I suggest that none of the arguments for pessimism about aesthetic testimony succeeds against a p... more I suggest that none of the arguments for pessimism about aesthetic testimony succeeds against a plausible version of optimism. However, I claim also that pessimist intuitions have a certain pull that optimists must account for. My second task is to explain the force of pessimist intuitions by shedding new light on their source.
I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim a... more I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim also that all major pessimist accounts – Understanding, Affect, Virtue, and Autonomy – fail. Having argued for these claims, I go on to propose a new pessimist alternative.
As standardly understood, for an act to be optional is for it to be permissible but not required.... more As standardly understood, for an act to be optional is for it to be permissible but not required. Supererogatory acts are commonly taken to be optional in this way. In “Supererogation, Optionality and Cost”, Claire Benn rejects this common view: she argues that optionality so understood—permissible but not required—cannot be the sort of optionality involved in supererogation. As an alternative, she offers a novel account of the optionality of supererogatory acts: the “comparative cost” account. In this paper, we rebut Benn’s objection to the common view that supererogation involves optionality as standardly understood. We also point out that her objection, if it worked, would equally undermine her own comparative cost proposal.
I discuss three limitations of the account of romantic love Aaron Ben-Ze'ev offers in The Arc of ... more I discuss three limitations of the account of romantic love Aaron Ben-Ze'ev offers in The Arc of Love. I first argue that Ben-Ze'ev never actually tells us what romantic love is. I then suggest that he does not appreciate the proper role of the ‘we' perspective that emerges in romantic love. Finally, I claim that his account of the genesis of romantic love is importantly incomplete and, as a result, he conflates falling in love with love.
Some of our largely unchosen first-order reactions, such as disgust, can underwrite morally-laden... more Some of our largely unchosen first-order reactions, such as disgust, can underwrite morally-laden character traits. This observation is in tension with the plausible idea that virtues and vices are based on reasons. I propose a way to resolve the tension.
What is gender and how do we know what our gender is? These are the questions I propose to answer... more What is gender and how do we know what our gender is? These are the questions I propose to answer here. I review and reject several hypotheses: gender as sex or (a more careful version of the view) as subjective experiences that arise from sexual characteristics; gender as brain configuration; and gender as a historical kind. I express sympathy with an existentialist conception of gender but argue that such a conception, even according to its proponents, cannot help solve the problems of what gender is and how we know what our gender is. I then advance a new view.
Consider a man who steals money left by his parents for his newborn child and spends it on gambli... more Consider a man who steals money left by his parents for his newborn child and spends it on gambling and alcohol. What is your reaction to this story? I would conjecture that the reaction, in some at least, would be most accurately described as “moral disgust.” However, some have questioned the existence of moral disgust. It has been argued that so-called moral disgust is either not really moral or not really disgust. Are moral disgust skeptics correct? If not, what makes an affective response an instance of moral disgust? Its cause? Its object? Its phenomenal qualities? All of the above? Those are the questions I propose to answer here. I will argue that there is a distinct emotional response best described as “moral disgust.” I will go on to offer an account of its constitutive features.
We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rational... more We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rationally asserted. We then explain why Moorean assertions of the sort we discuss do not incur the irrationality charge. Our argument involves an appeal to the dual-process theory of the mind and a contrast between the conditions for ascribing beliefs to oneself and the conditions for making assertions about independently existing states of affairs. We conclude by contrasting beliefs of the sort we discuss with the structurally similar but rationally impermissible beliefs of certain psychiatric patients.
In ordinary practice, character traits are often cited in an attempt to explain why an action was... more In ordinary practice, character traits are often cited in an attempt to explain why an action was done. Thus, we say, “Young Abraham Lincoln walked through a storm to give the correct change to a customer because he is honest” or “James Tyrone refuses to pay for his wife’s medical treatment because he is miserly.” But how exactly do traits explain actions? In what sense of “why” does Lincoln’s honesty or the stinginess of Eugene O’Neill’s Tyrone tell us why Lincoln or Tyrone acted as each did?
