M R. X. Dentith is a philosopher who specialises in the epistemic analysis of conspiracy theory as well as writing on rumours, fake news, and the epistemology of secrecy. They received their PhD in Philosophy from the University of Auckland in 2012, and has been a Fellow at the Institute for Research in the Humanities at the University of Bucharest (ICUB-IRH) and the New Europe College (Bucharest).In 2014 they wrote the first single author on conspiracy theory in Philosophy, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories (Palgrave, 2014). They are a leading light in Philosophy on conspiracy theory, having authored five peer reviewed articles on the topic: “A (naive) view of conspiracy as collective action,” Filosofia e Collettività Supervisors: Dr. Justine Kingsbury and Dr. Jonathan McKeown-Green Phone: +64211776690
The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories is aimed at both the philosopher and the non-philosopher. T... more The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories is aimed at both the philosopher and the non-philosopher. The book is a qualified defence of belief in conspiracy theories, presenting the argument that belief in particular conspiracy theories can be rational. It covers such issues as: who might be considered a qualified conspiracy theorist; how do we analyse claims of disinformation; is our reliance on official theories a good reason to be suspicious of rival conspiracy theories; and what should we do when official theories and conspiracy theories are in conflict?
The purpose of this doctoral project is to explore the epistemic issues surrounding the concept o... more The purpose of this doctoral project is to explore the epistemic issues surrounding the concept of the conspiracy theory and to advance the analysis and evaluation of the conspiracy theory as a mode of explanation. The candidate is interested in the circumstances under which inferring to the truth or likeliness of a given conspiracy theory is, or is not, warranted.
Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, ... more Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then show what does and does not fall under the rubric of 'fake news'. I then go on to argue that fake news is not a new problem. Rather, if there is problem with fake news it is its centrality in contemporary public debate.
Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the expe... more Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call ‘conspiracy theories’, but that the conspiracy theorist has good reason to be suspicious of the role of expert endorsements when it comes to conspiracy theories and their rivals. The kind of expertise, then, we might associate with conspiracy theories is largely improvised – in that it lacks institutional features – and, I argue, ideally the product of a community of inquiry.
Looking at the recent spate of claims about " fake news " which appear to be a new feature of pol... more Looking at the recent spate of claims about " fake news " which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem in epistemology. The phenomena of fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indifference towards truth, which is sometimes expressed insincerely by political actors. This indifference and insincerity, I argue, has been allowed to flourish due to the way in which we have set the terms of the " public " epistemology that maintains what is considered " rational " public discourse. I argue one potential salve to the problem of fake news is to challenge this public epistemology by injecting a certain ethical consideration back into the discourse.
Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as unwarranted beliefs, typically supported by suspicious... more Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as unwarranted beliefs, typically supported by suspicious kinds of evidence. Yet contemporary work in Philosophy argues provisional belief in conspiracy theories is at the very least understandable---because conspiracies occur---and that if we take an evidential approach, judging individual conspiracy theories on their particular merits, belief in such theories turns out to be warranted in a range of cases.
Drawing on this work, I examine the kinds of evidence typically associated with conspiracy theories, and show how the so-called evidential problems with conspiracy theories are also problems for the kinds of evidence put forward in support of other theories. As such, if there is a problem with the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence, it is one of principle: is the principle which guides the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence somehow in error? I argue that whatever we might think about conspiracy theories generally, there is no prima facie case for a scepticism of conspiracy theories based purely on their use of evidence.
A reply to Patrick Stokes' 'Reluctance and Suspicion'—itself a reply to an early piece by myself ... more A reply to Patrick Stokes' 'Reluctance and Suspicion'—itself a reply to an early piece by myself replying to Stokes—in which I clarify what it is I intend when talking about how we should investigate conspiracy theories.
In the literature on conspiracy theories, the least contentious part of the academic discourse wo... more In the literature on conspiracy theories, the least contentious part of the academic discourse would appear to be what we mean by a “conspiracy”: a secretive plot between two or more people toward some end. Yet what, exactly, is the connection between something being a conspiracy and it being secret? Is it possible to conspire without also engaging in secretive behavior? To dissect the role of secrecy in conspiracies – and thus contribute to the larger debate on the epistemology of conspiracy theories – we define the concepts of “conspiracy,” “conspirator,” and “secret,” and argue that while conspirators might typically be thought to commit to keeping secrets once their conspiracy is underway, the idea that conspiracies are necessarily secretive to start with is not as obvious as previously thought.
