Papers by Sean Butler
Encyclopedia of Indian Religions, 2017
Buddhism and Jainism, 2017
ProQuest, 2020
Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism admits of certain observed inconsistencies that have long trou... more Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism admits of certain observed inconsistencies that have long troubled Spinoza scholars. The scholarship over the last one hundred and thirty years or so has offered three dominant interpretations of Spinoza’s metaphysics as a result of the deficiencies with the doctrine of parallelism. These are 1) the subjective/objective distinction according to which the attribute of thought is understood as subjective and the attribute of extension is understood as objective, 2) materialism according to which the attribute of thought is claimed to depend on the attribute of extension, and 3) idealism according to which the attribute of extension is claimed to depend on the attribute of thought. A tension between materialism and idealism is addressed by each of these approaches. And the question of Spinozist idealism is of great concern to contemporary Spinoza scholarship. However, none of these interpretations succeed as they each fail to properly locate Spinoza’s problems with parallelism in a deeper attribute problem. Interpretations 1 and 2 fail more severely for also clashing with other central themes of Spinoza’s project such as his ethics which prioritizes thought at the expense of extension.
This dissertation observes that the interpretive trends in the literature not only do not succeed but cannot succeed as Spinoza’s system admits of certain contradictions. Of primary consideration, and beyond the problems with parallelism, conflation of attribute with substance and conflation of attribute with mode. It being the case that Spinoza’s theory of attributes is deficient, I propose a revisionist approach to what I have termed Spinoza’s “deep attribute problem” according to which the attributes are disassociated from the active/passive distinction. The active/passive distinction is shown to be instrumental in tying Spinoza’s metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics together as well as being erroneously applied to the attributes. The proposed revision is that the attributes be disassociated from the active/passive distinction which is to be understood now in terms of a vertical and horizontal association. The vertical association identifies substance-mode relations and the horizontal association identifies mode-mode relations. An important consequence of this revision is that substance is recast as absolutely infinite intellectual substance. As such, Spinoza’s revised system is ontological idealism and it is suggested but left for future research that the revision may entail un understanding of Spinoza’s system too as modal existentialism and ethical mysticism.
Abstract: Humanity has a tendency to move toward dogmatism with regard to ideology. I observe tha... more Abstract: Humanity has a tendency to move toward dogmatism with regard to ideology. I observe that one of humanity’s enlightened domains of inquiry, natural science, might prove susceptible to this tendency by way of the ideology known as naturalism. Here I ask whether or not contemporary naturalism is leaning toward fundamentalism. I subsequently levy the accusation that there are identifiable instances of fundamentalism in the naturalist worldview, as represented through the New Atheists. Lastly, I conclude with a caution to those who would favor dogmatism regarding the pursuit of knowledge through the natural sciences.
In the last fifty years or so, since Yogācāra texts have been available to western academics, the... more In the last fifty years or so, since Yogācāra texts have been available to western academics, there has been a debate as to how Yogācāra Buddhism should be interpreted. This article seeks to establish that Yogācāra Buddhism is most properly interpreted as an idealist school of Buddhist thought. Specifically, it challenges the arguments that have been put forth in recent years that suggest a phenomenological interpretation of Yogācāra Buddhism. The primary target of my argumentation is Dan Lusthaus but arguments of other scholars are also taken into account. In the process of defending my thesis I will explain the fundamentals of Yogācāra Buddhism, provide the reasons why Yogācāra Buddhism should be interpreted as an idealist school, provide reasons why some have interpreted Yogācāra Buddhism as phenomenology, refute non-idealist interpretations of Yogācāra Buddhism, and investigate the relation between Yogācāra Buddhism and other forms of idealism. In order to achieve each of these goals I will utilize the original texts of Yogācāra Buddhism, known as the Trimsika, authored by Vasubandhu and the Cheng Wei-Shih Lun, authored by Hsüan-Tsang. I will also reference and expound upon the philosophies of George Berkeley, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Hegel along with recent scholars who have partaken in this debate.
