Specialist in sub-Saharan Africa, climate change, energy access, decentralization, democratization, patronage politics, political economy of development, developing countries
In 2015, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), henceforth Congo, expanded the number of its pro... more In 2015, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), henceforth Congo, expanded the number of its provinces from 11 to 26. Given the importance of ethnicity in Congolese politics, we investigate how this process, known as découpage, has affected the ethnic distribution of populations and governments by province, and the extent to which it has changed the autochthony status of provincial residents. We then ask whether our findings have implications for identity reconfigurations among the Congolese and for the foundations of the country’s political system.
Expectations that decentralisation in DRC would result in improved provincial governance were pre... more Expectations that decentralisation in DRC would result in improved provincial governance were predicated upon an understanding of provincial elites as autonomous from Kinshasa. In reality, they are deeply embedded in informal patronage networks that reach out across the country, emanating from the presidency outwards. These networks are highly centralised, weaving a web that largely neutralises the political, financial and administrative autonomy of provinces. Features of this web include: (1) the informal control of political and administrative appointments, that should be provincially allocated, by elites in and around the presidency; (2) financial poaching of provincial actors; (3) predatory extractive pressures by central elites; (4) the use of political ‘godfathers’ to maintain indirect oversight of provincial elites; (5) the use of provincial legislative authorities as tools for sanctioning unreliable governors. Under these conditions, effective decentralisation remains elusive. For possibly better odds of success, donors could consider interventions that seek to build on the existing patronage structure rather than seeking to eliminate or ignoring it. Our findings are based on fieldwork carried out over 2017–2018 in three of the four provinces of former Katanga: Haut-Katanga, Haut-Lomami and Lualaba. We interviewed about 80 respondents, including provincial political actors, civil servants, civil society activists, ethnic representatives and academics. We also gathered data on budgets, transfers and employment from provincial executives and assemblies.
Are societies products of the natural environment or of manmade institutions? Why are some countr... more Are societies products of the natural environment or of manmade institutions? Why are some countries more economically developed than others? These types of questions have been asked for centuries. With such questions in mind, Montesquieu gives us extensive musings and considerations about the various relationships among climate, laws, culture, and economics. Contemporary scholars, who are still struggling to answer these same types of questions, often look to Montesquieu as an authority on the climate aspect. However, as they tend to focus solely on Montesquieu’s thoughts on climate, they miss the greater theory that encompasses a number of other factors as well as the rather complex, interactive set of relationships among them. This shortsightedness and oversimplification of Montesquieu’s theory has limited the scope of what contemporary scholars seek to explore. By missing his greater theory, they have missed an opportunity to apply their advanced statistical methods to a comprehensive and dynamic theory that merits empirical investigation. In this project, I will try, in a minor way, to help bridge that gap. I will first attempt to pinpoint what were Montesquieu’s true intents regarding climate, laws, and economic development, and I will then use statistical methods to test his theory empirically.
This project uses statistical methods to test Montesquieu’s theories on climate, laws, and economic development. It thus offers a unique interpretive strategy. The empirical models in this study employ two interactions terms between geographic and institutional variables. By doing so, this project helps fill an important gap in the literature on geography and institutions, and it therefore contributes to the ongoing debate between which matters most for economic development. I find that the interaction between geography and institutions has a significant effect on economic development.
The promotion of “good governance” in Africa has been the lofty goal of numerous, well-funded pro... more The promotion of “good governance” in Africa has been the lofty goal of numerous, well-funded projects implemented by many Western nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) since the early 1990s. These attempts, however, have been underwhelming at best, and obstructive at worst. In this research, we focus on political accountability in each nation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as it is a fundamental component of good governance. This focus has been lacking in the current literature and in the ongoing debate regarding good governance promotion in Africa.
We use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to show that World Bank-financed governance contracts from the US are negatively and significantly associated with decreases in political accountability in the African host nation. Political accountability is measured as the World Bank’s “Voice and Accountability” score (which ranges along a -2.5–2.5 scale). Our results indicate that for every one million dollar increase in governance contracts from the US, the SSA host nation’s accountability score decreases by 0.176 points, ceteris paribus.
