This chapter presents a positive philosophy of male sexuality: one that is not rooted in so-calle... more This chapter presents a positive philosophy of male sexuality: one that is not rooted in so-called toxic masculinity and which is compatible with gender equality. I argue that, for such a sexuality to be possible, respect is the moral baseline. However, the status quo for male sexuality is shaped by white supremacy and heteronormativity. To resist these values, men must do more than merely cross some minimal moral threshold for permissible sex. Rather, they ought to develop a caring character so that they would want to seek out their own and their partner’s (robust) sexual fulfillment. Men ought actively to develop ways to increase pleasure for themselves and their partners.
With the cultural reckoning of the #MeToo movement, current conversations are largely revolving a... more With the cultural reckoning of the #MeToo movement, current conversations are largely revolving around how to give and receive consent properly. Sexual consent is based on the sexual choices and preferences of the people involved.
The common idea of love is a fusion of the individuals into one. The idea has permeated throughou... more The common idea of love is a fusion of the individuals into one. The idea has permeated throughout society so that it has now been taken for granted. Such an idea of fusion of two individuals is actually harmful rather than helpful. Starting with Sartre, he is the paradigmatic example of the traditional model of love going wrong. By taking the fusion model to its final culmination, love is impossible or—among other things— sadomasochistic. Beauvoir reads Sartre's view as a bad-faith version of love. She inserts her view by giving an account of the “woman in love” which is an example of a woman under Sartre's interpretation of love. Beauvoir states that authentic love can only happen if the individuals are equal. That way, love can have grounds for culmination and fusion. Irigaray looks at the fusion model as debunked. She sees what Sartre and Beauvoir assuming major things. Irigaray states that genuine love is based on the differences— particularly sexual differences—which S...
The COVID-19 pandemic is a worldwide phenomenon that has disrupted people's lives and the economy... more The COVID-19 pandemic is a worldwide phenomenon that has disrupted people's lives and the economy. Currently, the United States leads COVID cases in the world and as of this writing, the United States has the largest amount of confirmed deaths, and ranks eighth in deaths per capita due to the virus. There are a number of factors that might explain why the numbers are so high: the United States' failed leadership in tackling the virus back in December/January, the government's response to handling the crisis once the virus spread throughout the United States, states' opening up too early-and too quickly-in May and June, and people's unwillingness to take the pandemic seriously by not social distancing or wearing face masks. Let us focus on the last point. Why the unseriousness? As soon as the pandemic hit, conspiracy theories regarding the virus spread like-well, like the virus itself. Some are so fully convinced about a conspiracy theory that their beliefs may be incorrigible. Others seem only to doubt mask-wearing as a solution. Part of the unwillingness to wear face masks is due to the CDC and WHO having changed their positions about wearing masks as a preventative measure. From the beginning, the U.S. Surgeon General claimed that masks were ineffective, but now both the CDC and the WHO recommend wearing them. Why this reversal? We are facing a novel virus. Science, as an institution, works through confirming and disconfirming hypotheses. Scientists find evidence for a claim and it leads to their hypothesis being correct. As time goes on, scientists gather new evidence disconfirming their original hypothesis. And as time continues further, they gather more information and evidence and were too quick to disconfirm the hypothesis. Because this virus is so new, scientists are working with limited knowledge. There will inevitably be back-and-forth shifts on what works and what doesn't.
This essay explains some basic concepts about BDSM, and it responds to two important objections t... more This essay explains some basic concepts about BDSM, and it responds to two important objections to it. The first is the psychological objection—that BDSM practitioners suffer from mental disorders—and the second is the ethical objection—that BDSM practitioners have morally compromised desires because of the kinds of activities they desire to participate in, especially ones that involve roles that dip into tortured oppressive histories (e.g., "rape" scenes, "master-and-slave" scenes). The paper argues that both objections fail, and, more specifically focusing on the ethical objection, argues that BDSM desires are psychologically, conceptually, and phenomenologically different from their seeming counterpart real-life desires that are truly ethically defective. Finally, the paper argues that BDSM practitioners, in having to always understand, explore, and justify their desires (especially to a majority that is hostile to them), have an interesting chance to lead rich, flourishing lives.
Is abortion morally permissible? Should we avoid the practice of genetic engineering? How shall w... more Is abortion morally permissible? Should we avoid the practice of genetic engineering? How shall we allocate scarce medical resources fairly? What does it mean to have informed consent for patients? These are some of the questions that we will consider this semester. Students will gain an appreciation for the major issues facing contemporary bioethics.
