research-article

Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information

Authors:

Jean -François Mertens,

Shmuel ZamirAuthors Info & Claims

Volume 14, Issue 1

Pages 1 - 29

https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770224

Published: 01 March 1985 Publication History

Abstract

A formal model is given of Harsanyi's infinite hierarchies of beliefs. It is shown that the model closes with some Bayesian game with incomplete information, and that any such game can be approximated by one with a finite number of states of world.

References

[1]

Aumann, R.J., andM. Maschler: Repeated Games With Incomplete Information, A Survey of Recent Results. In: Game Theoretical Aspects of Gradual Disarmament. Final report on Contract ACDA/ST-116, prepared by Mathematica, Princeton, N.J., 1967, September, Chapter III.

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[2]

Böge, W., andTh. Eisele: On Solutions of Baysian Games. International Journal of Game Theory,8 (4), 1979, 193–215.

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[3]

Harsanyi, J.C.: Games With Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players. Parts I, II, III. Management Science14 (3, 5, 7), 1967 and 1968.

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Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information

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cover image International Journal of Game Theory

International Journal of Game Theory Volume 14, Issue 1

Mar 1985

62 pages

ISSN:0020-7276

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Physica-Verlag GmbH

Germany

Publication History

Published: 01 March 1985

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On repeated games with incomplete information played by non-Bayesian players

Zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information

The bayesian formulation of incomplete information — The non-compact case

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