The present study was designed to test whether actions on Facebook such as commenting on others' ... more The present study was designed to test whether actions on Facebook such as commenting on others' posts can create a sense of commitment to continue performing similar actions in the future. Across four online experiments, we found evidence that regularly commenting on others' Facebook posts generates a sense of commitment to commenting on similar posts in the future, leading people to feel worse about not commenting on a post if they have done so regularly in the past than if they have not done so, and leading them to expect a Facebook friend to be more disappointed if they do not comment when there has been this previous history of commenting. These findings may contribute to illuminating the feelings associated with social media use, including its compulsive aspects and its effects on well-being.
How should we account for the planning and performance of a bodily action in terms of the agent’s... more How should we account for the planning and performance of a bodily action in terms of the agent’s intentions? An influential answer invokes two distinct kinds of intention: intentions for the future (also known as prior intentions or distal intentions), responsible for action planning, and intentions for the present (also known as intentions in action or proximal intentions), responsible for action performance. This article argues that this influential answer is wrong, because the notion of intention for the present is either superfluous (because intentions for the future can exercise both functions) or confused (because it conflates temporal, functional and content-related aspects). Developing this critique will lead to an alternative account of action planning and performance based on intentions of just one kind
In this chapter, we examine Iris Murdoch’s views about art. We highlight continuities and differe... more In this chapter, we examine Iris Murdoch’s views about art. We highlight continuities and differences between her views on art and aesthetics, and those of Plato, Kant, and Freud. We argue that Murdoch’s views about art, though traditionally linked to Plato, are more compatible with Kant’s thought than has been acknowledged—though with his ethics rather than his aesthetics. Murdoch shows Plato’s influence in her idea that beauty is the good in a different guise. However, Murdoch shows a more Kantian than Platonic influence in her suggestion that the experience of beauty can be conducive to virtue, and distances herself from Plato in her claim that the enjoyment, as well as the production, of certain kinds of art can be virtuous. We also argue that her view of bad art as self-consoling fantasy is consonant with Freudian thought. Lastly, we question her view of bad art, specifically concerning her identification of bad art as self-consoling fantasy or entertainment, and her separation...
Skilled sportsmen or musicians—more generally, skilled agents—often fill us with awe with the way... more Skilled sportsmen or musicians—more generally, skilled agents—often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether they intended to perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of one’s action to be incompatible with intending to perform that aspect of one’s action. Subsequently, though, I will also argue that, in some cases, the incompatibility is only prima facie, and can be dispelled by drawing the following distinction: that between aspects of one’s action that are merely temporarily not consciously accessed, versus aspects of one’s action that are permanently inaccessible to consciousness. I will thus remove an obstacle towards saying that skilled agents intended to perform ...
According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an ac... more According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent’s habits and skills. Markos Valaris (2015) argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. He concludes that we therefore have to jettison its conception of actions as mindless bodily movements animated from the outside by intentions. Here we defend the standard story. We can make sense of the reach of non-observational knowledge of action once we reject the following two assumptions: (i) that an intended habitual or skilled action is a so-called basic action — that is, an action that doesn’t involve any finer-grained intentions — and (ii) that an agent, in acting, is merely executing one intention rather than a whole hierarchy of more or less fine-grained intentions. We argue that (i) and (ii) are false.
A distorted representation of one's own body is a diagnostic criterion and core psychopatholo... more A distorted representation of one's own body is a diagnostic criterion and core psychopathology of both anorexia nervosa (AN) and bulimia nervosa (BN). Despite recent technical advances in research, it is still unknown whether this body image disturbance is characterized by body dissatisfaction and a low ideal weight and/or includes a distorted perception or processing of body size. In this article, we provide an update and meta-analysis of 42 articles summarizing measures and results for body size estimation (BSE) from 926 individuals with AN, 536 individuals with BN and 1920 controls. We replicate findings that individuals with AN and BN overestimate their body size as compared to controls (ES=0.63). Our meta-regression shows that metric methods (BSE by direct or indirect spatial measures) yield larger effect sizes than depictive methods (BSE by evaluating distorted pictures), and that effect sizes are larger for patients with BN than for patients with AN. To interpret these r...
