Article

Private circuits II: keeping secrets in tamperable circuits

Authors:

Manoj Prabhakaran,

David WagnerAuthors Info & Claims

EUROCRYPT'06: Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques

Pages 308 - 327

https://doi.org/10.1007/11761679_19

Published: 28 May 2006 Publication History

Abstract

Motivated by the problem of protecting cryptographic hardware, we continue the investigation of private circuits initiated in [16]. In this work, our aim is to construct circuits that should protect the secrecy of their internal state against an adversary who may modify the values of an unbounded number of wires, anywhere in the circuit. In contrast, all previous works on protecting cryptographic hardware relied on an assumption that some portion of the circuit must remain completely free from tampering.

We obtain the first feasibility results for such private circuits. Our main result is an efficient transformation of a circuit C, realizing an arbitrary (reactive) functionality, into a private circuit C′ realizing the same functionality. The transformed circuit can successfully detect any serious tampering and erase all data in the memory. In terms of the information available to the adversary, even in the presence of an unbounded number of adaptive wire faults, the circuit C′ emulates a black-box access to C.

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cover image Guide Proceedings

EUROCRYPT'06: Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques

May 2006

611 pages

ISBN:3540345469

Editor:
Serge Vaudenay
EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

Publisher

Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 28 May 2006

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