In philosophy of mind, desire is an also-ran when it comes to theorizing about mental states- all... more In philosophy of mind, desire is an also-ran when it comes to theorizing about mental states- all the attention is on belief, (visual) perceptual experience, and pain. Desire is largely ignored, as it is assumed to be similar enough to belief that one can simply focus on belief, in forming theories of belief and desire. Here I address two areas where I see this assumption as a particular problem. One is in the metaphysics of desire. It has not been recognized that we might have conflicting behavioral dispositions because of an over-focus on mental states that are usually held together coherently: beliefs. Desires, unlike beliefs, are often held together although they conflict; I can both want to have coffee because I love the taste, and also want to refrain because I want to sleep. I argue in chapter 1, for reasons independent of philosophy of mind, that an object can have conflicting dispositions. I then apply this in chapter 2 to argue that having conflicting desires involves having conflicting behavioral dispositions. It is also usually assumed that the first-personal epistemology of belief and desire will be roughly the same. Given this, there have been attempts to extend a promising account of introspection for belief to desire, and I address this in chapter 3. On this account, we know our beliefs by looking out towards the belief's content, without turning inwards to our own mind. I know I believe there is coffee in the cupboard by thinking about the cupboard, and concluding that there is coffee inside. Those who have extended this to desire claim that to know whether I want something, I look out to the world, fixing my attention on the potential object of desire, and ignoring my own mind. I think that although we must of course attend in thought to the object of desire, we also keep one eye on ourselves. The epistemology of desire is unlike that of belief in that we must measure how we feel - to know what we want, our attention is be split between our own minds and the world.
This paper is an invited commentary on a forthcoming paper critiquing John Campbell's use of Thou... more This paper is an invited commentary on a forthcoming paper critiquing John Campbell's use of Thought Insertion as a counterexample to Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.
It is common to hold that introspective knowledge of one’s mental states is highly epistemically ... more It is common to hold that introspective knowledge of one’s mental states is highly epistemically privileged. Often this is thought to be explained by introspective knowledge’s directness; we somehow know our mental states “immediately,” without inference from distinct states. This chapter argues that if one holds this view concerning privilege and directness about introspective knowledge of desire, then desires cannot be normative or evaluative judgments, nor can they entirely consist in appearances of value. Since motivation is one of the things we pay attention to in introspecting our desires, this implies that motivation is not an entirely separate state from the desire.
Slurring language has had a lot of recent interest, but the focus has been almost
exclusively on ... more Slurring language has had a lot of recent interest, but the focus has been almost exclusively on racial slurs. Gendered pejoratives, on the other hand—terms like “slut,” “bitch,” or “sissy”—do not fit into existing accounts of slurring terms, as these accounts require the existence of neutral correlates, which, I argue, these gendered pejoratives lack. Rather than showing that these terms are not slurs, I argue that this challenges the assumption that slurs must have neutral correlates, and so that a new approach to thinking about the meaning of slurring terms is required.
There seems to be some kind of close relationship between desires and behavioral dispositions. Wh... more There seems to be some kind of close relationship between desires and behavioral dispositions. While a popular view about the nature of desire is that it essentially involves dispositions towards action, there do seem to be pressing objections to this view. However, recent work on dispositional properties potentially undermines some of the metaphysical assumptions that lie beneath these objections.
The idea that introspection is transparent – that we know our minds by looking out to the world, ... more The idea that introspection is transparent – that we know our minds by looking out to the world, not inwards towards some mental item – seems quite appealing when we think about belief. It seems that we know our beliefs by attending to their content; I know that I believe there is a café nearby by thinking about the streets near me, and not by thinking directly about my mind. Such an account is thought to have several advantages – for example, it is thought to avoid the need to posit any extra mental faculties peculiar to introspection. In this paper I discuss recent attempts to extend this kind of outwards-looking account to our introspective knowledge of desire, which claim that we know our desires by attending to what in the world we judge to be valuable. These accounts, however, do not deal satisfactorily with cases where my value judgments and introspective knowledge of my desires come apart. I propose a better alternative for the proponent of transparency, but one which requires giving up on the supposed metaphysical advantages.
"Dispositional ascriptions do not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering fact... more "Dispositional ascriptions do not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering factors may be poised to prevent the disposition from manifesting in its very stimulus conditions. Such factors are commonly called finks and masks. It is thought,
however, that finks and masks cannot be intrinsic to the disposition bearer; if an intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain conditions, the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. I argue that we
should accept intrinsic finks and masks if we think there are finks and masks at all, and also if we maintain that paradigmatic dispositions are intrinsic. This last point is particularly problematic for the claim that there cannot be intrinsic finks and masks, for if paradigmatic dispositions are not intrinsic then the central argument for the impossibility of intrinsic finks and masks is undermined."