We propose that Africans and Westerners have fundamentally different conceptions of “political accountability,” and that this explains, at least in part, the lackluster and even perverse outcomes of Western good governance promotion strategies in SSA. When supply does not meet demand, neither party is satisfied.
For comparative purposes, we also examine the relationship between accountability and contracts from the US that are targeted to education, infrastructure, and natural resources, as well as Chinese contracts targeted to these same sectors. Most studies look at foreign financial assistance as a whole, but we distinguish between targeted sectors in order to better assess specific relationships these sectors may have with political accountability. This novel approach of singling out funds targeted specifically to good governance promotion better identifies its relationship with accountability than do other studies that look at aid or investment in general.
Throughout the Federalist Papers, Publius limits his use of direct references to the works of Mon... more Throughout the Federalist Papers, Publius limits his use of direct references to the works of Montesquieu. When he does provide direct references (e.g., with quotes or stating his name) it is usually done so only to reply in kind to the Anti-Federalists. Publius also restricts these references to more technical issues. As Kesler explains, “Montesquieu is introduced [by Publius] only in response to the circumstances…he is not presented as an independent authority for the Constitution on his own terms” (Kesler 1987, 21). Publius’ purpose in writing the Federalist Papers is multifaceted; all at once he seeks to defend the Constitution against the Anti-Federalists’ charges, to convince the public of the urgency of ratifying the Constitution without further adjustments, to persuade his readers of the Constitution’s merits, and to cultivate a general reverence for Constitution. To accomplish this, the Constitution must be seen to stand on its own good design; its defense cannot rely too heavily on past examples or foreign standards. Publius discusses Montesquieu in a topical manner, but refers to him only as ancillary support and on isolated occasions. To be embraced as the foundation of America, the Constitution has to be viewed as entirely American.
Publius, too, leading the charge of the Constitution’s defense, must present himself as quintessentially American and devotedly republican. At the helm of a uniquely public debate, Publius has to create an image of himself as both trusted citizen and erudite political pundit. He has to be seen as impervious to dangerous foreign influences, but at the same time enlightened about worldly affairs. In the Federalist Papers, he makes his knowledge of foreign nations, ancient history, and distant philosophers undeniable, but he does not allow his arguments to depend on these things alone. Even though Montesquieu is highly respected among the Anti-Federalists, Publius is cautious about openly invoking a French baron with an unapologetic monarchical bent. The war fought against the British monarchy is still fresh in Americans’ minds, and so appearing too Montesquieuian could tarnish the image of Publius as the citizen upon a hill.
The minimal number of direct references, often technical in nature, may distract the reader from immediately recognizing the deeper philosophical links between the two authors. In Federalist 9, for example, Publius counters the Anti-Federalists’ frequent appeals to Montesquieu’s statement about the small size of republics by employing a different Montesquieu quote concerning the insecurity of small republics. This counter-quote, however, is merely an initial refutation of the small republic challenge; it does not comprise Publius’ full response in this debate, nor does it characterize Publius’ full understanding of Montesquieu on this point. Montesquieu’s influence on this subject is, in actuality, stronger where Publius does not cite him directly.
On closer inspection, Publius’ use of direct Montesquieu references appears strategic. Even in Federalist 47, where Publius specifically references Montesquieu regarding separation of powers, Publius begins by examining the British Constitution in order to “ascertain his meaning on this point” and only subsequently addresses Montesquieu’s own words (Hamilton et al. 1999, 298). Publius then proceeds to examine the distribution of powers within the state constitutions, and comments on how these correspond to Montesquieu’s doctrine. This method of using the legal document to interpret the theory is an odd reversal of what would normally be expected, but such a strategy delicately leads the reader to consider the US Constitution first instead of Montesquieu’s own propositions. The Constitution, not an abstract theoretical doctrine, is placed as the standard, as the “mirror of political liberty,” and as the source of political principles (ibid.). In a circuitous manner, however, this strategy follows Montesquieu. If the principles of a constitution are good, he says, “liberty will appear there as in a mirror” (Montesquieu 2009, 156). “Not much trouble needs be taken to discover political liberty in the constitutions,” he adds, for “[i]f it can be seen where it is, if it has been found, why seek it?” (ibid.). Furthermore, Montesquieu does not intend his works to be interpreted as templates for constitutional designs; far from it, he seeks rather to direct the legislator’s attention to societal particulars, while always keeping a knowledge of universals.