Course Description Since the advent of industrialization it has become clear that modern technolo... more Course Description Since the advent of industrialization it has become clear that modern technology is not simply tools and instruments, nor merely the application of scientific principles to human practice and production in fundamental ways. This course examines the nature and scope of technology with the aim of understanding its contemporary manifestations and their causes. Look at the technology around you now. Think of the role it has in your life. Think about how it makes you conceive of yourself, in body and identity. Think of the kinds of choices and actions it makes available to you. Ask yourself if the form of your rational thinking is shaped by our current technology. Think of the anxiety you feel when trying to keep your phone in your pocket for 50 minutes. Think of the anxiety you feel when the phone you bought last year can't compete with the one from this year, and that feeling of being left behind socially when the new popular and essential app is not compatible with your phone. How did we end up here? This course will start with a historical outlook of what people have said about technology and various responses to people in the past. These questions are: (1) What is technology? Can we define it? What is it made up of? (2) Is technology autonomous? Does it control us?
This chapter presents a positive philosophy of male sexuality: one that is not rooted in so-calle... more This chapter presents a positive philosophy of male sexuality: one that is not rooted in so-called toxic masculinity and which is compatible with gender equality. I argue that, for such a sexuality to be possible, respect is the moral baseline. However, the status quo for male sexuality is shaped by white supremacy and heteronormativity. To resist these values, men must do more than merely cross some minimal moral threshold for permissible sex. Rather, they ought to develop a caring character so that they would want to seek out their own and their partner’s (robust) sexual fulfillment. Men ought actively to develop ways to increase pleasure for themselves and their partners.
With the cultural reckoning of the #MeToo movement, current conversations are largely revolving a... more With the cultural reckoning of the #MeToo movement, current conversations are largely revolving around how to give and receive consent properly. Sexual consent is based on the sexual choices and preferences of the people involved.
The common idea of love is a fusion of the individuals into one. The idea has permeated throughou... more The common idea of love is a fusion of the individuals into one. The idea has permeated throughout society so that it has now been taken for granted. Such an idea of fusion of two individuals is actually harmful rather than helpful. Starting with Sartre, he is the paradigmatic example of the traditional model of love going wrong. By taking the fusion model to its final culmination, love is impossible or—among other things— sadomasochistic. Beauvoir reads Sartre's view as a bad-faith version of love. She inserts her view by giving an account of the “woman in love” which is an example of a woman under Sartre's interpretation of love. Beauvoir states that authentic love can only happen if the individuals are equal. That way, love can have grounds for culmination and fusion. Irigaray looks at the fusion model as debunked. She sees what Sartre and Beauvoir assuming major things. Irigaray states that genuine love is based on the differences— particularly sexual differences—which S...
The COVID-19 pandemic is a worldwide phenomenon that has disrupted people's lives and the economy... more The COVID-19 pandemic is a worldwide phenomenon that has disrupted people's lives and the economy. Currently, the United States leads COVID cases in the world and as of this writing, the United States has the largest amount of confirmed deaths, and ranks eighth in deaths per capita due to the virus. There are a number of factors that might explain why the numbers are so high: the United States' failed leadership in tackling the virus back in December/January, the government's response to handling the crisis once the virus spread throughout the United States, states' opening up too early-and too quickly-in May and June, and people's unwillingness to take the pandemic seriously by not social distancing or wearing face masks. Let us focus on the last point. Why the unseriousness? As soon as the pandemic hit, conspiracy theories regarding the virus spread like-well, like the virus itself. Some are so fully convinced about a conspiracy theory that their beliefs may be incorrigible. Others seem only to doubt mask-wearing as a solution. Part of the unwillingness to wear face masks is due to the CDC and WHO having changed their positions about wearing masks as a preventative measure. From the beginning, the U.S. Surgeon General claimed that masks were ineffective, but now both the CDC and the WHO recommend wearing them. Why this reversal? We are facing a novel virus. Science, as an institution, works through confirming and disconfirming hypotheses. Scientists find evidence for a claim and it leads to their hypothesis being correct. As time goes on, scientists gather new evidence disconfirming their original hypothesis. And as time continues further, they gather more information and evidence and were too quick to disconfirm the hypothesis. Because this virus is so new, scientists are working with limited knowledge. There will inevitably be back-and-forth shifts on what works and what doesn't.
