abstract

Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange

Authors:

Itai Ashlagi,

Alvin RothAuthors Info & Claims

EC '11: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 321 - 322

https://doi.org/10.1145/1993574.1993625

Published: 05 June 2011 Publication History

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Abstract

As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed.

We show that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive compatible mechanism.

References

[1]

I. Ashlagi and A. E. Roth. Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. Working paper, 2011.

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[2]

A. E. Roth, T. Sönmez, and M. U. Ünver. A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England. phAmerican Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 95(2): 376--380, 2005.

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Carvalho MLodi A(2022)A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player Kidney Exchange ProgramEuropean Journal of Operational Research10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.027Online publication date: May-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.027
Viana AKlimentova XCarvalho M(2022)Kidney Exchange ProgramsEncyclopedia of Optimization10.1007/978-3-030-54621-2_744-1(1-11)Online publication date: 21-Sep-2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54621-2_744-1
Klimentova XViana APedroso JSantos N(2021)Fairness models for multi-agent kidney exchange programmesOmega10.1016/j.omega.2020.102333102(102333)Online publication date: Jul-2021
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2020.102333
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
    1. Economics

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Information

Published In

EC '11: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

June 2011

384 pages

ISBN:9781450302616

DOI:10.1145/1993574

General Chair:
Yoav Shoham
Stanford University, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Yan Chen
University of Michigan, USA
,
Tim Roughgarden
Stanford University, USA

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 05 June 2011

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EC '11

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EC '11: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

June 5 - 9, 2011

California, San Jose, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Carvalho MLodi A(2022)A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player Kidney Exchange ProgramEuropean Journal of Operational Research10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.027Online publication date: May-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.05.027
Viana AKlimentova XCarvalho M(2022)Kidney Exchange ProgramsEncyclopedia of Optimization10.1007/978-3-030-54621-2_744-1(1-11)Online publication date: 21-Sep-2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54621-2_744-1
Klimentova XViana APedroso JSantos N(2021)Fairness models for multi-agent kidney exchange programmesOmega10.1016/j.omega.2020.102333102(102333)Online publication date: Jul-2021
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2020.102333
Carvalho MLodi APedroso JViana A(2017)Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange gameMathematical Programming: Series A and B10.1007/s10107-016-1013-7161:1-2(389-417)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10107-016-1013-7
Fang WTang PZuo S(2016)Digital good exchangeProceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3060621.3060659(264-270)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3060621.3060659
Esfandiari HKortsarz G(2016)A Bounded-Risk Mechanism for the Kidney Exchange GameLATIN 2016: Theoretical Informatics10.1007/978-3-662-49529-2_31(416-428)Online publication date: 22-Mar-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-49529-2_31
Luo STang P(2015)Mechanism design and implementation for lung exchangeProceedings of the 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/2832249.2832278(209-215)Online publication date: 25-Jul-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2832249.2832278
Blum ADickerson JHaghtalab NProcaccia ASandholm TSharma ARoughgarden TFeldman MSchwarz M(2015)Ignorance is Almost BlissProceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/2764468.2764479(325-342)Online publication date: 15-Jun-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2764468.2764479
Manlove DO’malley G(2015)Paired and Altruistic Kidney Donation in the UKACM Journal of Experimental Algorithmics10.1145/267012919(1-21)Online publication date: 7-Jan-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2670129
Caragiannis IFilos-Ratsikas AProcaccia A(2015)An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanismTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2015.04.013589:C(53-60)Online publication date: 19-Jul-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.tcs.2015.04.013
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