend critically assesses not only the campaigns in Papua and their context in the wider lengthy Pacific war, but also the actions of senior Australian, American and Japanese military leaders. Moving beyond the legend, this book addresses the central question of why Kokoda holds such a significant place in Australian military history.
In this book, Karl James brings together eminent military historians and scholars from Great Britain, the United States, Japan and Australia, including Sir Antony Beevor, Richard B. Frank, John B. Lundstrom, Edward J. Drea, and David Horner, to reassess the principal battles from both Allied and Japanese perspectives, providing readers with a more complete understanding of one of the major turning points in the Second World War.
The story of these elite independent companies and commando squadrons, whose soldiers wore the distinctive double-diamond insignia, is told here for the first time.
Through 130 powerful images from the Australian War Memorial’s unparalleled collection – some never published before – Double Diamonds captures the operational history of these units and the personal stories of the men who served in them, many of whom lost their lives or the friends who trained and fought alongside them.
In partnership with Sturdee, Rowell did much to shape Australia’s post-war army. At a time when recruits and resources were limited, Rowell was a strong advocate for the new Australian Regular Army. With the onset of the Cold War he oversaw the army’s expansion, the deployment of Australian forces to the Korean War, and the introduction of compulsory military service under the National Service scheme in 1951. Rowell believed in the continued importance of the British Empire, and saw the spread of communism in South-East Asia as a direct threat to Australia.
Despite his long service, Rowell is best known for his clash with Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey. This chapter will examine Rowell’s contribution to the Australian Army by concentrating on his relationships with the three men who most shaped his career: Lieutenant General Ernest Squires, Blamey and Sturdee.
The bitter campaign fought in Papua along the Kokoda Trail between July and November 1942 has become one of the defining wartime experiences of Australia during the Second World War. The attributes displayed by the Australian soldiers – their courage, determination, resourcefulness and, above all else, mateship – have become closely identified with perceived “Australian values”. It is this association that in part helps explain the significance of the name “Kokoda” today.
It is easy to be parochial. Kokoda and Milne Bay were significant battles in Papua, but it was the naval battles of Coral Sea and Midway fought in May and June 1942, and the epic struggle for Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands from August to February 1943, that blunted the Japanese thrust south into the Pacific. The fighting in Papua was conducted on the fringe of a vast war fought by the Allies to defeat Japan. This war was waged from the frozen Aleutian Islands in the North Pacific, across China and Burma, over the vastness of the Central Pacific, to the dense jungles of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific. The British Commonwealth – including Australian airmen and sailors – and the United States continued the fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in North Africa, the Atlantic Ocean, and in the skies above occupied Europe. The titanic German and Soviet clashes on the Eastern Front dwarfed anything experienced by Australian forces in the war. It is important to remember that the fighting in Papua was just one front in a global war.
There is no question that in 1944 and 1945 Australian soldiers were fighting and dying in areas where their blood and sweat could do nothing to bring about Japan’s surrender any sooner. But this does not equate to a conclusion that such campaigns were an ‘unnecessary waste’. They were fought by General Sir Thomas Blamey, in an aggressive manner, in order to shorten the campaigns and free up Australian manpower, as he had been directed. They were also fought in accordance with the Australian Government’s clear desire and intention to see Australian servicemen shouldering such a burden of the fighting as would ensure favourable post-war political positioning. It is worth remembering in this regard that armies exist, their raison d’être, is not to win glory in what might later be seen as watershed battles, but rather to act as instruments of national policy.
The significance and understanding of Australia’s involvement in the Second World War have evolved over the decades since the conflict.
Seventy-five years ago, on 15 August 1945, Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley addressed the country with the following: “Fellow citizens, the war is over. The Japanese government has accepted the terms of surrender imposed by the Allied nations.” In cities around Australia spontaneous rejoicing broke out with wild scenes of celebration. One Sydney resident remembers: “We joined the deliriously happy throng celebrating in the city streets, particularly in Martin Place, which was awash with torn paper, streamers and unrolled toilet paper rolls.”