One might think that to be a muppet is just to be something that the Jim Henson Company decides i... more One might think that to be a muppet is just to be something that the Jim Henson Company decides is a muppet. After all, they have copyright on "muppet," (or rather, had, until they sold the rights to Disney). I argue, however, for a dispositional account of muppetationality - that to be a muppet is to be an appropriately created puppet character who is disposed towards engaging in muppetry, which includes the tendency to act absurdly.
In this essay I explore whether dreamfasting (from Jim Henson's The Dark Crystal) might teach us ... more In this essay I explore whether dreamfasting (from Jim Henson's The Dark Crystal) might teach us about introspection. It may seem surprising to think that dreamfasting – a purely imaginary method for knowing someone else’s mental states – could teach us anything about how we actually come to know things about our own minds. Yet purely hypothetical examples of interpersonal mind-reading, like dreamfasting, have been used to argue against particular explanations of our privileged access to our own mental states. I explain and evaluate some of these arguments, and suggest that maybe we went wrong in thinking that introspection was so privileged in the first place.
In philosophy of mind, desire is an also-ran when it comes to theorizing about mental states- all... more In philosophy of mind, desire is an also-ran when it comes to theorizing about mental states- all the attention is on belief, (visual) perceptual experience, and pain. Desire is largely ignored, as it is assumed to be similar enough to belief that one can simply focus on belief, in forming theories of belief and desire. Here I address two areas where I see this assumption as a particular problem. One is in the metaphysics of desire. It has not been recognized that we might have conflicting behavioral dispositions because of an over-focus on mental states that are usually held together coherently: beliefs. Desires, unlike beliefs, are often held together although they conflict; I can both want to have coffee because I love the taste, and also want to refrain because I want to sleep. I argue in chapter 1, for reasons independent of philosophy of mind, that an object can have conflicting dispositions. I then apply this in chapter 2 to argue that having conflicting desires involves having conflicting behavioral dispositions. It is also usually assumed that the first-personal epistemology of belief and desire will be roughly the same. Given this, there have been attempts to extend a promising account of introspection for belief to desire, and I address this in chapter 3. On this account, we know our beliefs by looking out towards the belief's content, without turning inwards to our own mind. I know I believe there is coffee in the cupboard by thinking about the cupboard, and concluding that there is coffee inside. Those who have extended this to desire claim that to know whether I want something, I look out to the world, fixing my attention on the potential object of desire, and ignoring my own mind. I think that although we must of course attend in thought to the object of desire, we also keep one eye on ourselves. The epistemology of desire is unlike that of belief in that we must measure how we feel - to know what we want, our attention is be split between our own minds and the world.
This paper is an invited commentary on a forthcoming paper critiquing John Campbell's use of Thou... more This paper is an invited commentary on a forthcoming paper critiquing John Campbell's use of Thought Insertion as a counterexample to Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.
It is common to hold that introspective knowledge of one’s mental states is highly epistemically ... more It is common to hold that introspective knowledge of one’s mental states is highly epistemically privileged. Often this is thought to be explained by introspective knowledge’s directness; we somehow know our mental states “immediately,” without inference from distinct states. This chapter argues that if one holds this view concerning privilege and directness about introspective knowledge of desire, then desires cannot be normative or evaluative judgments, nor can they entirely consist in appearances of value. Since motivation is one of the things we pay attention to in introspecting our desires, this implies that motivation is not an entirely separate state from the desire.
Slurring language has had a lot of recent interest, but the focus has been almost
exclusively on ... more Slurring language has had a lot of recent interest, but the focus has been almost exclusively on racial slurs. Gendered pejoratives, on the other hand—terms like “slut,” “bitch,” or “sissy”—do not fit into existing accounts of slurring terms, as these accounts require the existence of neutral correlates, which, I argue, these gendered pejoratives lack. Rather than showing that these terms are not slurs, I argue that this challenges the assumption that slurs must have neutral correlates, and so that a new approach to thinking about the meaning of slurring terms is required.
There seems to be some kind of close relationship between desires and behavioral dispositions. Wh... more There seems to be some kind of close relationship between desires and behavioral dispositions. While a popular view about the nature of desire is that it essentially involves dispositions towards action, there do seem to be pressing objections to this view. However, recent work on dispositional properties potentially undermines some of the metaphysical assumptions that lie beneath these objections.