Skilled sportsmen or musicians-more generally, skilled agents-often fill us with awe with the way... more Skilled sportsmen or musicians-more generally, skilled agents-often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether they intended to perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of one's action to be incompatible with intending to perform that aspect of one's action. Subsequently, though, I will also argue that, in some cases, the incompatibility is only prima facie, and can be dispelled by drawing the following distinction: that between aspects of one's action that are merely temporarily not consciously accessed, versus aspects of one's action that are permanently inaccessible to consciousness. I will thus remove an obstacle towards saying that skilled agents intended to perform certain aspects of their actions, despite lack of conscious access to those aspects at the time of performance.
What more do we need to fully appreciate perfumes, beyond considering them objects for aesthetic ... more What more do we need to fully appreciate perfumes, beyond considering them objects for aesthetic appreciation? My contention is that our appreciation of some perfumes would be largely incomplete, unless we acknowledged them as works of art. I will defend the claim that some perfumes are works of art from the point of view of different definitions. Zangwill's aesthetic definition makes it easy to defend the proposed claim, but is not very informative for the purposes of fully appreciating some perfumes. On the other hand, Levinson's intentional-historical definition and Lopes's approach to defining art make it more challenging to defend the proposed claim. I will show that, even so, the challenge may be met. Moreover, the challenge is well worth engaging with, since tackling it will uncover features of some perfumes that are essential to their full appreciation.
According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an a... more According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent’s habits and skills. Markos Valaris (2015) argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. He concludes that we therefore have to jettison its conception of actions as mindless bodily movements animated from the outside by intentions. Here we defend the standard story. We can make sense of the reach of non-observational knowledge of action once we reject the following two assumptions: (i) that an intended habitual or skilled action is a so-called basic action — that is, an action that doesn’t involve any finer-grained intentions — and (ii) that an agent, in acting, is merely executing one intention rather than a whole hierarchy of more or less fine-grained intentions. We argue that (i) and (ii) are false.
What are the most detailed descriptions under which subjects intend to perform bodily actions? Ac... more What are the most detailed descriptions under which subjects intend to perform bodily actions? According to Pacherie (2006), these descriptions may be found by looking into motor representations—action representations in the brain that determine the movements to be performed. Specifically, for any motor representation guiding an action, its subject has an M-intention representing that action in as much detail. I show that some M-intentions breach the constraints that intentions should meet. I then identify a set of intentions—motor intentions—that represent actions in as much detail as some motor representations while meeting the constraints that intentions should meet.
The present study was designed to test whether actions on Facebook such as commenting on others' ... more The present study was designed to test whether actions on Facebook such as commenting on others' posts can create a sense of commitment to continue performing similar actions in the future. Across four online experiments, we found evidence that regularly commenting on others' Facebook posts generates a sense of commitment to commenting on similar posts in the future, leading people to feel worse about not commenting on a post if they have done so regularly in the past than if they have not done so, and leading them to expect a Facebook friend to be more disappointed if they do not comment when there has been this previous history of commenting. These findings may contribute to illuminating the feelings associated with social media use, including its compulsive aspects and its effects on well-being.
How should we account for the planning and performance of a bodily action in terms of the agent’s... more How should we account for the planning and performance of a bodily action in terms of the agent’s intentions? An influential answer invokes two distinct kinds of intention: intentions for the future (also known as prior intentions or distal intentions), responsible for action planning, and intentions for the present (also known as intentions in action or proximal intentions), responsible for action performance. This article argues that this influential answer is wrong, because the notion of intention for the present is either superfluous (because intentions for the future can exercise both functions) or confused (because it conflates temporal, functional and content-related aspects). Developing this critique will lead to an alternative account of action planning and performance based on intentions of just one kind
In this chapter, we examine Iris Murdoch’s views about art. We highlight continuities and differe... more In this chapter, we examine Iris Murdoch’s views about art. We highlight continuities and differences between her views on art and aesthetics, and those of Plato, Kant, and Freud. We argue that Murdoch’s views about art, though traditionally linked to Plato, are more compatible with Kant’s thought than has been acknowledged—though with his ethics rather than his aesthetics. Murdoch shows Plato’s influence in her idea that beauty is the good in a different guise. However, Murdoch shows a more Kantian than Platonic influence in her suggestion that the experience of beauty can be conducive to virtue, and distances herself from Plato in her claim that the enjoyment, as well as the production, of certain kinds of art can be virtuous. We also argue that her view of bad art as self-consoling fantasy is consonant with Freudian thought. Lastly, we question her view of bad art, specifically concerning her identification of bad art as self-consoling fantasy or entertainment, and her separation...
