Cited By
View all- Vigo RBruni AYüksel E(2013)Security Games for Cyber-Physical SystemsProceedings of the 18th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems - Volume 820810.1007/978-3-642-41488-6_2(17-32)Online publication date: 18-Oct-2013
A game-theoretic framework for specification and verification of cryptographic protocols
Pages 585 - 609
Abstract
We model security protocols as games using concepts of game semantics. Using this model we ascribe semantics to protocols written in the standard simple arrow notation. According to the semantics, a protocol is interpreted as a set of strategies over a game tree that represents the type of the protocol. The model uses abstract computation functions and message frames in order to model internal computations and knowledge of agents and the intruder. Moreover, in order to specify properties of the model, a logic that deals with games and strategies is developed. A tableau-based proof system is given for the logic, which can serve as a basis for a model checking algorithm. This approach allows us to model a wide range of security protocol types and verify different properties instead of using a variety of methods as is currently the practice. Furthermore, the analyzed protocols are specified using only the simple arrow notation heavily used by protocol designers and by practitioners.
References
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Published In
© British Computer Society 2009.
Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Berlin, Heidelberg
Publication History
Published: 01 September 2010
Accepted: 29 September 2009
Received: 10 September 2007
Published in FAC Volume 22, Issue 5
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View all- Vigo RBruni AYüksel E(2013)Security Games for Cyber-Physical SystemsProceedings of the 18th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems - Volume 820810.1007/978-3-642-41488-6_2(17-32)Online publication date: 18-Oct-2013
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