Australia played its part towards the eventual Allied victory. Almost a million Australian men and women served in the war, and more than half of those went overseas. Australians served around the world: from the deserts of north Africa to the Arctic convoys taking aid to the Soviet Union; from the skies over occupied Europe to the jungles of Malaya and New Guinea. Some 40,000 Australians died in the conflict, while more than 30,000 were taken prisoner. Thousands more were wounded or injured. The Japanese also interned some 1,500 Australian civilians; more than 300 of those were interned in New Guinea, Nauru, and the Ocean Islands. During 1944–45 Australian forces in the Pacific participated in seven separate campaigns: fighting slow, gruelling campaigns in New Guinea and Bougainville, on Borneo, and contributing to the liberation of the Philippines. Australian forces were more heavily committed in 1945 than at any other time during the war. Australia’s final campaigns remain controversial, with many questioning their necessity and the justification for what were referred to as “mopping up” operations.
Yet Bougainville was one of the largest campaigns fought by Australian forces during the Second World War. It was a slow, gruelling nine-month campaign to destroy the Japanese occupying the island. More than 30,000 Australians served on the island and over 500 were killed. Corporal Reg Rattey and Private Frank Partridge were awarded Victoria Crosses for their actions during the campaign
On the morning of 1 July 1945 hundreds of warships and vessels from the United States Navy, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Royal Netherlands Navy lay off the coast of Balikpapan, an oil refining centre on Borneo’s south-east coast.
This offensive to land the 7th Australian Infantry Division at Balikpapan was the final in a series amphibious operations conducted by the Allies to liberate areas of Dutch and British territory on Borneo. It was the largest amphibious operation conducted by Australian forces during the Second World War. Within an hour some 16,500 troops were ashore and pushing inland, along with nearly 1,000 vehicles. Ultimately more than 33,000 personnel from the 7th Division and Allied forces were landed in the amphibious assault. Balikpapan is often cited as an example of the expertise achieved by Australian forces in amphibious operations during the war. It was a remarkable development. Four years earlier, the capability of Australia or even the United States to conduct amphibious operations in the South-West Pacific Area (SWPA) was limited, if not non-existent. Between 22 June 1943 and 12 July 1945, United States-led Allied forces conducted more than 60 major amphibious landings in the theatre. The RAN participated in nearly half of them.
In the night air of a Timorese mountain hideout, a group of bearded Australians watched anxiously as Corporal Jack Sargeant began tapping out a signal in Morse code.
Two months earlier, on 20 February 1942, the Japanese had invaded Dutch Timor, and most of the island’s Australian and Dutch defenders were overwhelmed and captured. In Portuguese Timor the Australians of the 2/2nd Independent Company had fallen back into the mountains overlooking Dili. They were reached in early March by some Australians and a few Dutch troops who had escaped from Dutch Timor on foot. Among this group was Captain George Parker, Sargeant, and signaller Lance Corporal John Donovan. They began working with the independent company’s signalmen Max “Joe” Loveless and Keith Richards to build a radio capable of communicating with Darwin. Loveless had been a radio technician in Hobart before the war, and his knowledge marked him out at the team’s “No. 1 man”.
Australia had begun to develop a naval aviation capability only few years earlier, with the commissioning of Sydney and the formation of its air squadrons in 1948. This rapid development of Australian naval aviation capability from concept through to operations was possible only with the wholehearted assistance of the Royal Navy.
This paper discusses the knowledge transfer of techniques, experiences, and cultures between naval aviators of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy.
During the Second World War, special operations were carried out by small groups of soldiers who could be inserted undetected by land, sea, or air into any environment to conduct sensitive operations in a secret,
unorthodox, or unconventional manner. These operations were high-risk, and often achieved significant military or political objectives.
to conduct sensitive combat or noncombat operations. They constitute
a fast, flexible, low-cost, and discreet asset. They have been continuously
deployed both at home and abroad for nearly two decades. They won
honours in Afghanistan, fought in Iraq, helped establish security in East Timor, performed counter-terrorist roles in Australia, and supported domestic security agencies.