We do not have a satisfactory answer to this question, and surprisingly few proposals are on offer. While there is voluminous literature on action explanation, philosophers interested in the explanation of action have tended to focus exclusively on reasons explanations. Traits, on the other hand, especially morally-laden traits, are discussed almost exclusively in relation to action evaluation. But traits, as evidenced by ordinary discourse, are relevant to the explanation, not just to the evaluation, of actions. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the precise role they play in action explanation.
I begin by noting that traits and reasons explanations of action are systematically connected and in two ways. First, traits require motivation by reasons. Actions due to mental disorders and phobias cannot be explained by an appeal to traits (thus, we cannot say about the compulsive hand-washer that she washes her hands 20 times a day because she is overly clean.) Second, traits typically require motivation by particular kinds of reasons. Thus, if we know that young Lincoln walked through the storm to give back the correct change because he is honest, we can infer that, in acting as he did, he was motivated by certain kinds of reasons and not others (e.g., by reasons which have to do with rightness or sense of duty rather than by fear of punishment).
I then ask whether it follows from these systematic links that traits and reasons explanations of action are equivalent – though, perhaps, offered from different points of view – or whether, by contrast, they differ in important and interesting ways.
I argue that the differences are interesting and important: traits and reasons explanations differ in that they answer different “why” questions regarding action: while both traits and reasons can be cited in explaining why an action was done, a reasons explanation tells us what reasons have motivated the agent acting; a traits explanation, by contrast, while it indicates something about the agent’s reasons, tells us something else in addition, namely, why the agent acted on the reasons she acted on rather than on other available reasons.
Cognitive Systems Research, Special Issue on Law and Neuroscience, Aug 24, 2015
In a widely read essay, "For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything," Joshua Greene... more In a widely read essay, "For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything," Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will eventually result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it -- of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order and to predict that such reforms will occur. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think that such a development will have much to do with neuroscience – it won’t, because neuroscience is unlikely to show that we have no free will. We have two main aims in this paper. The first is to rebut various aspects of the case against free will. The second is to examine the case for consequentialist reforms. We take Greene and Cohen’s essay as a hobbyhorse, but our criticisms are applicable to neurodeterministic anti-free-willism in general.
We first suggest that Greene and Cohen take proponents of free will to be committed to an untenable homuncular account of agency. But proponents of free will can dispense with such a commitment. In fact, we argue, it is Greene and Cohen who work with an overly simple account of free will. We sketch a more nuanced conception. We then turn to the proposal for consequentialist reforms. We argue that retributivism will fall out of favor not as a consequence of neuroscience-driven rejection of free will, but rather, as a result of a familiar feature of moral progress -- the expanding circle of concern. In short, retributivism can and must die, but neuroscience will not kill it – humanity will.
In “Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency” (Mind 2010) Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett argue t... more In “Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency” (Mind 2010) Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett argue that prominent versions of metaethical sentimentalism and moral realism ignore the importance, for moral agency and moral judgment, of the capacity to experientially project oneself into the past and possible futures – to engage in ‘mental time travel’ (MTT). They argue that such views are committed to taking subjects with impaired capacities for MTT to be moral judgers, and thus confront a dilemma: either allow that these subjects are moral agents, or deny that moral agency is required for moral judgment. In reply, we argue for two main claims. First, it is implausible that moral agency is required for moral judgment, and Gerrans and Kennett give us no good reason for thinking it is. Second, at least some of the subjects in question seem able to make moral judgments, and Gerrans and Kennett give us no good reason to doubt that they can. We conclude that they have not shown a problem for any of the metaethical views in question.
I question the widespread assumption that when we act for reasons we know what our reasons are. I... more I question the widespread assumption that when we act for reasons we know what our reasons are. I argue that an agent may act in ignorance, or partial ignorance, regarding his or her reasons, and an action involving ignorance of this sort may still qualify as done for reasons. I conclude from here that we need to develop a suitable new model of action for reasons, and I proceed to offer such a model. Briefly, I argue that an action qualifies as done for reasons when the agent performing that action possesses a reasons explanation of it and is (at least partly) motivated to act by the fact he possesses such an explanation. The crucial point is that the agent may not be motivated – not even in part – by the content of the reasons that constitute the explanation in question.
