James N Kanarek

Many in favour of a market in live donor organs argue that a regulated market would be unlikely to harm people in poverty, while one philosopher in particular 1 argues it would actually benefit them. If a market for kidneys cannot mitigate harm, the cost of causing psychic harm to people in poverty, is a price worth paying in order to reduce the physical harm of the countless, avoidable deaths from kidney failure. The paper presents an overview of several arguments for and against a market in kidneys, and examines in depth the argument against a market by Simon Rippon, and the direct response in favour of a market, by Luke Semrau. The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to show that under present social conditions, a market in kidneys will be not only unfair, but also unjust. This injustice arises from placing an avoidable burden on the weakest members of society, whilst other non-harmful options for solving the kidney crisis remain unexploited. The second aim is to present a simple, common-sense argument showing why the market will inevitably fail, even if we accept all the claims of the pro-market lobby. The claim is that a market in kidneys will not provide a long-term solution to the kidney shortage. The argument is that increased supply often leads to increased demand, and with the case of a kidney market, this is an almost certain consequence. This paper concludes that in the case of a market in organs, there remain untried methods of increasing kidney supply and reducing kidney demand that do not impose harm on others. Until such measures have been fully explored, we cannot morally justify regulated kidney vending, even on the most extreme utilitarian grounds. Legalizing a market that Kidney market failure-Undersupply or Overdemand? James Kanarek August 2021 I.D

In 'The Idea of History', R.G Collingwood claims that the idea of history is very special type of idea that requires a very special kind of study. In this paper I explain the reasons behind Collingwood's claim that history cannot be studied in the same way as the natural sciences. I furthermore clarify Collingwood's distinction between scientific and interpretive explanations in history. I moreover provide a concise explanation of Collingwood's theory of causation, and its implications for the notions of evidence, and truth. I conclude that Collinwood's idealistic cultural philosophy of history, although having certain merits, makes a highly implausible argument for apriori knowledge based on an unoriginal, and universally recognised epistemological principle.

In this essay I examine how Rousseau supports the claims against the arts and sciences made in his First Discourse, with arguments from his Second Discourse. I focus on Rousseau's account of man's descent from goodness into corruption, via the process of perfectibility. I furthermore explain how according to Rousseau, innocent self-love becomes corrupted as man, driven by need, adapts, socialises, develops language, reason, and imagination. I moreover venture my own opinion, that Rousseau's claim hangs on his fallacious conception of the state of nature.