Article

A Practical Adaptive Key Recovery Attack on the LGM (GSW-like) Cryptosystem

Authors:

Prastudy Fauzi,

Martha Norberg Hovd,

Håvard RaddumAuthors Info & Claims

Post-Quantum Cryptography: 12th International Workshop, PQCrypto 2021, Daejeon, South Korea, July 20–22, 2021, Proceedings

Pages 483 - 498

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5_25

Published: 20 July 2021 Publication History

Abstract

We present an adaptive key recovery attack on the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme suggested by Li, Galbraith and Ma (Provsec 2016), which itself is a modification of the GSW cryptosystem designed to resist key recovery attacks by using a different linear combination of secret keys for each decryption. We were able to efficiently recover the secret key for a realistic choice of parameters using a statistical attack. In particular, this means that the Li, Galbraith and Ma strategy does not prevent adaptive key recovery attacks.

References

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Li, Z., Galbraith, S.D., Ma, C.: Preventing adaptive key recovery attacks on the gentry-sahai-waters leveled homomorphic encryption scheme. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/1146 (2016). http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1146

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Raddum, H., Fauzi, P.: LGM-attack (2021). https://github.com/Simula-UiB/LGM-attack

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Cited By

Ikematsu YNakamura SSantoso BYasuda T(2021)Security Analysis on an ElGamal-Like Multivariate Encryption Scheme Based on Isomorphism of PolynomialsInformation Security and Cryptology10.1007/978-3-030-88323-2_12(235-250)Online publication date: 12-Aug-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-88323-2_12
Ahmed IHanna JFosong EAlbrecht S(2021)Towards Quantum-Secure Authentication and Key Agreement via Abstract Multi-Agent InteractionAdvances in Practical Applications of Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, and Social Good. The PAAMS Collection10.1007/978-3-030-85739-4_2(14-26)Online publication date: 6-Oct-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-85739-4_2

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A Practical Adaptive Key Recovery Attack on the LGM (GSW-like) Cryptosystem

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Published In

cover image Guide Proceedings

Post-Quantum Cryptography: 12th International Workshop, PQCrypto 2021, Daejeon, South Korea, July 20–22, 2021, Proceedings

Jul 2021

501 pages

ISBN:978-3-030-81292-8

DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-81293-5

Editors:
Jung Hee Cheon
Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea (Republic of)
,
Jean-Pierre Tillich
Inria, Paris, France

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021.

Publisher

Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 20 July 2021

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Cited By

Ikematsu YNakamura SSantoso BYasuda T(2021)Security Analysis on an ElGamal-Like Multivariate Encryption Scheme Based on Isomorphism of PolynomialsInformation Security and Cryptology10.1007/978-3-030-88323-2_12(235-250)Online publication date: 12-Aug-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-88323-2_12
Ahmed IHanna JFosong EAlbrecht S(2021)Towards Quantum-Secure Authentication and Key Agreement via Abstract Multi-Agent InteractionAdvances in Practical Applications of Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, and Social Good. The PAAMS Collection10.1007/978-3-030-85739-4_2(14-26)Online publication date: 6-Oct-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-030-85739-4_2

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