In February 2015, the Commission of the European Union put forward a proposal for an EU Energy Un... more In February 2015, the Commission of the European Union put forward a proposal for an EU Energy Union that signaled a shift in the EU’s use of economic power in external relations. Some of the new policies would amount to the EU’s using market might in the shape of a $17.5 trillion economy and a 400 bcm gas market, not only for setting market standards, but also for political ends such as energy security. The proposal featured five related and mutually reinforcing dimensions—security of supply, a fully integrated internal energy market, energy efficiency, emissions reductions and research and innovation (European Commission 2015). The first two have a direct effect on the EU’s external energy policy. The external dimension of security of supply concerns the diversification of the EU’s sources of gas imports, with dependence on Russian gas, a particularly sensitive issue in the context of gas cut-offs in the 2000s (particularly related to Russian–Ukrainian relations in 2006 and 2009) and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Completion of the internal energy market affects external players inasmuch as they have to comply with EU rules if they want to sell gas to or operate on the Single European Market. Moreover, as the Commission and the more liberally oriented member states have long argued (Andersen and Sitter 2009), an integrated and interconnected market reduces each state’s vulnerability to external gas supply shocks. The EU’s long-standing approach to energy policy has been to treat energy as a commodity that has important public goods characteristics, and to address issues related to the behavior of Russia and its state-owned gas monopoly exporter, Gazprom, as matters of a big firm’s abuse of its dominant market position. The central question in this book is whether the Energy Union proposals and the debates surrounding them signal a shift from the EUs long-standing ‘regulatory power’ approach to energy policy to a new policy agenda that involves more direct and assertive use of the EU’s economic power.
In Norway, the central elite sport organization, Olympiatoppen, has the overall responsibility fo... more In Norway, the central elite sport organization, Olympiatoppen, has the overall responsibility for coordinating and supporting all elite sport efforts. Part of this is the responsibility for the Norwegian participation in the Olympic Games. This study focuses on the 2010 Vancouver project, and how it was carried out in the light of the negative experiences form the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin
IJASS(International Journal of Applied Sports Sciences), 2013
ABSTRACT National teams face organizational challenges when planning and preparing for Olympic ac... more ABSTRACT National teams face organizational challenges when planning and preparing for Olympic accommodation. In Norway such efforts are coordinated by the Olympic Top Sport Organization, Olympiatoppen. The ability to deal systematically with the many mundane factors in preparations and competitions is crucial, for example minor and mundane issues related to housing conditions may easily impact athletes’ ability to perform. When discussing perceptions of stressors related to accommodations with ten Norwegian winter Olympians from the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games (OWG), they identified four areas of concern that may be central in comprehensive planning and preparation: accommodation and specific individual needs, the quality of recreation and food, managing security issues, and the regulation of press meetings. The most satisfied athletes belonged to sports where leaders took active part in discussions and spent time on details that would give the team an advantage like single room for clear medal candidates, Norwegian chefs, bringing their usual support personnel, extra recreational activities etc. Others were not that satisfied and felt that their needs (or sport) were not considered important enough. In conclusion, the Norwegian preparations for the 2010 OWG reflected a more conscious approach to quality control than previously, and even more important, the athletes felt that they had a say in the decision-making.
The European Union (EU) energy market is fragmented in terms of resources, policies and instituti... more The European Union (EU) energy market is fragmented in terms of resources, policies and institutions. The North-Western market, centered on the UK, is liberalized (particularly compared to the Mediterranean and Eastern markets), and its gas-to-gas competition increasingly shapes the German and Central European market. This chapter examines the options that the biggest “internal” EU gas suppliers (i.e. including Norway) and market-players face in the context of the Energy Union proposal, their reactions to a more mercantilist policy agenda, and how their preferences and responses shape the energy union debate. These three, more liberal, players, represent the main internal opposition to possible modifications of the EU’s liberal approach to the political economy of energy.