Book Reviews by Sean Butler
Aleksandar Fatić's work is impressively constructed for a project so wide in scope. Virtue as Ide... more Aleksandar Fatić's work is impressively constructed for a project so wide in scope. Virtue as Identity unifies a variety of content from psychology and philosophy to current/ recent global events. Both well-crafted and interesting, I recommend that Fatić's work be acknowledged for its contributions to philosophy and sociology particularly where ethics intersects with social/political thought. I also recommend that the work be engaged with carefully and critically. My experience with Fatić's work was complicated, evoking appreciation at times, shock and disdain at others. I appreciate many of Fatić's positions but take issue both personally and philosophically with Fatić's more central views and arguments. I offer these sentiments at the outset of this review for two reasons. First, I wish to empower the reader to contextualize my critique, second, I want it to be known that reviewing this work was difficult, particularly in that I very much wanted to engage Fatić more dynamically. I will direct the majority of my comments towards Fatić's views on personal identity which I take to be essential to the success of his project. I will challenge Fatić's views on personal identity first as a metaphysical claim, second as circular, third as ambiguous, and fourth as it relates to philosophical practice. I will then highlight a few contributions of Fatić's that I take to be exemplary. First, though, a brief outline of Fatić's work. Fatić seeks to identify personal identity with virtue. Fatić construes both personal identity and virtue as essentially social. The work is thus primarily involved with large scale social analysis, favoring empirical, data driven inquiry. Fatić elevates emotions over intellect in human decision making and links emotions to social circumstance, identifying individual functioning as determined by social realities. Fatić orients his ethical considerations towards societies over and above individuals making societies the primary object of ethical evaluation. Moral judgment upon individuals is justified through the identification of positive emotions such as love or sympathy, which Fatić interestingly supports with an appeal to aesthetics. The ideal community is thus evaluated by its ability to influence thriving or the seeking of the good life in its constituent individuals and is construed as an organic community that facilitates mutual understanding, support, and trust. The primary arguments for accepting Fatić's conclusions focus on considerations for the wellbeing of individuals, the health of individuals and societies, and the avoidance of local and global crises. Presumably the reader is expected to be both convinced by Fatić's reasoning and motivated to accept his views and thus work socially to reform their respective societies to fall in line with Fatić's utopic picture. Now I will critically engage with Fatić's discourse on identity. Fatić rejects a metaphysical construal of personal identity in favor of a social one. Fatić's position is stated here: " Our identities on all levels, including our moral identities, are dynamic, shifting, and they derive from our social relationships, " (Fatić, 81). Fatić offers various motivations for accepting a social construal of identity but fails to address the most important one: reasoned argument. Prior to all pragmatic benefits, reasoned argument is necessary for the acceptance of a metaphysical claim and Fatić is making a
Encyclopedia Articles by Sean Butler
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Papers by Sean Butler
This dissertation observes that the interpretive trends in the literature not only do not succeed but cannot succeed as Spinoza’s system admits of certain contradictions. Of primary consideration, and beyond the problems with parallelism, conflation of attribute with substance and conflation of attribute with mode. It being the case that Spinoza’s theory of attributes is deficient, I propose a revisionist approach to what I have termed Spinoza’s “deep attribute problem” according to which the attributes are disassociated from the active/passive distinction. The active/passive distinction is shown to be instrumental in tying Spinoza’s metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics together as well as being erroneously applied to the attributes. The proposed revision is that the attributes be disassociated from the active/passive distinction which is to be understood now in terms of a vertical and horizontal association. The vertical association identifies substance-mode relations and the horizontal association identifies mode-mode relations. An important consequence of this revision is that substance is recast as absolutely infinite intellectual substance. As such, Spinoza’s revised system is ontological idealism and it is suggested but left for future research that the revision may entail un understanding of Spinoza’s system too as modal existentialism and ethical mysticism.
Book Reviews by Sean Butler
Encyclopedia Articles by Sean Butler
This dissertation observes that the interpretive trends in the literature not only do not succeed but cannot succeed as Spinoza’s system admits of certain contradictions. Of primary consideration, and beyond the problems with parallelism, conflation of attribute with substance and conflation of attribute with mode. It being the case that Spinoza’s theory of attributes is deficient, I propose a revisionist approach to what I have termed Spinoza’s “deep attribute problem” according to which the attributes are disassociated from the active/passive distinction. The active/passive distinction is shown to be instrumental in tying Spinoza’s metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics together as well as being erroneously applied to the attributes. The proposed revision is that the attributes be disassociated from the active/passive distinction which is to be understood now in terms of a vertical and horizontal association. The vertical association identifies substance-mode relations and the horizontal association identifies mode-mode relations. An important consequence of this revision is that substance is recast as absolutely infinite intellectual substance. As such, Spinoza’s revised system is ontological idealism and it is suggested but left for future research that the revision may entail un understanding of Spinoza’s system too as modal existentialism and ethical mysticism.