research-article

Strongly balanced cooperative games

Authors:

S. WeberAuthors Info & Claims

Volume 20, Issue 4

Pages 419 - 427

https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01271134

Published: 01 December 1992 Publication History

Abstract

Kaneko/Wooders (1982) derived a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for a partitioning game to have a nonempty core regardless of the payoff functions of its effective coalitions. The main purpose of our paper is to provide a graph-theoretical characterization of this family of games whose associated hypergraphs we callstrongly balanced: we show that the strong balancedness condition is equivalent to thenormality of the hypergraph, which is a type ofcoloring property (Lovasz (1972)). We also study interesting economic examples ofcommunication andassignment games and provide direct proofs that their associated hypergraphs are strongly balanced.

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Digital Library

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Digital Library

Cited By

Béal SRémila ESolal P(2022)Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solutionJournal of Combinatorial Optimization10.1007/s10878-021-00811-443:4(818-849)Online publication date: 1-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10878-021-00811-4
Greco GGuzzo A(2018)Constrained coalition formation on valuation structuresProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304652.3304810(5612-5616)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304652.3304810
Igarashi ALarson KWinikoff MDas SDurfee E(2017)Supermodular Games on Social NetworksProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3091125.3091173(299-307)Online publication date: 8-May-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3091125.3091173
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Published In

cover image International Journal of Game Theory

International Journal of Game Theory Volume 20, Issue 4

Dec 1992

140 pages

ISSN:0020-7276

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Copyright © 1992 Physica-Verlag GmbH.

Publisher

Physica-Verlag GmbH

Germany

Publication History

Published: 01 December 1992

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Cited By

Béal SRémila ESolal P(2022)Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solutionJournal of Combinatorial Optimization10.1007/s10878-021-00811-443:4(818-849)Online publication date: 1-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10878-021-00811-4
Greco GGuzzo A(2018)Constrained coalition formation on valuation structuresProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304652.3304810(5612-5616)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304652.3304810
Igarashi ALarson KWinikoff MDas SDurfee E(2017)Supermodular Games on Social NetworksProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3091125.3091173(299-307)Online publication date: 8-May-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3091125.3091173
Greco GGuzzo A(2017)Constrained coalition formation on valuation structuresArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2017.04.005249:C(19-46)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.artint.2017.04.005
Igarashi AElkind EJonker CMarsella SThangarajah JTuyls K(2016)Hedonic Games with Graph-restricted CommunicationProceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems10.5555/2936924.2936962(242-250)Online publication date: 9-May-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2936924.2936962
Bir PFleiner T(2016)Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchingsDiscrete Optimization10.1016/j.disopt.2015.02.00222:PA(241-254)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.disopt.2015.02.002
Chalkiadakis GGreco GMarkakis E(2016)Characteristic function games with restricted agent interactionsArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2015.12.005232:C(76-113)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.artint.2015.12.005
Bousquet NLi ZVetta ARoughgarden TFeldman MSchwarz M(2015)Coalition Games on Interaction GraphsProceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/2764468.2764477(95-112)Online publication date: 15-Jun-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2764468.2764477
Çiftçi BBorm PHamers HSlikker M(2013)Batch sequencing and cooperationJournal of Scheduling10.1007/s10951-013-0318-016:4(405-415)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10951-013-0318-0
Chalkiadakis GMarkakis EJennings N(2012)Coalitional stability in structured environmentsProceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 210.5555/2343776.2343808(779-786)Online publication date: 4-Jun-2012
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