European Journal of Political Economy, Mar 1, 2000
ABSTRACT Recent theoretical work has incorporated assumptions that agents have preferences for re... more ABSTRACT Recent theoretical work has incorporated assumptions that agents have preferences for reciprocity, leading them to behave non-opportunistically in social interactions. There is extensive experimental evidence for the existence of such preferences. This paper explains the emergence of preferences for reciprocity in a population consisting of two types: “reciprocators” and “opportunists”. Unlike conventional evolutionary models, both types maximize their expected payoffs, given their preferences. The population proportions of these two types evolve from one generation to the next, according to their expected payoffs. It is shown that, under a variety of conditions, preferences for reciprocity can survive in the population.
ABSTRACT The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyze... more ABSTRACT The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real-world cases of voluntary collective action. The model, which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional Cournot theory, predicts a higher level of collective action than that theory. The impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for the public good are given special emphasis. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
The authors develop a model of strategic work interactions in collective enterprises explaining t... more The authors develop a model of strategic work interactions in collective enterprises explaining the following observation: the Israeli kibbutz, in which net collective output is distributed equally, has been an economic success, while the Soviet kolkhoz, in which net output traditionally was divided according to relative work input, has been a failure. In contrast, the conventional Cournot-Nash theory of collective enterprises predicts superoptimal output in the kolkhoz, while in the kibbutz, the free-fider problem is predicted to lead to suboptimal effort. Their theory predicts Pareto optimal work effort in the kibbutz and suboptimal effort in the kolkhoz. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.
ABSTRACT This paper presents a model of the emergence of cooperative social norms in a society co... more ABSTRACT This paper presents a model of the emergence of cooperative social norms in a society composed exclusively of rational agents. Following Kreps et al. [Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., Wilson, R., 1982. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245–252], opportunistic agents are assumed to uphold cooperative norms in order to maintain reputations for being trustworthy — reputations which are necessary in order to find partners in mutually beneficial market and non-market transactions. Unlike the model of Kreps et al. [Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., Wilson, R., 1982. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245–252], however, the present model endogenizes agents’ prior beliefs regarding their partners’ type, rather than introducing these priors by assumption. The model is supported by evidence from an international micro-data set on family behavior.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Jun 1, 1986
Abstract A new approach to explaining voluntary collective action, emphasizing strategic interact... more Abstract A new approach to explaining voluntary collective action, emphasizing strategic interactions of actors in their contributions to the provision of a public good, is tested experimentally. The results support this approach, and tend to reject the conventional, Cournot theory of the provision of public goods. Among the findings are a positive interaction between individual contributions to the provision of a public good, and a U-shaped time trend in combined contributions.
This paper applies a model of the demand for public goods to explain cross-sectional differences ... more This paper applies a model of the demand for public goods to explain cross-sectional differences in public allocations to agricultural research in the United States. The model postulates that demanders of agricultural research on the state level--primarily farmers ...
European Journal of Political Economy, Mar 1, 2000
ABSTRACT Recent theoretical work has incorporated assumptions that agents have preferences for re... more ABSTRACT Recent theoretical work has incorporated assumptions that agents have preferences for reciprocity, leading them to behave non-opportunistically in social interactions. There is extensive experimental evidence for the existence of such preferences. This paper explains the emergence of preferences for reciprocity in a population consisting of two types: “reciprocators” and “opportunists”. Unlike conventional evolutionary models, both types maximize their expected payoffs, given their preferences. The population proportions of these two types evolve from one generation to the next, according to their expected payoffs. It is shown that, under a variety of conditions, preferences for reciprocity can survive in the population.
ABSTRACT The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyze... more ABSTRACT The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real-world cases of voluntary collective action. The model, which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional Cournot theory, predicts a higher level of collective action than that theory. The impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for the public good are given special emphasis. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
The authors develop a model of strategic work interactions in collective enterprises explaining t... more The authors develop a model of strategic work interactions in collective enterprises explaining the following observation: the Israeli kibbutz, in which net collective output is distributed equally, has been an economic success, while the Soviet kolkhoz, in which net output traditionally was divided according to relative work input, has been a failure. In contrast, the conventional Cournot-Nash theory of collective enterprises predicts superoptimal output in the kolkhoz, while in the kibbutz, the free-fider problem is predicted to lead to suboptimal effort. Their theory predicts Pareto optimal work effort in the kibbutz and suboptimal effort in the kolkhoz. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.
ABSTRACT This paper presents a model of the emergence of cooperative social norms in a society co... more ABSTRACT This paper presents a model of the emergence of cooperative social norms in a society composed exclusively of rational agents. Following Kreps et al. [Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., Wilson, R., 1982. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245–252], opportunistic agents are assumed to uphold cooperative norms in order to maintain reputations for being trustworthy — reputations which are necessary in order to find partners in mutually beneficial market and non-market transactions. Unlike the model of Kreps et al. [Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., Wilson, R., 1982. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245–252], however, the present model endogenizes agents’ prior beliefs regarding their partners’ type, rather than introducing these priors by assumption. The model is supported by evidence from an international micro-data set on family behavior.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Jun 1, 1986
Abstract A new approach to explaining voluntary collective action, emphasizing strategic interact... more Abstract A new approach to explaining voluntary collective action, emphasizing strategic interactions of actors in their contributions to the provision of a public good, is tested experimentally. The results support this approach, and tend to reject the conventional, Cournot theory of the provision of public goods. Among the findings are a positive interaction between individual contributions to the provision of a public good, and a U-shaped time trend in combined contributions.
This paper applies a model of the demand for public goods to explain cross-sectional differences ... more This paper applies a model of the demand for public goods to explain cross-sectional differences in public allocations to agricultural research in the United States. The model postulates that demanders of agricultural research on the state level--primarily farmers ...
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Papers by Joel M. Guttman