I suggest that none of the arguments for pessimism about aesthetic testimony succeeds against a p... more I suggest that none of the arguments for pessimism about aesthetic testimony succeeds against a plausible version of optimism. However, I claim also that pessimist intuitions have a certain pull that optimists must account for. My second task is to explain the force of pessimist intuitions by shedding new light on their source.
I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim a... more I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim also that all major pessimist accounts – Understanding, Affect, Virtue, and Autonomy – fail. Having argued for these claims, I go on to propose a new pessimist alternative.
As standardly understood, for an act to be optional is for it to be permissible but not required.... more As standardly understood, for an act to be optional is for it to be permissible but not required. Supererogatory acts are commonly taken to be optional in this way. In “Supererogation, Optionality and Cost”, Claire Benn rejects this common view: she argues that optionality so understood—permissible but not required—cannot be the sort of optionality involved in supererogation. As an alternative, she offers a novel account of the optionality of supererogatory acts: the “comparative cost” account. In this paper, we rebut Benn’s objection to the common view that supererogation involves optionality as standardly understood. We also point out that her objection, if it worked, would equally undermine her own comparative cost proposal.
I discuss three limitations of the account of romantic love Aaron Ben-Ze'ev offers in The Arc of ... more I discuss three limitations of the account of romantic love Aaron Ben-Ze'ev offers in The Arc of Love. I first argue that Ben-Ze'ev never actually tells us what romantic love is. I then suggest that he does not appreciate the proper role of the ‘we' perspective that emerges in romantic love. Finally, I claim that his account of the genesis of romantic love is importantly incomplete and, as a result, he conflates falling in love with love.
Some of our largely unchosen first-order reactions, such as disgust, can underwrite morally-laden... more Some of our largely unchosen first-order reactions, such as disgust, can underwrite morally-laden character traits. This observation is in tension with the plausible idea that virtues and vices are based on reasons. I propose a way to resolve the tension.
What is gender and how do we know what our gender is? These are the questions I propose to answer... more What is gender and how do we know what our gender is? These are the questions I propose to answer here. I review and reject several hypotheses: gender as sex or (a more careful version of the view) as subjective experiences that arise from sexual characteristics; gender as brain configuration; and gender as a historical kind. I express sympathy with an existentialist conception of gender but argue that such a conception, even according to its proponents, cannot help solve the problems of what gender is and how we know what our gender is. I then advance a new view.
Consider a man who steals money left by his parents for his newborn child and spends it on gambli... more Consider a man who steals money left by his parents for his newborn child and spends it on gambling and alcohol. What is your reaction to this story? I would conjecture that the reaction, in some at least, would be most accurately described as “moral disgust.” However, some have questioned the existence of moral disgust. It has been argued that so-called moral disgust is either not really moral or not really disgust. Are moral disgust skeptics correct? If not, what makes an affective response an instance of moral disgust? Its cause? Its object? Its phenomenal qualities? All of the above? Those are the questions I propose to answer here. I will argue that there is a distinct emotional response best described as “moral disgust.” I will go on to offer an account of its constitutive features.
We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rational... more We present counterexamples to the widespread assumption that Moorean sentences cannot be rationally asserted. We then explain why Moorean assertions of the sort we discuss do not incur the irrationality charge. Our argument involves an appeal to the dual-process theory of the mind and a contrast between the conditions for ascribing beliefs to oneself and the conditions for making assertions about independently existing states of affairs. We conclude by contrasting beliefs of the sort we discuss with the structurally similar but rationally impermissible beliefs of certain psychiatric patients.
In ordinary practice, character traits are often cited in an attempt to explain why an action was... more In ordinary practice, character traits are often cited in an attempt to explain why an action was done. Thus, we say, “Young Abraham Lincoln walked through a storm to give the correct change to a customer because he is honest” or “James Tyrone refuses to pay for his wife’s medical treatment because he is miserly.” But how exactly do traits explain actions? In what sense of “why” does Lincoln’s honesty or the stinginess of Eugene O’Neill’s Tyrone tell us why Lincoln or Tyrone acted as each did?