A reply to Gérald Bronner, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez, Nicola... more A reply to Gérald Bronner, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez, Nicolas Gauvrit, Anthony Lantian, and Pascal Wagner-Egger's piece, '“They” Respond: Comments on Basham et al.’s “Social Science’s Conspiracy-Theory Panic: Now They Want to Cure Everyone”.
Belief in conspiracy theories is typically considered irrational, and as a consequence of this, c... more Belief in conspiracy theories is typically considered irrational, and as a consequence of this, conspiracy theorists – those who dare believe some conspiracy theory – have been charged with a variety of epistemic or psychological failings. Yet recent philosophical work has challenged the view that belief in conspiracy theories should be considered as typically irrational. By performing an intra-group analysis of those people we call 'conspiracy theorists', we find that the problematic traits commonly ascribed to the general group of conspiracy theorists turn out to be merely a set of stereotypical behaviours and thought patterns associated with a purported subset of that group. If we understand that the supposed problem of belief in conspiracy theories is centred on the beliefs of this purported subset – the conspiracists – then we can reconcile the recent philosophical contributions to the wider academic debate on the rationality of belief in conspiracy theories.
Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely... more Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely to be warranted. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy theories are unlikely relative to non-conspiratorial explanations which account for the same phenomena. However, such arguments turn out to rest upon how we define what gets counted both as a 'conspiracy' and a 'conspiracy theory', and such arguments rest upon shaky assumptions. It turns out that is not clear that conspiracy theories are prima facie unlikely, and so the claim such theories do not typically appear in our accounts of the best explanations for particular kinds of events needs to be re-evaluated.
In "Bad thinkers" Quassim Cassam of Warwick argues that we can explain away our suspicion of cons... more In "Bad thinkers" Quassim Cassam of Warwick argues that we can explain away our suspicion of conspiracy theories by virtue of conspiracy theorists merely being gullible. In this paper we turn Cassam's argument on its head, and argue that it is Cassam's political piety which seems to be the problem, rather than the supposed gullibility of conspiracy theorists.
Historically, conspiracy theories have been typically thought to be examples of irrational belief... more Historically, conspiracy theories have been typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy theories are unlikely relative compared to non-conspiratorial explanations which account for the same phenomena. However, such arguments turn out to rest upon how we define what gets counted both as a “conspiracy” and a “conspiracy theory”, which often rest upon shaky assumptions. It turns out that is not clear that conspiracy theories are prima facie unlikely, and so the claim such theories do not typically appear in our accounts of the best explanations for particular kinds of events need to be reconsidered.
Drawing on work by philosophers CAJ Coady and David Coady on the epistemology of rumours, I devel... more Drawing on work by philosophers CAJ Coady and David Coady on the epistemology of rumours, I develop a theory which exploits the distinction between rumouring and rumour- mongering for the purpose of explaining why we should treat rumours as a species of justified belief.
Whilst it is true that rumour-mongering, the act of passing on a rumour maliciously, presents a pathology of the normally reliable transmission of rumours, I will argue that rumours themselves have a generally reliable transmission process, that of rumouring, and should be considered to be examples of warranted beliefs.
My argument will also touch on the association of rumours with another class of beliefs that are usually considered to be suspect, conspiracy theories. I will argue that whilst rumours are reliable (as a mechanism for the transmission of justified beliefs) the analysis of the transmission of conspiracy theories requires us to realise they are different to rumours in some important respects.
The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories is aimed at both the philosopher and the non-philosopher. T... more The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories is aimed at both the philosopher and the non-philosopher. The book is a qualified defence of belief in conspiracy theories, presenting the argument that belief in particular conspiracy theories can be rational. It covers such issues as: who might be considered a qualified conspiracy theorist; how do we analyse claims of disinformation; is our reliance on official theories a good reason to be suspicious of rival conspiracy theories; and what should we do when official theories and conspiracy theories are in conflict?
The purpose of this doctoral project is to explore the epistemic issues surrounding the concept o... more The purpose of this doctoral project is to explore the epistemic issues surrounding the concept of the conspiracy theory and to advance the analysis and evaluation of the conspiracy theory as a mode of explanation. The candidate is interested in the circumstances under which inferring to the truth or likeliness of a given conspiracy theory is, or is not, warranted.
Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, ... more Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then show what does and does not fall under the rubric of 'fake news'. I then go on to argue that fake news is not a new problem. Rather, if there is problem with fake news it is its centrality in contemporary public debate.
Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the expe... more Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call ‘conspiracy theories’, but that the conspiracy theorist has good reason to be suspicious of the role of expert endorsements when it comes to conspiracy theories and their rivals. The kind of expertise, then, we might associate with conspiracy theories is largely improvised – in that it lacks institutional features – and, I argue, ideally the product of a community of inquiry.
Looking at the recent spate of claims about " fake news " which appear to be a new feature of pol... more Looking at the recent spate of claims about " fake news " which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem in epistemology. The phenomena of fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indifference towards truth, which is sometimes expressed insincerely by political actors. This indifference and insincerity, I argue, has been allowed to flourish due to the way in which we have set the terms of the " public " epistemology that maintains what is considered " rational " public discourse. I argue one potential salve to the problem of fake news is to challenge this public epistemology by injecting a certain ethical consideration back into the discourse.
Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as unwarranted beliefs, typically supported by suspicious... more Conspiracy theories are often portrayed as unwarranted beliefs, typically supported by suspicious kinds of evidence. Yet contemporary work in Philosophy argues provisional belief in conspiracy theories is at the very least understandable---because conspiracies occur---and that if we take an evidential approach, judging individual conspiracy theories on their particular merits, belief in such theories turns out to be warranted in a range of cases.
Drawing on this work, I examine the kinds of evidence typically associated with conspiracy theories, and show how the so-called evidential problems with conspiracy theories are also problems for the kinds of evidence put forward in support of other theories. As such, if there is a problem with the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence, it is one of principle: is the principle which guides the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence somehow in error? I argue that whatever we might think about conspiracy theories generally, there is no prima facie case for a scepticism of conspiracy theories based purely on their use of evidence.
A reply to Patrick Stokes' 'Reluctance and Suspicion'—itself a reply to an early piece by myself ... more A reply to Patrick Stokes' 'Reluctance and Suspicion'—itself a reply to an early piece by myself replying to Stokes—in which I clarify what it is I intend when talking about how we should investigate conspiracy theories.
In the literature on conspiracy theories, the least contentious part of the academic discourse wo... more In the literature on conspiracy theories, the least contentious part of the academic discourse would appear to be what we mean by a “conspiracy”: a secretive plot between two or more people toward some end. Yet what, exactly, is the connection between something being a conspiracy and it being secret? Is it possible to conspire without also engaging in secretive behavior? To dissect the role of secrecy in conspiracies – and thus contribute to the larger debate on the epistemology of conspiracy theories – we define the concepts of “conspiracy,” “conspirator,” and “secret,” and argue that while conspirators might typically be thought to commit to keeping secrets once their conspiracy is underway, the idea that conspiracies are necessarily secretive to start with is not as obvious as previously thought.
A reply to Gérald Bronner, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez, Nicola... more A reply to Gérald Bronner, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez, Nicolas Gauvrit, Anthony Lantian, and Pascal Wagner-Egger's piece, '“They” Respond: Comments on Basham et al.’s “Social Science’s Conspiracy-Theory Panic: Now They Want to Cure Everyone”.
Belief in conspiracy theories is typically considered irrational, and as a consequence of this, c... more Belief in conspiracy theories is typically considered irrational, and as a consequence of this, conspiracy theorists – those who dare believe some conspiracy theory – have been charged with a variety of epistemic or psychological failings. Yet recent philosophical work has challenged the view that belief in conspiracy theories should be considered as typically irrational. By performing an intra-group analysis of those people we call 'conspiracy theorists', we find that the problematic traits commonly ascribed to the general group of conspiracy theorists turn out to be merely a set of stereotypical behaviours and thought patterns associated with a purported subset of that group. If we understand that the supposed problem of belief in conspiracy theories is centred on the beliefs of this purported subset – the conspiracists – then we can reconcile the recent philosophical contributions to the wider academic debate on the rationality of belief in conspiracy theories.
Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely... more Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely to be warranted. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy theories are unlikely relative to non-conspiratorial explanations which account for the same phenomena. However, such arguments turn out to rest upon how we define what gets counted both as a 'conspiracy' and a 'conspiracy theory', and such arguments rest upon shaky assumptions. It turns out that is not clear that conspiracy theories are prima facie unlikely, and so the claim such theories do not typically appear in our accounts of the best explanations for particular kinds of events needs to be re-evaluated.