Though Publius may prudently conceal much of the footsteps in which he follows, the shared path is not as necessary to hide. Publius’ insight does not require the backing of eminent persons because his arguments reveal wisdom and prudence on their own. This allows Publius to take Montesquieu’s, and others’, teaching and form it anew in an American light. Publius, as the enlightened legislator, is a student of Montesquieu; but as the citizen lodestar, Publius offers a genius all his own. A legacy is thus established, whereby “Americans will look to the explanation of Publius, who will become our authority, even as Montesquieu was his” (Kirstol 1987, 105). Much of Publius’ success, however, must be attributed to his artful appeal and skillful persuasion, part of which rests on his literary autonomy. Obviously well-read in Montesquieu’s works, Publius could have opted to debate the Anti-Federalists on their theoretical interpretation of the philosophe (and probably could have won), yet he chooses not to refute them in this way. Instead, he entices his opponents—the misguided but “enlightened friends of liberty”—over to his side by illuminating the American Constitution as the best available means for achieving their common cause (Hamilton et al. 1999, 67).
In 2015, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), henceforth Congo, expanded the number of its pro... more In 2015, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), henceforth Congo, expanded the number of its provinces from 11 to 26. Given the importance of ethnicity in Congolese politics, we investigate how this process, known as découpage, has affected the ethnic distribution of populations and governments by province, and the extent to which it has changed the autochthony status of provincial residents. We then ask whether our findings have implications for identity reconfigurations among the Congolese and for the foundations of the country’s political system.
Expectations that decentralisation in DRC would result in improved provincial governance were pre... more Expectations that decentralisation in DRC would result in improved provincial governance were predicated upon an understanding of provincial elites as autonomous from Kinshasa. In reality, they are deeply embedded in informal patronage networks that reach out across the country, emanating from the presidency outwards. These networks are highly centralised, weaving a web that largely neutralises the political, financial and administrative autonomy of provinces. Features of this web include: (1) the informal control of political and administrative appointments, that should be provincially allocated, by elites in and around the presidency; (2) financial poaching of provincial actors; (3) predatory extractive pressures by central elites; (4) the use of political ‘godfathers’ to maintain indirect oversight of provincial elites; (5) the use of provincial legislative authorities as tools for sanctioning unreliable governors. Under these conditions, effective decentralisation remains elusive. For possibly better odds of success, donors could consider interventions that seek to build on the existing patronage structure rather than seeking to eliminate or ignoring it. Our findings are based on fieldwork carried out over 2017–2018 in three of the four provinces of former Katanga: Haut-Katanga, Haut-Lomami and Lualaba. We interviewed about 80 respondents, including provincial political actors, civil servants, civil society activists, ethnic representatives and academics. We also gathered data on budgets, transfers and employment from provincial executives and assemblies.
Are societies products of the natural environment or of manmade institutions? Why are some countr... more Are societies products of the natural environment or of manmade institutions? Why are some countries more economically developed than others? These types of questions have been asked for centuries. With such questions in mind, Montesquieu gives us extensive musings and considerations about the various relationships among climate, laws, culture, and economics. Contemporary scholars, who are still struggling to answer these same types of questions, often look to Montesquieu as an authority on the climate aspect. However, as they tend to focus solely on Montesquieu’s thoughts on climate, they miss the greater theory that encompasses a number of other factors as well as the rather complex, interactive set of relationships among them. This shortsightedness and oversimplification of Montesquieu’s theory has limited the scope of what contemporary scholars seek to explore. By missing his greater theory, they have missed an opportunity to apply their advanced statistical methods to a comprehensive and dynamic theory that merits empirical investigation. In this project, I will try, in a minor way, to help bridge that gap. I will first attempt to pinpoint what were Montesquieu’s true intents regarding climate, laws, and economic development, and I will then use statistical methods to test his theory empirically.
This project uses statistical methods to test Montesquieu’s theories on climate, laws, and economic development. It thus offers a unique interpretive strategy. The empirical models in this study employ two interactions terms between geographic and institutional variables. By doing so, this project helps fill an important gap in the literature on geography and institutions, and it therefore contributes to the ongoing debate between which matters most for economic development. I find that the interaction between geography and institutions has a significant effect on economic development.