The EU has a range of policy tools for dealing with the challenges it faces in the regional and i... more The EU has a range of policy tools for dealing with the challenges it faces in the regional and international gas trade: when 1) integrating Norway into the Single European Market (SEM), 2) coping with Russia, 3) securing supply of Algerian gas and 4) taking advantage of the rising global trade in LNG. Norway as a major gas exporter to the EU shares interests with other major gas suppliers, Russia and Algeria. This chapter analyses the EU’s approaches to the governance of regional gas markets and responses of Norway, Russia, Algeria and the countries that export LNG to the EU that have chosen various strategies of relating to EU regulatory and market power. Some sell gas at the EU border while others develop other forms of cooperation with the EU.
This chapter defines and explores the European Union (EU)’s ‘regulatory power’ and ‘economic powe... more This chapter defines and explores the European Union (EU)’s ‘regulatory power’ and ‘economic power’, with a view to assessing the dynamics and potential of both forms of power in the EU’s external energy strategy. Overall, the chapter finds that the EU’s regulatory power, based on regulation and legislation, proves suitable to address some of the challenges of a more ‘geopolitical’ external energy environment. Although the Commission used regulatory power for mercantilist ends, this power, clearly, is limited as by definition it works best in a market context. Acknowledging that the Energy Union pushed security of supply to the center stage, the chapter concludes that the EU is best advised not to try to use its economic (and not just regulatory) power more assertively and adopt a strategy with ‘liberal mercantilist’ elements.
EU Leadership in Energy and Environmental Governance, 2016
In the 1990s the European Union extended its regulatory state model (Majone 1994; Lodge 2002; Mor... more In the 1990s the European Union extended its regulatory state model (Majone 1994; Lodge 2002; Moran 2002; Lodge 2008; Levi-Faur 2011) to the utilities sectors, and began to liberalize its gas market. As this process got underway, the EU began to pursue a parallel process: extending the reach of the single market beyond its borders. In fact, the EU sought to guarantee security of energy supplies primarily by extending its regulatory governance beyond its jurisdiction. These efforts included enlarging the EU (thereby expanding the direct reach of its regulatory apparatus), establishing the European Economic Area (EEA) (making key energy-supplier Norway comply with EU rules), and setting up policy agreements such as the Energy Charter Treaty with former Communist states — notably Russia (which currently supplies the EU with 30 per cent of its gas and 35 per cent of its oil) (Eurostat 2012).
ABSTRACT Structured talent identification and development, it has been argued, is one of the foun... more ABSTRACT Structured talent identification and development, it has been argued, is one of the foundations of international sporting success and many modern elite sport systems have applied normative talent development (TD) models. The success of Norwegian handball, however, is based on an alternative approach to TD. Norwegian handball is characterized by a heterarchical organizational structure in which several key actors function highly autonomously. The aim of this article is three-fold: (a) to describe the organization of TD in Norwegian handball, (b) to identify how the inherent organizational characteristics of Norwegian handball have influenced the TD processes used and (c) to discuss if contemporary TD models provide an adequate conceptualization of the model used in Norwegian handball. This case study includes three units of analysis: (i) the overall organizational structure of Norwegian handball, (ii) the characteristics of the key actors involved and (iii) the inter-communication and collaborations of the key actors. The data sources were (a) documents and (b) interviews with 11 key informants. The informants were selected strategically to represent experienced coaches and professionals from multiple organizational units. The National Handball Federation uses a broad-based model for TD: 23% of male handball players and 15% of female handball players from the age of 13–17 years participate in regional-level initiatives in addition to practising daily in community-based volunteer sport clubs and sport schools. Findings reveal that the broad base of TD initiatives creates multiple access points to the talent pipeline for adolescents. However, because the heterarchical structure involves many actors, the unintended consequences are often related to (im)properly managing training and competition loads. There is a need therefore for well-developed coordination mechanisms and good communication between the key actors involved.
