research-article

The manipulability of the Shapley-value

Author:

W. ThomsonAuthors Info & Claims

Volume 17, Issue 2

Pages 101 - 127

https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01254542

Published: 01 June 1988 Publication History

Abstract

The manipulation of the Shapley-value, when used as a resource allocation mechanism, is examined. First, the extent to which an individual can, by unilaterally misrepresenting his utility function, affect the value allocation in his favor, is evaluated. When all agents attempt to manipulate, a game results, whose equilibrium allocations can be described as follows. At an equilibrium, the initial allocation appears to be Pareto-efficient. Any equilibrium allocation is also an equilibrium allocation of the analogously defined Walrasian manipulation game. The true (constrained) Walrasian allocations are equilibrium allocations. Under two slight respecifications of the value, there are no other equilibrium allocations.

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Cited By

Blocq GBachrach YKey PBazzan AHuhns MLomuscio AScerri P(2014)The shared assignment game and applications to pricing in cloud computingProceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2615731.2615829(605-612)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2615731.2615829
Fujinaka YSakai T(2009)The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocationInternational Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-009-0156-738:3(325-348)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00182-009-0156-7

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cover image International Journal of Game Theory

International Journal of Game Theory Volume 17, Issue 2

Jun 1988

74 pages

ISSN:0020-7276

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Copyright © 1988 Physica-Verlag Ges. m. b. H.

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Physica-Verlag GmbH

Germany

Publication History

Published: 01 June 1988

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Cited By

Blocq GBachrach YKey PBazzan AHuhns MLomuscio AScerri P(2014)The shared assignment game and applications to pricing in cloud computingProceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2615731.2615829(605-612)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2615731.2615829
Fujinaka YSakai T(2009)The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocationInternational Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-009-0156-738:3(325-348)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s00182-009-0156-7

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