What role do justice institutions play in autocracies? We bring together the literatures on autho... more What role do justice institutions play in autocracies? We bring together the literatures on authoritarian political institutions and on judicial politics to create a framework to answer this question. We start from the premise that autocrats use justice institutions to deal with the fundamental problems of control and power-sharing. Unpacking " justice institutions " we argue that prosecutors and ordinary courts can serve, respectively, as " top-down " and " bottom-up " monitoring and information-gathering mechanisms helping the dictator in the choice between repression and cooptation. We also argue that representation in the Supreme Court and special jurisdictions enables the dictator and his ruling coalition to solve intra-elite conflicts facilitating coordination. We provide several examples from Mexico under the hegemonic system of the PRI and of Spain under Francisco Franco, as well as punctual illustrations from other countries around the world. We conclude by reflecting on some of the potential consequences of this usage of justice institutions under autocracy for democratization.
We argue that authoritarian leaders use judicial institutions (different types and levels of pros... more We argue that authoritarian leaders use judicial institutions (different types and levels of prosecutors, judges, and courts) to deal with their two fundamental problems: The problem of authoritarian control, i.e. the relation between the autocrat and the masses, and the problem of authoritarian power sharing, i.e. the relation between the autocrat and his ruling coalition. Specifically, judicial institutions can contribute to solve the problem of control by monitoring actual and potential political opponents. We also sustain that they can contribute to solve the problem of authoritarian power-sharing by making credible the commitments made by the authoritarian leader to the members of his ruling coalition, either by awarding them with the privilege of special jurisdictions to deal with their own affairs (e.g. military, labor, or ecclesiastical), or by guarantying the (relative) neutrality of certain (judicial) institutions to solve intra-elite conflicts. We illustrate these different roles of judicial institutions in the cases of Mexico under the hegemonic system of the PRI, and of Spain under Francisco Franco.
Mexico has undergone a peculiar transition to a democracy that in some aspects and places still e... more Mexico has undergone a peculiar transition to a democracy that in some aspects and places still exhibits traits of the authoritarian past. The combination of authoritarian shades and democratic glares, rich diversity in socioeconomic conditions across the country, and the recent availability of a wealth of information and systematized data make for a great deal of research opportunities for sociolegal scholarship. This article reviews recent sociolegal studies on courts and judicial behavior, public security and the criminal justice system, and legal culture, pointing to several empirical puzzles and open questions that are crying out for explanations and systematic empirical analysis.
What role do justice institutions play in autocracies? We bring together the literatures on autho... more What role do justice institutions play in autocracies? We bring together the literatures on authoritarian political institutions and on judicial politics to create a framework to answer this question. We start from the premise that autocrats use justice institutions to deal with the fundamental problems of control and power-sharing. Unpacking " justice institutions " we argue that prosecutors and ordinary courts can serve, respectively, as " top-down " and " bottom-up " monitoring and information-gathering mechanisms helping the dictator in the choice between repression and cooptation. We also argue that representation in the Supreme Court and special jurisdictions enables the dictator and his ruling coalition to solve intra-elite conflicts facilitating coordination. We provide several examples from Mexico under the hegemonic system of the PRI and of Spain under Francisco Franco, as well as punctual illustrations from other countries around the world. We conclude by reflecting on some of the potential consequences of this usage of justice institutions under autocracy for democratization.
We argue that authoritarian leaders use judicial institutions (different types and levels of pros... more We argue that authoritarian leaders use judicial institutions (different types and levels of prosecutors, judges, and courts) to deal with their two fundamental problems: The problem of authoritarian control, i.e. the relation between the autocrat and the masses, and the problem of authoritarian power sharing, i.e. the relation between the autocrat and his ruling coalition. Specifically, judicial institutions can contribute to solve the problem of control by monitoring actual and potential political opponents. We also sustain that they can contribute to solve the problem of authoritarian power-sharing by making credible the commitments made by the authoritarian leader to the members of his ruling coalition, either by awarding them with the privilege of special jurisdictions to deal with their own affairs (e.g. military, labor, or ecclesiastical), or by guarantying the (relative) neutrality of certain (judicial) institutions to solve intra-elite conflicts. We illustrate these different roles of judicial institutions in the cases of Mexico under the hegemonic system of the PRI, and of Spain under Francisco Franco.
Mexico has undergone a peculiar transition to a democracy that in some aspects and places still e... more Mexico has undergone a peculiar transition to a democracy that in some aspects and places still exhibits traits of the authoritarian past. The combination of authoritarian shades and democratic glares, rich diversity in socioeconomic conditions across the country, and the recent availability of a wealth of information and systematized data make for a great deal of research opportunities for sociolegal scholarship. This article reviews recent sociolegal studies on courts and judicial behavior, public security and the criminal justice system, and legal culture, pointing to several empirical puzzles and open questions that are crying out for explanations and systematic empirical analysis.
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