In "Bad thinkers" Quassim Cassam of Warwick argues that we can explain away our suspicion of cons... more In "Bad thinkers" Quassim Cassam of Warwick argues that we can explain away our suspicion of conspiracy theories by virtue of conspiracy theorists merely being gullible. In this paper we turn Cassam's argument on its head, and argue that it is Cassam's political piety which seems to be the problem, rather than the supposed gullibility of conspiracy theorists.
Historically, conspiracy theories have been typically thought to be examples of irrational belief... more Historically, conspiracy theories have been typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy theories are unlikely relative compared to non-conspiratorial explanations which account for the same phenomena. However, such arguments turn out to rest upon how we define what gets counted both as a “conspiracy” and a “conspiracy theory”, which often rest upon shaky assumptions. It turns out that is not clear that conspiracy theories are prima facie unlikely, and so the claim such theories do not typically appear in our accounts of the best explanations for particular kinds of events need to be reconsidered.
Drawing on work by philosophers CAJ Coady and David Coady on the epistemology of rumours, I devel... more Drawing on work by philosophers CAJ Coady and David Coady on the epistemology of rumours, I develop a theory which exploits the distinction between rumouring and rumour- mongering for the purpose of explaining why we should treat rumours as a species of justified belief.
Whilst it is true that rumour-mongering, the act of passing on a rumour maliciously, presents a pathology of the normally reliable transmission of rumours, I will argue that rumours themselves have a generally reliable transmission process, that of rumouring, and should be considered to be examples of warranted beliefs.
My argument will also touch on the association of rumours with another class of beliefs that are usually considered to be suspect, conspiracy theories. I will argue that whilst rumours are reliable (as a mechanism for the transmission of justified beliefs) the analysis of the transmission of conspiracy theories requires us to realise they are different to rumours in some important respects.
In this paper I analyse Freeman Dyson's anti-reductionist views about the paranormal and argue th... more In this paper I analyse Freeman Dyson's anti-reductionist views about the paranormal and argue that Dyson's anti-reductionism is not, in itself, an unreasonable position to take on the extent and limits of scientific reasoning.
Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely... more Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely to be warranted. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy theories are unlikely relative to non-conspiratorial explanations which account for the same phenomena. However, such arguments turn out to rest upon how we define what gets counted both as a ‘conspiracy’ and a ‘conspiracy theory’, and such arguments rest upon shaky assumptions. It turns out that is not clear that conspiracy theories are prima facie unlikely, and so the claim such theories do not typically appear in our accounts of the best explanations for particular kinds of events needs to be re-evaluated.
Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely... more Conspiracy theories are typically thought to be examples of irrational beliefs, and thus unlikely to be warranted. However, recent work in Philosophy has challenged the claim that belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, showing that in a range of cases belief in conspiracy theories is warranted. However, it is still often said that conspiracy theories are unlikely relative to non-conspiratorial explanations which account for the same phenomena. However, such arguments turn out to rest upon how we define what gets counted both as a ‘conspiracy’ and a ‘conspiracy theory’, and such arguments rest upon shaky assumptions. It turns out that is not clear that conspiracy theories are prima facie unlikely, and so the claim such theories do not typically appear in our accounts of the best explanations for particular kinds of events needs to be re-evaluated.
Christopher Hitchens, in his last book, claims to have seen the evidence that Saddam Hussein’s re... more Christopher Hitchens, in his last book, claims to have seen the evidence that Saddam Hussein’s regime was developing weapons of mass destruction, thus justifying the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Hitchens provides no collaboration for this extraordinary claim, so what are we to make of it? Indeed, what are we to make of cases where someone claims to have evidence which persuades them that some proposition is true but cannot give you any specific details about that evidence? How can you agree or disagree with whether some information counts as evidence if you cannot be told anything about the purported evidence? This is a live issue when it comes to assessing both conspiracy theories and the replies to certain conspiracy theories, since such “unsharable evidence” (as we might call it) is cited frequently as justification for, say, political action? Even if its use can be justified in some cases, the citation of such unsharable evidence looks open to abuse by the kind of people conspiracy theorists routinely warn us about.
Social activists like to claim that the Government and the various state agencies which act for i... more Social activists like to claim that the Government and the various state agencies which act for it should not be trusted. Looking at a relatively recent example of a series of Police raids concerning potential terrorist activity in New Zealand, I will argue that:
1. Sometimes activists not only have good grounds to be suspicious of various state agencies but
2. The operation of state agencies often does call into question our trust in both in them specifically and the operation of our governments in general.