The promotion of “good governance” in Africa has been the lofty goal of numerous, well-funded pro... more The promotion of “good governance” in Africa has been the lofty goal of numerous, well-funded projects implemented by many Western nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) since the early 1990s. These attempts, however, have been underwhelming at best, and obstructive at worst. In this research, we focus on political accountability in each nation in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as it is a fundamental component of good governance. This focus has been lacking in the current literature and in the ongoing debate regarding good governance promotion in Africa.
We use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to show that World Bank-financed governance contracts from the US are negatively and significantly associated with decreases in political accountability in the African host nation. Political accountability is measured as the World Bank’s “Voice and Accountability” score (which ranges along a -2.5–2.5 scale). Our results indicate that for every one million dollar increase in governance contracts from the US, the SSA host nation’s accountability score decreases by 0.176 points, ceteris paribus.
We propose that Africans and Westerners have fundamentally different conceptions of “political accountability,” and that this explains, at least in part, the lackluster and even perverse outcomes of Western good governance promotion strategies in SSA. When supply does not meet demand, neither party is satisfied.
For comparative purposes, we also examine the relationship between accountability and contracts from the US that are targeted to education, infrastructure, and natural resources, as well as Chinese contracts targeted to these same sectors. Most studies look at foreign financial assistance as a whole, but we distinguish between targeted sectors in order to better assess specific relationships these sectors may have with political accountability. This novel approach of singling out funds targeted specifically to good governance promotion better identifies its relationship with accountability than do other studies that look at aid or investment in general.
Throughout the Federalist Papers, Publius limits his use of direct references to the works of Mon... more Throughout the Federalist Papers, Publius limits his use of direct references to the works of Montesquieu. When he does provide direct references (e.g., with quotes or stating his name) it is usually done so only to reply in kind to the Anti-Federalists. Publius also restricts these references to more technical issues. As Kesler explains, “Montesquieu is introduced [by Publius] only in response to the circumstances…he is not presented as an independent authority for the Constitution on his own terms” (Kesler 1987, 21). Publius’ purpose in writing the Federalist Papers is multifaceted; all at once he seeks to defend the Constitution against the Anti-Federalists’ charges, to convince the public of the urgency of ratifying the Constitution without further adjustments, to persuade his readers of the Constitution’s merits, and to cultivate a general reverence for Constitution. To accomplish this, the Constitution must be seen to stand on its own good design; its defense cannot rely too heavily on past examples or foreign standards. Publius discusses Montesquieu in a topical manner, but refers to him only as ancillary support and on isolated occasions. To be embraced as the foundation of America, the Constitution has to be viewed as entirely American.
Publius, too, leading the charge of the Constitution’s defense, must present himself as quintessentially American and devotedly republican. At the helm of a uniquely public debate, Publius has to create an image of himself as both trusted citizen and erudite political pundit. He has to be seen as impervious to dangerous foreign influences, but at the same time enlightened about worldly affairs. In the Federalist Papers, he makes his knowledge of foreign nations, ancient history, and distant philosophers undeniable, but he does not allow his arguments to depend on these things alone. Even though Montesquieu is highly respected among the Anti-Federalists, Publius is cautious about openly invoking a French baron with an unapologetic monarchical bent. The war fought against the British monarchy is still fresh in Americans’ minds, and so appearing too Montesquieuian could tarnish the image of Publius as the citizen upon a hill.
The minimal number of direct references, often technical in nature, may distract the reader from immediately recognizing the deeper philosophical links between the two authors. In Federalist 9, for example, Publius counters the Anti-Federalists’ frequent appeals to Montesquieu’s statement about the small size of republics by employing a different Montesquieu quote concerning the insecurity of small republics. This counter-quote, however, is merely an initial refutation of the small republic challenge; it does not comprise Publius’ full response in this debate, nor does it characterize Publius’ full understanding of Montesquieu on this point. Montesquieu’s influence on this subject is, in actuality, stronger where Publius does not cite him directly.