Sailing through a rain storm with high winds and seas, landing craft carrying British commandos came ashore near the Albanian town of Sarande, on the Adriatic coast opposite the Greek island of Corfu, shortly before midnight on 22/23 September 1944. Greek partisans already controlled much of Corfu but in seizing Sarande the commandos would cut off the German garrison’s only escape route to the mainland.
Among the commandos was 34-year-old Australian Lieutenant James “Jim” McMenamin from Kelso, Bathurst. The commandos were formed a few years earlier with the intention of aggressively taking the war into enemy occupied or controlled territory.
The involvement of Australians serving directly in British forces and their contribution to the war in Europe is still little appreciated today. Any number of Australians may have served in the British Army. What is certain, however, is that McMenamin’s service highlights the diversity and complexity of Australia’s experience in the Second World War.
Balikpapan is often cited as an example of the expertise achieved by Australian forces in amphibious operations during the war. It was a remarkable development. Four years earlier, the capability of Australia or even the United States to conduct amphibious operations in the South-West Pacific Area was limited if not non-existent. This paper provides a brief outline of the development of amphibious operations in the SWPA during the Second World War.
In late 1951 the Royal Australian Navy’s new asset, the Carrier Air Group (CAG) from the light aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney (III) went to war. Flying Hawker Sea Furies and Fairey Fireflies during the Korean autumn and winter of 1951–52, Sydney’s CAG earned a reputation for effectiveness and high performance. Operating from a small flight deck that pitched and rolled with the ocean, the CAG confronted formidable North Korean and Chinese anti-aircraft fire, and even weathered a typhoon. During this period three Australian pilots were killed and another was wounded. Australia had begun to develop a naval aviation capability only few years earlier, with the commissioning of Sydney and the formation of its air squadrons in 1948. This rapid development of Australian naval aviation capability from concept through to operations was possible only with the wholehearted assistance of the Royal Navy.
This paper will discuss the knowledge transfer of techniques, experiences, and cultures between naval aviators of the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. It will contribute to a new project on Sydney’s CAG in the Korean War.
In late 1940 the British Army formed commando units to carry out raids and guerrilla operations in German-occupied Europe. A small British training team was also sent to Australia to set up similar units in the Australian Imperial Force, and a school was established at Foster on Wilsons Promontory in Victoria. Because of their ability to fight independently of other units the commandos became known as “independent companies”. Highly trained, each company had a nominal strength of about 290 officers and men. The wartime experiences of these independent companies were diverse: from waging a successful guerrilla war against occupying Japanese in the mountains of Timor through to conducting long-range reconnaissance patrols and raids deep into Japanese-controlled territory in New Guinea. Renamed “commando squadrons”, by the war’s end these units were also in action on Bougainville and participated in the amphibious landings on Borneo.
By concentrating on three key actions conducted by these units – the guerrilla war on Timor in 1942; the capture of the village of Kaiapit, New Guinea, in 1943; and the battle for Tarakan Hill, Borneo, in 1945 – this paper will survey the wartime history of these independent companies/commando squadrons.
By Karl James and Kazuhiro Monden
For three years during the Second World War, from 1942 to 1945, men from Australia and Japan fought a long, hard campaign across the mountains and through the swamps of Papua and New Guinea. It was a bitter war; the Australians fought to destroy the Japanese who in turn often fought to the death.
New Guinea became a place of victory and commemoration for the Australians, but one of defeat and loss for the Japanese. For Australians, the focus of the Pacific War was the war in New Guinea, where “Diggers” fought “up north, in the islands”. It was popularly believed that they were fighting to prevent a Japanese invasion of the Australian mainland. The Japanese perspective was very different; their aim was not to invade Australia, but rather to isolate it from the United States and the United Kingdom. New Guinea was a secondary priority, behind Japan’s other campaigns in China and elsewhere in the Pacific. As the war continued, it was the Japanese who became isolated on the island – many were killed, but most died from sickness and starvation.
