Joanna Burch-Brown
Joanna Burch-Brown is Director of Teaching and Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at University of Bristol, where she works on ethics of contested heritage, transitional justice and community development. From 2016-2020, she contributed to campaigns to change how Bristol memorializes figures like Edward Colston, and to help Bristol acknowledge and understand its historic role in transatlantic slavery, and is now working on asset-based community development in St Pauls, Bristol. As co-chair of the Bristol History Commission, she co-wrote "The Colston Statue: What Next?", analysing findings from a survey of 14,000 people on the future of the statue, and contributed to curating display of the vandalized Colston statue in the MShed Museum. She has also co-written guidelines for public bodies on how to review contested heritage. She is Founder and Director of Bridging Histories, a project inviting people of all ages and social groups to share their stories, learn about the past and make positive change for the future. She has a particular interest is in bridging between different viewpoints and promoting understanding of the positive intentions of people on all sides of a debate.
She directs the Fulbright Institute's most popular summer school, on "Arts, activism and social justice", which is delivered collaboratively with leading practitioners in Bristol. Her innovative model of research and teaching has empowered young people in Britain and the US to develop their own initiatives addressing concerns that matter in their communities. One student reports that her courses “truly changed my global perspective” and another says "I've learned a lot about how I want to conduct myself in my life after this." Another says “It has empowered me … I know I can make a difference”.
She is a founding member of the University of Bristol Centre for Black Humanities. Before coming to Bristol, she did her PhD at King's College, Cambridge, in the History and Philosophy of Science Department, and a postdoctoral research fellowship at Oxford. She did her BA at Oberlin College. In 2003 she received a Compton Fellowship to establish Forest Farm Peace Garden, a therapeutic gardening project in East London, working with refugees and asylum seekers.
She directs the Fulbright Institute's most popular summer school, on "Arts, activism and social justice", which is delivered collaboratively with leading practitioners in Bristol. Her innovative model of research and teaching has empowered young people in Britain and the US to develop their own initiatives addressing concerns that matter in their communities. One student reports that her courses “truly changed my global perspective” and another says "I've learned a lot about how I want to conduct myself in my life after this." Another says “It has empowered me … I know I can make a difference”.
She is a founding member of the University of Bristol Centre for Black Humanities. Before coming to Bristol, she did her PhD at King's College, Cambridge, in the History and Philosophy of Science Department, and a postdoctoral research fellowship at Oxford. She did her BA at Oberlin College. In 2003 she received a Compton Fellowship to establish Forest Farm Peace Garden, a therapeutic gardening project in East London, working with refugees and asylum seekers.
less
InterestsView All (48)
Uploads
Drafts by Joanna Burch-Brown
Papers by Joanna Burch-Brown
• Raise awareness of racism in Britain & Bristol.
• Give concrete ideas for making a difference.
• Inspire through poetry.
• Create a positive, forward-looking conversation about links between our city’s past
Georgian House Museum, Bristol in 2019.
Created by: Dr Joanna Burch-Brown (Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Bristol) with Anndeloris Chacon, Shaun Clarke, Marie-Annick Gournet, Lawrence Hoo, Michael Jenkins, Lottie Kennett, Charmaine Lawrence, Ros Martin, Vanessa Melody, Idren Natural, Clive Smith, Abolition Shed Collective, As It is TV, Bristol Black Carers, CARGO, Countering Colston, Everyday Racism Project, Lyrically Justified, Teach Diverse, Urban Word Collective, We Need More Black Teachers, and St Paul’s Carnival. With warm thanks to Jimmy Galvin, University of Bristol, and Bristol Museums & Galleries. Design by Bristol Design/Nicky Stott.
In this dissertation, I defend consequentialism—or rather certain forms of consequentialism—against epistemic objections. Along the way, I show that the challenges are serious ones. I argue that certain dominant forms of consequentialism do indeed fall to worries about ignorance, and I explain how worries about our epistemic limits should influence what sort of consequentialism we find plausible and attractive.
In the first part of the dissertation, I focus on two dominant forms of consequentialism—objective act consequentialism (OAC) and subjective act consequentialism (SAC). I argue that neither theory is satisfying in light of epistemic worries. OAC falls because, given our non-negligible ignorance, it introduces an unacceptably large gap between the criterion of rightness and standards related to praise and blame, responsibility, reasonable expecta- tion and practical guidance. SAC falls because it fails to pick out a standard that really matters. I argue that ethical theories will be more attractive insofar as they are organised around ends that matter, and insofar as we can iden- tify tools by which to approach those ends. I call this the desideratum of Full Normativity.
I then argue that consequentialists will have better prospects for achieving full normativity if we have reason to believe that by taking acts with better subjective expectable consequences we will tend to bring about better consequences overall. I consider but reject G.E. Moore’s attempt to justify such a claim. I then offer my own solution, arguing that for reasons to do with statistical theory, we have grounds for believing that particular strategies and patterns of action will tend to have better consequences, and that consequentialists should recommend acting with those advantageous strategies. I close by suggesting that epistemic considerations should lead us to favour what I call strategy consequentialism."
Syllabi by Joanna Burch-Brown
• Raise awareness of racism in Britain & Bristol.
• Give concrete ideas for making a difference.
• Inspire through poetry.
• Create a positive, forward-looking conversation about links between our city’s past
Georgian House Museum, Bristol in 2019.
Created by: Dr Joanna Burch-Brown (Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Bristol) with Anndeloris Chacon, Shaun Clarke, Marie-Annick Gournet, Lawrence Hoo, Michael Jenkins, Lottie Kennett, Charmaine Lawrence, Ros Martin, Vanessa Melody, Idren Natural, Clive Smith, Abolition Shed Collective, As It is TV, Bristol Black Carers, CARGO, Countering Colston, Everyday Racism Project, Lyrically Justified, Teach Diverse, Urban Word Collective, We Need More Black Teachers, and St Paul’s Carnival. With warm thanks to Jimmy Galvin, University of Bristol, and Bristol Museums & Galleries. Design by Bristol Design/Nicky Stott.
In this dissertation, I defend consequentialism—or rather certain forms of consequentialism—against epistemic objections. Along the way, I show that the challenges are serious ones. I argue that certain dominant forms of consequentialism do indeed fall to worries about ignorance, and I explain how worries about our epistemic limits should influence what sort of consequentialism we find plausible and attractive.
In the first part of the dissertation, I focus on two dominant forms of consequentialism—objective act consequentialism (OAC) and subjective act consequentialism (SAC). I argue that neither theory is satisfying in light of epistemic worries. OAC falls because, given our non-negligible ignorance, it introduces an unacceptably large gap between the criterion of rightness and standards related to praise and blame, responsibility, reasonable expecta- tion and practical guidance. SAC falls because it fails to pick out a standard that really matters. I argue that ethical theories will be more attractive insofar as they are organised around ends that matter, and insofar as we can iden- tify tools by which to approach those ends. I call this the desideratum of Full Normativity.
I then argue that consequentialists will have better prospects for achieving full normativity if we have reason to believe that by taking acts with better subjective expectable consequences we will tend to bring about better consequences overall. I consider but reject G.E. Moore’s attempt to justify such a claim. I then offer my own solution, arguing that for reasons to do with statistical theory, we have grounds for believing that particular strategies and patterns of action will tend to have better consequences, and that consequentialists should recommend acting with those advantageous strategies. I close by suggesting that epistemic considerations should lead us to favour what I call strategy consequentialism."
In summary, this unit offers us a chance to explore some of the most profound and systematic forms of injustice and oppression that have affected our societies, and to learn how people have sought to overcome this injustice.