On closer inspection, Publius’ use of direct Montesquieu references appears strategic. Even in Federalist 47, where Publius specifically references Montesquieu regarding separation of powers, Publius begins by examining the British Constitution in order to “ascertain his meaning on this point” and only subsequently addresses Montesquieu’s own words (Hamilton et al. 1999, 298). Publius then proceeds to examine the distribution of powers within the state constitutions, and comments on how these correspond to Montesquieu’s doctrine. This method of using the legal document to interpret the theory is an odd reversal of what would normally be expected, but such a strategy delicately leads the reader to consider the US Constitution first instead of Montesquieu’s own propositions. The Constitution, not an abstract theoretical doctrine, is placed as the standard, as the “mirror of political liberty,” and as the source of political principles (ibid.). In a circuitous manner, however, this strategy follows Montesquieu. If the principles of a constitution are good, he says, “liberty will appear there as in a mirror” (Montesquieu 2009, 156). “Not much trouble needs be taken to discover political liberty in the constitutions,” he adds, for “[i]f it can be seen where it is, if it has been found, why seek it?” (ibid.). Furthermore, Montesquieu does not intend his works to be interpreted as templates for constitutional designs; far from it, he seeks rather to direct the legislator’s attention to societal particulars, while always keeping a knowledge of universals.
Though Publius may prudently conceal much of the footsteps in which he follows, the shared path is not as necessary to hide. Publius’ insight does not require the backing of eminent persons because his arguments reveal wisdom and prudence on their own. This allows Publius to take Montesquieu’s, and others’, teaching and form it anew in an American light. Publius, as the enlightened legislator, is a student of Montesquieu; but as the citizen lodestar, Publius offers a genius all his own. A legacy is thus established, whereby “Americans will look to the explanation of Publius, who will become our authority, even as Montesquieu was his” (Kirstol 1987, 105). Much of Publius’ success, however, must be attributed to his artful appeal and skillful persuasion, part of which rests on his literary autonomy. Obviously well-read in Montesquieu’s works, Publius could have opted to debate the Anti-Federalists on their theoretical interpretation of the philosophe (and probably could have won), yet he chooses not to refute them in this way. Instead, he entices his opponents—the misguided but “enlightened friends of liberty”—over to his side by illuminating the American Constitution as the best available means for achieving their common cause (Hamilton et al. 1999, 67).
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Papers by Lisa Jené
This project uses statistical methods to test Montesquieu’s theories on climate, laws, and economic development. It thus offers a unique interpretive strategy. The empirical models in this study employ two interactions terms between geographic and institutional variables. By doing so, this project helps fill an important gap in the literature on geography and institutions, and it therefore contributes to the ongoing debate between which matters most for economic development. I find that the interaction between geography and institutions has a significant effect on economic development.
We use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to show that World Bank-financed governance contracts from the US are negatively and significantly associated with decreases in political accountability in the African host nation. Political accountability is measured as the World Bank’s “Voice and Accountability” score (which ranges along a -2.5–2.5 scale). Our results indicate that for every one million dollar increase in governance contracts from the US, the SSA host nation’s accountability score decreases by 0.176 points, ceteris paribus.
We propose that Africans and Westerners have fundamentally different conceptions of “political accountability,” and that this explains, at least in part, the lackluster and even perverse outcomes of Western good governance promotion strategies in SSA. When supply does not meet demand, neither party is satisfied.
For comparative purposes, we also examine the relationship between accountability and contracts from the US that are targeted to education, infrastructure, and natural resources, as well as Chinese contracts targeted to these same sectors. Most studies look at foreign financial assistance as a whole, but we distinguish between targeted sectors in order to better assess specific relationships these sectors may have with political accountability. This novel approach of singling out funds targeted specifically to good governance promotion better identifies its relationship with accountability than do other studies that look at aid or investment in general.
Publius, too, leading the charge of the Constitution’s defense, must present himself as quintessentially American and devotedly republican. At the helm of a uniquely public debate, Publius has to create an image of himself as both trusted citizen and erudite political pundit. He has to be seen as impervious to dangerous foreign influences, but at the same time enlightened about worldly affairs. In the Federalist Papers, he makes his knowledge of foreign nations, ancient history, and distant philosophers undeniable, but he does not allow his arguments to depend on these things alone. Even though Montesquieu is highly respected among the Anti-Federalists, Publius is cautious about openly invoking a French baron with an unapologetic monarchical bent. The war fought against the British monarchy is still fresh in Americans’ minds, and so appearing too Montesquieuian could tarnish the image of Publius as the citizen upon a hill.
