Philosophy

One of the most pressing challenges facing environmental philosophers is how to address social and economic inequality while pursuing ecological sustainability. Bioregionalism is a view that is theoretically and practically well-equipped to grapple with the ecological, sociocultural, and economic complexity of the ecological crisis. However, its virtue ethics- oriented communitarianism as well as its spatial understanding of the just human polity render it unable to adequately address the on-the-ground reality of environmental degradation and political injustice as they occur in urban regions. Indeed, legacies of environmental racism and present patterns of social exclusion and economic inequality give good reason to designate multibioregional urban areas as the principal polity. Iris Young’s conception of justice as the “being together of strangers” critically yet sympathetically helps bioregionalism address these problems and that of the proper scale of the polity. The New York City region is a case study.

The World Social Forum is a new social and political phenomenon. The fact that it does have antecedents does not diminish its newness. Rather, quite the opposite. It is not an event, nor a mere succession of events. It is not a scholarly conference, although the contributions of many scholars converge in it. It is not a party or an international of parties, although militants and activists of many parties all over the world take part in it. It is not an NGO [non-governmental organization] or confederation of NGOs, even though its conception and ...

Argues that democratic theory and practice need to shift their focus from elections and representation to sharing power and property in government and the economy.
          Participatory democracy calls for the creation and proliferation of practices and institutions that enable individuals and groups to better determine the conditions in which they act and relate to others. Michael Menser's timely book We Decide! is arguably the most comprehensive treatment of participatory democracy. He explains the three waves of participatory democracy theory to show that this movement is attentive to the mechanics of contemporary political practices. Menser also outlines "maximal democracy," his own view of participatory democracy that expands people's abilities to shape their own lives, reduce inequality, and promote solidarity.

We Decide! draws on liberal, feminist, anarchist, and environmental justice philosophies as well as in-depth case studies of Spanish factory workers, Japanese housewives, and Brazilian socialists to show that participatory democracy actually works. Menser concludes his study by presenting a reconstructed version of the state that is shaped not by corporations but by inclusive communities driven by municipal workers, elected officials, and ordinary citizens working together. In this era of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, the participatory democracy proposed in We Decide! is more significant than ever.

As technological innovations continue to proliferate, new modes of shared
decision-making and inclusive empowering public engagement have not.
Too many put their faith in new apps, algorithms and the internet of things,
and talk excitedly about a green transition, but where is the enthusiasm and
curiosity for new mechanisms of accountable democratic governance and
creative multi-stakeholder collaborations?

In this essay, we argue that democratizing public services, especially water
and electricity, is essential for a just, sustainable and resilient production and
allocation of the public goods needed to promote human flourishing and
a healthy planet. We believe that democratizing public utilities can help to
address our political institutions’ legitimacy crisis by showing that democracy  can be innovative and empowering, and a trust-enhancing alternative to an increasingly oligopolistic economy and political authoritarianism.

The knowledge of unsustainable human and Earth system interactions is widespread, especially in light of systemic environmental injustices. Systems science has enabled complex and rigorous understandings of human and Earth system dynamics, particularly relating to pollution of Earth’s land, water, air, and organisms. Given that many of these systems are not functioning sustainably or optimally, how might this field enable both rigorous understanding of the issues and experiments aimed at alternative outcomes? Here, we put forth a novel, multiscale systems science approach with three steps: (1) understanding the systemic issues at hand, (2) identifying systemic interventions, and (3) applying experiments to study the efficacy of such interventions. We illustrate this framework through the ubiquitous and yet frequently underrecognized issue of soil lead (Pb). First, we describe the systemic interactions of humans and soil Pb at micro-, meso-, and macroscales in time and space. We then...

C.S. Peirce defines mathematics in two ways: first as "the science which draws necessary conclusions," and second as "the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things" (CP 4.227–244). Given the dual definition, Peirce notes, a question arises: Should we exclude the work of poietic hypothesis-making from the domain of pure mathematical reasoning? (CP 4.238). This paper examines Peirce's answer to the question. Some commentators hold that for Peirce the framing of mathematical hypotheses requires poietic genius but is not scientific work. I propose, to the contrary, that although Peirce occasionally seems to exclude the poietic creation of hypotheses altogether from pure mathematical reasoning, Peirce's position is rather that the creation of mathematical hypotheses is poietic, but it is not merely poietic, and accordingly, that hypothesis-framing is part of mathematical reasoning that involves an element of poiesis but is not merely poietic either. Scientific considerations also inhere in the process of hypothesis-making, without excluding the poietic element. In the end, I propose that hypothesis-making in mathematics stands between artistic and scientific poietic creativity with respect to imaginative freedom from logical and actual constraints upon reasoning.

I discuss the epistemic conditions for the possibility of mathematical discovery that are implied by Peirce’s logic of mathematical inquiry. Peirce describes the mathematician’s reasoning abilities as the powers of imagination, concentration, and generalization. I interpret all three as different semiotic abilities to reason with mathematical icons, given Peirce’s conception of mathematics as the study of what is true of hypothetical states of things and his view of mathematical method as experimentation upon diagrams that embody formal relations. These abilities come into play at different stages of the process of experimentation upon diagrams. I illustrate Peirce’s view with a historical example from ancient Greek geometry.

I articulate Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of mathematical education as related to his conception of mathematics, the nature of its method of inquiry, and especially, the reasoning abilities required for mathematical inquiry. The main thesis is that Peirce’s philosophy of mathematical education primarily aims at fostering the development of the students’ semeiotic abilities of imagination, concentration, and generalization required for conducting mathematical inquiry by way of experimentation upon diagrams. This involves an emphasis on the relation between theory and practice and between mathematics and other fields including the arts and sciences. For achieving its goals, the article is divided in three sections. First, I expound Peirce’s philosophical account of mathematical reasoning. Second, I illustrate this account by way of a geometrical example, placing special emphasis on its relation to mathematical education. Finally, I put forth some Peircean philosophical principles for mathematical education.

I argue against the tendency in the philosophy of science literature to link abduction to the inference to the best explanation (IBE), and in particular, to claim that Peircean abduction is a conceptual predecessor to IBE. This is not to discount either abduction or IBE. Rather the purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between Peircean abduction and IBE in accounting for ampliative inference in science. This paper aims at a proper classification—not justification—of types of scientific reasoning. In particular, I claim that Peircean abduction is an in-depth account of the process of generating explanatory hypotheses, while IBE, at least in Peter Lipton’s thorough treatment, is a more encompassing account of the processes both of generating and of evaluating scientific hypotheses. There is then a two-fold problem with the claim that abduction is IBE. On the one hand, it conflates abduction and induction, which are two distinct forms of logical inference, with two distinct aims, as shown by Charles S. Peirce; on the other hand it lacks a clear sense of the full scope of IBE as an account of scientific inference.

This essay provides an account of the personal experience of immigration at three levels: general aims; relations to place and to other persons; and feelings and sensibility. The account is structured by Charles Peirce's phenomenological categories, but the emphasis is on describing the experience. For the experiential descriptions, the essay also relies on the work of Latin Americans such as Octavio Paz and Mario Benedetti and Anglo Americans such as Henry Thoreau, John McDermott, Jane Addams, and Lara Trout.