Skilled sportsmen or musicians—more generally, skilled agents—often fill us with awe with the way... more Skilled sportsmen or musicians—more generally, skilled agents—often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether they intended to perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of one’s action to be incompatible with intending to perform that aspect of one’s action. Subsequently, though, I will also argue that, in some cases, the incompatibility is only prima facie, and can be dispelled by drawing the following distinction: that between aspects of one’s action that are merely temporarily not consciously accessed, versus aspects of one’s action that are permanently inaccessible to consciousness. I will thus remove an obstacle towards saying that skilled agents intended to perform ...
According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an ac... more According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent’s habits and skills. Markos Valaris (2015) argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. He concludes that we therefore have to jettison its conception of actions as mindless bodily movements animated from the outside by intentions. Here we defend the standard story. We can make sense of the reach of non-observational knowledge of action once we reject the following two assumptions: (i) that an intended habitual or skilled action is a so-called basic action — that is, an action that doesn’t involve any finer-grained intentions — and (ii) that an agent, in acting, is merely executing one intention rather than a whole hierarchy of more or less fine-grained intentions. We argue that (i) and (ii) are false.
A distorted representation of one's own body is a diagnostic criterion and core psychopatholo... more A distorted representation of one's own body is a diagnostic criterion and core psychopathology of both anorexia nervosa (AN) and bulimia nervosa (BN). Despite recent technical advances in research, it is still unknown whether this body image disturbance is characterized by body dissatisfaction and a low ideal weight and/or includes a distorted perception or processing of body size. In this article, we provide an update and meta-analysis of 42 articles summarizing measures and results for body size estimation (BSE) from 926 individuals with AN, 536 individuals with BN and 1920 controls. We replicate findings that individuals with AN and BN overestimate their body size as compared to controls (ES=0.63). Our meta-regression shows that metric methods (BSE by direct or indirect spatial measures) yield larger effect sizes than depictive methods (BSE by evaluating distorted pictures), and that effect sizes are larger for patients with BN than for patients with AN. To interpret these r...
Skilled sportsmen or musicians-more generally, skilled agents-often fill us with awe with the way... more Skilled sportsmen or musicians-more generally, skilled agents-often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether they intended to perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of one's action to be incompatible with intending to perform that aspect of one's action. Subsequently, though, I will also argue that, in some cases, the incompatibility is only prima facie, and can be dispelled by drawing the following distinction: that between aspects of one's action that are merely temporarily not consciously accessed, versus aspects of one's action that are permanently inaccessible to consciousness. I will thus remove an obstacle towards saying that skilled agents intended to perform certain aspects of their actions, despite lack of conscious access to those aspects at the time of performance.
What more do we need to fully appreciate perfumes, beyond considering them objects for aesthetic ... more What more do we need to fully appreciate perfumes, beyond considering them objects for aesthetic appreciation? My contention is that our appreciation of some perfumes would be largely incomplete, unless we acknowledged them as works of art. I will defend the claim that some perfumes are works of art from the point of view of different definitions. Zangwill's aesthetic definition makes it easy to defend the proposed claim, but is not very informative for the purposes of fully appreciating some perfumes. On the other hand, Levinson's intentional-historical definition and Lopes's approach to defining art make it more challenging to defend the proposed claim. I will show that, even so, the challenge may be met. Moreover, the challenge is well worth engaging with, since tackling it will uncover features of some perfumes that are essential to their full appreciation.
According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an a... more According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent’s habits and skills. Markos Valaris (2015) argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. He concludes that we therefore have to jettison its conception of actions as mindless bodily movements animated from the outside by intentions. Here we defend the standard story. We can make sense of the reach of non-observational knowledge of action once we reject the following two assumptions: (i) that an intended habitual or skilled action is a so-called basic action — that is, an action that doesn’t involve any finer-grained intentions — and (ii) that an agent, in acting, is merely executing one intention rather than a whole hierarchy of more or less fine-grained intentions. We argue that (i) and (ii) are false.
What are the most detailed descriptions under which subjects intend to perform bodily actions? Ac... more What are the most detailed descriptions under which subjects intend to perform bodily actions? According to Pacherie (2006), these descriptions may be found by looking into motor representations—action representations in the brain that determine the movements to be performed. Specifically, for any motor representation guiding an action, its subject has an M-intention representing that action in as much detail. I show that some M-intentions breach the constraints that intentions should meet. I then identify a set of intentions—motor intentions—that represent actions in as much detail as some motor representations while meeting the constraints that intentions should meet.
Uploads
Papers by Chiara Brozzo