The minimal number of direct references, often technical in nature, may distract the reader from immediately recognizing the deeper philosophical links between the two authors. In Federalist 9, for example, Publius counters the Anti-Federalists’ frequent appeals to Montesquieu’s statement about the small size of republics by employing a different Montesquieu quote concerning the insecurity of small republics. This counter-quote, however, is merely an initial refutation of the small republic challenge; it does not comprise Publius’ full response in this debate, nor does it characterize Publius’ full understanding of Montesquieu on this point. Montesquieu’s influence on this subject is, in actuality, stronger where Publius does not cite him directly.
On closer inspection, Publius’ use of direct Montesquieu references appears strategic. Even in Federalist 47, where Publius specifically references Montesquieu regarding separation of powers, Publius begins by examining the British Constitution in order to “ascertain his meaning on this point” and only subsequently addresses Montesquieu’s own words (Hamilton et al. 1999, 298). Publius then proceeds to examine the distribution of powers within the state constitutions, and comments on how these correspond to Montesquieu’s doctrine. This method of using the legal document to interpret the theory is an odd reversal of what would normally be expected, but such a strategy delicately leads the reader to consider the US Constitution first instead of Montesquieu’s own propositions. The Constitution, not an abstract theoretical doctrine, is placed as the standard, as the “mirror of political liberty,” and as the source of political principles (ibid.). In a circuitous manner, however, this strategy follows Montesquieu. If the principles of a constitution are good, he says, “liberty will appear there as in a mirror” (Montesquieu 2009, 156). “Not much trouble needs be taken to discover political liberty in the constitutions,” he adds, for “[i]f it can be seen where it is, if it has been found, why seek it?” (ibid.). Furthermore, Montesquieu does not intend his works to be interpreted as templates for constitutional designs; far from it, he seeks rather to direct the legislator’s attention to societal particulars, while always keeping a knowledge of universals.
Though Publius may prudently conceal much of the footsteps in which he follows, the shared path is not as necessary to hide. Publius’ insight does not require the backing of eminent persons because his arguments reveal wisdom and prudence on their own. This allows Publius to take Montesquieu’s, and others’, teaching and form it anew in an American light. Publius, as the enlightened legislator, is a student of Montesquieu; but as the citizen lodestar, Publius offers a genius all his own. A legacy is thus established, whereby “Americans will look to the explanation of Publius, who will become our authority, even as Montesquieu was his” (Kirstol 1987, 105). Much of Publius’ success, however, must be attributed to his artful appeal and skillful persuasion, part of which rests on his literary autonomy. Obviously well-read in Montesquieu’s works, Publius could have opted to debate the Anti-Federalists on their theoretical interpretation of the philosophe (and probably could have won), yet he chooses not to refute them in this way. Instead, he entices his opponents—the misguided but “enlightened friends of liberty”—over to his side by illuminating the American Constitution as the best available means for achieving their common cause (Hamilton et al. 1999, 67).
This project uses statistical methods to test Montesquieu’s theories on climate, laws, and economic development. It thus offers a unique interpretive strategy. The empirical models in this study employ two interactions terms between geographic and institutional variables. By doing so, this project helps fill an important gap in the literature on geography and institutions, and it therefore contributes to the ongoing debate between which matters most for economic development. I find that the interaction between geography and institutions has a significant effect on economic development.
We use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to show that World Bank-financed governance contracts from the US are negatively and significantly associated with decreases in political accountability in the African host nation. Political accountability is measured as the World Bank’s “Voice and Accountability” score (which ranges along a -2.5–2.5 scale). Our results indicate that for every one million dollar increase in governance contracts from the US, the SSA host nation’s accountability score decreases by 0.176 points, ceteris paribus.
We propose that Africans and Westerners have fundamentally different conceptions of “political accountability,” and that this explains, at least in part, the lackluster and even perverse outcomes of Western good governance promotion strategies in SSA. When supply does not meet demand, neither party is satisfied.