I will start by examining how both the New Zealand Police and the alleged terrorists exploited the evidence in support of their particular cases in order to understand why we might have grounds to prefer one version of events over the other. Part of this analysis will centre on just how transparently either side acted when presenting their arguments. I will argue that openness is taken into consideration, this gives us grounds to say certain members of the public really do have good reason for their lack of trust in public institutions.
I will then argue that whilst the alleged terrorists have shown remarkable resilience (both with respect to themselves and with respect to the public), the public profile of the New Zealand Police Force continues to fracture, because their handling of the October Raids is symptomatic of a grander narrative of secret and negligent behaviour.
Looking at the recent spate of claims about 'fake news' which appear to be a new feature of polit... more Looking at the recent spate of claims about 'fake news' which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem both in epistemology and in ethics. Fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indifference towards truth, which is sometimes also expressed insincerely by political actors. This indifference and insincerity has been allowed to flourish due to the way in which we have set the terms of the 'public' episte-mology that maintains what is rational public discourse. I argue one potential salve to the problem of fake news is to challenge this public epistemology, by injecting a certain passion back into the discourse.
In the wider academic literature belief in conspiracy theories is typically treated as irrational... more In the wider academic literature belief in conspiracy theories is typically treated as irrational. As a consequence of this, conspiracy theorists – those who dare believe some conspiracy theory – are charged with a variety of epistemic or psychological failings. Yet recent work in Philosophy has challenged the idea belief in conspiracy theories is irrational, arguing instead that we need to judge particular conspiracy theories on their merits. But what of conspiracy theorists? By performing an intra-group analysis of those people we call 'conspiracy theorists', we find the traits commonly ascribed to the general group of conspiracy theorists by social sci-* Thanks to Edmund King, Justine Kingsbury and Lee Basham for feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
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Drawing on this work, I examine the kinds of evidence typically associated with conspiracy theories, and show how the so-called evidential problems with conspiracy theories are also problems for the kinds of evidence put forward in support of other theories. As such, if there is a problem with the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence, it is one of principle: is the principle which guides the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence somehow in error? I argue that whatever we might think about conspiracy theories generally, there is no prima facie case for a scepticism of conspiracy theories based purely on their use of evidence.
Whilst it is true that rumour-mongering, the act of passing on a rumour maliciously, presents a pathology of the normally reliable transmission of rumours, I will argue that rumours themselves have a generally reliable transmission process, that of rumouring, and should be considered to be examples of warranted beliefs.
My argument will also touch on the association of rumours with another class of beliefs that are usually considered to be suspect, conspiracy theories. I will argue that whilst rumours are reliable (as a mechanism for the transmission of justified beliefs) the analysis of the transmission of conspiracy theories requires us to realise they are different to rumours in some important respects.
Drawing on this work, I examine the kinds of evidence typically associated with conspiracy theories, and show how the so-called evidential problems with conspiracy theories are also problems for the kinds of evidence put forward in support of other theories. As such, if there is a problem with the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence, it is one of principle: is the principle which guides the conspiracy theorist's use of evidence somehow in error? I argue that whatever we might think about conspiracy theories generally, there is no prima facie case for a scepticism of conspiracy theories based purely on their use of evidence.
Whilst it is true that rumour-mongering, the act of passing on a rumour maliciously, presents a pathology of the normally reliable transmission of rumours, I will argue that rumours themselves have a generally reliable transmission process, that of rumouring, and should be considered to be examples of warranted beliefs.
My argument will also touch on the association of rumours with another class of beliefs that are usually considered to be suspect, conspiracy theories. I will argue that whilst rumours are reliable (as a mechanism for the transmission of justified beliefs) the analysis of the transmission of conspiracy theories requires us to realise they are different to rumours in some important respects.
1. Sometimes activists not only have good grounds to be suspicious of various state agencies but
2. The operation of state agencies often does call into question our trust in both in them specifically and the operation of our governments in general.
I will start by examining how both the New Zealand Police and the alleged terrorists exploited the evidence in support of their particular cases in order to understand why we might have grounds to prefer one version of events over the other. Part of this analysis will centre on just how transparently either side acted when presenting their arguments. I will argue that openness is taken into consideration, this gives us grounds to say certain members of the public really do have good reason for their lack of trust in public institutions.
I will then argue that whilst the alleged terrorists have shown remarkable resilience (both with respect to themselves and with respect to the public), the public profile of the New Zealand Police Force continues to fracture, because their handling of the October Raids is symptomatic of a grander narrative of secret and negligent behaviour.