article

Characterizing conflicts in fair division of indivisible goods using a scale of criteria

Authors:

Sylvain Bouveret,

Michel LemaîtreAuthors Info & Claims

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Volume 30, Issue 2

Pages 259 - 290

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-015-9287-3

Published: 01 March 2016 Publication History

Abstract

We investigate five different fairness criteria in a simple model of fair resource allocation of indivisible goods based on additive preferences. We show how these criteria are connected to each other, forming an ordered scale that can be used to characterize how conflicting the agents' preferences are: for a given instance of a resource allocation problem, the less conflicting the agents' preferences are, the more demanding criterion this instance is able to satisfy, and the more satisfactory the allocation can be. We analyze the computational properties of the five criteria, give some experimental results about them, and further investigate a slightly richer model with $$k$$k-additive preferences.

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cover image Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems Volume 30, Issue 2

March 2016

228 pages

ISSN:1387-2532

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © Copyright © 2016 The Author(s).

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Kluwer Academic Publishers

United States

Publication History

Published: 01 March 2016

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Cited By

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