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  • Deligkas A, Lotfi M and Voudouris A. (2025). Agent-constrained truthful facility location games. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 10.1007/s10878-025-01258-7. 49:2. Online publication date: 1-Mar-2025.

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  • Wang C. (2025). Facility Location Games. Handbook of Combinatorial Optimization. 10.1007/978-1-4614-6624-6_94-1. (1-13).

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  • Auricchio G and Zhang J. (2024). The k-Facility Location Problem via Optimal Transport: A Bayesian Study of the Percentile Mechanisms. Algorithmic Game Theory. 10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9_9. (147-164).

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  • Ma M, Li S, Shmaliy Y, Sun Y, Zaidi H, Meng H, Kolivand H, Luo J and Alazab M. (2023). Heterogenous facility location games with entrance fees 2023 5th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science (AICS 2023). 10.1117/12.3009442. 9781510668621. (70).

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  • Tang Z, Wang C, Zhang M and Zhao Y. (2022). Strategyproof Facility Location with Limited Locations. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China. 10.1007/s40305-021-00378-1. 11:3. (553-567). Online publication date: 1-Sep-2023.

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  • Goel S and Hann-Caruthers W. (2022). Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions. Social Choice and Welfare. 10.1007/s00355-022-01435-1. 61:1. (11-34). Online publication date: 1-Jul-2023.

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  • Filimonov A and Meir R. (2022). Strategyproof facility location mechanisms on discrete trees. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 37:1. Online publication date: 1-Jun-2023.

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  • Zhang R. Mechanism Design for Heterogeneous and Distributed Facility Location Problems. Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. (2985-2987).

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  • Chan H and Wang C. Mechanism Design for Improving Accessibility to Public Facilities. Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. (2116-2124).

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  • Zhao Q, Liu W, Nong Q and Fang Q. (2023). Constrained heterogeneous facility location games with max-variant cost. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 45:3. Online publication date: 1-Apr-2023.

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  • Ma M, Xiao M, Bai T and Khoussainov B. Facility location games with entrance fees. Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-Fifth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Thirteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence. (5797-5804).

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  • Li M, Wang C and Zhang M. (2022). Budget feasible mechanisms for facility location games with strategic facilities. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 36:2. Online publication date: 1-Oct-2022.

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  • de Keijzer B and Wojtczak D. (2022). Facility Reallocation on the Line. Algorithmica. 84:10. (2898-2925). Online publication date: 1-Oct-2022.

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  • Chen X, Fang Q, Liu W, Ding Y and Nong Q. (2021). Strategyproof mechanisms for 2-facility location games with minimax envy. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 10.1007/s10878-021-00711-7. 43:5. (1628-1644). Online publication date: 1-Jul-2022.

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  • Wang F, Wang J, Li N, Jiang Y and Li S. (2021). A Cost-Sharing Scheme for the k-Level Facility Location Game with Penalties. Journal of the Operations Research Society of China. 10.1007/s40305-021-00345-w. 10:1. (173-182). Online publication date: 1-Mar-2022.

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  • Wu X, Mei L and Zhang G. Two-Facility Location Games with a Minimum Distance Requirement on a Circle. Combinatorial Optimization and Applications. (497-511).

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  • Chen X, Hu X, Tang Z and Wang C. (2021). Tight efficiency lower bounds for strategy-proof mechanisms in two-opposite-facility location game. Information Processing Letters. 10.1016/j.ipl.2021.106098. 168. (106098). Online publication date: 1-Jun-2021.

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  • Zhang M. Mechanism Design in Facility Location Games. Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. (1850-1852).

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  • Xu X, Li B, Li M and Duan L. (2021). Two-facility Location Games with Minimum Distance Requirement. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research. 70. (719-756). Online publication date: 1-May-2021.

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  • Liu W, Ding Y, Chen X, Fang Q and Nong Q. (2021). Multiple facility location games with envy ratio. Theoretical Computer Science. 10.1016/j.tcs.2021.01.016. 864. (1-9). Online publication date: 1-Apr-2021.

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  • Ferraioli D and Ventre C. (2021). Approximation Guarantee of OSP Mechanisms: The Case of Machine Scheduling and Facility Location. Algorithmica. 83:2. (695-725). Online publication date: 1-Feb-2021.

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  • Tang Z, Wang C, Zhang M and Zhao Y. Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games with Candidate Locations. Combinatorial Optimization and Applications. (440-452).

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  • Chen Z, Fong K, Li M, Wang K, Yuan H and Zhang Y. (2020). Facility location games with optional preference. Theoretical Computer Science. 10.1016/j.tcs.2020.10.004. 847. (185-197). Online publication date: 1-Dec-2020.

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  • Chen X, Fang Q, Liu W and Ding Y. Strategyproof Mechanisms for 2-Facility Location Games with Minimax Envy. Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management. (260-272).

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  • Ding Y, Liu W, Chen X, Fang Q and Nong Q. (2020). Facility location game with envy ratio. Computers & Industrial Engineering. 10.1016/j.cie.2020.106710. (106710). Online publication date: 1-Aug-2020.

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  • Tang P, Yu D and Zhao S. Characterization of Group-strategyproof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Strictly Convex Space. Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. (133-157).

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  • Feldotto M, Lenzner P, Molitor L and Skopalik A. From Hotelling to Load Balancing. Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. (1949-1951).

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  • Duan L, Li B, Li M and Xu X. Heterogeneous Two-facility Location Games with Minimum Distance Requirement. Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. (1461-1469).

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  • Li M, Mei L, Xu Y, Zhang G and Zhao Y. Facility Location Games with Externalities. Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. (1443-1451).

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  • Mei L, Li M, Ye D and Zhang G. (2019). Facility location games with distinct desires. Discrete Applied Mathematics. 10.1016/j.dam.2019.02.017. Online publication date: 1-Mar-2019.

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  • Golowich N, Narasimhan H and Parkes D. Deep learning for multi-facility location mechanism design. Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. (261-267).

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  • De Keijzer B and Wojtczak D. Facility reallocation on the line. Proceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. (188-194).

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  • Anastasiadis E and Deligkas A. Heterogeneous Facility Location Games. Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems. (623-631).

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  • Fong K, Li M, Lu P, Todo T and Yokoo M. Facility location games with fractional preferences. Proceedings of the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirtieth Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and Eighth AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence. (1039-1046).

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  • Filos-Ratsikas A, Li M, Zhang J and Zhang Q. (2017). Facility location with double-peaked preferences. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. 31:6. (1209-1235). Online publication date: 1-Nov-2017.

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  • Fotakis D, Tzamos C and Zampetakis E. (2017). Who to Trust for Truthful Facility Location?. Extended Abstracts Summer 2015. 10.1007/978-3-319-51753-7_6. (35-39).

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  • Fotakis D, Gourvès L and Monnot J. Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences. Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics - Volume 10123. (221-235).

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  • Fotakis D and Tzamos C. (2016). Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions. Algorithmica. 76:1. (143-167). Online publication date: 1-Sep-2016.

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  • Yuan H, Wang K, Fong K, Zhang Y and Li M. Facility location games with optional preference. Proceedings of the Twenty-second European Conference on Artificial Intelligence. (1520-1527).

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  • Serafino P and Ventre C. (2016). Heterogeneous facility location without money. Theoretical Computer Science. 636:C. (27-46). Online publication date: 11-Jul-2016.

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  • Drees M, Feldkord B and Skopalik A. (2016). Strategic Online Facility Location. Combinatorial Optimization and Applications. 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43. (593-607).

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