Este trabajo presenta algunas reflexiones en torno al problema del conocimiento de las otras ment... more Este trabajo presenta algunas reflexiones en torno al problema del conocimiento de las otras mentes. En primer lugar, sin desestimar la relevancia que puedan tener los mecanismos o procesos postulados por la Teoría de la teoría y la Teoría de la simulación, se resalta la importancia, a veces olvidada, de los testimonios en primera persona de los agentes cuyos estados mentales queremos conocer. En segundo lugar, se presenta una sugerencia acerca de cómo entender la tesis de que, al menos en ocasiones y para algunos estados mentales, podemos conocer los estados mentales ajenos percibiéndolos.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentin
If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify ... more If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify two opposing approaches that we propose to call “intellectualism” and “minimalism.” In this paper, we outline a new account of doxastic revision — “the first-order model”— that is neither as cognitively demanding as intellectualism nor as deflationary as minimalism. First-order doxastic revision, we argue, is a personal-level process in which a creature rejects some beliefs and accepts others based on reasons. However, it does not involve second-order thinking or sophisticated semantic and epistemic concepts. Besides defending that there is conceptual space for this alternative, we explore the possibility of extending it to some non-human animals. Based on our interpretation of some empirical evidence, we conclude that there are initial reasons to think that some animals — i.e., great apes— may be capable of correcting their beliefs in the way that our first-order model suggests.
Reasons and Normativity in Non-human Animals According to intellectualist approaches to reasons a... more Reasons and Normativity in Non-human Animals According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals-such as great apes-have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals.
For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in ... more For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject’s taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in a certain kind of relation with them, which makes them available to us, nevertheless, to be represented in judgment or belief. The question arises, however, whether this does not imply a new fall into the Myth of the Given. In this article, I argue for an affirmative response to that question.
Theoria. A Swedish Journal of Philosophy and Psychology , 2022
For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in ... more For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject’s taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in a certain kind of relation with them, which makes them available to us, nevertheless, to be represented in judgment or belief. The question arises, however, whether this does not imply a new fall into the Myth of the Given. In this article, I argue for an affirmative response to that question.
This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to B... more This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentin
This paper reconstructs Dewey's criticism to classic empiricism as a criticism to what Sellar... more This paper reconstructs Dewey's criticism to classic empiricism as a criticism to what Sellars calls "The Myth of the Given". Firstly, the Myth of the Given is characterized. Secondly, Dewey's experimental conception of experience and his main objections to traditional empiricism are described. Thirdly, it is showed how those objections can be understood as objections to the Myth criticized by Sellars. Finally, some differences between Sellars and Dewey are stressed. In certain way, those differences make preferable Dewey's proposal.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentin
According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: (i) ... more According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlements and commitments of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects.
Este articulo examina el concepto de objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva. Este sentido ... more Este articulo examina el concepto de objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva. Este sentido de la objetividad esta presente (entre otros) en la obra de Williams (especificamente, en su nocion de una concepcion absoluta de la realidad). La estructura del articulo es la siguiente: en primer lugar, se describe el programa fisicalista de Williams. En segundo lugar, el articulo presenta algunas objeciones a dicho programa. En tercer lugar, a fin de defender el pluralismo conceptual de Putnam, se esgrimen algunas razones en contra de la nocion de objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva. Finalmente, el articulo defiende la compatibilidad entre el pluralismo conceptual y la idea de convergencia en una opinion final. En consecuencia, se concluye que la objetividad depende de los vocabularios particulares empleados.
According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to ... more According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2019
It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, ... more It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss Crane’s arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis and will try to show, in contrast, that they are unconvincing. My conclusion will be that, despite all that Crane claims, perceptual content could after all be propositional in nature.
Este trabajo presenta algunas reflexiones en torno al problema del conocimiento de las otras ment... more Este trabajo presenta algunas reflexiones en torno al problema del conocimiento de las otras mentes. En primer lugar, sin desestimar la relevancia que puedan tener los mecanismos o procesos postulados por la Teoría de la teoría y la Teoría de la simulación, se resalta la importancia, a veces olvidada, de los testimonios en primera persona de los agentes cuyos estados mentales queremos conocer. En segundo lugar, se presenta una sugerencia acerca de cómo entender la tesis de que, al menos en ocasiones y para algunos estados mentales, podemos conocer los estados mentales ajenos percibiéndolos.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentin
If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify ... more If we focus on current debates on how creatures revise or correct their beliefs, we can identify two opposing approaches that we propose to call “intellectualism” and “minimalism.” In this paper, we outline a new account of doxastic revision — “the first-order model”— that is neither as cognitively demanding as intellectualism nor as deflationary as minimalism. First-order doxastic revision, we argue, is a personal-level process in which a creature rejects some beliefs and accepts others based on reasons. However, it does not involve second-order thinking or sophisticated semantic and epistemic concepts. Besides defending that there is conceptual space for this alternative, we explore the possibility of extending it to some non-human animals. Based on our interpretation of some empirical evidence, we conclude that there are initial reasons to think that some animals — i.e., great apes— may be capable of correcting their beliefs in the way that our first-order model suggests.