This essay explains some basic concepts about BDSM, and it responds to two important objections t... more This essay explains some basic concepts about BDSM, and it responds to two important objections to it. The first is the psychological objection—that BDSM practitioners suffer from mental disorders—and the second is the ethical objection—that BDSM practitioners have morally compromised desires because of the kinds of activities they desire to participate in, especially ones that involve roles that dip into tortured oppressive histories (e.g., "rape" scenes, "master-and-slave" scenes). The paper argues that both objections fail, and, more specifically focusing on the ethical objection, argues that BDSM desires are psychologically, conceptually, and phenomenologically different from their seeming counterpart real-life desires that are truly ethically defective. Finally, the paper argues that BDSM practitioners, in having to always understand, explore, and justify their desires (especially to a majority that is hostile to them), have an interesting chance to lead rich, flourishing lives.
Is abortion morally permissible? Should we avoid the practice of genetic engineering? How shall w... more Is abortion morally permissible? Should we avoid the practice of genetic engineering? How shall we allocate scarce medical resources fairly? What does it mean to have informed consent for patients? These are some of the questions that we will consider this semester. Students will gain an appreciation for the major issues facing contemporary bioethics.
Course Description Since the advent of industrialization it has become clear that modern technolo... more Course Description Since the advent of industrialization it has become clear that modern technology is not simply tools and instruments, nor merely the application of scientific principles to human practice and production in fundamental ways. This course examines the nature and scope of technology with the aim of understanding its contemporary manifestations and their causes. Look at the technology around you now. Think of the role it has in your life. Think about how it makes you conceive of yourself, in body and identity. Think of the kinds of choices and actions it makes available to you. Ask yourself if the form of your rational thinking is shaped by our current technology. Think of the anxiety you feel when trying to keep your phone in your pocket for 50 minutes. Think of the anxiety you feel when the phone you bought last year can't compete with the one from this year, and that feeling of being left behind socially when the new popular and essential app is not compatible with your phone. How did we end up here? This course will start with a historical outlook of what people have said about technology and various responses to people in the past. These questions are: (1) What is technology? Can we define it? What is it made up of? (2) Is technology autonomous? Does it control us?
Sexual consent has been receiving much attention lately. Most of the criteria for sexual consent ... more Sexual consent has been receiving much attention lately. Most of the criteria for sexual consent are formulaic. Some theories of consent constitute some features that are needed (e.g. voluntariness, being informed, cognitive capacities) while others appeal to some ideal view of the world (e.g. a world where heteronormative features are eradicated to truly consent). While these formulas are worthy of note, the problems with an ideal theory of consent is that (1) it ignores the character of the agents who are consenting, (2) it ignores the context of the relationship, and (3) it ignores the speakers formation of the truth of what they want. I offer an account that does not appeal to an ideal theory. Instead, I rely on autonomy as forming and developing agentic skills. Since autonomy and consent correlate with each other, I suggest what consent looks like by developing agentic skills. The agentic skills are not purely cognitive, but also affective and somatic. The affective and somatic faculties will be discussed and developed with the latest scientific work in sexuality studies. These studies offer different ways people’s understanding of their sexual self. After mentioning these scientific studies, I show that agentic skills can vary and change depending on the context of the relationship. Moreover, agentic skills help constitute various virtues that the agents have thereby constituting consent. How does one develop agentic skills? I suggest bringing in the notion of parrhesia from Foucault where the speakers tell the truth of their sexual desires such that consent is possible. Parrhesia and askesis are ways to build up the agent’s autonomy such that consent is not only maintained, but also reveals the agent’s inner character of their sexual self.
To degrade someone is to deny someone's humanity. Therefore, degradation is unethical. However,... more To degrade someone is to deny someone's humanity. Therefore, degradation is unethical. However, some sexual activities include not only degradation, but the desire for degradation. Claudia Card argues that any desire for degradation (and BDSM, in general) is to be under patriarchal control. I argue against this view by offering a sketch of ethical sexual degradation. I propose that one must be consenting enthusiastically, which means that substantial autonomy must be the foundation. Second, one must have relational autonomy with the other agent so that there is a sense of trust between the people involved. Finally, one must feel empowered through one’s choices, which, in turn maximizes substantial autonomy.
Monogamy is the assumed default when it comes to romantic relationships. Dan Savage has question... more Monogamy is the assumed default when it comes to romantic relationships. Dan Savage has questioned this assumption by making a case for “monogamish” relationships. His argument is based on sexual fulfillment of the partners and being G.G.G. (being good, giving, and game). I analyze Savage’s argument and detail specific points. The analysis includes a syllogistic format of Savage’s claim followed by a detailed investigation of the premises. The investigation will include philosophical and empirical claims to see if Savage’s argument is valid. Finally, I look at the implications of Savage’s argument and see what this entails for romantic love, relationships, and sexual exclusivity.
