research-article

Incentive Mechanisms for Discretized Mobile Crowdsensings

Authors:

Tingting ChenAuthors Info & Claims

IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, Volume 15, Issue 1

Pages 146 - 161

https://doi.org/10.1109/TWC.2015.2468724

Published: 01 January 2016 Publication History

Abstract

In crowdsensing to mobile phones, each user needs incentives to participate. Mobile devices with sensing capabilities have enabled a new paradigm of mobile crowdsensing with a broad range of applications. A major challenge in achieving stable crowdsensing on a large scale is the incentive issue. Proper incentive mechanisms are necessary to keep the crowdsensing working. However, most existing incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing assume the system admit continuous strategies like sensing time in opposite of the fact that many digital devices and crowdsensing models only admit discretized strategies. In this paper, we show that discretization, like rounding method, can make the existing crowdsensing incentive mechanisms invalid. To address this problem, we design the incentive mechanism for discrete crowdsensing in which each user has a uniform sensing subtask length. We rigorously show that our mechanism can achieve perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and maximize the platform utility. Our algorithm is efficient since its complexity is linear to the number of users. We also consider the cases in which the users have diverse subtask lengths, and propose another two incentive mechanisms to achieve PBEs and maximize platform utility. Extensive simulations verify our mechanisms are efficient, individual-rational, and system-optimal.

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Cited By

Wang H(2022)A Survey of Application and Key Techniques for Mobile CrowdsensingWireless Communications & Mobile Computing10.1155/2022/36935372022Online publication date: 1-Jan-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1155/2022/3693537
Song BShah-Mansouri HWong V(2017)Quality of Sensing Aware Budget Feasible Mechanism for Mobile CrowdsensingIEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications10.1109/TWC.2017.268608516:6(3619-3631)Online publication date: 8-Jun-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TWC.2017.2686085

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Incentive Mechanisms for Discretized Mobile Crowdsensings
1. Networks

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cover image IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications

IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications Volume 15, Issue 1

Jan. 2016

804 pages

ISSN:1536-1276

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IEEE Press

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Published: 01 January 2016

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Cited By

Wang H(2022)A Survey of Application and Key Techniques for Mobile CrowdsensingWireless Communications & Mobile Computing10.1155/2022/36935372022Online publication date: 1-Jan-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1155/2022/3693537
Song BShah-Mansouri HWong V(2017)Quality of Sensing Aware Budget Feasible Mechanism for Mobile CrowdsensingIEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications10.1109/TWC.2017.268608516:6(3619-3631)Online publication date: 8-Jun-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TWC.2017.2686085

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