In February 2015, the Commission of the European Union put forward a proposal for an EU Energy Un... more In February 2015, the Commission of the European Union put forward a proposal for an EU Energy Union that signaled a shift in the EU’s use of economic power in external relations. Some of the new policies would amount to the EU’s using market might in the shape of a $17.5 trillion economy and a 400 bcm gas market, not only for setting market standards, but also for political ends such as energy security. The proposal featured five related and mutually reinforcing dimensions—security of supply, a fully integrated internal energy market, energy efficiency, emissions reductions and research and innovation (European Commission 2015). The first two have a direct effect on the EU’s external energy policy. The external dimension of security of supply concerns the diversification of the EU’s sources of gas imports, with dependence on Russian gas, a particularly sensitive issue in the context of gas cut-offs in the 2000s (particularly related to Russian–Ukrainian relations in 2006 and 2009) and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Completion of the internal energy market affects external players inasmuch as they have to comply with EU rules if they want to sell gas to or operate on the Single European Market. Moreover, as the Commission and the more liberally oriented member states have long argued (Andersen and Sitter 2009), an integrated and interconnected market reduces each state’s vulnerability to external gas supply shocks. The EU’s long-standing approach to energy policy has been to treat energy as a commodity that has important public goods characteristics, and to address issues related to the behavior of Russia and its state-owned gas monopoly exporter, Gazprom, as matters of a big firm’s abuse of its dominant market position. The central question in this book is whether the Energy Union proposals and the debates surrounding them signal a shift from the EUs long-standing ‘regulatory power’ approach to energy policy to a new policy agenda that involves more direct and assertive use of the EU’s economic power.
In Norway, the central elite sport organization, Olympiatoppen, has the overall responsibility fo... more In Norway, the central elite sport organization, Olympiatoppen, has the overall responsibility for coordinating and supporting all elite sport efforts. Part of this is the responsibility for the Norwegian participation in the Olympic Games. This study focuses on the 2010 Vancouver project, and how it was carried out in the light of the negative experiences form the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin
IJASS(International Journal of Applied Sports Sciences), 2013
ABSTRACT National teams face organizational challenges when planning and preparing for Olympic ac... more ABSTRACT National teams face organizational challenges when planning and preparing for Olympic accommodation. In Norway such efforts are coordinated by the Olympic Top Sport Organization, Olympiatoppen. The ability to deal systematically with the many mundane factors in preparations and competitions is crucial, for example minor and mundane issues related to housing conditions may easily impact athletes’ ability to perform. When discussing perceptions of stressors related to accommodations with ten Norwegian winter Olympians from the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Winter Games (OWG), they identified four areas of concern that may be central in comprehensive planning and preparation: accommodation and specific individual needs, the quality of recreation and food, managing security issues, and the regulation of press meetings. The most satisfied athletes belonged to sports where leaders took active part in discussions and spent time on details that would give the team an advantage like single room for clear medal candidates, Norwegian chefs, bringing their usual support personnel, extra recreational activities etc. Others were not that satisfied and felt that their needs (or sport) were not considered important enough. In conclusion, the Norwegian preparations for the 2010 OWG reflected a more conscious approach to quality control than previously, and even more important, the athletes felt that they had a say in the decision-making.
The European Union (EU) energy market is fragmented in terms of resources, policies and instituti... more The European Union (EU) energy market is fragmented in terms of resources, policies and institutions. The North-Western market, centered on the UK, is liberalized (particularly compared to the Mediterranean and Eastern markets), and its gas-to-gas competition increasingly shapes the German and Central European market. This chapter examines the options that the biggest “internal” EU gas suppliers (i.e. including Norway) and market-players face in the context of the Energy Union proposal, their reactions to a more mercantilist policy agenda, and how their preferences and responses shape the energy union debate. These three, more liberal, players, represent the main internal opposition to possible modifications of the EU’s liberal approach to the political economy of energy.
The EU has a range of policy tools for dealing with the challenges it faces in the regional and i... more The EU has a range of policy tools for dealing with the challenges it faces in the regional and international gas trade: when 1) integrating Norway into the Single European Market (SEM), 2) coping with Russia, 3) securing supply of Algerian gas and 4) taking advantage of the rising global trade in LNG. Norway as a major gas exporter to the EU shares interests with other major gas suppliers, Russia and Algeria. This chapter analyses the EU’s approaches to the governance of regional gas markets and responses of Norway, Russia, Algeria and the countries that export LNG to the EU that have chosen various strategies of relating to EU regulatory and market power. Some sell gas at the EU border while others develop other forms of cooperation with the EU.