Sartre is known for propounding the idea that all relationships are based on conflict. Because o... more Sartre is known for propounding the idea that all relationships are based on conflict. Because of this, all loving relationships are impossible because each leads to a circularity where the individuals involved switch between being dominant or submissive. Luce Irigaray has pointed out mistakes that Sartre made. For Irigaray, Sartre is missing two major components. First, Sartre is missing the intersubjectivity of two subjects. According to Irigaray, Sartre sees the other as “a place, a thing,” which is an object and not a subject. Secondly, and most importantly, Sartre is misconstruing the terms of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. They both involve the body and consciousness. Moreover, by recognizing the differences, this opens up a space between the lover the and the Other, which for Irigaray, is needed for a genuine relationship. The barrier between the lover and the Other is a problem for Sartre, but for Irigaray, this is a sanctuary. Therefore, the two subjects can meet rather trying to have a conflictual sublimation of the other. The object of this paper is to respond to Irigaray’s critiques through a Sartrean lens. To the first critique, I argue that Sartre does want another subject, but through his metaphysics about the nature of consciousness—and not because of sexual difference—it is impossible. The subject is free and one cannot capture a freedom. Thus, the lover goes for the closest thing available: the body. This does not lead to objectification, but simply capturing the subject through means of an object. To respond to Irigaray’s second critique, Irigaray makes the mistake that Sartre splits consciousness and the body. In fact, Sartre in general is accused of ignoring the “lived body,” the body as it figures in the everyday stream of life as opposed to the body as a physiological and biological object. However, Sartre does talk about the body as an expressive object, “the body-for-itself” as opposed to the “body-object.” This is how we can desire each other as human beings rather than a concrete split between consciousness and body. It is only in a sense that we desire the body of the other. What is desired is a conscious “living body” and not just a combined parts of the body. So Sartre is not denying the body. The for-itself is not something connected or inside the body. The body is not merely something that I control, but is the center of consciousness where consciousness projects its possibilities. Embodiment entails some intimate connection between consciousness and body. Thus, Sartre does have the concept of embodied consciousness that Irigaray thought was missing in Sartre’s phenomenology. With this, I do not encounter the Other as mere body or as merely an object, but as embodied consciousness with desire. This desire means that not only do I see the Other’s body, but it reveals my own body. Sexual desire is a desire for a body, to possess the Other as flesh, but not to possess the Other as a thing, as just pure in-itself. It is the desire for a particular body “with consciousness on the horizon.” In sexual encounters, we both want something mutual. The aim of desire is what we must do but we cannot do: see the other as both object and subject simultaneously, be both object and subject for the other. The freedom of the Other is always beyond my reach because a free subjectivity will never be captured.
Traditionally, love has been seen as searching for one’s “other half.” We are determined to find... more Traditionally, love has been seen as searching for one’s “other half.” We are determined to find our soul mate and if we do not find one, we are deemed “less than human” or not truly living up to our potential humanity. In society, the fusion of lovers is permeated through our culture. The main reply against this is Sartre but he still falls under the rubric of the fusion model. Luce Irigaray is a philosopher that stands against the fusion model altogether. She will point out the mistakes that both the tradition and Sartre have fallen into and what they have been assuming. For both sides, they are assuming that love can only happen (1) under a unification of the individuals, (2) if the individuals are equal, and (3) under a pre-existing framework of having a family. In the end, Irigaray will conclude that love as a unification is possible, but one would not want that anyways because it just leads into Sartrean sadomasochism. In fact, one would not want love qua union at all. Genuine love for Irigaray means that the lovers must be different, and with that, I will bring in her concept of sexual difference and what it could mean for society if everyone followed the rubric of sexual difference.
