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2. Quest for the best: How to measure central bank independence and show its relation with inflation?. (2008). Masłowska-Jokinen, Aleksandra.
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3. Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures. (2007). Masłowska-Jokinen, Aleksandra.
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4. Will Monetary Policy Become More of a Science?. (2007). Mishkin, Frederic.
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5. Will monetary policy become more of a science?. (2007). Mishkin, Frederic.
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1. Institutions and Business Cycles. (2011). Neyapti, Bilin ; Altug, Sumru ; Emin, Mustafa .
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2. Independence Day for the “Old Lady? A Natural Experiment on the Implications of Central Bank Independence. (2006). Nolan, Charles ; Chadha, Jagjit ; Macmillan, Peter ; BADRAN, rema.
   In: CDMA Working Paper Series.
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3. Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation: Why the Wage Contracts Length Matters?. (2006). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Diana, Giuseppe.
   In: International Advances in Economic Research.
   RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:287-297:10.1007/s11294-006-9017-3.

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4. Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean. (2005). Vazquez, Francisco ; Jácome, Luis ; Jacome, Luis.
   In: Macroeconomics.
   RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0508011.

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5. Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank. (2005). Klein, Michael ; Goldberg, Linda.
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6. Central Bank Reform and Inflation Dynamics in the Transition Economies theory and some evidence. (2005). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Papadopoulos, Athanasios ; Diana, Giuseppe.
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7. Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank. (2005). Klein, Michael ; Goldberg, Linda.
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8. Establishing credibility: evolving perceptions of the European Central Bank. (2005). Klein, Michael ; Goldberg, Linda.
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9. Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy. (2004). Rose, Andrew ; Mihov, Ilian ; Fatas, Antonio.
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10. Bureaucrats or Politicians?. (2004). Tabellini, Guido ; Alesina, Alberto.
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11. Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker. (2004). Kempf, Hubert ; Aaron-Cureau, Corinne.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004.
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12. Central bank transparency in theory and practice. (2004). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Demertzis, Maria.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2003.
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13. Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy: Evidence from OECD Economies. (2004). Falk, Barry ; Doyle, Matthew.
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14. Political support for anti-inflationary monetary policy. (2004). Sabani, Laura ; Di Gioacchino, Debora ; Ginebri, Sergio .
    In: International Journal of Finance & Economics.
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15. Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2004 an Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott. (2004). Setzer, Ralph ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim.
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16. Central Bank Transparency: A Market Indicator. (2003). Howells, Peter ; biefang-frisancho, iris ; Mariscal, Iris Biefang-Frisancho .
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17. Central Bank Independence, Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio.. (2003). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Diana, Giuseppe.
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18. The Non-Monotonic Relationship Between Seigniorage and Inequality. (2003). Haslag, Joseph ; Bunzel, Helle ; Bhattacharya, Joydeep.
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19. Bureaucrats or Politicians?. (2003). Tabellini, Guido ; Alesina, Alberto.
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20. Central Bank Independence and Price Stability: Evidence from 23 OECD-countries. (2003). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; de Luna, Xavier.
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21. Political Business Cycles and Central Bank Independence. (2003). Pickering, Andrew ; Hadri, Kaddour ; Maloney, John .
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22. The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence. (2003). Herrendorf, Berthold ; Manfred J. M. Neumann, ; Manfred J. M. Neumann, .
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23. Independência e autonomia do Banco Central: mais sobre o debate [Central Bank independence and autonomy: more on this debate]. (2003). Jayme Jr, Frederico ; Crocco, Marco.
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24. Inflation and the size of government. (2002). Mulligan, Casey ; Han, Song.
    In: Finance and Economics Discussion Series.
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25. Reflections on the Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence. (2001). Bibow, Joerg.
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26. Financial Markets and Economic Development in Africa. (2001). NDIKUMANA, LEONCE.
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27. Three Pillars of Conventional Wisdom. (2001). Cross, Rod.
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28. Central Bank Independence and Accountability Under Complete Information. (2001). Castellani, Francesca.
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29. Sacrifice ratios and monetary policy credibility: do smaller budget deficits, inflation-indexed debt, and inflation targets lower disinflation costs?. (2001). Durham, J. Benson.
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30. Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - An International Perspective. (2001). Neyapti, Bilin ; Cukierman, Alex ; Miller, Geoffrey .
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31. Wage Indexation, Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation. (2000). Diana, Giuseppe.
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32. Inflation Targeting Macroeconomic Distortions and the Policy Reaction Function. (2000). Karunaratne, Neil D..
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33. Causes of the Korean Financial Crisis: Lessons for Policy. (2000). Mishkin, Frederic ; Hahm, Joon-Ho .
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34. International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes. (2000). Mishkin, Frederic.
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35. Reliance, composition, and inflation. (2000). Haslag, Joseph ; Bhattacharya, Joydeep.
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36. International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes. (1999). Mishkin, Frederic.
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37. The European system of central banks. (1999). Wynne, Mark.
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38. Is bank supervision central to central banking?. (1999). Tootell, Geoffrey ; Rosengren, Eric ; Peek, Joe.
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39. An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments. (1999). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Demertzis, Maria.
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40. Inflation Target Instability and Interest Rates. (1998). Mellin, Stefan.
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41. Central Bank Policy Rules: Conceptual Issues and Practical Considerations. (1997). Cecchetti, Stephen.
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42. Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?. (1997). Tirelli, Patrizio ; Natale, Piergiovanna ; Lossani, M..
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43. Is banking supervision central to central banking?. (1997). Tootell, Geoffrey ; Rosengren, Eric ; Peek, Joe.
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44. Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. (1996). Barro, Robert.
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45. Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions. (1996). Perotti, Roberto ; Alesina, Alberto.
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46. Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences and Central Bank Independence. (1996). Muscatelli, Vito.
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47. Inflation and Economic Growth. (1995). Barro, Robert.
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48. Central bank independence : a critical view. (1994). Mas, Ignacio .
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49. Designing Monetary Policy when Unemployment Persists.. (1994). Zhang, Lei ; Miller, Marcus ; Lockwood, Ben.
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50. Public Debt Indexation and Denomination with and Indipendent Central Bank. (). Missale, Alessandro ; Falcetti, Elisabetta.
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