This chapter defines and explores the European Union (EU)’s ‘regulatory power’ and ‘economic powe... more This chapter defines and explores the European Union (EU)’s ‘regulatory power’ and ‘economic power’, with a view to assessing the dynamics and potential of both forms of power in the EU’s external energy strategy. Overall, the chapter finds that the EU’s regulatory power, based on regulation and legislation, proves suitable to address some of the challenges of a more ‘geopolitical’ external energy environment. Although the Commission used regulatory power for mercantilist ends, this power, clearly, is limited as by definition it works best in a market context. Acknowledging that the Energy Union pushed security of supply to the center stage, the chapter concludes that the EU is best advised not to try to use its economic (and not just regulatory) power more assertively and adopt a strategy with ‘liberal mercantilist’ elements.
EU Leadership in Energy and Environmental Governance, 2016
In the 1990s the European Union extended its regulatory state model (Majone 1994; Lodge 2002; Mor... more In the 1990s the European Union extended its regulatory state model (Majone 1994; Lodge 2002; Moran 2002; Lodge 2008; Levi-Faur 2011) to the utilities sectors, and began to liberalize its gas market. As this process got underway, the EU began to pursue a parallel process: extending the reach of the single market beyond its borders. In fact, the EU sought to guarantee security of energy supplies primarily by extending its regulatory governance beyond its jurisdiction. These efforts included enlarging the EU (thereby expanding the direct reach of its regulatory apparatus), establishing the European Economic Area (EEA) (making key energy-supplier Norway comply with EU rules), and setting up policy agreements such as the Energy Charter Treaty with former Communist states — notably Russia (which currently supplies the EU with 30 per cent of its gas and 35 per cent of its oil) (Eurostat 2012).
ABSTRACT Structured talent identification and development, it has been argued, is one of the foun... more ABSTRACT Structured talent identification and development, it has been argued, is one of the foundations of international sporting success and many modern elite sport systems have applied normative talent development (TD) models. The success of Norwegian handball, however, is based on an alternative approach to TD. Norwegian handball is characterized by a heterarchical organizational structure in which several key actors function highly autonomously. The aim of this article is three-fold: (a) to describe the organization of TD in Norwegian handball, (b) to identify how the inherent organizational characteristics of Norwegian handball have influenced the TD processes used and (c) to discuss if contemporary TD models provide an adequate conceptualization of the model used in Norwegian handball. This case study includes three units of analysis: (i) the overall organizational structure of Norwegian handball, (ii) the characteristics of the key actors involved and (iii) the inter-communication and collaborations of the key actors. The data sources were (a) documents and (b) interviews with 11 key informants. The informants were selected strategically to represent experienced coaches and professionals from multiple organizational units. The National Handball Federation uses a broad-based model for TD: 23% of male handball players and 15% of female handball players from the age of 13–17 years participate in regional-level initiatives in addition to practising daily in community-based volunteer sport clubs and sport schools. Findings reveal that the broad base of TD initiatives creates multiple access points to the talent pipeline for adolescents. However, because the heterarchical structure involves many actors, the unintended consequences are often related to (im)properly managing training and competition loads. There is a need therefore for well-developed coordination mechanisms and good communication between the key actors involved.
Svein S. Andersen and Nick SItter, in G. Fermann (ed) Energy and institution-building in Europe, ... more Svein S. Andersen and Nick SItter, in G. Fermann (ed) Energy and institution-building in Europe, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2009
This chapter first discusses the EU as an actor in global energy, and shows that the EU – short o... more This chapter first discusses the EU as an actor in global energy, and shows that the EU – short of a strong set of policy tools – relies more than other players on exporting its own rules. It then explores the areas in which the Commission is capable of exerting (regulatory) external power in the energy sector. Next, it assesses the Commission's actions with regards to the challenges facing the EU along the energy value chain: upstream, midstream and downstream. Here, it pays most attention to the assessing the reach of the ‘regulatory state’ in the energy sector. A last section concludes the argument, and suggests that the Commission is emerging as an international actor that relies on the attractiveness of the EU’s domestic market in order to exert power beyond it.
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