Reasons and Normativity in Non-human Animals According to intellectualist approaches to reasons a... more Reasons and Normativity in Non-human Animals According to intellectualist approaches to reasons and normativity, non-human animals lack a genuine sensitivity to reasons. In that sense, in contrast to human beings, they cannot be considered normative creatures. Against intellectualism, in this paper, we hold that when a creature arrives at a new doxastic state by carrying out a certain type of reasoning, the premises of it constitute genuine reasons for her. We are interested in reasoning as a personal level process, which requires a certain kind of intelligence, implicit knowledge, and some (partial) understanding of the reasons by which the creature arrives at a new belief. However, this sort of reasoning requires neither the possession of epistemic concepts nor the possession of meta-representational competencies, as the intellectualists hold. Thus, if some non-human animals-such as great apes-have the capacity to carry out this kind of reasoning, they can be credited with a practical ability to use reasons and a (partial) cognitive access to them. In this sense, they could also be taken to be normative animals.
For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in ... more For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject’s taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in a certain kind of relation with them, which makes them available to us, nevertheless, to be represented in judgment or belief. The question arises, however, whether this does not imply a new fall into the Myth of the Given. In this article, I argue for an affirmative response to that question.
Theoria. A Swedish Journal of Philosophy and Psychology , 2022
For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in ... more For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject’s taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in a certain kind of relation with them, which makes them available to us, nevertheless, to be represented in judgment or belief. The question arises, however, whether this does not imply a new fall into the Myth of the Given. In this article, I argue for an affirmative response to that question.
This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to B... more This article presents some objections to Burge´s theory of perceptual entitlement. According to Burge, perceptual entitlement is a sort of warrant that is different from justification because it does not require the subject to have reasons for its beliefs. In contrast, it is argued, firstly, that entitlement does not escape from an objection usually made to epistemological externalism, that is, that the warrant is detached from the subject´s rationality. Secondly, two of the reasons offered by Burge to think that perceptions cannot be reasons are critically examined.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentin
This paper reconstructs Dewey's criticism to classic empiricism as a criticism to what Sellar... more This paper reconstructs Dewey's criticism to classic empiricism as a criticism to what Sellars calls "The Myth of the Given". Firstly, the Myth of the Given is characterized. Secondly, Dewey's experimental conception of experience and his main objections to traditional empiricism are described. Thirdly, it is showed how those objections can be understood as objections to the Myth criticized by Sellars. Finally, some differences between Sellars and Dewey are stressed. In certain way, those differences make preferable Dewey's proposal.Fil: Kalpokas, Daniel Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Instituto de Humanidades; Argentin
According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: (i) ... more According to Brandom, perceptual knowledge is the product of two distinguishable capacities: (i) the capacity to reliably discriminate behaviorally between different sorts of stimuli, and (ii) the capacity to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for reasons. However, in focusing exclusively on the entitlements and commitments of observation reports, rather than on perception itself, Brandom passes over a conception of perceptual experience as a sort of contentful mental state. In this article, I argue that this is a blind spot, which makes Brandom’s account of perceptual knowledge unable to properly accommodate the phenomenon of seeing aspects.
Este articulo examina el concepto de objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva. Este sentido ... more Este articulo examina el concepto de objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva. Este sentido de la objetividad esta presente (entre otros) en la obra de Williams (especificamente, en su nocion de una concepcion absoluta de la realidad). La estructura del articulo es la siguiente: en primer lugar, se describe el programa fisicalista de Williams. En segundo lugar, el articulo presenta algunas objeciones a dicho programa. En tercer lugar, a fin de defender el pluralismo conceptual de Putnam, se esgrimen algunas razones en contra de la nocion de objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva. Finalmente, el articulo defiende la compatibilidad entre el pluralismo conceptual y la idea de convergencia en una opinion final. En consecuencia, se concluye que la objetividad depende de los vocabularios particulares empleados.
According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to ... more According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main thesis of the article: seeing-as cannot be explained by the conception of experience defended by Rorty, Davidson and Brandom.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2019
It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, ... more It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?” (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of “the propositional-attitude thesis”, it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss Crane’s arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis and will try to show, in contrast, that they are unconvincing. My conclusion will be that, despite all that Crane claims, perceptual content could after all be propositional in nature.
Recently, several philosophers have called attention to the idea that there are occasions on whic... more Recently, several philosophers have called attention to the idea that there are occasions on which we can perceive (at least some) mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals in this direction: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 2010) and the hybrid model (Krueger & Overgaard, 2012). We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections against both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts which allows us to avoid such objections. Broadly stated, our idea is that by perceiving other people’s behaviors we also perceive their mental states because behaviors co-present some features of the latter, and that this perception of others’ minds is direct and immediate because behavior is a constitutive part of the mental states in question.