For comparative purposes, we also examine the relationship between accountability and contracts from the US that are targeted to education, infrastructure, and natural resources, as well as Chinese contracts targeted to these same sectors. Most studies look at foreign financial assistance as a whole, but we distinguish between targeted sectors in order to better assess specific relationships these sectors may have with political accountability. This novel approach of singling out funds targeted specifically to good governance promotion better identifies its relationship with accountability than do other studies that look at aid or investment in general.
Publius, too, leading the charge of the Constitution’s defense, must present himself as quintessentially American and devotedly republican. At the helm of a uniquely public debate, Publius has to create an image of himself as both trusted citizen and erudite political pundit. He has to be seen as impervious to dangerous foreign influences, but at the same time enlightened about worldly affairs. In the Federalist Papers, he makes his knowledge of foreign nations, ancient history, and distant philosophers undeniable, but he does not allow his arguments to depend on these things alone. Even though Montesquieu is highly respected among the Anti-Federalists, Publius is cautious about openly invoking a French baron with an unapologetic monarchical bent. The war fought against the British monarchy is still fresh in Americans’ minds, and so appearing too Montesquieuian could tarnish the image of Publius as the citizen upon a hill.
The minimal number of direct references, often technical in nature, may distract the reader from immediately recognizing the deeper philosophical links between the two authors. In Federalist 9, for example, Publius counters the Anti-Federalists’ frequent appeals to Montesquieu’s statement about the small size of republics by employing a different Montesquieu quote concerning the insecurity of small republics. This counter-quote, however, is merely an initial refutation of the small republic challenge; it does not comprise Publius’ full response in this debate, nor does it characterize Publius’ full understanding of Montesquieu on this point. Montesquieu’s influence on this subject is, in actuality, stronger where Publius does not cite him directly.
On closer inspection, Publius’ use of direct Montesquieu references appears strategic. Even in Federalist 47, where Publius specifically references Montesquieu regarding separation of powers, Publius begins by examining the British Constitution in order to “ascertain his meaning on this point” and only subsequently addresses Montesquieu’s own words (Hamilton et al. 1999, 298). Publius then proceeds to examine the distribution of powers within the state constitutions, and comments on how these correspond to Montesquieu’s doctrine. This method of using the legal document to interpret the theory is an odd reversal of what would normally be expected, but such a strategy delicately leads the reader to consider the US Constitution first instead of Montesquieu’s own propositions. The Constitution, not an abstract theoretical doctrine, is placed as the standard, as the “mirror of political liberty,” and as the source of political principles (ibid.). In a circuitous manner, however, this strategy follows Montesquieu. If the principles of a constitution are good, he says, “liberty will appear there as in a mirror” (Montesquieu 2009, 156). “Not much trouble needs be taken to discover political liberty in the constitutions,” he adds, for “[i]f it can be seen where it is, if it has been found, why seek it?” (ibid.). Furthermore, Montesquieu does not intend his works to be interpreted as templates for constitutional designs; far from it, he seeks rather to direct the legislator’s attention to societal particulars, while always keeping a knowledge of universals.
Though Publius may prudently conceal much of the footsteps in which he follows, the shared path is not as necessary to hide. Publius’ insight does not require the backing of eminent persons because his arguments reveal wisdom and prudence on their own. This allows Publius to take Montesquieu’s, and others’, teaching and form it anew in an American light. Publius, as the enlightened legislator, is a student of Montesquieu; but as the citizen lodestar, Publius offers a genius all his own. A legacy is thus established, whereby “Americans will look to the explanation of Publius, who will become our authority, even as Montesquieu was his” (Kirstol 1987, 105). Much of Publius’ success, however, must be attributed to his artful appeal and skillful persuasion, part of which rests on his literary autonomy. Obviously well-read in Montesquieu’s works, Publius could have opted to debate the Anti-Federalists on their theoretical interpretation of the philosophe (and probably could have won), yet he chooses not to refute them in this way. Instead, he entices his opponents—the misguided but “enlightened friends of liberty”—over to his side by illuminating the American Constitution as the best available means for achieving their common cause (Hamilton et al. 1999, 67).