We do not have a satisfactory answer to this question, and surprisingly few proposals are on offer. While there is voluminous literature on action explanation, philosophers interested in the explanation of action have tended to focus exclusively on reasons explanations. Traits, on the other hand, especially morally-laden traits, are discussed almost exclusively in relation to action evaluation. But traits, as evidenced by ordinary discourse, are relevant to the explanation, not just to the evaluation, of actions. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the precise role they play in action explanation.
I begin by noting that traits and reasons explanations of action are systematically connected and in two ways. First, traits require motivation by reasons. Actions due to mental disorders and phobias cannot be explained by an appeal to traits (thus, we cannot say about the compulsive hand-washer that she washes her hands 20 times a day because she is overly clean.) Second, traits typically require motivation by particular kinds of reasons. Thus, if we know that young Lincoln walked through the storm to give back the correct change because he is honest, we can infer that, in acting as he did, he was motivated by certain kinds of reasons and not others (e.g., by reasons which have to do with rightness or sense of duty rather than by fear of punishment).
I then ask whether it follows from these systematic links that traits and reasons explanations of action are equivalent – though, perhaps, offered from different points of view – or whether, by contrast, they differ in important and interesting ways.
I argue that the differences are interesting and important: traits and reasons explanations differ in that they answer different “why” questions regarding action: while both traits and reasons can be cited in explaining why an action was done, a reasons explanation tells us what reasons have motivated the agent acting; a traits explanation, by contrast, while it indicates something about the agent’s reasons, tells us something else in addition, namely, why the agent acted on the reasons she acted on rather than on other available reasons.
Cognitive Systems Research, Special Issue on Law and Neuroscience, Aug 24, 2015
In a widely read essay, "For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything," Joshua Greene... more In a widely read essay, "For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything," Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will eventually result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it -- of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order and to predict that such reforms will occur. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think that such a development will have much to do with neuroscience – it won’t, because neuroscience is unlikely to show that we have no free will. We have two main aims in this paper. The first is to rebut various aspects of the case against free will. The second is to examine the case for consequentialist reforms. We take Greene and Cohen’s essay as a hobbyhorse, but our criticisms are applicable to neurodeterministic anti-free-willism in general.
We first suggest that Greene and Cohen take proponents of free will to be committed to an untenable homuncular account of agency. But proponents of free will can dispense with such a commitment. In fact, we argue, it is Greene and Cohen who work with an overly simple account of free will. We sketch a more nuanced conception. We then turn to the proposal for consequentialist reforms. We argue that retributivism will fall out of favor not as a consequence of neuroscience-driven rejection of free will, but rather, as a result of a familiar feature of moral progress -- the expanding circle of concern. In short, retributivism can and must die, but neuroscience will not kill it – humanity will.
In “Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency” (Mind 2010) Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett argue t... more In “Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency” (Mind 2010) Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett argue that prominent versions of metaethical sentimentalism and moral realism ignore the importance, for moral agency and moral judgment, of the capacity to experientially project oneself into the past and possible futures – to engage in ‘mental time travel’ (MTT). They argue that such views are committed to taking subjects with impaired capacities for MTT to be moral judgers, and thus confront a dilemma: either allow that these subjects are moral agents, or deny that moral agency is required for moral judgment. In reply, we argue for two main claims. First, it is implausible that moral agency is required for moral judgment, and Gerrans and Kennett give us no good reason for thinking it is. Second, at least some of the subjects in question seem able to make moral judgments, and Gerrans and Kennett give us no good reason to doubt that they can. We conclude that they have not shown a problem for any of the metaethical views in question.
I question the widespread assumption that when we act for reasons we know what our reasons are. I... more I question the widespread assumption that when we act for reasons we know what our reasons are. I argue that an agent may act in ignorance, or partial ignorance, regarding his or her reasons, and an action involving ignorance of this sort may still qualify as done for reasons. I conclude from here that we need to develop a suitable new model of action for reasons, and I proceed to offer such a model. Briefly, I argue that an action qualifies as done for reasons when the agent performing that action possesses a reasons explanation of it and is (at least partly) motivated to act by the fact he possesses such an explanation. The crucial point is that the agent may not be motivated – not even in part – by the content of the reasons that constitute the explanation in question.