This paper will compare and contrast Australian and Japanese memories of the war in New Guinea: it will look at why Australian and Japanese veterans have made post-war pilgrimages to New Guinea; and it will discuss the popular memory of the campaign in each country’s society.
Dr Karl James, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, and Dr Kazuhiro Monden, University of Wollongong, Wollongong
The final years of the war were also a time of frustration and disappointment for Australia. The Australian Government had to manage a manpower crisis, balancing the competing demands of the military, industry, and the economy; yet it was also adamant that Australian forces maintain an active role in the war. For much of 1944 the army’s future role was uncertain, and by 1945 it was obvious that despite his long-standing assurances, General Douglas MacArthur had deliberately excluded the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) from the Philippines. Instead, MacArthur allocated the AIF a series of amphibious operations on Borneo.
As visitors in the Australian War Memorial’s permanent Second World War galleries are told: “these final campaigns have become controversial, with many questioning the necessity of these ‘mopping up’ operations” while many “questioned the need to fight isolated Japanese forces that posed no threat.”
Why is this the case? Why is it that when the war ends Australia’s military forces are not participating in more prominent roles in the Pacific? My paper this morning will address this issue. To do so, I need to examine the three figures who directed Australia’s war effort: Generals Douglas MacArthur and Sir Thomas Blamey, and Prime Minister John Curtin. I will give a quick recap of the early operations conducted by Australian and United States forces in 1942–43 before focusing on the debate surrounding the employment of the AIF in the Philippines in 1944–45. In doing so, I will provide a brief survey of Australia’s final campaigns.
The attributes displayed by the Australians on Gallipoli and along the Kokoda Trail – their courage, determination, resourcefulness and, above all else, mateship – have become closely identified with “Australian values”. One hundred years ago the Anzac legend was born on Gallipoli. Seventy-five years ago that legend was upheld along the Kokoda Trail as Australians faced their darkest hour. This afternoon I will discuss some of the enduring resonances that connect Gallipoli and Kokoda: the rugged terrain and the extreme environment; the conditions endured by Australian soldiers; and the lasting significance of the campaigns.
Some 70 years ago the war correspondent George Johnston predicted that the name “Kokoda” would “live in the minds of Australians for generations, just as another name, Gallipoli, lives on as freshly”. Johnston’s words proved true. After a more than a century of Australian military history, few names convey as much power or are as symbolic. Tobruk. Changi. Long Tan. These names resonate, too, but it is Gallipoli and Kokoda that have become closely associated with Australian national character.
The attributes displayed by the Australians on Gallipoli and Kokoda – their courage, determination, resourcefulness and, above all else, mateship – have become closely identified with “Australian values”. One hundred and two years ago today the Anzac legend was born on Gallipoli. Seventy-five years ago that legend was upheld along the Kokoda Trail as Australians faced their darkest hour. This address discusses some of the enduring resonances that connect Gallipoli and Kokoda: the rugged terrain and the extreme environment; the conditions endured by Australian soldiers; and the lasting significance of the campaigns.
This paper will provide an overview of the Australian independent companies and commando squadrons – their training, employment, and wartime experiences – offering historical lessons on their employment. This study will also provide insights into the interactions between Australians and the local peoples of the region, whose support and assistance were vital to both the survival and success of Australian forces and the Allied war effort.
In 1940 the British army formed commando units to raid, conduct sabotage, and gather information throughout German-occupied Europe. In Australia, little was known of these British independent companies or “commando organisations” beyond what one senior Australian officer described as some form of “cloak and dagger gang”. A small British military mission was sent to Australia to establish similar units in the AIF, and the first of eight Australian independent companies was raised in 1941. Highly trained, each independent company contained some 290 officers and men. In 1943 the companies were redesignated cavalry (commando) squadrons, later just commando squadrons. Four additional commando squadrons were established during 1944. These independent companies were involved in myriad wartime experiences: from the tragic loss of the Montevideo Maru and the celebrated defiance on Timor in 1942, through to raids and long-range patrols into Japanese territory in New Guinea and the spectacular amphibious landings on Borneo in 1945.