Sex education has had mainly two discourses: paternalism and liberalism. Both of these discourse... more Sex education has had mainly two discourses: paternalism and liberalism. Both of these discourses focus on what to avoid in sexual activity, but this is not why people engage in sex. Furthermore, these discourses mention that one should not engage in sex until “one is ready” but this is quickly set aside, and the focus moves on what to avoid in sexuality. These discourses have set up norms where engaging in sexual activity is only valuable in the context of a certain model (usually within a heterosexual monogamous marriage). This thereby makes both the paternalistic and liberal models limited. I argue that by using Foucault’s hermeneutics of the subject and his notion of what it means to take care of the self will open up discourses where students can “empower” themselves and form a relationship with themselves, and to see themselves as sexual subjects. Part of taking care of the self means to take care of others: the practices are not done by oneself, but through an engagement with others where these practices become principles of action. I investigate the discourses of paternalism and liberalism and show their limitations by showing their norms in sex education. I then investigate what Foucault means by taking care of the self along with parrhesia–which means truth-telling in a courageous and honest way where risk is involved. Finally, I apply care of the self in sex education. By using new discourses, these will elicit new questions and engage the students as sexual subjects. I will use three practices: (1) discourse of erotics, which would open up new discourses and allows certain questions and expressions to be discussed and thinkable; (2) repairing the self after emotional harm or oppression in a sexual context. A “repair” would still be learning how to take care of the self as the foundational point in order to “move beyond” the destruction of the self; and (3) new modes of relationships, which would allow different forms of sexual expressions and practices as part of what it means to be a sexual subject. With these practices, one can be “free” by undergoing techniques of the self and exercising parrhesia.
Our normal routines have been thrown asunder due to the novel SARS-CoV-2. Soon the world will be ... more Our normal routines have been thrown asunder due to the novel SARS-CoV-2. Soon the world will be able to take a vaccine to counter the virus. While the vaccine is a cause for celebration, many communities have stated that they would not take the vaccine due to ideological concerns and exercising their autonomy. Without a sufficient number of people taking the vaccine, the community cannot reach herd immunity. There must be a way to respect people’s autonomy yet incentivize people to take the vaccine. I offer three disparate solutions that could offer both. The first solution recommends similar lockdowns that many communities had in early 2020 are in place until herd immunity is achieved. People are free to go about their business as long as those stipulations are in place such as wearing masks and social distancing. The second solution recommends a vaccine passport when traveling internationally or perhaps in certain cases, from one community to another. The third solution recommends paying people to take the vaccine. I consider objections throughout.
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The object of this paper is to respond to Irigaray’s critiques through a Sartrean lens. To the first critique, I argue that Sartre does want another subject, but through his metaphysics about the nature of consciousness—and not because of sexual difference—it is impossible. The subject is free and one cannot capture a freedom. Thus, the lover goes for the closest thing available: the body. This does not lead to objectification, but simply capturing the subject through means of an object.
To respond to Irigaray’s second critique, Irigaray makes the mistake that Sartre splits consciousness and the body. In fact, Sartre in general is accused of ignoring the “lived body,” the body as it figures in the everyday stream of life as opposed to the body as a physiological and biological object. However, Sartre does talk about the body as an expressive object, “the body-for-itself” as opposed to the “body-object.” This is how we can desire each other as human beings rather than a concrete split between consciousness and body. It is only in a sense that we desire the body of the other. What is desired is a conscious “living body” and not just a combined parts of the body. So Sartre is not denying the body. The for-itself is not something connected or inside the body. The body is not merely something that I control, but is the center of consciousness where consciousness projects its possibilities. Embodiment entails some intimate connection between consciousness and body. Thus, Sartre does have the concept of embodied consciousness that Irigaray thought was missing in Sartre’s phenomenology. With this, I do not encounter the Other as mere body or as merely an object, but as embodied consciousness with desire. This desire means that not only do I see the Other’s body, but it reveals my own body. Sexual desire is a desire for a body, to possess the Other as flesh, but not to possess the Other as a thing, as just pure in-itself. It is the desire for a particular body “with consciousness on the horizon.” In sexual encounters, we both want something mutual. The aim of desire is what we must do but we cannot do: see the other as both object and subject simultaneously, be both object and subject for the other. The freedom of the Other is always beyond my reach because a free subjectivity will never be captured.
Luce Irigaray is a philosopher that stands against the fusion model altogether. She will point out the mistakes that both the tradition and Sartre have fallen into and what they have been assuming. For both sides, they are assuming that love can only happen (1) under a unification of the individuals, (2) if the individuals are equal, and (3) under a pre-existing framework of having a family. In the end, Irigaray will conclude that love as a unification is possible, but one would not want that anyways because it just leads into Sartrean sadomasochism. In fact, one would not want love qua union at all. Genuine love for Irigaray means that the lovers must be different, and with that, I will bring in her concept of sexual difference and what it could mean for society if everyone followed the rubric of sexual difference.