research-article

BGP security in partial deployment: is the juice worth the squeeze?

Authors:

Sharon Goldberg,

Michael SchapiraAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Volume 43, Issue 4

Pages 171 - 182

https://doi.org/10.1145/2534169.2486010

Published: 27 August 2013 Publication History

Abstract

As the rollout of secure route origin authentication with the RPKI slowly gains traction among network operators, there is a push to standardize secure path validation for BGP (i.e., S*BGP: S-BGP, soBGP, BGPSEC, etc.). Origin authentication already does much to improve routing security. Moreover, the transition to S*BGP is expected to be long and slow, with S*BGP coexisting in "partial deployment" alongside BGP for a long time. We therefore use theoretical and experimental approach to study the security benefits provided by partially-deployed S*BGP, vis-a-vis those already provided by origin authentication. Because routing policies have a profound impact on routing security, we use a survey of 100 network operators to find the policies that are likely to be most popular during partial S*BGP deployment. We find that S*BGP provides only meagre benefits over origin authentication when these popular policies are used. We also study the security benefits of other routing policies, provide prescriptive guidelines for partially-deployed S*BGP, and show how interactions between S*BGP and BGP can introduce new vulnerabilities into the routing system.

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Rodday NCunha ÍBush RKatz-Bassett ERodosek GSchmidt TWählisch M(2024)The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): A Survey on Measurements and Future ProspectsIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2023.332745521:2(2353-2373)Online publication date: Apr-2024
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JUNJIE OYANAI NTAKEMURA TOKADA MOKAMURA SCRUZ J(2023)APVAS: Reducing the Memory Requirement of AS_PATH Validation by Introducing Aggregate Signatures into BGPsecIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0024E106.A:3(170-184)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2023
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Umeda NKimura TYanai N(2023)The Juice Is Worth the Squeeze: Analysis of Autonomous System Provider Authorization in Partial DeploymentIEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society10.1109/OJCOMS.2022.32338334(269-306)Online publication date: 2023
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Index Terms

BGP security in partial deployment: is the juice worth the squeeze?
1. Networks
  1. Network protocols
    1. Network layer protocols
      1. Routing protocols

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BGP security in partial deployment: is the juice worth the squeeze?
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Information & Contributors

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Published In

cover image ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review

ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review Volume 43, Issue 4

October 2013

595 pages

ISSN:0146-4833

DOI:10.1145/2534169

Issue’s Table of Contents

SIGCOMM '13: Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2013 conference on SIGCOMM
August 2013
580 pages
ISBN:9781450320566
DOI:10.1145/2486001
General Chairs:
Dah Ming Chiu
Chinese University of Hong Kong, China
,
Jia Wang
AT&T Labs - Research, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Paul Barford
University of Wisconsin, USA
,
Srinivasan Seshan
Carnegie Mellon University, USA

Copyright © 2013 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 27 August 2013

Published in SIGCOMM-CCR Volume 43, Issue 4

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https://doi.org/10.1109/TNSM.2023.3327455
JUNJIE OYANAI NTAKEMURA TOKADA MOKAMURA SCRUZ J(2023)APVAS: Reducing the Memory Requirement of AS_PATH Validation by Introducing Aggregate Signatures into BGPsecIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0024E106.A:3(170-184)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2023
https://doi.org/10.1587/transfun.2022CIP0024
Umeda NKimura TYanai N(2023)The Juice Is Worth the Squeeze: Analysis of Autonomous System Provider Authorization in Partial DeploymentIEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society10.1109/OJCOMS.2022.32338334(269-306)Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/OJCOMS.2022.3233833
Subtil AOliveira MValadas RSalvador PPacheco A(2023)Detection of Internet‐wide traffic redirection attacks using machine learning techniquesIET Networks10.1049/ntw2.1208512:4(179-195)Online publication date: 27-May-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1049/ntw2.12085
Umeda NYanai NTakemura TOkada MCruz JOkamura S(2022)SQUAB: A Virtualized Infrastructure for BGP-related Experiments and Its Applications to Evaluation on BGPsecJournal of Information Processing10.2197/ipsjjip.30.82930(829-840)Online publication date: 2022
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Wirtgen TBonaventure O(2022)A first step towards checking BGP routes in the dataplaneProceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Future of Internet Routing & Addressing10.1145/3527974.3545723(50-57)Online publication date: 22-Aug-2022
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Yang YShi XMa QLi YYin XWang Z(2022)Path stability in partially deployed secure BGP routingComputer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking10.1016/j.comnet.2022.108762206:COnline publication date: 7-Apr-2022
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Takemura TYanai NUmeda NOkada MOkamura SCruz J(2021)APVAS+: A Practical Extension of BGPsec with Low Memory RequirementICC 2021 - IEEE International Conference on Communications10.1109/ICC42927.2021.9500278(1-7)Online publication date: Jun-2021
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Miller LPelsser C(2019)A Taxonomy of Attacks Using BGP BlackholingComputer Security – ESORICS 201910.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_6(107-127)Online publication date: 23-Sep-2019
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