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We do not have a satisfactory answer to this question, and surprisingly few proposals are on offer. While there is voluminous literature on action explanation, philosophers interested in the explanation of action have tended to focus exclusively on reasons explanations. Traits, on the other hand, especially morally-laden traits, are discussed almost exclusively in relation to action evaluation. But traits, as evidenced by ordinary discourse, are relevant to the explanation, not just to the evaluation, of actions. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the precise role they play in action explanation.
I begin by noting that traits and reasons explanations of action are systematically connected and in two ways. First, traits require motivation by reasons. Actions due to mental disorders and phobias cannot be explained by an appeal to traits (thus, we cannot say about the compulsive hand-washer that she washes her hands 20 times a day because she is overly clean.) Second, traits typically require motivation by particular kinds of reasons. Thus, if we know that young Lincoln walked through the storm to give back the correct change because he is honest, we can infer that, in acting as he did, he was motivated by certain kinds of reasons and not others (e.g., by reasons which have to do with rightness or sense of duty rather than by fear of punishment).
I then ask whether it follows from these systematic links that traits and reasons explanations of action are equivalent – though, perhaps, offered from different points of view – or whether, by contrast, they differ in important and interesting ways.
I argue that the differences are interesting and important: traits and reasons explanations differ in that they answer different “why” questions regarding action: while both traits and reasons can be cited in explaining why an action was done, a reasons explanation tells us what reasons have motivated the agent acting; a traits explanation, by contrast, while it indicates something about the agent’s reasons, tells us something else in addition, namely, why the agent acted on the reasons she acted on rather than on other available reasons.
We first suggest that Greene and Cohen take proponents of free will to be committed to an untenable homuncular account of agency. But proponents of free will can dispense with such a commitment. In fact, we argue, it is Greene and Cohen who work with an overly simple account of free will. We sketch a more nuanced conception. We then turn to the proposal for consequentialist reforms. We argue that retributivism will fall out of favor not as a consequence of neuroscience-driven rejection of free will, but rather, as a result of a familiar feature of moral progress -- the expanding circle of concern. In short, retributivism can and must die, but neuroscience will not kill it – humanity will.
We do not have a satisfactory answer to this question, and surprisingly few proposals are on offer. While there is voluminous literature on action explanation, philosophers interested in the explanation of action have tended to focus exclusively on reasons explanations. Traits, on the other hand, especially morally-laden traits, are discussed almost exclusively in relation to action evaluation. But traits, as evidenced by ordinary discourse, are relevant to the explanation, not just to the evaluation, of actions. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the precise role they play in action explanation.
I begin by noting that traits and reasons explanations of action are systematically connected and in two ways. First, traits require motivation by reasons. Actions due to mental disorders and phobias cannot be explained by an appeal to traits (thus, we cannot say about the compulsive hand-washer that she washes her hands 20 times a day because she is overly clean.) Second, traits typically require motivation by particular kinds of reasons. Thus, if we know that young Lincoln walked through the storm to give back the correct change because he is honest, we can infer that, in acting as he did, he was motivated by certain kinds of reasons and not others (e.g., by reasons which have to do with rightness or sense of duty rather than by fear of punishment).
I then ask whether it follows from these systematic links that traits and reasons explanations of action are equivalent – though, perhaps, offered from different points of view – or whether, by contrast, they differ in important and interesting ways.
I argue that the differences are interesting and important: traits and reasons explanations differ in that they answer different “why” questions regarding action: while both traits and reasons can be cited in explaining why an action was done, a reasons explanation tells us what reasons have motivated the agent acting; a traits explanation, by contrast, while it indicates something about the agent’s reasons, tells us something else in addition, namely, why the agent acted on the reasons she acted on rather than on other available reasons.
We first suggest that Greene and Cohen take proponents of free will to be committed to an untenable homuncular account of agency. But proponents of free will can dispense with such a commitment. In fact, we argue, it is Greene and Cohen who work with an overly simple account of free will. We sketch a more nuanced conception. We then turn to the proposal for consequentialist reforms. We argue that retributivism will fall out of favor not as a consequence of neuroscience-driven rejection of free will, but rather, as a result of a familiar feature of moral progress -- the expanding circle of concern. In short, retributivism can and must die, but neuroscience will not kill it – humanity will.