The idea that introspection is transparent – that we know our minds by looking out to the world, ... more The idea that introspection is transparent – that we know our minds by looking out to the world, not inwards towards some mental item – seems quite appealing when we think about belief. It seems that we know our beliefs by attending to their content; I know that I believe there is a café nearby by thinking about the streets near me, and not by thinking directly about my mind. Such an account is thought to have several advantages – for example, it is thought to avoid the need to posit any extra mental faculties peculiar to introspection. In this paper I discuss recent attempts to extend this kind of outwards-looking account to our introspective knowledge of desire, which claim that we know our desires by attending to what in the world we judge to be valuable. These accounts, however, do not deal satisfactorily with cases where my value judgments and introspective knowledge of my desires come apart. I propose a better alternative for the proponent of transparency, but one which requires giving up on the supposed metaphysical advantages.
"Dispositional ascriptions do not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering fact... more "Dispositional ascriptions do not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering factors may be poised to prevent the disposition from manifesting in its very stimulus conditions. Such factors are commonly called finks and masks. It is thought,
however, that finks and masks cannot be intrinsic to the disposition bearer; if an intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain conditions, the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. I argue that we
should accept intrinsic finks and masks if we think there are finks and masks at all, and also if we maintain that paradigmatic dispositions are intrinsic. This last point is particularly problematic for the claim that there cannot be intrinsic finks and masks, for if paradigmatic dispositions are not intrinsic then the central argument for the impossibility of intrinsic finks and masks is undermined."
One might think that to be a muppet is just to be something that the Jim Henson Company decides i... more One might think that to be a muppet is just to be something that the Jim Henson Company decides is a muppet. After all, they have copyright on "muppet," (or rather, had, until they sold the rights to Disney). I argue, however, for a dispositional account of muppetationality - that to be a muppet is to be an appropriately created puppet character who is disposed towards engaging in muppetry, which includes the tendency to act absurdly.
In this essay I explore whether dreamfasting (from Jim Henson's The Dark Crystal) might teach us ... more In this essay I explore whether dreamfasting (from Jim Henson's The Dark Crystal) might teach us about introspection. It may seem surprising to think that dreamfasting – a purely imaginary method for knowing someone else’s mental states – could teach us anything about how we actually come to know things about our own minds. Yet purely hypothetical examples of interpersonal mind-reading, like dreamfasting, have been used to argue against particular explanations of our privileged access to our own mental states. I explain and evaluate some of these arguments, and suggest that maybe we went wrong in thinking that introspection was so privileged in the first place.
Uploads
Papers by Lauren Ashwell
exclusively on racial slurs. Gendered pejoratives, on the other hand—terms like “slut,” “bitch,” or “sissy”—do not fit into existing accounts of slurring terms, as these accounts require the existence of neutral correlates, which, I argue, these gendered pejoratives lack. Rather than showing that these terms are not slurs, I argue that this challenges the assumption that slurs must have neutral correlates, and so that a new approach to thinking about the meaning of slurring terms is required.
however, that finks and masks cannot be intrinsic to the disposition bearer; if an intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain conditions, the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. I argue that we
should accept intrinsic finks and masks if we think there are finks and masks at all, and also if we maintain that paradigmatic dispositions are intrinsic. This last point is particularly problematic for the claim that there cannot be intrinsic finks and masks, for if paradigmatic dispositions are not intrinsic then the central argument for the impossibility of intrinsic finks and masks is undermined."
exclusively on racial slurs. Gendered pejoratives, on the other hand—terms like “slut,” “bitch,” or “sissy”—do not fit into existing accounts of slurring terms, as these accounts require the existence of neutral correlates, which, I argue, these gendered pejoratives lack. Rather than showing that these terms are not slurs, I argue that this challenges the assumption that slurs must have neutral correlates, and so that a new approach to thinking about the meaning of slurring terms is required.
however, that finks and masks cannot be intrinsic to the disposition bearer; if an intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain conditions, the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. I argue that we
should accept intrinsic finks and masks if we think there are finks and masks at all, and also if we maintain that paradigmatic dispositions are intrinsic. This last point is particularly problematic for the claim that there cannot be intrinsic finks and masks, for if paradigmatic dispositions are not intrinsic then the central argument for the impossibility of intrinsic finks and masks is undermined."