¿Puede haber algún papel cognitivo para la percepción en el campo de la moral? ¿Tiene sentido y r... more ¿Puede haber algún papel cognitivo para la percepción en el campo de la moral? ¿Tiene sentido y resulta plausible sostener que, así como podemos ver un hecho empírico, podemos ver también un hecho moral? ¿Hay juicios morales que puedan ser justificados por la percepción de un hecho moral? La ética del discurso de Jürgen Habermas ofrece una respuesta negativa a estas preguntas. En contraste, en este trabajo exploro la posibilidad de que la percepción tenga, de un modo nada misterioso, cierto papel en la aprehensión de hechos morales y, consecuentemente, en la justificación de, al menos, cierto tipo de enunciados morales.
¿Puede haber algún papel cognitivo para la percepción en el campo de la moral? ¿Tiene sentido y r... more ¿Puede haber algún papel cognitivo para la percepción en el campo de la moral? ¿Tiene sentido y resulta plausible sostener que, así como podemos ver un hecho empírico, podemos ver también un hecho moral? ¿Hay juicios morales que puedan ser justificados por la percepción de un hecho moral? La ética del discurso de Jürgen Habermas ofrece una respuesta negativa a estas preguntas. En contraste, en este trabajo exploro la posibilidad de que la percepción tenga, de un modo nada misterioso, cierto papel en la aprehensión de hechos morales y, consecuentemente, en la justificación de, al menos, cierto tipo de enunciados morales.
Colección de ensayos de filosofía teórica y práctica producto del Ciclo Cruzando Fronteras realiz... more Colección de ensayos de filosofía teórica y práctica producto del Ciclo Cruzando Fronteras realizado en Córdoba, Argentina, en el año 2014. Guillermo Lariguet, organizador del ciclo, convocó a los participantes a seguir la discusión a partir de la escritura. Respondieron a la invitación los filósofos L. Danón, D. Kalpokas, P. Brunsteins, A. Battán Horenstein, F. Mié, S. Prono, L. Samamé, J. Montero y L. Misseri abordando temas que van desde el naturalismo filosófico a los derechos humanos, pasando por la teoría del discurso de Habermas, la ética de Aristóteles y de Schopenhauer, la política en la era de la información y la empatía.
Ediciones UNL. Colección Ciencia y Tecnología, 2023
La ética es una de las disciplinas más respetadas y desarrolladas de toda la tradición filosófica... more La ética es una de las disciplinas más respetadas y desarrolladas de toda la tradición filosófica. Casi no ha habido autor de importancia que no haya dedicado parte de sus esfuerzos a pensar distintos aspectos de esta rama de la filosofía. La posibilidad de concebir hechos morales objetivos, la incidencia de las perspectivas naturalistas en el razonamiento moral, la dimensión metafísica de la moral son solo algunos de los tantos temas que demandan un ámbito de reflexión específico en el que convergen, junto con la ética, áreas de la filosofía tales como la filosofía del lenguaje, la metafísica, la epistemología, e incluso la psicología moral. Estos cruces constituyen el ámbito propio de la metaética, rama de la ética contemporánea que ha experimentado un gran crecimiento en los últimos años y que convoca la atención de algunos de los más relevantes especialistas de la filosofía moral de la actualidad. Aunque importante en el panorama de las discusiones filosóficas, la metaética todavía no ha tenido, en nuestro medio, la atención que merece. La metaética puesta a punto pretende contribuir a saldar esta deuda al poner a disposición del público de habla hispana el tratamiento de algunos de los temas de esta área del pensamiento ético. Los capítulos que lo componen se dirigen a estudiantes e investigadores en el área de las humanidades interesados en la discusión moral y los cruces que pueden surgir a partir de ella.
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de importancia que no haya dedicado parte de sus esfuerzos
a pensar distintos aspectos de esta rama de la filosofía. La
posibilidad de concebir hechos morales objetivos, la incidencia de las perspectivas naturalistas en el razonamiento
moral, la dimensión metafísica de la moral son solo algunos
de los tantos temas que demandan un ámbito de reflexión
específico en el que convergen, junto con la ética, áreas de
la filosofía tales como la filosofía del lenguaje, la metafísica,
la epistemología, e incluso la psicología moral. Estos cruces
constituyen el ámbito propio de la metaética, rama de la
ética contemporánea que ha experimentado un gran crecimiento en los últimos años y que convoca la atención de
algunos de los más relevantes especialistas de la filosofía
moral de la actualidad.
Aunque importante en el panorama de las discusiones
filosóficas, la metaética todavía no ha tenido, en nuestro
medio, la atención que merece.
La metaética puesta a punto pretende contribuir a saldar
esta deuda al poner a disposición del público de habla hispana el tratamiento de algunos de los temas de esta área del
pensamiento ético. Los capítulos que lo componen se
dirigen a estudiantes e investigadores en el área de las
humanidades interesados en la discusión moral y los cruces
que pueden surgir a partir de ella.